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Irven, Donovan Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Being and Literature: The 
Disclosure of Place in Modernity. Major Professor: Daniel W. Smith. 
 
The dissertation develops an original ontology of place by reading Modernist 
literature (1864-1950) as a critical reaction to Modern philosophy (1641-1800), and 
builds a platform upon movements implicit in literature from which future metaphysical 
and epistemological inquiries can begin. Western metaphysics and epistemology have 
been conditioned by the Cartesian commitment to the ego cogito, primarily understood as 
a subject to which the world appears as represented in concepts or ideas. The postmodern 
and deconstructive criticisms of such philosophical foundations – and indeed, on the very 
notion of foundation itself – have become well worn, but have failed to offer a viable 
alternative, everywhere heralding the “end of metaphysics” while simultaneously 
carrying on metaphysical discourse as if unaware of their own dictum! Being and 
Literature: The Disclosure of Place in Modernity offers the ontology of place as an 
alternative to postmodern anti-realism, showing that Modernist literature prefigures the 
postmodern critical project and implicitly leads the way toward an ontology of place that 
would de-center the cogito subject from the heart of Western metaphysics and 
epistemology. We avoid anti-realism through the reading of Modernism, while 




The ontology of place offered as an alternative to the Cartesian legacy operates on 
the principle of “oscillation.” This principle is a newly developed contribution to 
ontology, original to the dissertation, and rooted in close readings of Modernist novels, 
notably by William Faulkner and Robert Musil, put into dialogue with interlocutors from 
Modern philosophy.  Oscillation accounts for the basic differentiation of things as they 
take shape in place. The relation of things, in their differentiation as the play of 
oscillation, determines the what-content of appearances in the world. We can thus agree 
that the signifier is arbitrary, but that the signified, in a radical independence and 
recalcitrance to our cognitive models, is not arbitrary. The signifier, even if arbitrary, 
signifies a real difference. This difference is explained by oscillation – the basic interplay 
within which recalcitrant entities in the world take on significance to other entities with 
human-like cognitive capacities. This basic play of oscillation is the occurrence of place, 
the basic unit of the emerging ontological picture. 
The dissertation outlines a general ontological platform from which more 
systematic explorations in metaphysics and epistemology can proceed, maintaining 
literature as a source of philosophical insight and conceptual innovation. 
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Poetry, creative literature, is nothing but the elementary emergence into words, the 
becoming-uncovered, of existence as being-in-the-world. For the others who 
before it were blind, the world first becomes visible by what is thus spoken. 
– Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, (1927) 
 
1.1 The Place at the End of the Mind 
 The poet Wallace Stevens writes Of Mere Being,1 
The palm at the end of the mind, 
Beyond the last thought, rises 
In the bronze décor, 
 
A gold-feathered bird 
Sings in the palm, without human meaning; 
Without human feeling, a foreign song. 
 
You know it is not the reason 
That makes us happy or unhappy. 
The bird sings. Its feathers shine. 
 
The palm stands on the edge of space. 
The wind moves slowly in the branches. 
The bird’s fire-fangled feathers dangle down. 
 
In many ways, what follows is an attempt to approach mere being. It is an approach 
through philosophy and literature. Wallace speaks of “the end of the mind,” that if we are 
to approach mere being, the being of beings in the ontological language of Heidegger, we 
                                                
1 Stevens, “Of Mere Being.” Collected Poetry and Prose (New York: The Library of America, 
1997), 476-77. 
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 must approach a terminal point – an end without human meaning, without human feeling. 
An impossible task! What are we if not human? How can we make such an approach to 
being without destroying ourselves, without erasing the very thing that we are? This 
struggle with being human, which is a struggle with finitude, is the essence of modernity. 
It is fitting, then, to begin here, with Stevens, a Modernist poet of the early 20th century. 
His poem asks us to attempt the impossible, to tempt madness, to dare and make a leap 
into something other than human, into a non-human place; the place at the end of the 
mind. And yet, this is not a philosophy of ends. It is a philosophy of beginnings, of new 
and other beginnings. We strive for this place at the end of the mind, struggling as 
moderns struggle with its foreign song, so that we might begin again. 
 Something grows in this place, from it. A palm, a palm still moved by the breeze, 
in which a bird can still rest, its fire-fangled feathers dangling down. There is still 
difference at this place, still something. But it is not for us. It is not by us. We must wait 
and let it come to us of its own accord. This is not the coming of some agent, some divine 
intentionality, but is only a happening, a basic movement, an impulse that like a breeze 
brings us to thought. If we have difficulty it is because we suffer. We suffer from a 
malaise, a metaphysical malaise that has taken hold, but which we forget and, in our 
forgetfulness, fail to treat it. Though we began here, with Stevens the Modernist poet, we 
will also be confronted by Modern philosophy, brought into its maturity by Descartes in 
1641. It is an era grounded in humanism and repeatedly thrown into crisis by the 
crumbling foundations laid on the sands of the human condition, to borrow Hannah 
Arendt’s titular phrase. These crises emanate from the central figure of philosophical 
discourse, which remains rooted in the interlocking metaphysics and epistemology of 
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 Modern philosophy, borne of the Enlightenment: the human person, primarily defined as 
subjective cogito, or ego. The major crises of Modernity, I will show, spreads out from 
the central fissure of the I-Am’s basic placelessness. In finding that palm at the end of the 
mind, we discover the basic ontological emplacement that grounds any mind before it 
even has a chance to think. As literary Modernism began to take shape in 1864, nascent 
in such works as Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground and Baudelaire’s “The Painter 
of Modern Life,” it proved to be a movement in the grips of the human struggle for 
meaning in a world from which it was increasingly alienated. Banished from any 
authentic home life, Modernism diagnosed the placelessness at the heart of philosophy. 
Literary Modernism, often thought to be shattered by the relativities of postmodernism 
and deconstruction in the 1950s and -60s, continues to be given new life by the 
metaphysical and epistemological crises of so-called postmodernity. It is significant that 
Modernism re-emerges precisely where postmodernism fails to provide a ground. There 
is no better example of this in philosophy than in the recent reassertion (and it is entirely 
an assertion) of a New Realism by philosophers such as Markus Gabriel, Maurizio 
Ferraris, and the object-oriented ontologist Graham Harman. In literature, we see the 
return of Modernism in Luke Turner’s Metamodernist Manifesto, the Joycean panoply of 
Bolaño’s 2666, and the essayistic, Proustian tangents in the pseudo-realism of 
Knausgaard’s My Struggle. These reactionary assertions respond to modernity’s 
perceived lack of a place to be – the abyss of the ground in our own subjectivity. Without 
a place to be, there can be no ground for beings. Thus, the periods of literary 
Modernism’s dominance are marked by instability, a trend toward cultural fragmentation, 
decentralization, and a touch of historical madness. At the heart of these characterizations 
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 is a humanistic philosophy that grew from the seeds of the Cartesian cogito and have 
become reified, most notably by Kant. Such is the metaphysics of subjectivity. This is a 
metaphysics in which the subject must represent [vorstellen] objects to itself. It must set 
before itself an image of the object that is rendered sensible in the very act of setting-
before. However, as the creation of the subject, the representation rendered in the setting-
before becomes questionable, and the gulf that opens between the inside of the subject 
and the outside of the object is infinite. Truth is undermined. The chasm of the Real 
gapes, and the Realists do battle with the Idealists, with the Anti-Real that says we can 
never know, when to know must be to make representations that fully correspond to what 
is always and forever outside, that can never be adequately brought to the inside and vice 
versa. This representative procedure of bringing something into presence is the first 
casualty of the new beginning. What can stand in the place of presence? That is our first 
guiding question. 
 Our task in asking this first in a series of guiding questions is to seek out another 
beginning. The other beginning starts out from place. But a placial ontology2 is not a 
Messianic ontology. It cannot save us from the cycles of crises instigated and exacerbated 
by humanity itself as the ground and measure of all things. Indeed, it is likely that this 
new beginning, coming about so suddenly and without regard to the authority of 
tradition, is itself the coming of a still more profound crisis. This crisis, the crisis of the 
ground of all grounds, comes about by the critical relation of literary Modernism to 
Modern philosophy. Thus we, still stranded, at home in transit, must turn again and ask, 
                                                
2 “Placial” is here the counterpart to “spatial” and “temporal,” an ontologically prior phenomenon 
that is spatiotemporal qua place. 
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 even at so late an hour – what is philosophy? What is literature? What are we that can be 
philosophic, literary, human, all too human… 
 The philosophical value of Modernist literature comes about through a 
confrontation with Modern philosophy. When Modernist literature is read 
philosophically, and further, placed in critical dialogue with the metaphysical doctrines of 
the West (doctrines never fully divorced from epistemology), we find the Modernist 
already at work undermining the foundations laid upon the subjective cogito. What’s 
more, literary Modernism has already cleared a path toward another beginning for 
Western thought, one that does not rest its edifice upon the certainty of the subject over 
and against some “objective” reality understood as “out there,” independent of the 
subject. The alternative to the everywhere latent Cartesianism is found in place. 
Modernism expresses the need to “get back into place,” as the philosopher Edward Casey 
has put it. It will be my task to provide this alternative, this other beginning, in a placial 
ontology. The new ontology opens upon as yet undisclosed vistas of thought barred to us 
by the prejudice that “man is the measure of all things.” Through the Modernists, I will 
show the measure of things to be place. We cannot yet know what that sentence means. 
First, we must see how Modernists diagnose Modern philosophy as “dis-eased.” Once the 
Modernist critique is made explicit, we can move beyond the critical, where the question 
concerning place can be adequately formulated. 
1.2 The Dis-ease of Consciousness 
 To the extent that the modernist writer is a symptomatologist who diagnoses the 
diseases of the world as it merges in illness with humanity, then Modernist literature 
appears, from the start, to trace a disease of the mind, the disease of consciousness that 
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 arose from the fervor of the Enlightenment.3 There are analogues in the philosophical 
literature as well. In 1949, Gilbert Ryle famously diagnoses the Cartesian mythology of 
the “Ghost in the Machine” as suffering from a category mistake. The category mistake is 
made apparent by philosophical problems (symptoms) that emerge in other areas as a 
consequence of adherence to the Cartesian myth – problems (symptoms) of determinism, 
the assumption of a mechanical body, etc.4 When we read Ryle as a symptomatologist, 
the malfunctions of theory demonstrate the presence of the category mistake. Literary 
Modernism will be shown to struggle with the same Cartesian legacy, displaying a 
similar symptomatology in the process. The symptoms that show in literary Modernism 
arise from the radical disemplacement encouraged by subjectivistic philosophical 
assumptions about what it means to be human. The diseases of the mind, which lead to its 
untimely end at the foot of the palm, are caused by the lack of place, the madness of not 
fitting in, of being strangely other, unable to relate, to commend oneself to social mores 
and behavioral protocols. It is a general and existential dis-ease with living, with simply 
having to be. It is an ontological malaise. 
 It is no coincidence that Dostoevsky’s underground man laments being too 
acutely conscious, and thus concludes that he is a “sick man.”5 If we seek the end of the 
mind in order to think from another beginning, then we must be able to recognize that 
consciousness, particularly self-consciousness, has long been regarded as essential to 
                                                
3 This is how Gilles Deleuze treats literature in his essay “Literature and Life,” Essays Critical 
and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997), 3. 
4 Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002), 18-24. 
5 Dostoevsky, “Notes from the Underground.” Great Short Works, trans. David Magarshack 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 263, 266. 
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 mind. When, in 1689, John Locke helps to bring the Enlightenment notion of Modern 
Man into fruition, he writes, 
For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself, personal 
identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual 
substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances…For 
it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is 
self to itself now, and so will be the same self, so far as the same 
consciousness can extend to actions past or to come…6 
 
The above passage is notable both for its clear articulation of consciousness as the 
essence of personal identity, but also for the way in which it positions Locke against the 
background of Cartesian substance ontology. For Locke, a person’s very constitution is 
not dependent on some one substance, immaterial or otherwise, but rather on their 
capacity as a thinking thing to unite all actions past and present in recognition of their 
continuity within one and the same consciousness. Locke emphasizes that personal 
identity was constituted by the sameness of a rational being, because consciousness 
always accompanies thinking and the very definition of “person” is to be “a thinking 
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same 
thinking thing, at different times and places…”7 It is clear that Locke is not attacking the 
metaphysical underpinnings of the Cartesian concept of mind. His argument, rather, is 
that the metaphysical substance was irrelevant to the constitution of identity. Throughout 
Locke’s argument it remains possible to separate the mind (defined essentially as 
consciousness accompanying thought) from the body, and this separation is performed in 
a series of thought experiments designed to prove consciousness to be the essential 
                                                
6 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1995), 247-
48. 
7 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 246-47. 
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 ingredient of personhood. Perhaps most pertinent to our purposes is the scenario wherein 
we are to imagine a prince and a cobbler who “switch bodies,” the consciousness 
continuous with the cobbler’s experience entering into the body of the prince, and vice 
versa.8 In examples such as this, Locke shows that the Cartesian immaterial substance is 
more or less commensurable with his theory, as long as it is conceded that the continuity 
of consciousness and not the substance itself constitutes a person’s identity. In an 
important sense, Locke has caught Descartes’ logical leap from “I think” to “I am a 
thinking thing,” i.e., an immaterial substance. In Descartes’ famous argument, it is the act 
of recognition that does all of the work required to prove his point. “Then without a 
doubt,” Descartes writes, “I exist also if he [the All-powerful Deceiver] deceives me, and 
let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I 
think that I am something…I am, I exist is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, 
or that I mentally conceive it.”9 This sounds very much like an act of pure reflection, as 
Locke defines reflection to be “the perception of the operations of our minds within us, as 
it is employed about the ideas it has got…”10 Enlightenment epistemology, divided 
between Rationalism and Empiricism, share the foundational claim that the perception of 
thinking by itself grounds all knowledge in a consciousness whose existence is confirmed 
in its own acts of reflective self-perception. Spinoza, for instance, claims that the truth of 
any thought is intrinsic to the thought itself, and false ideas are the result of our finitude, 
writing, “it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us only because we are parts of a 
                                                
8 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 250-51. 
9 Descartes, “Meditation II: On the Nature of the Human Mind.” Philosophical Works of 
Descartes, Vol. 1, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1955), 150. 
10 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 60. 
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 thinking being, whose thoughts – some in their entirety, others in fragments only – 
constitute our mind.”11 Literary Modernism is the symptomatology of this limited, finite 
consciousness. It is, after all, a consciousness born in doubt, and is therefore perhaps 
predisposed to neurosis. Following from Dostoevsky to Nietzsche and on through literary 
Modernism’s maturity in the mid-twentieth century is a literary trope of consciousness as 
a disease. 
 Dostoevsky’s underground man is insistent, “I firmly believe that not only too 
much consciousness, but any sort of consciousness is a disease.”12 Disease, then, lies 
coiled in the heart of modernity. The certainty of my own existence in the face of the self-
reflective thinking by thought provided the epistemological foundations of the new 
mechanistic science, but in Locke’s philosophy the problem of personal identity was 
forensic, not metaphysical.13 Specifically, the term “person,” whose essential 
characteristic was consciousness, is a forensic term taken by Locke to entail the merits of 
people’s actions, and thus requires that the rational being be capable of law, happiness, 
and misery. Dostoevsky is careful to show that it is an understanding of happiness and 
misery, rooted primarily in the underground man’s aching tooth and liver pain, that 
inspire much of his thinking, as well as his relationship to the law. When the underground 
man imagines being slapped, for instance, he does so with apparent joy and happiness 
over the justice of the act. He is, of course, guilty. He is, for instance, guilty of being too 
clever! On the one hand, he is, “overwhelmed by the consciousness of being utterly 
                                                
11 Spinoza, “On the Improvement of the Understanding.” The Chief Works of Benedict de 
Spinoza, Vol. 2, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover, 1951), 28. 
12 Dostoevsky, “Notes from the Underground,” 267. 
13 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 256-57. 
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 humiliated and snubbed,” and yet he cannot help but feel his humiliation is somehow 
justified, that “though innocent I was guilty and, as it were, guilty according to the laws 
of nature.”14 It is then the function of self-surveyor that gives rise to the first symptoms of 
the disease. It is the disciplinary nature of the mind’s eye turned in on itself, when the 
mind minds itself, assuming the role of forensic investigator, constructing an identity for 
the purpose of rendering a verdict. Although Locke is certainly relevant here, Kant is 
more likely the object of the underground man’s polemic. I will expand on this point 
below, but first, one last lesson from Locke’s engagement with Descartes. 
 The whole intellectual movement traced out above describes the mind’s coming 
into its own presence, standing before [vorstellen] itself as rational judge. To do this, the 
mind must be fractured, divided against itself, reflective, reactive. This process 
subjugates the person, literally subjects them to a certain discipline, a rationalized 
regulatory protocol that presents its self as given, that is, analytically contained and 
derivable from the concept “person” as such – consciousness, the self-reflective thinking 
of thought. The rational discipline cannot be entirely disentangled from metaphysical 
theories. The present arguments aim to show that the necessary condition for the 
Cartesian mind to come into its own presence is a radical disemplacement. However, the 
stage will thereby be set to emerge on the other side of presence, to a more radical 
insight, another place to begin from within Descartes’ own movement – that in order to 
stand in one’s own presence one must, a priori, prepare a place into which one could 
stand forth as present. Chapter Two will primarily be concerned with uncovering this 
                                                
14 Dostoevsky, “Notes from the Underground,” 268. 
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 basic emplacement through a confrontation with the centrality of Descartes’ optics to his 
metaphysical position, and the play of this grounding metaphor of optical reflection in 
literary Modernism precisely where it undermines the Cartesian tradition of philosophical 
reflection grounding all knowledge in the cogito as subiectum. Having recovered this 
basic emplacing movement in Chapter Two, the remaining Chapters will pursue this 
other beginning in a placial ontology begun by this crossing out of the subject. For now, 
it is enough to emphasize that the Enlightenment theory sketched out above holds mind to 
be basically placeless. Its place, à la Locke, is irrelevant. The mind can move about 
anywhere, its immaterial status preserved so long as it retains continuity with a particular 
consciousness perceiving itself and remembering the series of self-conscious perceptions. 
As it develops, Modernism becomes a literature of the outsider and diagnoses 
consciousness with a profound homelessness, a sense that it has nowhere to fit in, a 
permanent exile, a wanderer, a nomad. The mind flits, bird-like, from one body to 
another. In 1970, it still made sense to suppose, as Bernard Williams does, “that there 
were some process to which two persons, A and B, could be subjected as a result of 
which they might be said – question beggingly – to have switched bodies.”15 I note and 
appreciate Williams’ question begging caveat, however, he proceeds to develop a less 
question begging version of Locke’s own prince and cobbler thought experiment in order 
to conclude that there is a problematic relationship between first- and third-personal 
aspect of personhood. In Williams, we see the uniquely analytic turn to language, as the 
semantic issues of the first- and third-personal accounts quickly manifest. The thought 
                                                
15 Williams, “The Self and the Future.” Philosophical Review, 79 (1970), 161. 
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 experiment, Williams argues, yields intuitions that support a “mentalistic” picture in 
which continuity of consciousness constitutes personal identity only when the argument 
is conducted in third-personal terms. Arguments conducted in first-personal terms, 
however, yield intuitions about the thought experiment which support a picture wherein 
bodily continuity constitutes personal identity. Although Williams confesses that “we 
cannot seriously use such a model,” as one that posits “ghostly persons in bodies,” he has, 
despite his reservations, based his entire argument on a presupposition that we gain 
philosophical ground doing precisely that!16 Williams sets the tone for the debate in the 
late 20th century with this paper, and opinions divide along the lines of whether it was 
continuity of consciousness or bodily continuity that constituted personal identity – 
always in terms of personal identity over time, hence the centrality of continuity. 
Throughout this debate there remains a focus on the mind-as-consciousness, and one in 
which we are to presuppose a possible separation of mind and body, accompanied by 
Enlightenment style thought experiments as guides to the problems of mind and identity. 
Notice too that Williams has shifted the discourse to a surprisingly existential concern – 
the essential concern with survival. We have stumbled upon the ontological question 
where we least suspect it, where our own being has become an issue for us. The analytic 
discourse on personal identity, with its presupposition of the placeless conscious mind, is 
concerned primarily with how such a being can survive the passage of time as the thing 
that it is, the same thing, the same, even when it appears different at different times. We 
see a concern with the repetition, not of the same, but of a difference called “the same.” 
                                                
16 Williams, “The Self and the Future,” 79-80. 
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 The trend is epitomized in Derek Parfit’s 1986 book Reasons and Persons, which 
contains the Teletransportation thought experiment. We are to image our consciousness 
being beamed to Mars and downloaded into variously functional replicas of our own 
bodies, the original body being destroyed (in fact, each replica is subsequently destroyed 
any time we teletransport, bodily destruction just being a feature of the transportation 
mechanism). We can then imagine various malfunctions of the mechanism such that there 
results a variety of different “branch-line” instances of ourselves running around, each 
with different life-spans, and thus, increasingly intense deviation in continuity with 
myself at the point from which they branched off. Again, the primary distinction of 
significance is bodily, or so-called “physical,” continuity and conscious 
(mental/psychical) continuity.17 Parfit is addressing a discourse mapped primarily by 
Williams, Robert Nozick, David Lewis, and Ernest Sosa with the existential concern with 
survival driving the conversation.18 Parfit offered the contrarian view, kicking the door in 
to say, “You’ve got it all wrong! Our identity is not at all what matters where our survival 
is concerned!”19 Yet, we are still confronted with this placeless mind. It is always 
disembodied, tricked, lied to, beamed about, bisected and split, sharing a body with other 
minds in exile, and so on. The person is in a constant state of triage. How to be kept alive 
                                                
17 Parfit, “Part Three: Personal Identity.” Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford, 1987), 199-
350. 
18 Cf., Nozick, “Personal Identity through Time.” Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 1981), 29-70; David Lewis, Survival and Identity.” Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 
(New York: Oxford, 1983), 55-77; and Ernest Sosa, “Surviving Matters.” Noûs, 24 (1990), 297-
322. 
19 Cf., Parfit, “Chapter Twelve: Why Our Identity is Not What Matters.” Reasons and Persons, 
245-80; and, Parfit, “The Unimportance of Identity.” Identity, ed. Henry Harris (New York: 
Oxford, 1995), 13-45. 
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 during these procedures, how to endure and live on after being so violently wrenched 
from place and separated from that which makes us what we are? 
 These placeless minds have troubled relationships with the body, doubtful 
relationships. The “brain in a vat” trope succeeds as a late 20th century reinvention of 
Descartes’ Maleficent Genie, and in 1980 Hilary Putnam saw a serious enough challenge 
to famously prove that we cannot be brains in vats.20 Later, I will return to Putnam in the 
context of realism, but it is more pressing at this juncture to appreciate the turn in analytic 
philosophy toward semantic externalism as a solution to the problems of meaning and 
reference. Putnam largely drove that development and it gained enough ground to have 
spawned its very own progeny in a full-blown externalist philosophy of mind.21 Putnam’s 
famous twin earth thought experiment in the 1973 paper “Meaning and Reference,” and 
again two years later in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,”22 is used to show that meaning 
“just ain’t in the head,” a phrase now synonymous with different varieties of externalism. 
Of interest is Putnam’s turn to the environment, to a basic emplacement as an explanation 
for the source of meaning, and the attending conclusion that meaning and reference were 
robustly context dependent. This early semantic externalism laid the groundwork for 
more thoroughgoing externalisms in philosophy of mind. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
employ phenomenology geared toward extension of the mind into the body, and Evan 
Thompson in particular has developed these phenomenological insights in the philosophy 
                                                
20 Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (New York: Cambridge, 1980). 
21 The flood gate on externalism in philosophy of mind was opened by Clark and Chalmers, “The 
Extended Mind.” Analysis, 58:1 (January 1998), 7-19. 
22 Putnam, “Meaning and Reference.” Journal of Philosophy 70, (1973), 699-711; and, Putnam, 
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Mind, Language and Reality (New 
York: Cambridge University, 1985). 
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 of life and biology.23 Two general trends make these developments in Anglo-American 
analytic philosophy relevant to the current study. The first is the apparent rediscovery of 
phenomenology as a method among certain analytic philosophers. Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty figure heavily, and Shaun Gallagher’s text on phenomenology emphasizes its 
methodological aspects in the context of cognitive science, and his book with Dan Zahavi 
uses phenomenological insights to interpret the data of cognitive science in order to 
account for agency, social cognition, how we know ourselves and others, and offer a 
theory of personhood to compete with those of Williams, Nozick, and Parfit.24 Andy 
Clark’s 1997 book Being There makes titular reference to the Dasein analysis of 
Heidegger's Being and Time, but his research paradigm is driven by robotics and the 
ability of sensory feedback to manifest adaptive behaviors in machines without a central 
computing “agent” with coded operations to be followed.25 Aside from the reemergence 
of phenomenology, there is a stirring similarity of theme and movement among these two 
different groups of analytic philosophers of mind and personal identity. 
 One the one hand, they display a superficial dissimilarity – they work in roughly 
different areas of research, the problem personal identity is not the same, philosophically, 
as philosophy of mind. And yet, despite this superficial difference of content, both groups 
struggle with the same set of presuppositions about what we are. Both center on issues of 
consciousness and embodiment. The fight over criterion, bodily or mental (conscious) 
                                                
23 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The Embodied Mind Cognitive Science and Human Experience 
(Cambridge: MIT, 1993); and, Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the 
Sciences of Mind, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007).  
24 Gallagher, Phenomenology (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); and, Gallagher and 
Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, 2nd Ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
25 Clark, Being There, (Cambridge: MIT, 1997). 
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 continuity, and the issues of the where of mind: just in the brain, in the body, extended 
beyond both into the environment? But, if we are to some extent nothing more than the 
continuity of some consciousness, and that consciousness (mind) is extended, in its 
constitution, into my body and the environment, then am I not myself out there – outside 
my own inside – already in the world? Am I not other people? Do we share minds? This 
line of thought completely destroys the cogito, but all along fails to acknowledge the 
world-changing consequences of its conclusion. All of Western metaphysics and 
epistemology is rooted in the cogito as subiectum. To alter this ground is to change the 
whole, to demand another beginning, even if one does so timidly, with humility.  
Although they work in differing areas, the lines of philosophical thought briefly 
treated above lead to the same radical place, and the need for another beginning. 
Williams already admits that the model of a ghost in a machine cannot really be taken 
seriously. Parfit argues that for a person to exist “just involves physical and psychological 
continuity,” that can “be described in an impersonal way…Personal identity just involves 
certain kinds of connections and continuity,” and that “These connections are what 
matter.”26 Parfit abandons the simple, unified ego-self in favor of a more fluid and 
differentiated continuity, the intensity of this continuity making it more or less identical 
with past and future selves. Parfit looks East, to the Buddhist no-self, and traces out 
similar conclusions regarding self-interest. In dialogue with Hume and the Empiricist 
tradition, Parfit is disseminating consciousness, “extending” mind over a temporal 
continuum. There is something to be said regarding Kant on this matter momentarily. 
                                                
26 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 275. 
 17 
 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch extend the mind into the body, disseminating the ego from 
the cabinet of consciousness, and they too endorse a no-self view.27 They describe the 
end of the mind as we know it, and outline a non-representational theory of cognition in 
the process. This is a major area of resonance with the current project. If we are to really 
think a different subject, to think through the end of the mind, the whole representational 
procedure of knowledge becomes disrupted. It is really a systemic upheaval, despite the 
often local manifestations. Parfit, as a reductionist, is adamant that there be nothing that 
is even said to have an experience. I offer a less extreme position here, it being entirely 
reasonable to talk about experiences, the phenomena in question. But we are immediately 
confronted then by questions of meaning and reference – a certain explanation is in order! 
Representation, and more importantly, an alternative, will be a recurring theme. 
Sometimes, I will ask that we think basic concepts as non-representational, and the idea 
of autopoiesis found in the work of Varela, Maturana, and Thompson will make an 
important contribution. But I will also talk of representations as being built up, as a 
structure made of smaller mental parts, for the momentary lack of a better vocabulary. 
Because of their interest in biology, philosophers such as Gallagher, Thompson, and 
Zahavi also rely on the work of James J. Gibson, who will feature, along with his mentor 
Edwin B. Holt, in Chapter Four. This also lends a certain developmental bent to their 
theorizing. As place is a temporal event, my ontology will always have a procedural feel 
to it. There will be processes and movement. A certain affinity with process philosophy, 
Alfred North Whitehead, will be felt alongside the explicit influence of Heidegger. Both 
                                                
27 Varela et al., The Embodied Mind, 105-30. 
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 Mark Rowlands and Richard Menary develop a theory in which representations are built 
up over time, a result of the active engagement of a cognitive agent with their 
environment, though perhaps Menary’s work will prove more relevant here.28 I too will 
talk about the accretion of representations, the way thinking comes to pass over time. The 
degree to which thought as such, base cognitive ability, depends in some way on 
representation as a basic component will be disputed. Thus, we must really consider a 
new paradigm for thinking about meaning, why things have significance for us. 
Certainly, those were central preoccupations of Being and Time, which prefigures the 
deconstruction of the Ego-Self that is repeated, an almost neurotic repetition, again and 
again. Its renunciation in theories of personal identity, its reduction in philosophy of 
mind, only to be reimagined as a dynamic, emergent, thoroughly differentiated being. 
This is, in fact, an unspoken re-valuation of the highest value in philosophy – the mind, 
self-conscious reflection. The subject, cast out of itself, made into the outside, 
transfigures both inside and outside, and demands a different ground. 
Working on local problems, these analytic thinkers have diagnosed a fundamental 
problem. They have made this dis-ease apparent, shaken the simplicity and centrality of 
the cogito, cast the existence of the I think into doubt – an impersonal continuity. It is 
significant that the first salvo in the reactive rush to defeat externalism in philosophy of 
mind was launched on the pretext of boundaries. Adams and Aizawa provide in essay and 
book a refutation of externalism based on boundaries, the need for a meaningful limit to 
                                                
28 Rowlands, The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes, (New York: Cambridge, 
1999); and, Menary, Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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 cognition, a limit that renders the being unified enough and compact enough to be a 
meaningful entity. The problems Adams and Aizawa focus on, that extracranialist 
(externalist) theories of tool use (an example of cognitive function), paid inadequate 
attention to the “mark of the cognitive,” thereby inadvertently damning the theory.29 The 
mark of the cognitive is twofold: 1) that there be non-derived content, that is, content 
intrinsic to cognitive processes themselves, and this first mark itself presupposes a 
representational model of thinking that is performed in a language of thought in which 
representation with non-derivable content operate within the combinatorial linguistic 
system of syntax and semantics; the second mark, 2) that cognitive processes are causally 
individuated, that is, in order to “carve nature at its joints,” cognitive processes, like all 
other natural phenomenon, are assumed to be discerned on the basis of underlying causal 
processes that determine them.30 They admit that these numerous pre-suppositions, for 
which they provide citation to the background literature which supports their 
presuppositions, are, in their own words, “orthodox.”31 Now, the major argument is that if 
we are to be orthodox, and attend to the proper criteria, the proper marks of the cognitive, 
we shall see that the externalists repeatedly fail to account for the causal connection 
between the cognitive acts and the environmental tools that facilitate and are thereby 
correlated to the cognitive act – that just because a being is constantly coupled with 
environmental tools, that this coupling does not thereby imply causation, and it is only by 
                                                
29 Adams and Aizawa, “The Bounds of Cognition.” Philosophical Psychology, 14:1 (2001), 43-
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30 Adams and Aizawa, “The Bounds of Cognition,” 48-51. 
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 causation that the environmental corollaries can be said to “constitute” cognition in the 
way externalism suggests.32 Without these bounds of cognition, without the within of the 
subject’s own private I-am, all of the presuppositions of Western metaphysics and 
epistemology become questionable. It becomes a systemic problem. This is not a study of 
causation. But really, Adams and Aizawa use causation as so much smoke and mirrors – 
a veneer of scientific validity, as if cause itself is never a question for the scientist! 
Without the bounds of cognition in place, the self, the invaluable cogito, bleeds out into 
the world and becomes lost, loses its reified interiority and is found only already in the 
world and demanding a new starting point, a new vantage from which to take off on the 
road to metaphysics, to epistemology. 
Kant haunts this discourse. We trace the analytic vacillation between 
metaphysical and epistemological terrain, on the one hand asking about cognition and its 
limits, on the other, entreating about the being of beings, how it is they are and what we 
must be in order to have access to the beings we do. Kant’s critiques were themselves 
about the bounds of cognition, and these bounds delimited and set out restrictions on the 
speculations of metaphysics as well. It was about a kind of being, the being of a being 
that was ontological, that was metaphysical, whose own being was an issue for it. How 
does it live? What matters for survival? How is it that this being that I am maintains itself 
as the thing that it is? Ontological questions that are always tinged with a flavor of 
epistemology, always demanding how I am to know. We have become sick with 
uncertainty alongside the externalists – turned inside out and made questionable by this 
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 history of philosophy, borne in doubt, raised into the private interior of the subjective I-
Am, only to lose life-giving contact with the world, and enter the claustrophobic un-ease 
of being the only measure of a world you can never reach. At last, cast back out of 
yourself, the self is dissolved in the flow of time, time once its substance and refuge, now 
a maelstrom that scatters it, under which there is nothing, no-thing that could support you 
any longer, the environment hostile to your very being, but, in the end, the only thing by 
which you could be maintained any longer. The externalists beckon, silently, without 
acknowledgement, toward the place at the end of the mind. Beyond the cogito, there can 
only be a thinking other than representation, with representation given a place more cut 
to its measure, more apt for the modelling/mapping function of the repraesentatio. But 
we must find a place first! We rush too far ahead, for we are only just now getting a sense 
of the diagnosis, tracing a history of this dis-ease of consciousness that threatens an ever 
deepening crisis, a crisis that has spread throughout the whole, undermining the very 
foundations even of the analytic tradition itself. These minds have been self-undermined, 
subjected to their own rigorous procedure that has maddeningly proved a vivisection. 
Thus rendered in their own presence, they step forth still-born in the mirror. 
These last minds, intent on their own self-perception, to be set forth before 
themselves for analysis, to see by which criteria they can be judged the same – criteria of 
unity and continuity, bodily and conscious, bodily conscious, always over time – these 
lost souls still shuffle after the mythic goal of the old metaphysics. The goal, 
philosophically, has remained a surprisingly forensic endeavor since Locke: to lay out 
analytically the necessary components of a given phenomenon and judge their merit, 
determine to what degree they “matter,” thereby displaying their worth to survive, to be 
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 kept alive in discourse, or discarded to the dust-bin of failed ideas. All this in spite of 
Ryle’s earlier diagnosis. He had pointedly admonished that, “To talk of a person’s mind 
is not to talk of a repository which is permitted to house objects that something called the 
‘physical world’ is forbidden to house [such as consciousness, thought, or feelings]; it is 
to talk of the person’s abilities, liabilities, and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts 
of things and of the doing, and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world.”33 I hope 
it will prove possible to accept such sound advice without adhering to a form of 
behaviorism (as Ryle does) and move us in a direction where we do not think of 
consciousness as “housing” our identity or mental states, qualia, or any other such 
“mental” (read: “immaterial”) characteristics traditionally associated with the mind and 
human thought. 
 As it stands within this reconstructed canon, the repository metaphor is a defining 
feature of personhood, the self-perceptive act of consciousness occurs nested in the mind, 
which is nested in the body, in the environment, layer within layer, confined and trapped 
there, an alien presence entombed while still living. Such a view is already found in Plato 
when he relays Socrates’ etymological analysis of the word soma (body) in the Cratylus 
dialogue: 
…some people say that the body [soma] is the tomb [sema] of the soul on 
the grounds that it is entombed in its present life, while others say that it is 
correctly called “a sign” [‘sema’] because the soul signifies whatever it 
wants to signify by means of the body. I think it is most likely the followers 
of Orpheus who gave the body its name, with the idea that the soul is being 
punished for something, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which 
the soul is securely kept [sozetai] – as the name ‘soma’ itself suggests – 
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 until the penalty is paid; for, on this view, not even a single letter of the 
word needs to be changed.34 
 
Plato presents both the mind’s theoretical separation from the body and its fallenness into 
guilt and judgment. For my purposes, it is not relevant whether or not Plato or Socrates 
actually held this view of the mind-body relation. It is enough that Socrates attributes it to 
Orphic tradition, thereby reinforcing the discourse occurring aboveground, in the open, 
there every day and taken for granted. Rooted in history, the germ of the disease of 
consciousness is nestled deep. When we get into the thick of Absalom, Absalom! and the 
heretofore unseen collective value of the underground discourse has achieved its full 
power, we can see the crypt and tomb of the mind from a new perspective, turned inside 
out, and given a place. Now the claustrophobia of the bodily tomb manifests as a 
symptom of the turn inward and the radical separation that enables the cogito’s stability 
and certitude. This sameness, maintained by isolation, by an inward turn away from the 
“physical” will be a reminder of the first renunciation of place – a renunciation to be 
repeated, as we shall later see. This first little death opens the interior of subjectivity as a 
grave, a repository for earthly remains, a box in which the static, dead, revenant remnants 
of the mental are housed after they’ve been siphoned from the fleshy nerves and muscles 
of the object through which we stared. This ghostly separation, ghost from machine, alive 
in the tomb of life, is the first major metaphysical decision. Here is our entry into a 
hidden undercurrent, the underground discourse. It is important to have emphasized that 
Locke covers over the issue of the mind’s substance in relation to the continuity of the 
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 consciousness always associated with that mind. This movement obscures the ontological 
question in a way, by allowing the presupposition of the disembodied, fundamentally 
disemplaced mind – its place has no bearing on what it is, is in fact, antagonistic to what 
it is. By allowing mind to be naturalistically subsumed, the Empiricists laid the seeds to 
its destruction, which we can see unfold in the Modernist literature. The acceptance of the 
Cartesian immaterial substance is covered over and made tacit by its irrelevance to the 
continuity of consciousness as constitutive of personhood. The presupposition of the 
cogito reappears in disparate studies, from Brentano’s empirical psychology where he 
states that “every [act] of presentation of sensation or imagination offers an example of 
mental phenomenon” in distinction from physical phenomenon,35 to externalists Clark 
and Chalmers, who treat mental states (experiences, beliefs, desires, emotions) to be 
something distinct from (though perhaps always coupled to with or otherwise dependent 
on) physical states in the brain.36 This first decision is the first symptom of the disease of 
consciousness, the germ of which is the substance ontology of Descartes, covered over by 
Locke and left as irrelevant. In recognition, in self-representation, the cogito sees the 
limit, a limit, the absolute limit that conditions what can be within the boundary – those 
limits in time, birth and death. The philosopher had sought to flee those external forces 
that threatened certain knowledge with doubt, but now within the I-Am’s retreat Hume 
discovers the same impersonal flow. We applied a balm to heal. In truth, sequestered in 
finitude, the ontological being festered there, a theoretical sore spot to which philosophy 
                                                
35 Brentano, “The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena.” Realism and the 
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36 Clark and Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” 11-16. 
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 returns to dig but which never fully heals. The separation is performed at the cost of 
place, consciousness is uprooted from the world, an island unto itself, disconnected, yet 
also the center of all meaning. 
1.3 The Underground Discourse and Minor Literature 
 In order to best make our way into the underground discourse, I want to turn now 
to the promised dialogue with Dostoevsky and Kant. I had previously mention Spinoza’s 
explanation for the finitude of thought, but it is really Kant who determines the discourse 
on the subject of the finitude of human cognition. It is Kant who sets out to define the 
boundaries of metaphysics through an analysis of the conditions of the possibility of 
experience. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the limits of cognition determine the 
possibilities for knowledge, what can be known and in what way, and also, the kinds of 
question for which we might reasonably expect to get an objective answer. Kant’s critical 
philosophy is, generally speaking, a philosophy of bounds, of limitations, but always in 
the sense that these limits are themselves the very condition of the possibility of the 
phenomenon being delimited. In the case of Kant’s first Critique, the phenomena to be 
delimited is human cognition, the conditions of the possibility of any experience 
whatsoever. Kant follows with a second Critique on moral philosophy, deemed 
“practical,” and a third Critique of Judgment, a theory of value – all concerning 
judgments derived from the capacity to judge itself, presented in the first Critique. Thus, 
the Great Synthesizer’s reputation for systematic philosophy and the scope of his 
influence. 
 Protesting against the suggestion that a systematic science can dissect and expose 
the fraudulence of freedom and desire, Dostoevsky’s underground man declares, “You 
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 see, gentlemen, reason is an excellent thing. There is no doubt about it. But reason is only 
reason, and it can only satisfy the reasoning ability of man, whereas volition is a 
manifestation of the whole of life, I mean, the whole of human life, including reason with 
all its concomitant head-scratchings.”37 The problem of mind, of being possessed of 
consciousness, throws the underground narrator into the gap between metaphysics and 
epistemology, wandering between the two, even substituting his epistemic fancies for 
reality itself. Kant closes the subject in on itself. The ontological commitment 
underwriting his epistemological limitations on objective truth is that human cognition, in 
virtue of being the kind of thing that it is, only has finite knowledge of the phenomenal. It 
is precisely the finitude of human knowledge that inspired Heidegger’s reading of Kant, 
and the Dasein-analysis of Being and Time is driven by a view of human finitude, of its 
death, on the one hand, but also the discrete nature of its temporality. In Kant, it is both 
the temporalization of human experience in the schematism, and its essential epistemic 
finitude from which Heidegger takes his lead.38 There must be something capable of 
being perceived in phenomenal experience by the subject, but what that something is, 
beyond the subject’s finite grasp, is in itself unknowable – the noumenal. This closure of 
the subject permits Kant to apply one of the most effective balms ever to be applied to the 
sore spot of Cartesian consciousness. In the balm of time, Kant soothes the mind’s 
displacement and gives a positive account of what it means to be an “immaterial 
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 substance.” To be immaterial is to be primarily constituted temporally, “extended” in 
time, and “taking up time,” as opposed to space. 
 Descartes’ substance ontology provides only a negative account. “Immaterial 
substance” tells us primarily what the subject is not, it is not material, it is not extended in 
space, it need not submit to mechanical laws of the body, etc. What is it? Thinking? And 
if so, what does it mean to think? Is there a description of this verb, or is it merely 
another noun in search of a definition, presenting itself as a verb? To explain this verbal 
noun “thinking,” the production of experience through perception, is the project of Kant’s 
analysis of human cognition in the first Critique. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant 
claims to have shown that space and time are the pure forms of outer and inner intuition 
respectively, forms of intuition which are necessary conditions for any cognitive 
experience whatsoever. Objects presented in space are, furthermore, objectively known, 
and objects presented in time are known subjectively. The forms of space and time 
themselves inform cognition a priori as the conditions of its occurrence, the form of inner 
intuition being facilitated by synthetic acts of retention and repetition which allow for the 
temporal orchestration of the movement of objects presented spatially in outer intuition. 
But the form of inner intuition is the key to our current study, for in this moment, Kant’s 
Copernican Revolution leaves its mark on the symptomatology of consciousness after the 
Enlightenment. Modernity is the age of internal time consciousness, to share Husserl’s 
emphasis. In an addition to §II of the Transcendental Aesthetic appearing in the second 
edition, Kant writes: 
Consciousness of itself (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, 
and if all of the manifold in the subject were given self-actively through 
that alone, then the inner intuition would be intellectual. In human beings 
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 this consciousness requires inner perception of the manifold that is 
antecedently given in the subject, and the manner in which this is given in 
the mind without spontaneity must be called sensibility on account of this 
difference. If the faculty for becoming conscious of oneself is to seek out 
(apprehend) that which lies in the mind, it must affect the latter, and it can 
only produce an intuition of itself in such a way, whose form, however, 
which antecedently grounds it in the mind, determines the way in which the 
manifold is together in the mind in the representation of time; there it then 
intuits itself not as it would immediately self-actively represent itself, but in 
accordance with the way in which it is affected from within, consequently 
as it appears to itself, not as it is (B68-69).39 
 
According to Kant above, I do not have access to consciousness itself, but rather, I only 
have access to the phenomenal manifestation of this consciousness as it appears sensibly 
to itself in the synthetic unity of the manifold of perception given through cognition. The 
New Realist Maurizio Ferraris, with whom we will contend in Chapter Three, has 
quipped that Kant’s revolution is really, seen in this light, more a Ptolemaic Revolution, 
than a Copernican one, precisely because “it places the human at the center of the 
[epistemic and metaphysical] universe.”40 The I-in-itself is closed off from us as 
noumenal, and consciousness is isolated absolutely, having only limited access to its own 
operations through sensible perturbations in the manifold of experience in which “I 
think” can accompany any possible experience of said manifold. Kant has successfully 
isolated consciousness within the now explicitly subjective mind and given it form in 
time. The legacy of the emphasis on temporality is present when the aforementioned 
analytic literature of the 20th century expresses concern with the problem of personal 
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 identity over time. Kant, as well as Locke, have formative influence on those particular 
constructions; albeit an often unspoken, underground discourse. 
 Kant’s effective isolation of consciousness in an essentially temporal subjectivity 
works to the extent that both inner and outer intuition form irreducible a priori roles in 
the syntheses that produce all experience. The result of this transcendental idealism is the 
ossifying of the ego into a self-contained temporal mass, a point in time that moves along 
the timeline – the line is, after all, Kant’s most fundamental illustration of the inner form 
of intuition.41 But this leads Kant to a significant turn. For this spatial illustration proves, 
according to Kant, that the representation of time is itself an intuition. This helps Kant 
secure the transcendental ideality of pure forms of intuition, and, thereby, the mode of all 
appearances whatsoever, which are themselves the basis of our knowledge. Further, Kant 
writes, 
Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general. Space, 
as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited in an a priori condition 
merely to outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the 
mind themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state thus belongs 
under the formal conditions of inner intuition, and thus of time, so time is 
the a priori condition of all appearance in general…all objects of the senses, 
are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time (A34/B50-51). 
 
He seems to offer a privileged position to time as the pure form of inner intuition. It 
reigns over all appearance in general, unlimited in the way that space as outer intuition is 
limited, and yet itself the absolute limitation of all appearance generally. Yet, when it 
comes to the refutation of idealism – a title we should all note, the refutation of idealism 
even in the face of the avowed transcendental idealism – Kant there wants space and 
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 time on equal ontological footing despite the dominance of time in subjective experience 
(an epistemological valence). It is clear that Heidegger leans heavily on the emphasis on 
time as the form of inner intuition in his interpretation of Kant, and sees in this 
dominance of temporality an entry into the Seinsfrage that was Heidegger’s primary 
goal.42 And yet Kant is clear: we don’t simply imagine things to be outside as in a purely 
intellectual exercise (Kant here seems, like Hume, to be thinking of intensity, that merely 
thinking of something strikes our consciousness with less vivacity than when we are 
struck by something that stands before us, with which we are present). For Kant, inner 
experience is not even possible without the presupposition of outer experience, for even if 
the cognition of outer things is dominated by time – the temporal play of the imagination 
as it applies the categories of the understanding to the manifold given in experience – this 
temporal process would be empty, would have no object, if it were not for the sensibility 
of outer things, even if we cannot assign space as a property of those things, whatever 
they happen to be.43 This is proven in the consciousness of the possibility of making a 
time determination, which is made possible by consciousness (retention and repetition) of 
changes in a persistent manifold given from the “outside.” What I experience in time, the 
objective content, is necessary for me to be time-conscious, just as I can perform the 
schema necessary for rending outside things sensible only because I have temporal access 
to it qua the form of inner intuition.44 Kant is, after all, an Empirical Realist, in addition 
to being a Transcendental Idealist. However, if we are focusing on the subject, on the 
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 conscious mind, then these considerations together with the previous passage make clear 
that consciousness itself arises primarily in time qua the activity of the imagination in the 
inner intuition of the sensible manifold. In terms of the order of conscious, finite 
knowledge, I am only secondarily associated with space through the temporal mediation 
of inner sense – although, Kant seems to think that ontologically, both are a priori 
necessary as the conditions of experience in general. But from the subjective side of 
experience itself, in its temporal unfolding, time takes hold first in the form of inner 
intuition. It is this sense of “inner” subjectivity, that subjectivity is the temporal “inside” 
of consciousness over and against the outside of the objective world, that is Kant’s most 
profound contribution to the major discourse driving to the end of the mind. The Kantian 
temporal account alleviates the Cartesian immaterial substance of its mind-body problem 
by a positive account of finite human thought as subjectivity in time. All knowledge of 
extended bodies is mediate by time relations, relations that prove permanence and are 
themselves proven by the permanence of the object they relate. Space is mediated 
through the epistemological stop-gap of inner intuition, filtering it through a non-
objective observer whose primary cognitive relation is the timeline of successive 
representational experiences. 
 But all this satisfies only reason! As Kant himself would agree, reason has its 
limits. At the limits of the mind, concepts such as human freedom (acts of volition) 
outstrip our cognitive capacity to render sound judgments on the matter. These issues are 
more than a reasonable mind can bear, they are all of life, as Dostoevsky writes, “volition 
is a manifestation of the whole of life, I mean, the whole of human life, including reason 
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 with all its concomitant head-scratchings.”45 And it is to reason that Kant would have us 
turn, and thus turn inwards to deduce morality, aesthetics, and the rest from principles of 
Reason alone. The underground man stands against this, and, “had sewn a piece of 
German beaver onto the collar of his overcoat. Suddenly, I was a hero.” In his dreams, in 
his mind, he is transfigured such that he would “give myself entirely up to dreaming,” so 
that he might “seek salvation in all that was ‘sublime and beautiful,’ in my dreams of 
course.”46 The phrase “sublime and beautiful” marked by quotations gives a nod to 
Kant’s third Critique, or at least to the Kantian vein within German Romanticism, such as 
it was in 1864. But we cannot take the underground man as a model, that is, he is not 
intended to be anything like a moral exemplar. There is something wrong with the 
underground man, he is, as he said, a sick man. The excess of consciousness that 
produces his heroic dreams, his speculative, imaginary world of ideality, is a disease as 
Dostoevsky presents it. It is possible to read the underground man as a diagnostic 
exercise in the symptomatology of consciousness; a critical reading that asks, “what is 
wrong here? What is consciousness such that it produces the underground man, a being 
whose key characteristic and defining feature is rational self-awareness?” There are other, 
formal reasons for considering Dostoevsky’s work. 
 Just as marking “sublime and beautiful” is a formal mark that points us to the 
confrontation with Kant’s legacy, there are other marks that orient Dostoevsky’s text 
towards the Enlightenment era discourse on the human mind. That the narrative takes a 
confessional form reveals its phenomenological dimension, the world according to the 
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 underground man, his first-person account. Dostoevsky presents confessional “notes,” 
suggesting incompleteness, fragmentation, a finite discourse, as though the mind were so 
tightly nestled within that it could not really get out except for scraps at a time. The 
underground man addresses his readers in these pieces, it it to us he confesses his dis-
ease, if only in part, the notes being the reflective part of himself, a representation of his 
own discrete consciousness. As Paul W. Nisly has suggested, Notes from Underground 
takes the form of a confession that implicates the reader in the narrator’s dis-ease.47 He 
sets himself up to be at least as intelligent as the reader, perhaps even more so when he 
shows how he can anticipate the reader’s objections. Nisly remarks that the underground 
man is a “pardoxicalist, a complexifier, one who can never treat any issue simply.”48 In 
other words, the underground man is a man of the Enlightenment, a le philosophe. Here, 
Dostoevsky’s emphasis on dreams is relevant, that the underground man was once 
decked out in German furs – but no more. No longer seduced by the dreams of Descartes, 
or the wild, absurd fantasies of reason without the constraints with which Kant 
cautioned.49 Now he knows better, and initiates us into a countercurrent within the 
prevailing Enlightenment discourse of Descartes and Kant, a countercurrent I am calling 
the underground discourse. 
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  The underground discourse implicates the reader because it is a counter-course to 
the dominant way of talking about the subject. Dostoevsky knows that, even to 
philosophically adventurous readers, the notion that consciousness is a disease will 
appear scandalous. The underground man speaks against the Enlightenment glorification 
of reason and takes the canonical view to task for the faults of its most lauded concept: 
the human mind. The underground discourse is thoroughly heterodox. It is a heresy. But, 
within this heterodox practice we develop the antidote to dogmatism. In this way, the 
unquestioned ontological commitments lingering from the Cartesian disemplacement of 
mind can be brought forth and analyzed, exorcizing the ghostly presence existing only in 
the act of self-perception spread out over time. 
 I have provided a gloss of the philosophical canon. This version of the canon was 
assembled in order to outline the development of a certain philosophical conception of 
the human condition, the condition being fundamentally self-conscious. On this point, the 
ontological occasionally slips into the epistemological, and the question of how we know 
being crops up in the shadow of the question of what is, what exists. With this epistemic 
element of awareness, of being able to recognize my own being thus somehow being a 
self, a who, ontology finds itself forced to confront, in the drift of its own guiding 
question, the fact of sense, that what is means something to and for a being who can take 
itself as such. That is the primordial ground of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and I 
will have something to say about this, and New Realism in particular, in Chapter Four. 
First, we must focus on getting to place, a placial ontology providing a new perspective 
from which to approach old problems. 
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  When such an old problem of the mind flickers again as it nears its end, it does so 
in the full strength of the major discourse that became dominant in Modern philosophy. 
What I am calling “underground discourse” can be thought of as a special case of what 
Deleuze and Guattari designate as “minor literature.” Underground discourse, with Notes 
from Underground still supplying our paradigm, fits generally into the schema of minor 
literature. Within the underground discourse on mind, there is a high coefficient of 
deterritorialization, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s terms.50 In other words, when 
Dostoevsky has his underground man call consciousness a “disease,” everything about 
the discourse on consciousness is brought into question. Through the appropriation and 
recasting of the central terms of the discourse, the underground man has effectively called 
into question the entire chain of signification emanating from the central terms. The sharp 
delineations and distinctions dictated by the major literature suddenly become disturbed, 
creating rifts in the established boundaries that are indicated by the underground man’s 
concern that his disease of consciousness is taking its toll on his physical body as well.51 
In expressing this concern, the underground man inverts the worries of Modern 
philosophy. He asserts that the mind must effect the body – not only must it produce an 
effect, this effect is bad, a detrimental causality, the cause of decay in the mind and body. 
 In defiance of the Enlightenment orthodoxy, of the right view regarding the mind, 
the underground discourse takes a quasi-political stance. 52 It is a discourse of resistance 
against powerful modes of discourse, against the basic presuppositions, the prejudices of 
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 philosophers, that infect the major literature and are spoken to only by the silence of a 
new dogma. Notes from Underground is certainly a political book. It is, in many ways, a 
response to Nikolai Chernyshevsky’s 1863 novel, What is to be Done? The underground 
man’s assault on the Crystal Palace in chapters nine and ten of part one of the Notes is the 
best illustration of this political bent.53 In Chernyshevsky’s novel the illusory Crystal 
Palace appears in the fourth dream of protagonist Viéra Pavlovna. In idyllic surroundings, 
people enjoy lives free of labor and experience evenings of joy in crystal palaces that 
have no match in the waking world. These dreamscapes broadly express the 
philosophical union of utopian, socialist, and utilitarian arguments within the work.54 
While my goal here is not an analysis of the explicit politics within Dostoevsky’s work, 
there is, nevertheless, a political element to the underground discourse in that it is a 
discourse of resistance. We are made to think of subjectivity and its central consciousness 
as a problem, as a dis-ease, the easy explanation given by the history of philosophy is 
barred from us, brought in question, made into a perverse explanation of dis-ease that 
brings about unforeseen and unaccounted for disturbances in the life of the subject itself. 
The authority of the disciplinary polity is disrupted. The orthodoxy that permits Bernard 
Williams to ask that we presupposed any procedure in which consciousness could be said 
– question beggingly or not – to be separated from its extended mechanical shell is 
denied. The underground man stands fast and says, “I shall presuppose no such thing. It’s 
preposterous!” This connects the underground man to what Deleuze and Guattari 
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 describe as a “political immediacy.”55 The dis-ease of consciousness must therefore be 
addressed, not just for the health of the individual, but also for the collective health of the 
body politics wherein the dis-eased individual expresses itself. Dostoevsky explains in a 
note at the beginning of part one, “such persons as the author of such memoirs not only 
may, but must, exist in our society, if we take into consideration the circumstances which 
lead to the formation of our society. It was my intention to bring before our reading 
public…one of the characters of our recent past.”56 He expresses an implicit 
problematization of the relationship between the individual and the whole of society. This 
problematic is played out in the solitary and idiosyncratic life of the underground man. 
Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari argue that, in minor literature, “everything takes on a 
collective value.”57 In my reconstruction of the canon I am not merely picking individual 
quarrels with Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, and so on. The purpose of the 
reconstruction is the disruption of the orthodoxy at the center of this discourse, and 
thereby a reconfiguration of the collective following the prognosis of the dis-ease. The 
discourse itself, the one contained in these pages, will itself remain unstable – that is, it is 
interdisciplinary through and through. It will traverse a variety of styles in order to 
deliver its arguments. 
 We cannot avoid this genealogy, which has conditioned the problem as we find it. 
We cannot avoid this discourse that slides in ontology, its ontological questions 
sometimes shaded epistemologically. Such questionable practice is part of the collective 
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 discipline of philosophy and its history. To think through the end of the mind, to seek 
another beginning, is to think through this metaphysics, to traverse this boundary, exceed 
it – to risk this existential concern. Nisly was right to point out that the readers of the 
underground man’s confession are themselves implicated in the dis-ease. So too are 
readers of the underground discourse implicated in these existential concerns. They are 
themselves participants within the major literature whose language is re-appropriated in 
the re-valuation occurring in the minor discourse. Taking up Notes from Underground as 
a confession, Sharon Lubkemann Allen argues that the authenticity and authority of the 
underground discourse rests upon an orthodox community which mediates a self-
conscious parody wherein the stubbornly rebellious yet reflective meditations on life 
make possible the recovery of a moral ground on which self and other can still stand as 
autonomous, dialogically realized beings.58 It is with Allen that I want to move the 
underground discourse in its own direction, distinguishing it from minor literature while 
maintaining a family resemblance with Deleuze and Guattri. Within the underground 
discourse, there exists a double orthodoxy. As a minor literature, underground discourse 
operates within the major literature and must make use of its terms; in our case it has 
been “mind,” “consciousness,” “presence,” “representation,” and so on. However, as a 
form of resistance within the polity of the disciplinary discourse established by canonical 
authority, underground discourse develops a tangential orthodoxy of resistance itself – 
what is, from the major perspective, “heterodox.” This alternative orthodoxy gains 
momentum in its dialogue with the major literature, producing an undercurrent of 
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 criticism functioning to subvert the meaning of the authoritative terms autochthonous to 
the major literature. Yet the minor orthodoxy, the resistant heterodox, mediates what 
Allen calls a “self-conscious parody,” which is clearly a marked formal difference from 
the major orthodox. Because the terms operating within the underground discourse are 
rebelliously appropriated and not autochthonous they take on a subversive tone that is 
discontinuous with the major literature in a fracture that is asymmetrical. That is to say, 
there is not a simple alteration of terms, but an additive element – some third term is 
introduced to explain the difference itself. Dostoevsky introduces “dis-ease,” a 
characterization of the ontological malaise occasioned by the existential concerns of 
Modernist literature. The appropriation of “consciousness” by a clinical discourse whose 
symptomatology treats the mind as dis-eased displaces consciousness from the essential 
core by mediating it through a third term. Therefore, to be human now means to be 
essentially dis-eased, to suffer from ontological malaise. Consciousness begins to lose its 
purchase on the claim to the essential being of personhood. To make sense of this radical 
transformation, we must consider the work of “parody” in Allen’s account. 
 I turn to Linda Hutcheon for an appropriate theory of parody. In Hutcheon’s 
work, we find a definition of “parody” that leads “to a vision of interconnectedness” 
while maintaining a “deliberate refusal” to take our social, historical, existential present, 
or the past as referent, to be the ultimate objects – the source of meaning and significance 
for us. And yet, this mode of parody, “…teaches and enacts the recognition of the fact 
that social and existential ‘reality’ is discursive reality when it is used as the referent of 
art, and so the only ‘genuine historicity’ becomes that which acknowledges its own 
discursive, contingent identity. The past as referent is nor bracketed of effaced…it is 
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 incorporated and modified, given new and different life and meaning.”59 It is this 
acknowledgement of its own discursive, contingent identity that makes the underground 
man feel “unhappy” to recount his life and philosophy. Insofar as Allen and Hutcheon’s 
work trade in Kantian notions of autonomy, as I’ll mention below, we must see how 
Allen’s discursive movement already undermines the identity she seeks, even though she 
very astutely renders an extremely lucid account of parody itself. In the next Chapter, I’ll 
return to Hutcheon’s troubled relationship to history in the context of the 
modern/postmodern distinction. At this time, recall the demand for structure, order, and 
limit that echoes after each question raised against the cogito, the simple unified self 
haunting a finite time. Such a demand for the order, discipline, and certainty of the 
cogito. “Why, just try,” says the underground man, “just give us, for instance, more 
independence, untie the hands of any one of us, widen the sphere of our activities, relax 
discipline, and we – yes, I assure you – we should immediately be begging for the 
discipline to be reimposed on us.”60 Again, I emphasize agreement with Nisly that 
Dostoevsky does not present the actions of the underground man in part two of the 
novella to be in any way a prescriptive model. Yet it is also apparent that Dostoevsky 
sympathizes with the underground man’s condition, and presents the arguments against 
enlightenment rationalism as damning.61 In fact, Dostoevsky gives the underground man 
an earnest, fiery finish, at which point the Notes proclaim: 
Why, we do not even know where we are to find real life, or what it is, what 
it is called. Leave us alone without any books, and we shall at once get 
                                                
59 Hutcheon, “The Politics of Postmodernism: Parody and History.” Cultural Critique, 5 (Winter 
1986-87), 182. 
60 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, 376-77. 
61 Nisly, “A Modernist Impulse,” 156. 
 41 
 confused, lose ourselves in a maze, we shall not know what to cling to, what 
to hold on to, what to love and what to hate, what to respect and what to 
despise. We even find it hard to be men, men of real flesh and blood, our 
own flesh and blood. We are ashamed of it. We think it a disgrace. And we 
do our best to be some theoretical “average” men.62 
 
The underground man is relating the burden placed on him by what Hutcheon called 
“discursive reality,” which is disclosed in the “confession” that places the reader in the 
place of God – where a godless man implicates the reader as judge in God’s place contra 
Confessions in the religious mode of St. Augustine. With this disclosure comes the vision 
of interconnectedness established by the parodic element within the underground 
discourse. The burden of this discursive reality is the need to incorporate and modify the 
past and thereby give it “new and different life and meaning.”63 
 It is a step the underground man is unwilling to take. The symptom of paralysis 
recurs in Modernist literature. The underground man is paralyzed and unable to make the 
move that would incorporate and modify the past because he has no place in it. He is 
removed, aloof, his consciousness separating him from the world in its foundational act 
of self-representation, the grounding act of making thinking present to thought, the act of 
self-surveillance that enables all future knowledge and structures the mind temporally 
over and against objective space. In the closing sections, I will sketch an argument that 
will be developed further in Chapter Two. Having established the underground discourse, 
I want to turn to the appropriation of representation in preparation to rethink this starting 
point, to begin thinking again, thinking other than representationally. I have been focused 
almost exclusively on the disemplacement of subjectivity, its retreat to interiority, from 
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 which the dis-ease of consciousness arose. This retreat, the interiorization of subjectivity 
by its submersion in time, is staged by a process of presencing, of bringing oneself into 
one’s own view by rendering a self-representation. To do this is to make oneself available 
through representational apperception. Moving forward, I will attempt to re-instantiate 
emplacement as the basic ontological movement; emplacement instead of presencing. But 
to do this I will extend the underground discourse beyond the limits found so far in 
Deleuze, Guattari, Allen, and Hutcheon. Particularly for Allen, but also for Hutcheon, we 
would need an underground discourse that rests on an assumption of the desirability of 
the self and others standing over and against one another as autonomous.64 As I noted 
above, this remains firmly in the Kantian orthodoxy, still singing a song too familiar to 
human ears to herald the end of the mind and another beginning. Autonomy relies upon 
and presupposes the very self-presencing that I am here attempting to overcome. Instead, 
I will develop in the direction of autopoiesis. The ontological substitution of 
emplacement for presencing will put us in a position to make more sense of what an 
autopoietic being would look like without the central processing unit and judge seated 
within the tomb of the mind, its ghostly mechanism making mysterious contact with the 
body it inhabits. For the time being, I must stick to a critical analysis of the process of 
self-presencing in order to elucidate how placial ontology might address certain 
systematic problems in philosophy. I will seek out underground interlocutors along the 
way, other nomads and wanderers within the Modern traditions that augment and 
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 strengthen the heterodox discourse we discovered in Dostoevsky. Together, we express 
the need for a place to be. 
1.4 In Place of Presence 
 I use the term “presencing.” This antimeria allows me to emphasize and 
foreground the procedural nature of consciousness as it emerges from the Enlightenment 
and is cast in its subjective temporal mold. The subject comes into its own presence, 
expressing the capacity to render itself to itself in representational forms. Jean-Luc Nancy 
argues that Western culture is primarily defined by its representative procedures, where 
representation “designates a limit, as demarcation, even when it ceaselessly pushes back 
the frontiers of its imperium,” such that it “opens the world to the closure that it is.”65 
Nancy and I share a similar perspective on the concept of consciousness in the history of 
philosophy, especially as he sees it at the beginning of his 1984 essay, “Identity and 
Trembling.” Nancy begins with a quote from Hegel’s Logic, which is rendered from 
Nancy’s French, “Identity as self-consciousness, is what distinguishes man from nature, 
particularly the brutes, which never reach the point of comprehending themselves as an 
‘I,’ that is pure self-contained unity,” [emphasis added].66 I am also in agreement with 
Nancy that this follows from the Kantian conception of the “I” as an Ego, the “irreducible 
kernel of self-constitution,” which lies at the heart of the subject to whom all 
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 representation must appear as such – that, “must be able to accompany all his 
representations.”67 Nancy’s argument is that any philosophy conducted in terms of “the” 
subject and subjectivity already presuppose the Ego-structure of representational thought 
bringing itself to presence in a self-contained unity. If this argument is followed, we can 
place Hegel within the lineage I’ve outlined above beginning with transitions from 
Descartes to Locke to Kant. However, my concern here is not so much to capture Hegel 
within my reconstruction, but rather, to engage Nancy himself on the issues of presence. 
He sees presencing as a process of coming-to-be wherein the key principle is one of 
difference. The foundational identity of the subject makes difference by self-actualizing in 
a representation to itself as, “the very movement proper to self-consciousness…”68 The 
fundamental movement of self-differentiation sets the stage for the possibility of all 
representation to come, just as Descartes has described the knowledge that I exist to be 
the one thing known for certain. As with Locke, self-consciousness remains the outcome 
and the telos of this procedure. But the procedure of self-differentiation occurs as a 
painful separation. The subject becomes removed from things, locked within the cabinet 
of consciousness. As a representational process, it extends across time, but loses its 
spatiality behind the veil of the representational procedure itself. Since the subject is itself 
the ground of the procedure, that to which the representation is present as such, space 
becomes mediated through the temporal displacement of a fundamental differentiation 
enacted as the first step of negation in a dialectical process. In this respect, Hegel himself 
is basically a Kantian, and had written that in fact, “Kant rediscovered this triadic form 
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 [of the movement of truth] by instinct,” and that, “since then it has…been raised to its 
absolute significance, and with it the true form in its true content has been presented.”69 
The interpretation of Kant’s position on the I’s self-representation provided above is the 
basis of my approach to Nancy’s work on presence. 
 The disemplacement of consciousness has been shown to be the result of a 
quadripartite process. First, there is the act of recognition – the perception of the 
processes of the mind itself establishes the fact of conscious existence. Following the 
initial act of recognition is a state of self-presence wherein thinking attends to itself, 
attends to the self-perception established in the act of recognition. The thinking of 
thought by thought is reflection, reflection being the perception of the operations of the 
mind. The outcome of this reflective procedure is self-presence. That reflection is a 
procedure of presencing must be emphasized. The third moment, the maintenance and 
retention of that presence, the repetition of the setting forth, is representation. To persist 
in presence is to be represented to the subject. Persistent presence only becomes possible 
by the attendance of some self-representation capable of accompanying any given 
experience – a consequence of the foundational self-perception. Perception how? 
Through the representation. Thus, the significance of Nancy’s comments concerning the 
dependence of Western culture on the representative procedure. But the fourth and final 
moment arises from the grounding function of the first two, remembering that Descartes 
intends the perception of thinking by thought to be an epistemological ground-floor. It 
was from the certainty of the self-perceptive act of “I think” that all subsequent 
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 knowledge was vouchsafed. As this ground, the overall procedure must serve a 
differential function. The foundational act of self-representation must be the basis of 
difference as such, the first difference from which all subsequent differences follow. But 
what is differentiated in the first difference? My self and the representation of myself. I 
cannot be in my own presence without this difference. It is then that I, who am self-
present, am differentiated from the I who is self-presented to me. Recognition, 
presencing, representation, difference – a placial ontology must deal with each in turn. 
Rather than attempting to refute each outright, I will work through the underground 
discourse, appropriating and modifying the significance of each as we proceed. 
 The first task to be accomplished will be the disclosure of place in modernity. 
Moving ahead, this will be the primary philosophical concern; to show how modernity 
discloses place. This first means confrontation with presencing as self-representational 
procedure. This means reconsidering the foundational role of representation itself. 
Representation is the abyss into which the cogito falls. Representation presents the circle, 
to stand out in a representation in order to represent. If we want to think differently, from 
another beginning, we must first think differently about representation. Remember, the 
response to externalism in philosophy of mind stems from a commitment and desire to 
preserve certain core beliefs about knowledge and language, thus knowers and thinkers, 
that center around the subject’s representational nature. Representation is the primary 
explanans for how the subject exists as a thinking thing. It is also important to keep in 
mind the significance of reflection. I will turn explicitly to reflection in Chapter Two. But 
reflection in general is key to the foundation of metaphysics and epistemology. 
Reflection allows us to represent ourselves. If we are, at bottom, thinking things, and our 
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 identity is constituted by the continuity of our thinking over time, and our thinking is a 
representational procedure by which the subject renders the outside world sensible to 
itself through a mental language, then reflection just is our ability to represent these 
internal processes to ourselves, thereby, as Locke and Hume said, we can observe the 
operations of our minds as it is busied with whatever thoughts and feelings, whatever 
experiences, we’re having at the time we reflect. From here, we will be working up to a 
position that better enables us to see how Modernist literature transforms the concept of 
reflection. To see that, and thereby gain the proof necessary to show the disclosure of 
place in modernity, we must begin with work on basic concepts, beginning, again, with 
representation. 
 I am started down the road to thinking representation differently by Alva Nöe’s 
excellent 2012 study, Varieties of Presence. There, Nöe writes plainly, “The idea that 
presence is representation is a bad idea,” because: 1) the fundamental disconnection 
between the mental model given in representation and the actual world has remained 
inexplicable; 2) the phenomenology of my perceptual experience does not seem pictorial; 
3) the world around us displays an abundance of images and reflections, and yet 
representations such as drawings, paintings, photographs, and the like must be 
painstakingly manufactured by us; and, 4) representations are not logically necessary in 
an explanation of perception.70 Nöe argues that presence is not representation. Instead, 
presence is conceived as availability. There is a strong resonance here between Nöe’s 
account of presence-as-availability and Heidegger’s investigation of equipmentality in 
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 Being and Time. Nöe himself acknowledges the debt to Heidegger, but goes on to claim 
that the so-called “existential phenomenologists” don’t go deep enough because they 
don’t just flat out deny the transcendental account that underpins representation, but insist 
instead that the transcendental account is a secondary one made possible by the pre-
thematic world we are absorbed in and involved with during the course of everyday 
human events.71 
 Before I dive into a disputation with Nöe over an interpretation of Heidegger’s 
ontology (all with a view to be more clear about what a non-representational view of 
human cognition could be), I want to take stock of a few key components of Nöe’s theory 
that will be indispensable to us moving forward. I also want to briefly mention an 
important piece of vocabulary that I am about to deploy in a somewhat idiosyncratic way. 
As part of the underground discourse I am confronted with a tangle of linguistic 
presuppositions and a very well entrenched technical vocabulary. We’ve got all the key 
words: perception, consciousness, identity, presence, representation, and so on. From 
here on out I am appropriating a philosophically familiar word. I want to talk about 
concepts. This is an advantageous time to discuss my use of the term “concept,” because 
I will have to make sense of what Nöe means by “presence-as-availability,” and that 
means making sense of “availability,” which is what I want concepts to do. I will use 
“concept” to mean that which makes things available to us as the things they are. 
Concepts, traditionally Begriffe in the German vocabulary, are important to ontology. 
They help us see the way things are – they help us to get a sense of things, to orient us in 
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 the right direction, so that we can take something in stride. If we can achieve this new 
and different sense of what a concept is, what it does for us (and to us, really), we can 
make some headway toward the disclosure of place. Places are made available by 
concepts, and so, concepts will be our first entry to place. Let us sit with that first insight 
for a moment. 
 Nöe and others, including those already mentioned, Thompson, Varela, Gallagher, 
Clark, Menary, are inspired by the idea of an affordance. The idea was developed by 
Princeton psychologist James Gibson in his work on visual perception. The first 
advantage, an extremely significant advantage, to Gibson’s approach is the way it 
downplays the salience of the subject-object dichotomy that is so prominent a feature of 
all the theories we’ve considered so far. Gibson writes, “an affordance is neither an 
objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts 
across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It 
is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both physical and 
psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the 
observer.”72 To say an affordance exists is to say that the environment has provided some 
being with the opportunity to do something, to behave in a certain way. In order to take 
advantage of the affordance, a being has to be oriented, attuned to its surroundings in a 
certain way. The being must be able to recognize the affordance, just recognize the fact 
that it can act, that it can do something. To begin again must be done simply. I look 
around and there’s meaningful stuff, stuff I recognize. Why? But not answering 
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 beginning from the presupposition of the unified cogito setting out the representation 
before itself, but nowhere, in a vacuous within. Just recognizing that there is and there 
can be done. What is there in the being and the doing? Concepts are a way to talk about 
the fact that there are kinds of beings, being like we are, for which the environment 
shows up in a meaningful way, meaningful in the sense that those beings do things that 
make sense. Much of the activity is geared toward maintaining the being that it is. Things 
persist, we've encountered this observation in the literature, but things also degrade, and 
some things do some work to keep themselves persisting longer. The environment can 
afford, for instance, opportunities to do these sorts of things. And the affordance tells us 
something about the environment itself by the way in which things can be observed 
engaging affordances, even arranging for affordances by the manipulation of the 
environment, and so on. So, concepts, as I understand them, are the conjunction, the 
coupling, of a being capable of maintaining its being, with surroundings from which it 
can continue to maintain itself. In many ways, I am echoing Graham Harman’s starting 
point in Tool Being, in which Harman says that his approach is “based neither on a 
credulous realism nor on some devious taste for substance abstracted from all relation. It 
relies only on a single, undeniable fact: the fact that there are discernable individual 
entities at all.”73 I may even demand less: that there are just discernable things, individual 
or not. 
 As I’ve demonstrated at length, concepts, and all such aspects of the language of 
thought, are traditionally held to be representational. That is, they are the subjective 
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 “stand in” for the thing-it-self. Concepts, understood in this way, are like mental maps or 
models of the outside world which we’ve constructed for ourselves secondhand, on the 
inside of thought. I’m intending a more direct reference here, where concepts speak to the 
way in which things stand out [vorstellen] for beings that are properly oriented toward 
them. The manner in which “trees” are foregrounded for me, distinguished with meaning, 
if I direct my gaze to look for “trees” and find them growing on a hillside. The 
environment affords for the seeing of trees, and by a certain attunement between being 
and environment (a concept) the being sees trees. All the ontology will demand at this 
point is an admission of two things: 1) things appear around me; and 2) I can do things 
with what appears around me. We could be even more basic, but perhaps less helpful, and 
say only that there happens that things appear. These are the first tentative moves for de-
centering the cogito and uncovering place as a new ontological starting point. This first 
real change, the transformation of “concepts,” and their role in making things present, in 
Nöe’s sense of presence-as-availability. In this ontological connection to Heidegger, Nöe 
touches upon the crisis of consciousness in modernity. Rethinking presence in terms of 
availability demands an engagement with Heidegger and Nöe, both of whom mark out 
ways to begin already “outside,” where we are not thinking from the inside of the subject 
to a mysteriously attained outside where we find knowledge to bring back inside. 
1.5 What a Concept Does 
 Let me give an example of a concept, one identified by Nisly when he calls the 
underground man one of the first modern “anti-heroes.” By “anti-hero” we all understand 
something about a kind of being in the world. We understand, first, a bit about heroes, 
their exemplary character, brave deeds, just causes, these all are struck in the chord of 
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 “hero.” But “anti-heroes” are somehow a negation of these, anarchic, against goodness, 
nihilistic, they are martyrs, not for any greater good, but for their own baser desires. Anti-
hero is a certain way of being attuned to the world, either you are one or you know what 
you’re looking for – brooding, dressed in black, cigarette, unwashed, but somehow still 
exuding sex appeal. Nisly means that the modern “hero” is an outsider who brings into 
question the culture in which he lives, and in the process, becomes something that refuses 
to be defined as a coherent unity.74 The anti-hero denies the cogito, denies self-perception 
of some discrete, identical consciousness nested within the body. Nisly thereby reads 
Dostoevsky opening the doors on modernity, crossing a line, a threshold from which 
there is no return. 
 However, I would question the use of heroic language to refer to the type of 
character taking shape in the underground man. Nisly points out, correctly, that Notes 
from Underground does not follow traditional narrative patterns of conflicts, crisis, and 
resolution, being more a character study illustrated by select episodes from the 
protagonist’s life. Except that really, the underground man is not even a protagonist who 
actively seeks the end of some plot; he even acts antagonistically at times. Rather, 
because he is standing at “The Abyss of the modern period,” as Nisly puts it, the 
underground man is beyond the heroic narratives that rely on the unity of some ideal. 
There is no ideal, for it is precisely the idea of the ideal that is called into question by the 
heresy of the underground discourse. Certainly, the underground man is “anti-hero” in 
that he does things contrary to what a given hero might do. But he is not “anti-hero” in 
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 the sense that modernity lies beyond the heroic age precisely because its literature and art 
expresses a dialectic procedure that could continue indefinitely, opening up further 
speculative possibilities rather than arriving at some final truth.75  
 Ironically, my point here, about both concepts and heroism, is a basically 
Hegelian one. In his Lectures on Fine Art, first published in 1835 and based on lecture 
notes from throughout the 1820s, Hegel argues that the heroic mode was best expressed 
by the epics of less modern cultures than the Germany of his day. Homer in Greece, the 
epics of ancient India and so forth, all express a cultural ideal made possible by their 
particular historical situation and the manner of their national unification. This is marked 
by the way in which the heroes of those epics are seamlessly integrated into the totality of 
the narrative structure that provided the hero with a whole and self-contained context 
within which they were driven toward a dramatic resolution that brings the story to an 
obvious end.76 But the modern period (Hegel’s example is Goethe) does not lend itself to 
heroic modes precisely because it lacks a self-contained unity. Hegel states that Goethe’s 
Hermann and Dorothea is the work of literature contemporary with himself that comes 
closest to achieving the sense of cultural and national unity found in the ancient epics. 
However closely Hegel places Goethe to the ancients, his own analysis betrays Goethe’s 
modernity as open, defying closure, ongoing, and referring always outside of its own 
bounds.77 Further, Hegel attributes this to the peculiarly modern mode of production by 
machines, in factories, etc.78 Thus, the Hegelian argument is that Dostoevsky’s 
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 underground man is conscious in a way that Homer’s Achilles is not. Achilles is fully 
immersed in the epic and follows the story to its logical end, only lamenting his Fate to 
the gods without questioning whether it could have been otherwise. The underground 
man seeks, through his confession to us, to question the logic of story, always unfolding 
some novel possibilities that do not appear fated, as destiny – even occasionally pointing 
out how people would really prefer a precise discipline dictated to them as if it were a 
logical necessity. 
 The “heroic” is a concept that lets us understand things in a comprehensive way. 
As a concept, it is a kind of short-hand, condensing a significant amount of cultural and 
historical information into a short breath, a word. But it is not this “short-hand,” not its 
abbreviatory function that truly marks off the concept. Rather, this concept, “heroic” 
orientates us toward the text in a comprehensive way. The concept guides our approach 
to the text and shapes its affordances to us, the way in which things appear, the different 
ways the text can be “lit up” under our conscious gaze so that different elements become 
apparent. This leads us to the secondary reason for my appropriation of Nöe’s notion that 
presence is availability, and my use of “concept” to indicated the being-made-available of 
things to and for something capable of accessing its surroundings. The new “conceptual” 
apparatus allows me to do two things that are distinct, and yet closely intertwined at the 
heart of this project. 
  First, the re-imagined work of the concept is a step on the way back to place. It 
places the being who “knows” and the surroundings that are “known” (the environment) 
on equal ontological footing – the concept is both together, both the being and what is 
afforded to that being in their capacity for epistemic action in the world. It allows me to 
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 do this without adopting Hegel’s dubious metaphysics of history, made problematic by 
his eminently modern sense of historical Progress. I can also steer clear of Heidegger’s 
troublesome philosophy of history with its vocabulary of fate and destiny. Remember, 
this is not about causes. Secondly, as we have seen, much of my arguments ask that we 
understand literary Modernism in relation to Modern philosophy. It is therefore crucial 
that we have the philosophical tools necessary to grapple with broad historical 
movements in philosophy and literature. To get at mere being, to get back into place, we 
will enter through literature, through the aperture between being and literature – 
understanding literature as art which discloses being, or, in other words, as the scene of 
ontology. I will therefore make one important distinction, one between concepts, broadly 
construed, just any thing that opens the world up in a meaningful way and orients us 
toward the stuff we find all around – and the idea of a basic concept. A basic concept is 
basic, not because it is simple or non-complex, but because it is foundational and, in 
some sense, comprehensive. This will become more clear as we work through Nöe and 
Heidegger, but a basic concept, something like a metaphysical concept (identity, 
difference, cause, finitude, etc.), takes a general vantage on the world and the place of 
human beings in that world. They are comprehensive in their ontological orientation, 
both revealing something about the world “out there,” but also something about us, about 
our basic emplacement and situation in the world. Basic concepts are attempts to 
approach the whole, in a way, though I do not intend that they “capture” or “model” the 
totality of all that exists in any numerical or absolute sense of being the “complete” 
picture. More on that in Chapter Four. Since we are just beginning, just now trying to 
think toward the end of the mind, straining to hear a non-human song, we will have to 
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 leave the full development of these transformative moves regarding concepts to take 
place as we proceed. To recapitulate briefly: concepts will not be thought as maps, 
models, or images of some outside that are projected “inside” to be viewed by a 
conscious being. In general concepts will be thought as the way in which the world opens 
to beings capable of being aware of their surroundings, and can act in this awareness in a 
meaningful way. Concepts are openings, conduits by which we orient ourselves for 
actions in a meaningful world. Basic concepts, as metaphysical or, better, ontological 
orientations, open on a view of the whole, strive to see the world and our place in it. 
 Nöe’s work on presence will help with arguments for this approach to concepts – 
the first move in our disclosure of place in modernity. With Nöe and Heidegger, presence 
and concepts are severed from representation. We thereby free concepts from laboring 
under the fruitless task of recreating a map or model of the world or object intended to be 
represented by the concept, because the concept – as that which becomes present in 
thought – is no longer representative of anything; indeed, there is no need to represent the 
“outside” to any “inside” of subjectivity. There is no need for representation, as far as 
Nöe is concerned.79 He argues convincingly for an understanding of “concepts” in which 
we think of concepts as tools by which we take hold of and grapple with the world that is 
present to us. This move places Nöe in a position very close to that taken by Heidegger 
concerning pragmata in section 15 of Being and Time as that which displays the structure 
of an “in-order-to,” Um-zu in German. While Nöe does try to distinguish himself from 
Heidegger and the “existential phenomenologists,” it is also true that he shares the 
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 existential idea that the concept itself is conditioned by the conjunction of human being 
and the world – indeed, that the meaning of the concept is itself conditioned by the 
interaction, the struggle, between the human being and the world it grapples with via the 
concept. So, both Nöe and Heidegger seem to agree that human understanding is 1) 
fundamentally interpretive, and, 2) that such interpretation is geared, primarily, for 
action. This is where the rubber meets the road in understanding both Nöe disagreement 
with existential phenomenology and in freeing presence from its entanglements with 
representation for the purposes of the current discussions. I will show that part of the 
problem is that Nöe’s criticism of existential phenomenology as relegating the 
“transcendental account” to a secondary position is wrongheaded, at least in Heidegger’s 
case. Since it is Heidegger who serves as Nöe’s most productive interlocutor on this 
issue, I take it that Heidegger is the primary target of Nöe’s criticism. There are some 
salient issues raised. Heidegger does claim that “correctness is an ineluctable scion of 
truth.”80 If we understand “correctness” here to refer only to the correctness of the 
correlation between a representation and some object or state of affairs out in the world, 
then Nöe is on his way to showing how the transcendental account is relegated to a 
secondary position. Here, Nöe must mean by the “transcendental account” the fact that 
Heidegger, as interpreted in Varieties of Presence, must be committed to the view that 
transcendental objects, something we know not what, must be “behind” the 
representation, something we sort of throw a representation over from a subjective, 
internal position, a first-person point of view – the Kantian phenomenal-noumenal 
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 distinction. But Heidegger’s position on Kant’s transcendental was rooted in his ontology 
of being as time, and thus, in part because he was so close to Nietzsche, Heidegger 
presents an entirely immanent transcendence that is primarily temporal – the ecstases of 
the past, present, and future, my being toward my ownmost possibility, finitude, death. 
He argues that Kant still has the metaphysical conception of transcendental objects that 
held there to be something out there toward which we stepped in a transcending 
movement. But the transcendent itself remains, in Kant, some being toward which we 
step. Heidegger’s transcendent just is the overstepping itself, the very movement of our 
being in time is the transcendent. Immanent transcendence is part of the explanation 
Heidegger gives for aletheaic truth, truth as disclosure, uncovering, revealing. In order to 
apply some representative proposition, something must stand out, be revealed and appear 
before me in order for me to say even that “there is” something there at all. So, it is true 
that Heidegger thinks this way of thinking truth, as unconcealing, as disclosure, is 
primordial and ontologically a priori to any “correctness” by way of representative 
propositions, or mathematical systematizing. Heidegger’s phenomenological roots are on 
display throughout, and his pursuit of the answer in Kant during the late 1920s and early 
1930s is evident by the way Heidegger treats truth always as the relation of some being 
(typically human being) to an appearance. But Heidegger does not then simply move the 
former account to a secondary position, completely untouched. To alter the ground of 
truth demands thinking differently about the representational procedure Heidegger sees 
running rampant as machination, manipulation, and calculative thinking – the nihilistic 
drive to level everything down to the value of resource, the value of utility, such that all 
landscapes became nothing but reserves to be put to use at a later time. So, yes, in one 
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 sense, the “transcendental account” is relegated to a secondary position – it comes after 
the basic disclosure of beings in their very presence with a being capable of experiencing 
them. But the understanding of the transcendent is radically transformed by this 
procedure, construed as immanent in terms of time, and the very nature of the 
representational structure of thinking is transformed and no longer the foundational 
process by which “thinking” is to be thought. There are radically different ways of 
thinking, ways that are not necessarily less oriented toward truth just because they are not 
calculating, are not ratio. It cannot just be business as usual. The system demands a 
thorough reassessment, according to Heidegger. Being relegated to a secondary position 
is not so simple and pat a move as Nöe would have us believe. Heidegger, in light of the 
above interpretation, cannot mean “correctness” in the sense of a transcendental 
correlation between some representative concept and its object. 
 If we return to section 15 of Being and Time, we see that Heidegger attempts a 
radical reassessment of reference, or assignment. When he says that the structure of the 
in-order-to [um-zu] refers something to something, he does not mean that the in-order-to 
is a relation of correspondence between representational ideas and objects. Rather, he 
means that the in-order-to directs us to the world of equipment that gives whatever object 
we have at hand meaning through the series of relationships that exist between the object 
at hand and the equipment involved in the project enabled by the in-order-to structure. 
So Heidegger’s famous hammer refers, not from a representation of a hammer to some 
object called “hammer,” but refers instead to the other things that are involved in the 
world of carpentry; that is, planers, planks of wood, nails, sandpaper, and so on. The 
relationship, the relations, between the hammer and these other bits of equipment, in part, 
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 underwrite the assignment of meaning to the hammer. But it is not just these other bits of 
equipment that give the hammer meaning; it is also that, taken together as a totality of 
references the collective noun “equipment” are all at the service of the in-order-to, that is, 
they are all tied together under the aegis of a practice – the in-order-to is geared for 
action. Later, in the same text at section 32, Heidegger makes it clear that we do not 
“throw a ‘signification’ over some naked thing which is present-to-hand [vorhanden], we 
do not stick a value on it…”81 and this is perfectly in line with Nöe’s basic position that, 
“the detail of [the appearance of a room] show up as present…in that I understand, 
implicitly, practically, that by the merest movement of my eyes and head I can secure 
access to an element that is now obscured on the periphery of the visual field,” and 
therefore, these details are not represented to me, but are rather made available to me.82 
Likewise, according to Heidegger, in my involvement with the hammer, I understand 
implicitly, practically, that by a series of movements coordinated with the equipment of 
carpentry of which the hammer is a part, I can make available a table that is not currently 
available to me (because I have not made it yet). Note too that Nöe’s conception of our 
conscious perception is a fundamentally relational one,83 as is Heidegger’s, dependent as 
it is on human being’s involvement with worlds and their totalities of reference. 
 All of the above to say that Nöe severely misreads Heidegger’s statements about 
the ineluctability of correctness. Heidegger certainly cannot mean “correctness” in the 
transcendental sense Nöe implies. While it is true that Heidegger claims that calculative 
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 thinking “makes beings ever more representable,” we cannot take him to mean 
“representable” here in the transcendental sense precisely because he believes that this 
representation makes beings more available, that is, more accessible for manipulation – 
in order to be put to use according to some plan.84 For Heidegger, the “representation” of 
anything in the concept is a matter of the most concrete and practical importance, not an 
abstract practice of labeling something with a sign to give it significance. Thus, Nöe talks 
past Heidegger because he fails to attend to the radical transformations taking place in 
how we are asked to understand “representation,” an interpretive project unfolding across 
several of Heidegger’s works. This is ironic, considering that Nöe’s ostensive goal is to 
re-imagine “presence” without jettisoning the word. My point is further emphasized when 
we attend to Heidegger’s understanding of the concept, which is the starting point for my 
own appropriation of the term. 
 In a 1924 lecture on Aristotle, Heidegger claims the conceptions themselves are 
concrete basic experiences and “not a theoretical grasping of the matter.”85 Later, in a 
1929-30 lecture, Heidegger argues that we should not understand concepts, especially 
metaphysical ones, as anything like a determinative representation through which we set 
something before us in order to evaluate it or judge about it. Rather, concepts, and here it 
is particularly metaphysical ones, arise from our being gripped by the world and 
struggling in this grip to understand the whole of our condition, thereby bringing 
ourselves as part of the whole into question as well.86 Thus, concepts rise from a direct 
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 encounter with the world, a direct encounter that Nöe is also trying to articulate in his 
work. 
 However, I agree that Heidegger’s maintenance of the word “representation” 
raises unnecessary problems in the interpretation of his philosophy. One must carefully 
work through several volumes of Heidegger’s oeuvre to really track the changes and 
modifications he makes to the idea of representation. I will therefore move forward using 
a bit more of Nöe’s “availability” and “access” vocabulary, and bearing in mind the 
particular definition of “concept” given above. So we’ll be trying, with Nöe, to think 
presence-as-availability. However, the purpose of this dialogue with Nöe and Heidegger 
has been to complicate Nöe’s dismissal of the existential phenomenologists. My own 
position is, at base, more in line with the phenomenologists that is Nöe’s. It is not clear to 
me, for instance, whether or not Nöe wants to totally reject “picture” thinking as 
representation is often conceived, or to deny that we can really “map” or “model” the 
world in our thoughts. If he is indeed making those more extreme claims, I think a quick 
phenomenological experiment handily refutes him: I sit here right now thinking of an 
image of my car, and it is very clearly a model of my car in several respect, sitting there, 
even, in its usual parking place. Readers may feel free to map out their own ways in 
thought, or imagine a familiar object in detail. I think this is “representational” in all the 
relevant senses discussed in the canon, and there is a sense in which these types of 
thoughts can “match up” to objects in the world, but this is only a kind of thinking, not 
the basic level at which all thought whatsoever operates. And we can see how this kind of 
thinking, capturing the world in minute detail to map it out and “cover it,” to really have 
“gone over it all,” lends itself to calculation, machination, and utility. There’s something 
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 to be said about Heidegger’s basic starting point for cultural critique, even if he could 
digress into extravagant polemics in moments of thoughtlessness.87 But more to the point, 
we can, at will, imagine a handful of different locations and easily map out a trajectory 
through those places. However, I agree with Nöe that we do not need classical 
representational schemes to account for these abilities. Concepts, as both Nöe and 
Heidegger think of them – as practical tools by which we grapple with the world – are 
adequate to the task of explaining these abilities without recourse to the language of 
“representation.” On this score, despite my advocacy of Nöe’s approach to presence as 
availability, I think Heidegger makes the stronger case precisely because he is able to 
work through the problems of representation so as to transfigure the meaning of 
representation itself. I have tried to outline this transformation as clearly as possible, but 
it will help too if we keep the general idea of “affordances” in the background, just to 
help avoid lapsing back into the “map/model/image” mold. I will not talk about 
representations except as special cases, and we will see this unfold in Chapter Three. I 
will be focusing primarily on “concepts” as I have been discussing them here, taking cues 
from Nöe and Heidegger. 
 Remember, it was the act of conceiving thought itself that secured knowledge for 
Descartes and laid the groundwork for all epistemological certainty. Further, it is the 
concept of the human person with which the literary Modernists struggle in their attempt 
to diagnose the ontological malaise suffered as a result of their excess of consciousness. 
The path so far can be summarized roughly: Modern philosophy developed the concept 
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 of human being in order to grapple with the ontological and epistemological problems 
that faced them at the time. However, literary Modernism finds this tool to be lacking in 
the full existential concerns of life. The self-conscious temporal subject might be a fine 
conceptual scheme for scientific (or calculative) thinking. Perhaps intellectual abstraction 
is well-served by such self-reflective grounding. Nevertheless, once this concept is 
generalized and used in order to understand human being as such, it quickly collapses 
into the maddening self-enclosed solipsism that plagues philosophers in the later 19th and 
throughout the 20th century. Literary Modernists show aesthetically how the concept of 
the human being, as conceived and reified by Modern philosophy, breaks down and 
reveals in its fracturing the very conditions by which it came to presence in the first 
place. This is the quadripartite structure: the act of recognition, presencing, 
representation, difference. Each of these moments are entangled with and interpenetrated 
by the others, each self-reinforcing, and as I have shown by engaging with Heidegger and 
Nöe, alterations in one of the four moments reverberates throughout and results in 
seismic shifts across the whole procedure. 
 With this systemic transformation foreground, perhaps my Hegelian consideration 
from before can be made more clear. Heroic conceptions, I can now say, were the 
dominant basic concepts used by artists and poets in ancient Greece to struggle with the 
conditions of their existence. As times changed, as the historical and material conditions 
of cultural life shifted and realigned, the heroic conception gave way to Modern 
conceptions of the individual subject, the Ego. There is “progress” from one stage or state 
to another, the next, but there is not Progress in terms of the eventual actualization of 
some Ideal. I think there are serious considerations to be made on this point regarding 
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 what cognitive scientists call “social cognition,” but these considerations largely fall 
outside the current project. We will encounter this topic again briefly near the end of our 
studies. All I mean to say here is that may adaption of Nöe and Heidegger’s action-
oriented understanding of the concept is to be applied in instances where I make broad 
historical arguments about the relationship between movements in Modern philosophy 
and those in literary Modernism. These arguments, by and large, are arguments about the 
clash, the synthesis, and the re-valuation of concepts geared toward human action – in the 
case of metaphysics, geared toward the act of understanding the world and our own 
selves holistically. 
 The underground discourse makes interventions in the dominant conceptual 
scheme that lead to disruptions throughout the discourse reliant upon those 
conceptualizations. My focus on Dostoevsky’s underground man was intended to lay the 
groundwork for the interventions that will occur and recur throughout the remainder of 
this text. I will encounter other underground interlocutors, literary and otherwise. 
Certainly Heidegger is such a thinker of the underground within the context of Anglo-
American philosophy in the U.S. Even Nöe, who thinks against representation, who 
resists representational schemes, can be considered part of this underground. These 
thinkers and artists have helped me articulate the need to get back into place against the 
background of the major discourse occurring “above ground.” They will also help to 
develop a placial ontology, one necessary for overcoming the difficulties inherited from 
the Enlightenment.  
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That climax when the brain acknowledges the world, 
all values extended into the blood awake. 
 – Muriel Rukeyser, “Reading Time: 1 Minute 26 Seconds,” (1939) 
 
2.1 Crises in Modernisms Literary and Philosophical 
 The fascinating thing about Modernist literature in relation to Modern philosophy 
is the specificity of its philosophical references and the way in which it prefigures the 
postmodern theoretical turn in philosophical discourse. Calvin O. Schrag reports, for 
instance, that while at Harvard together in the late 1950s, Derrida spent more time in the 
Lamont Library reading James Joyce than worrying over existential quantifiers.1 What’s 
more, leading figures in European Modernism (Joyce, Woolf, Thomas Mann, Rilke, 
Robert Musil, Pirandello, Svevo, are examples) were educated in the classical 
gymnasium style at least through secondary school, and often through university 
educations. This means they were all exposed to the philosophical canon – Plato, 
Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, etc. – and the influence of these various 
philosophical figures on different Modernist authors is documented in a wealth of literary 
critique, as well as in the letters and personal writings of the artists themselves. 
Philosophically, part of the underground discourse I’m engaging involves reading this 
                                                
1 Schrag, “Jacques Derrida and Martin Heidegger on Deconstruction.” Doing Philosophy with 
Others: Conversations, Reminiscences, and Reflections (West Lafayette: Purdue University, 
2010), 27-28. 
 67 
philosophical response in Modernism, and teasing out arguments therein that point to our 
basic emplacement. The main focus of this chapter will be a reading of Descartes through 
the lens of critiques found in Modernist literature, in Rainer Maria Rilke and Luigi 
Pirandello specifically. We will discover emplacement already in Descartes, tacitly 
necessitated by his very own reflective procedure – a metaphor of mirrors. The way in 
which Modernists play on this reflective procedure, inverting the metaphor from one of 
epistemic certainty to one that prefigures madness and the dis-ease of consciousness 
thrown into an epistemic abyss of meaning is shown through scenes in Rilke and 
Pirandello that describe the displacement at work when looking into mirrors, when 
reflecting back our own self in the representative procedure. But before such an argument 
can land with full effect, two preliminary tasks are in order. 
 Ontology and epistemology are both thematic elements that have variously been 
taken to be the key defining features that differentiate the Modern from the postmodern 
or a feature of Modernism’s fundamental orientation to the Enlightenment and its theories 
of representation.2 I will therefore situate Modernism and postmodernism so that we have 
a general framework from which to approach the specific examples I’ll draw on later. 
Keep in mind the need to see broad historical developments in artistic and philosophical 
movements that happen over several generations. Rilke and Pirandello are responding to 
philosophical ideas developed over 260 years. This background will help bring to a point 
                                                
2 Cf., Matei Calinescu, The Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, 
Kitsch, Postmodernism, (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1987), 269; Brian McHale, 
Postmodernist Fiction (New York: Routledge, 1987); Herman, “Modernism versus 
Postmodernism: Toward an Analytic Distinction.” Poetics Today, 12:1 (Spring 1991), 55-86; 
Pericles Lewis, The Cambridge Companion to Modernism (New York: Cambridge University, 
2007); and, Richard Sheppard, “The Problematics of European Modernism.” Theorizing 
Modernism, ed. Steve Giles (London: Routledge, 1993), 1-30. 
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two lines of thought that have, until now, perhaps appeared as separate. The first Chapter 
dealt alternatively with the idea of crisis, particularly the ontological malaise brought on 
by the dis-ease of consciousness that presents a systemic threat; and, the idea of 
representation, the need to think differently, to begin again, about the relationship 
between a given entity capable of acknowledging the world around it, and its place in that 
world, its constitution and maintenance as what it is in the world. When we understand 
the fundamental ontological and epistemological issues raised in Modernist literature, 
we’ll see that this is a crisis of representation itself, which, following Nancy’s analysis, is 
a grounding principle of Western culture – a systemic risk. That the crisis of 
representation is not a merely epistemic concern will become increasingly obvious, 
especially in Chapter Four’s interpretation of William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! 
Indeed, the crisis is seen to be “global” in its progression from Europe to North America. 
Although I cannot get into all the debts and trans-Atlantic exchanges between European 
and American Modernists, it will sometimes be relevant that the two are historically 
enmeshed.3  
                                                
3 Good general studies can be found in Michael Levenson, Modernism (New Haven: Yale 
University, 2011); Tim Armstrong, Modernism: A Cultural History (New York: Polity, 2005); 
Edward S. Cutler, Recovering the New: Transatlantic Roots of Modernism (Hanover: University 
Press of New England, 2003); Lemke Sieglinde, Primitivist Modernism: Black Culture and the 
Origins of Transatlantic Modernism (New York: Oxford University, 1998); Robert M. Crunden, 
American Salons: Encounters with European Modernism, 1885-1917 (New York: Oxford 
University, 1993); Graham Goode, “The American Reception of European Modernism.” 
Neohelicon, 14:2 (September 1987), 41-52; and, Malcolm Bradbury, “The Nonhomemade World: 
European and American Modernism.” American Quarterly, 39:1 (Spring 1987), 27-36. For more 
specifically on William Faulkner and European Modernism, see Richard C. Morland, “Faulkner 
and Modernism,” and André Bleikasten, “Faulkner from a European Perspective,” both in The 
Cambridge Companion to Faulkner, ed. Philip M. Weinstein (New York: Cambridge University, 
1995); Scott Williams, “Eating Faulkner, Eating Baudelaire: Multiple Rewritings and Cultural 
Cannibalism.” The Faulkner Journal, 25:1 (Fall 2009), 65-84, and Benjamin Koch, “The French 
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 After the context of Modernism has been fleshed out a bit, it will be necessary to 
briefly outline Descartes’ place within the history of modernity so that when the critical 
work is done, we are clear on the precise moment in Descartes’ philosophy when the 
ontological significance of emplacement can be recovered. 
2.2 Ontology, Epistemology, and the Crisis of Representation in Modernity 
The paradigmatic example of the crisis of representation in European Modernism 
is perhaps Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s 1902 text, Ein Brief, often translated as The Lord 
Chandos Letter. In Ein Brief, Hofmannsthal depicts a fictional letter written by Lord 
Chandos to Francis Bacon, dated August, 1603, in which Lord Chandos details, in 
ironically beautiful prose, how he is experiencing a crisis of language and meaning in 
which he can no longer articulate himself in speech or writing.4 Lord Chandos’ crisis of 
language has been explored by Rainer Nagele and Fernando Bayón,5 expressed 
philosophically as the tension between metaphysics and epistemology. Bayón is 
particularly sensitive to the crisis evoked by the fin de siècle, an attitude toward the end 
of the 19th century that was marked by suspicion, condemnation of society’s degradation 
by modernity, combined with terror and paranoia over the disintegration of traditions and, 
often rural, cultures. This attitude is typified by texts such as Max Nordau’s 
Degeneration (1892) and Otto Weininger’s misogynistic and anti-Semitic Sex and 
                                                
Quarter Apprentice: William Faulkner’s Modernist Evolution.” Louisiana History: The Journal 
of the Louisiana Historical Association, 48:1 (Winter 2007), 55-68. 
4 Hofmannsthal, The Lord Chandos Letter and Other Writings, trans. Joel Rotenburg (New York: 
NYRB, 2005). 
5 Cf., Nagele, “Die Sprachkrise und ihr dichterischer Ausdruck bei Hofmannsthal (The Language 
Crisis and Its Poetic Expression in Hofmannsthal).” German Quarterly, 43:4 (November 1970), 
720-732; and, Fernando, “Freud y la crisis del lenguaje moderno en la Viena fin de siglo: Broch, 
Hofmannsthal, Kraus.” ARBOR: Ciencia, Pensamiento y Cultura, 183:723 (January-February 
2007), 135-154. 
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Character (1903).6 Again, there is an explicit clinicalization, an appeal to health, in these 
texts, and Hofmannsthal’s Ein Brief opens with a Hippocratic aphorism that translates, 
“One who is suffering from a severe illness yet feels no pain is sick in mind.”7 Lord 
Chandos’ sickness is, like Dostoevsky’s underground man, related to his consciousness, 
and Bacon had written to him that, “I need medicine not merely to cure my illness but to 
heighten my awareness of my inner state.”8 Bacon, the representative of the 
Enlightenment to whom Chandos is attempting to explain his situation, recommends 
more consciousness, a heightened awareness of his inner state, more reflection – 
reflection being the observation of the operations of our minds (Descartes, Locke, 
Hume). Out of this dis-ease it comes to pass that Chandos, once a talented wordsmith, 
“completely lost the ability to think or speak coherently about anything at all,” 
emphasizes his specific unease over the words “spirit,” “soul,” or “body,” and also 
suffers an intense bout of the malaise while trying to impress upon his four-year-old 
daughter the need to always be truthful.9 An epistemic problem, arising from reflection, 
while planning artistic works entitled Nosce te ipsum,10 finally manifests in the 
ontological question wherein Chandos’ own being is an issue for him – the mind-body 
problematic leading to the crisis of representation, his inability to relate to the world out 
there. I briefly point out these elements of Hofmannsthal’s text because they are really 
paradigmatic of the way Modernists in Europe were mixing up the ontological-
                                                
6 Nordau, Degeneration, trans. George L. Mosse (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1993); and, 
Weininger, Sex and Character, trans. Ladislaus Löb (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2005). 
7 Hofmannsthal, Lord Chandos Letter, 117. 
8 Hofmannsthal, Lord Chandos Letter, 117. 
9 Hofmannsthal, Lord Chandos Letter, 121. 
10 “Know yourself,” in Hofmannsthal, Lord Chandos Letter, 120. 
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epistemological distinctions laid out by Modern philosophy. We’ll see similar moves in 
greater detail in Rilke and Pirandello.  
Using Ein Brief as an exemplar serves our purposes well for a variety of reasons, 
beyond illustrating the way Modernism had a fundamental orientation toward the 
Enlightenment that, as David Harman argues, “marks an unstable conjuncture of two 
phenomena: on the one hand, the elaboration of a highly progessivist ethos; on the other 
hand, an increased sensitivity to epistemological problems bound up with 
representation.”11 Thus we are also presented with a prefiguration of the so-called 
postmodern turn in philosophy, a turn instigated by the likes of Heidegger, Foucault, 
Deleuze, and Derrida – almost anyone “continental” – but also by the followers of 
Whitehead’s process philosophy and American Pragmatism in the Anglo-American 
world, and Richard Rorty in particular.12 Although I would like to point out that during a 
2014 summer seminar I attended at the Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense 
thanks to a generous scholarship from Purdue University and the Partner University 
Fund, I was hard-pressed to find any French scholar who took seriously the idea that 
Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, or anyone was “postmodern” or “post-structural” which 
seemed to them a mostly American invention. Many of the French, notably Jean-Michel 
Salanskis and Elie During, were happy treating Foucault and Deleuze as advanced 
                                                
11 Harman, “Modernism versus Postmodernism: Toward an Analytic Distinction.” Poetics Today, 
12:1 (Spring 1991), 56. 
12 G. B. Madison, “Postmodern Philosophy?” Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 
2:2-3 (1988), 166-82; David Ray Griffith, Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: 
Peirce, James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne (Albany: SUNY, 1993); Hilary Putnam, 
Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1990); John N. Deely, New 
Beginnings: Early Modern Philosophy and Postmodern Thought (Toronto: University of Toronto, 
1994). 
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varieties of structuralists, with Derrida able to safely claim the mantle of deconstruction 
for himself. In Chapter Three, I will address the particular issue with regards to 
representation in Derrida’s Grammatology. For now, it is important that these are crises 
of representation broadly speaking, that we find such a crisis not only in Derrida’s trace 
and his procedure of erasure, borrowed from Heidegger, but also find in Foucault’s 
famous concern with representation, and the classical versus modern epistemes 
throughout his early work culminating in Les Mots et les Choses in 1966.13 Further, when 
we turn to the New Realists in Chapter Four, they will make it clear that these 
postmodern theories, particularly those with the family resemblance of 
“constructivism,”14 are theories that carry both epistemological and ontological weight. 
More detailed analysis on these fronts can wait, but it is important now to show a general 
trend in both literary Modernism and so-called postmodern philosophy that echo and 
reinforce one another, but where literary Modernism offers an alternative to 
constructivism by way of emplacement. That alternative will be sought here, through a 
confrontation with Descartes – but one that seeks what is unspoken in Descartes. 
The Lord Chandos’ Letter is a brief text and it builds us toward the possibility of 
silence, the silence of a language Chandos knows not what; the sound of a foreign song 
sung from a palm at the end of the mind. When contemplating the profound peace that he 
seeks in another way of thinking, in a different kind of thought, he knows he will not 
                                                
13 Literally Words and Things, translated as Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of 
the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). 
14 Theories that claim things appearing in the world are “constructed” by human discourse 
(language) in some way – that things exist insofar as we carry on a discourse about them, 
meaning things are contingent, historical, and their meaning and/or value is entirely dependent on 
and derived from human linguistic activity. 
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write any more books, for the reason that “the language in which I might have been 
granted the opportunity not only to write but also to think is not Latin or English, or 
Italian, or Spanish, but a language of which I know not one word, a language in which 
mute things speak to me and in which I will perhaps have something to say for myself 
someday when I am dead and standing before an unknown judge.”15 Thus Modernist 
literature prepares the incredulity toward metanarrative that will be expressed by 
postmodern theorists, to use Jean-François Lyotard’s famous phrase. The repeated 
approaches to the unspeakable mere being, that place at the end of the mind, the end of 
subjectivity, erased “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea,”16 placed under 
erasure, “subjectivity” a necessary but insufficient sign, the true and authentic self always 
already yet to come, a futural projection, in the making, unformed, but finite. I want to 
focus on this epistemological and ontological tension within literary forms of Modernism 
and postmodernism, since on these issues we find a tremendous overlap and confusion 
between philosophy and literature. This is particularly true in the case of Brian McHale’s 
Postmodernist Fiction, which argues that the dominance of epistemology in Modernist 
fiction and the dominance of ontology in postmodern fiction is the key criterion for the 
distinction. 
The first signs of resistance to McHale’s neat distinction comes from Matei 
Calinescu’s intellectual history, Five Faces of Modernity. As the sub-title (Modernism, 
Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism) suggests, postmodernism is treated as 
                                                
15 Hofmannsthal, Lord Chandos Letter, 127-28. 
16 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1994), 387. 
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a derivative mode of modernity itself. Calinescu writes, “Postmodernism…is not a new 
name for a new ‘reality,’ or ‘mental structure,’ or ‘world view,’ but a perspective from 
which one can ask certain questions about modernity in its several incarnations…Within 
the lexicon of modernity, postmodernism appears to me as having an even more 
explicitly interrogative nature than other key terms…postmodernism is perhaps the most 
quizzical: self-skeptical yet curious, unbelieving yet searching, benevolent yet ironic.”17 
Strangely, then, according to Calinescu, postmodernism is marked by a particular concern 
with epistemology, not necessarily ontology. We can get a sense of this just by 
considering Michel Foucault’s title The Archeology of Knowledge, his emphasis on 
epistemes, and the “incredulity toward metanarrative,” attested by Lyotard. Under these 
interpretations, postmodernism is not especially marked by a tendency toward ontology 
over epistemology. As Calinescu attests, 
The more comprehensive presentations of the issues of postmodernism 
sometimes include references to epistemological problems and concepts, 
such as the crisis of determinism, the place of chance and disorder in natural 
processes, Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy, the question of time 
and particularly irreversible time (whose recognition has displaced the 
powerful classical clockwork model of the universe), Karl Popper’s view of 
scientific theories in terms of “falsifiability” rather than mere 
“verifiability,” and Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigms” and “scientific 
revolutions. That such ideas can easily be misunderstood and distorted by 
literary critics and artists goes without saying.18 
 
Again, the crisis of representational knowledge is acknowledged as a systemic crisis. 
With increasing anxiety over the possibility of truth, a real danger that we have lost 
                                                
17 Matei Calinescu, The Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, 
Postmodernism, (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1987), 279. 
18 Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, 269. 
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contact with the world, bound up with shifting cultural values and the upheaval of 
historical institutions and norms. We will see this widespread disruption addressed, for 
instance by Balzac and Faulkner, in Chapters Three and Four. Writing on the 
“problematic” of European Modernism, Richard Sheppard argues that, “At the heart of 
the problématique perceived by a large number of major modernist artists and 
intellectuals lay the sense, more or less explicitly formulated and explained in any given 
case, that contemporary European culture was experiencing the subversion of the most 
fundamental assumptions and conceptual models on which the liberal humanist epoch 
had been based.”19 This general picture is what’s important for our immediate concerns. 
For one, it becomes increasingly clear that a neat demarcation between Modernism and 
postmodernism may not come as easily as McHale had hoped. However, we may still be 
guided by him to an important intensity within postmodernism – an extreme skepticism 
that denies the world outright, or else accepts our subjective constructions (epistemic 
constructions) as identical with and constitutive of the world itself. Modernism is already 
fomenting the paradoxical complexities of these onto-epistemological entanglements. We 
have already considered, with Nisly, how Dostoevsky’s underground man, standing at the 
threshold of the Modern Abyss, was a paradoxicalist and a complexifier. Indeed, Nisly 
was prescient to call this a “Modernist Impulse.” Elsewhere, Marshall Berman famously 
observes that, “…it [Modernism] is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all 
into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of 
ambiguity and anguish. To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, 
                                                
19 Richard Sheppard, “The Problematics of European Modernism.” Theorizing Modernism, ed. 
Steve Giles (London: Routledge, 1993), 13. 
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‘all that is solid melts into air.’”20 Indeed, Calinescu notes that modernity is itself in 
tension, pulled between two modes of Modernism that run alongside one another and 
sometimes express a clash of ideas which mark the struggle and contradictions of the 
times. These two strains of modernity may be conflicting, but they are deeply 
interdependent, as Calinescu explains, “one socially progressive, rationalistic, 
competitive, technological; the other culturally critical and self-critical, bent on 
demystifying the basic values of the first.”21 In the terms of the current project, we can 
understand this as the tension between philosophical Modernism – exemplified here by 
Descartes, Kant, etc. – and literary Modernism – Rilke, Pirandello, Faulkner, etc. – where 
Modern philosophy is the rationalistic/technological strain and literary Modernism is the 
critical/demystifying variety. Calinescu is quick to point out, however, that literary 
Modernism is itself both modern and antimodern, “modern in its commitment to 
innovation, in its rejection of authority of tradition, in its experimentalism; antimodern in 
its dismissal of the dogma of progress, in its critique of rationality, in its sense that 
modern civilization has brought about the loss of something precious, the dissolution of a 
great integrative paradigm, the fragmentation of what once was a mighty unity.”22 Of 
course, I am applying these concepts broadly, for we can see in any particular example a 
mixture of these modes: Descartes is the champion of reason, a technologist, and believes 
in progress and the unity of scientific knowledge secure in God’s Being; yet, he rejects 
dogmatism, is critical of traditional authority (especially that of the ancients), and so on. 
                                                
20 Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: 
Penguin, 1988), 15. 
21 Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, 265. 
22 Calinescu, Fives Faces of Modernity, 265. 
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We will elaborate on Descartes’ Modernist impulses below. In short, I think a nuanced 
and complexified understanding of modernity has great advantages over neat 
compartmentalization, simply because it reflects historical reality and the very notions of 
cultural crisis, revaluation, and paradox that so consume folks who wade between these 
two currents. 
 At this point, we really hit upon the problem posed by Brian McHale’s tidy 
demarcations. When he first suggests his main thesis, he relies on a quote from Dick 
Higgins, which McHale repeats when he writes, “modernist fiction deploys strategies 
which engage and foreground questions such as… ‘How can I interpret this world of 
which I am a part? And what am I in it?’”23 The immediate problem is that only one of 
those questions is epistemological, namely the first, while the second is an ontological 
question that asks about the nature of being in the world, the being capable of asking 
questions regarding its own existence. McHale has a difficult time dealing with the 
philosophical aspects of his theses throughout Postmodernist Fiction. While I appreciate 
his desire to focus in on fiction, he does not maintain this focus, and consistently veers 
into the philosophical (which he must do – epistemology and ontology are the domains of 
philosophy, not literary criticism, and although it is desirable and sometimes necessary 
for literary critics and theorists to engage literature philosophically, the criteria by which 
their deployment of philosophical concepts must be judged remain philosophical criteria, 
which is the only domain appropriate to them). This tendency is expressed in a certain 
                                                
23 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (New York: Routledge, 1987), 9. Quoted from Dick 
Higgins, A Dialectic of Centuries: Notes Toward a Theory of the New Arts, (New York: Printed 
Editions, 1978), 101 – although, McHale himself provides no page number for this reference. 
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slippage of orientation toward Derrida. McHale sometimes treats Derrida’s texts right 
alongside works of fiction, subjecting those works to analysis as literary works, and 
sometimes uses Derrida’s theories in order to execute his own arguments regarding 
postmodernist literature. Part of this difficulty is addressed by deconstruction itself, but 
more to the point here, the difficulty can be alleviated by attentiveness to the dialogue 
occurring between philosophy and literature, that there is a seemingly generational 
process between the two – at least at that time in Europe. For instance, in sections on 
“machines,” and “schizoid texts” McHale could indicate Deleuze, who applies both these 
concepts explicitly to modernist texts by Kafka, Artaud, and others.24 On this front there 
is one oversight which I do consider a threat to the overall thesis of Postmodernist 
Fiction. Although there is an entire Part of the book, comprised of four chapters, entitled 
“Worlds,” and a total of eight chapters with “world” in the title, including one called 
“Worlds Under Erasure,” nowhere is there any reference to Heidegger, and this in a book 
that is, ostensibly, about the role of ontology in literature. Worse, McHale treats erasure 
as a technique developed by Derrida in Of Grammatology, when in fact, this technique 
was developed as a specifically ontological procedure by Heidegger as early as 1955. 
Even more problematic is that the very section in Of Grammatology cited by McHale is 
engaged in a rigorous dialogue exactly with Heidegger, and Derrida there emphasizes his 
attempts to think through the problems of erasure and trace in Speech and Phenomena, 
which also deals at great length with Heidegger’s ontology.25 It is not as if these texts are 
                                                
24 McHale, Postmodernist Fiction, 159-61, 190-94. 
25 Cf., McHale, Postmodernist Fiction, 99-111; Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. 
Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1997), 18-26; Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And 
Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
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irrelevant, as purely philosophical, to McHale’s thesis. On the contrary, Heidegger 
himself often treats literature and art as ontological, and most of his specific examples are 
exactly Modernist ones – Rilke, Paul Klee, Georg Trakl, van Gogh, Stefan George, to 
name a few – and the point of those discussions is precisely that the artists in question are 
primarily ontological, that is, they bring us to the Seinsfrage, the question of Being.26 I 
cannot help but think McHale’s book could only benefit from attention to some of this 
significant work already done on the relationship between Modernism, postmodernism, 
epistemology, and ontology, including Calinescu’s book, which had, ten years earlier, 
treated postmodernism as a new variety of the avant-garde, one marked by anarchism 
and hyper-intellectualism.27 The central problem with these philosophical oversights is 
precisely that the previous works explicitly contradict McHale’s main thesis regarding 
the division of Modernism and postmodernism along epistemological and ontological 
lines. As I have shown above, McHale himself does not always keep ontology and 
epistemology so neatly separated. In itself, Absalom, Absalom! – where McHale clams 
“postmodernist” literature begins – is not so unique in its blending of these two modes, a 
fact that outstrips our concerns here, though I urge readers to go back as early as 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra for but one example. 
                                                
University, 1973); and Heidegger, “On the Question of Being (1955).” Pathmarks, trans. William 
McNeill (New York: Cambridge University, 1998), 291-322. 
26 Cf., Heidegger, “The Nature of Language,” and “Language in the Poem: A Discussion of 
Georg Trakl’s Poetic Work,” both in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1982), 57-110 and 159-98, respectively; Heidegger, “The Origin 
of the Work of Art (1935-36),” and “Why Poets? (1946),” both in Off the Beaten Track, trans. 
Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (New York: Cambridge, 2002), 1-56 and 200-241 
respectively; Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 2002), 1-3; Heidegger, “What are Poets For?” Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert 
Hofstadter (New York: Harper Perennial Classics, 2001), 87-140. 
27 Calinescu, Fives Faces of Modernity, 132-48. 
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The ultimate point, one recognized by Calinescu, Lewis, Sheppard, Berman, and 
Heidegger, is that Modernism is not especially epistemological as opposed to ontological, 
and, in fact, a close reading of Modernist texts reveal a deep suspicion of the authority of 
those distinctions, which became canonical around the time of Kant. In the end, the 
distinction between epistemology and ontology is just not a good criterion for 
distinguishing between Modern and postmodern. Herman has argued that to even 
postulate the ontologic/epistemic distinction is already a Modernist gesture, one rooted, 
as I have already indicated, in the Enlightenment project exemplified by Kant. Herman 
himself advocates for understanding Modernism-postmodernism in terms of two 
responses to the Enlightenment itself, which serves as both a wellspring and a metonym 
for progressive ideals.28 This echoes Calinescu’s analysis of Modernism as both modern 
and antimodern; as divided within itself and against itself in a state of relative crises. It is 
also sensitive to the deeply historical concerns of modernity, concerns about the stability 
of culture and society, the dubiousness of Progress, the death of God, and this historical 
sensibility resonates with both Frederic Jameson and Linda Hutcheon, who fair better 
than McHale in treating the distinctly postmodern relationship to history as its defining 
feature.29 But John Duvall has pointed out that both these positions on postmodernism, 
Jameson’s as an ahistorical (politically dangerous) play on pastiched images with a 
consumer-focused analysis and Hutcheon’s as a parodic historicism focused on the artist-
                                                
28 Herman, “Modernism versus Postmodernism: Toward an Analytic Distinction,” 56-57. 
29 See particularly Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
(Durham: Duke University, 1991). Like Berman, Jameson argues from a predominantly Marxist 
position. Linda Hutcheon produced two book-length studies: Hutcheon, The Poetics of 
Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1988); and Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism 
(New York: Routledge, 1989). Her theory of parody has made important contributions to the 
current work. 
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as-producer, are ultimately rooted in basically Modernist trends. Jameson follows the 
path of Adorno, and Hutcheon that of the avant-garde.30 Given Adorno’s “accidental 
insight” into decadence as a philosophy of negation capable of severing art from 
ideology, and his attacks on kitsch, interpreted by Calinescu as the ideological 
manipulation of art to produce an illusion of taste, we can see how Jameson’s pastiche 
performs a similar function as the result of aesthetic production being subsumed by 
commodity production.31 Hutcheon’s relation to the avant-garde, as a term of 
revolutionary politics rooted in the French Enlightenment is likewise informative.32 For 
Hutcheon, the postmodern is progressive and liberatory because of its play with history, 
its acknowledgement of historical precedent while parodying that precedent in a creative 
dialogue that can be moved forward and provide political change. This aligns her, not 
only with the Utopians of the Romantic avant-garde, but also the politically extreme 
futurists Apollinaire and Boccioni, who ushered in an obsession with esprit nouveau, and 
Bakunin’s anarchist maxim that “To destroy is to create.”33 Even if Hutcheon strives to 
remain liberatory, insofar as she invokes a dialectic between two autonomous entities, the 
very dialectical process itself instantiates a transformation that destroys its first moment 
in the opening salvo. The parody of history destroys it. What is retained are the fragments 
of history reworked and reinterpreted and somehow different, representative of a break 
with the past and the creation of the new – thus, the realization of Jameson’s fear of the 
ahistorical.  
                                                
30 Duvall, “Troping History: Modernist Residue in Frederic Jameson’s Pastiche and Linda 
Hutcheon’s Parody.” Style, 33:3 (Fall 1999), 372. 
31 Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, 210-11 and 240-42. Duvall, “Troping History,” 374.  
32 Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, 100-101. 
33 Duvall, “Troping History,” 378-80. Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, 101 and 116-17. 
 82 
What we stumble upon is perhaps the key of postmodernism; that in it, the tension 
pulling ontology and epistemology apart reaches its highest point, and in a mad dash to 
tip the scales, the die is cast in favor of one extreme or the other. Both result in a loss of 
authentic history – the crisis of modernity still the beating heart of a derivative post-
modernism. Postmodernists respond to the crisis with a Pyrrhic skepticism that is 
interpreted either negatively (Jameson) or positively (Hutcheon). In the negative case, we 
must give up the fight for truth and surrender to a basically groundless existence, doomed 
to mass-produce a hollow meaning in the same manner as consumer goods, and be thus 
alienated from an authentic historical relationship with the world around us. In the 
positive case, we continue the fight, surrendering any pretense to an authentic history in 
parodic gestures performed in the hope of a liberation to come. Both approaches give up 
far more than they gain. They both essentially perform the equivalent of Husserl’s 
phenomenological epoché. The epoché asks that we bracket or set aside the question of 
the real existence of an object of thought in order to analyze the object as perceived 
through a series of intentional acts.34 Postmodernism sets these questions aside, and then 
promptly loses them altogether! We are thus left only with what we construct for 
ourselves out of the flotsam of our subjective states. This discussion serves to highlight 
Ferraris’ identification of postmodernism with social construction. Jameson sees 
postmodernism accepting this constructivism in despair, while Hutcheon remains ever 
hopeful of the rebirth that follows destruction. What has happened is that, in the 
                                                
34 I mean here only the “phenomenological reduction” given by Husserl in Cartesian Meditations, 
trans. Dorian Carnes (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1999), 20-21. I am aware that Husserl 
elsewhere details other modes of reduction, but these are not pertinent to the point, and it seems 
clear that Husserl himself never intends that we bracket these questions indefinitely – in fact, the 
phenomenological method should help us be better prepared to face them. 
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forgetting of the ontological question, surrendered in both the positive and negative 
iterations of postmodernism, the ontological question has been given an epistemological 
answer, namely, that existence, Being, just is our epistemic construction. It should be 
clear that the constructivist answer is epistemological only, and cannot address the 
constitution of the being that constructs, nor is there a viable explanation for why the 
construct has any significance to begin with.  
Husserl himself saw this tension as part of the crisis he had diagnosed in the 
European sciences. He writes, “Reason itself and its [object], ‘that which is,’ become 
ever more enigmatic – reason as giving, of itself, meaning to the existing world, and 
correlatively, the world as existing through reason – until finally the consciously 
recognized world-problem of the deepest essential interrelation between reason and what-
is in general, the enigma of all enigmas, has to become the actual theme of inquiry.”35 
Thus, Husserl is thoroughly modern. He did not fall prey to the Pyrrhic skepticism of 
postmodernity, still hoping for a universal philosophy, even under a modified 
understanding of “universal,” and retaining the Kantian ground in the transcendental ego. 
Heidegger, Husserl’s student, only makes progress by avoiding the transcendental ego in 
favor of emphasizing the finitude of thought in Kant. He thereby sought to reach the heart 
of the enigma of all enigmas, something that we will see the New Realists want to avoid 
by re-instantiating Modern philosophers’ barrier between ontology and epistemology. 
                                                
35 Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An 
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University, 1970), 13. 
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With this background now in place, and the tension between ontology and 
epistemology within the Modern paradigm made clear, we can turn again to the 
beginning, to Descartes and the founding procedure of consciousness. In Descartes’ 
grounding metaphor, his basic concept, reflection, we find the hidden entry into place. It 
is a strange language, spoken in silence, in which the underground discourse wins its 
terms from the aboveground, from the major literature. With this confrontation between 
Descartes and the Modernists, we take the first step, with Edward Casey, toward getting 
back into place. 
2.3 Descartes’ Mirror 
 The mirror perfectly illustrates the structure of the cogito. I have already outlined 
the basic significance of reflection in the procedure that sets things before the subject in 
representation. It is significant that Descartes was working seriously on optics in the late 
1620s, evidenced by a letter to Father Marsenne in November 1630, in which the early 
Dioptrics is mentioned by name.36 This study in natural philosophy was preparatory for a 
larger, systematic study of the mechanical universe, including its cosmology, to be titled 
Traité du Monde et de la Lumière. In the total system of mechanistic natural philosophy, 
only matter and three laws of motion were necessary to produce all natural phenomenon. 
The material basis of Descartes’ natural philosophy was designed in order to support his 
theory of optics using the well-established principles of hydrostatics. The task Descartes 
set for himself in Traité du Monde (hereafter referred to as The World) was to apply the 
                                                
36 Descartes, Philosophical Writings: Vol. 3, the Correspondence, trans. John Cottingham, Robert 
Soothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (New York: Cambridge University, 1991), 28-
29. 
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principles of hydrostatics to cosmology in order to construct a world in which his optics 
could be adequately formulated. But The World never appeared during Descartes’ 
lifetime.  
 In November, 1633, Descartes writes to Mersenne concerning Galileo’s 
condemnation, saying he had been “told that [World Systems] had indeed been published 
but that all the copies had immediately been burnt at Rome, and that Galileo had been 
convicted and fined. I was so astonished at this that I almost decided to burn all my 
papers or at least to let no-one see them.”37 Thankfully, Descartes did not burn his work, 
but instead, separated his research on optics and meteorology from the larger treatise, and 
published them independently and without including reference to the forbidden 
hypothesis of the Earth’s movement, though that hypothesis is actually central to the 
entire cohesion of The World. The heliocentric hypothesis, and the concomitant assertion 
that the Earth moved contrary to Church doctrine was, according to Descartes in his 
November 1633 letter to Mersenne, “such a central part of my treatise that I couldn’t 
remove it without making the whole work defective.”38 Gaukroger has conclusively 
shown that the condemnation of Galileo was the primary reason for Descartes’ 
abandonment of The World.39 These historical circumstances will become philosophically 
salient below. First, a consideration of what exactly Descartes achieved in his optics is in 
order. 
                                                
37 Descartes, The Correspondence, 40. 
38 Descartes, The Correspondence, 41. 
39 In both Gaukroger, Introduction to The World and Other Writings (New York: Cambridge 
University, 2004), vii-viii; and in the book length study Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual 
Biography (New York: Oxford University, 1995), 290-92. 
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 Descartes’ theory of optics was part of a lineage dating back to Greek antiquity 
and is bound together with the history of certain scientific technologies; equipment such 
as lenses, mirrors, and camera obscura. For instance, in 1604, the German astronomer 
Johannes Kepler describes having seen a camera obscura: 
…an experimentum...which I saw at Dresden in the elector's theater of 
artifices...A disk thicker in the middle, or a crystalline lens, a foot in 
diameter, was standing at the entrance of a closed chamber against a little 
window, which was the only thing that was open, slanted a little to the right. 
Thus when the eyesight travelled through the dark emptiness, it also, 
fortuitously, hit upon the place of the image, nearer, in fact, than the lens. 
And so since the lens was weakly illuminated, it did not particularly attract 
the eyes. But the walls were also not particularly conspicuous through the 
lens, because they were in deep darkness.40 
 
The device had been known since antiquity for its use in the safe observation of lunar 
eclipses. I mention this observation by Kepler, because it has been demonstrated that 
Kepler exerted an oft unacknowledged influence on Descartes, and both conducted 
research with the use of technological apparatuses such as lenses, mirrors, and camera 
obscura.41 The refinements of lens grinding technologies in the 1500s made for ever more 
                                                
40 Johannes Kepler, Optics: Paralipomena to Witelo & Optical Part of Astronomy, trans. William 
H. Donahue (Sante Fe, 2000), 194. 
41 Descartes does admit the profound influence in a letter to Mersenne dated 31 March 1638. For 
reasons about which I can only speculate, this letter (and many letters significant to Descartes’ 
work as a natural philosopher) are not included in Descartes, The Philosophical Writings, Vol. 3: 
Correspondence. This particular letter can be found at Descartes, Letter to Mersenne, 31 March 
1638, Circulation of Knowledge and Learned Practices in the 17th-Century Dutch Republic, 
http://ckcc.huygens.knaw.nl/epistolarium/letter.html?id=desc004/2152, [accessed 03/16/2016]. 
The relevant passage reads, “Cela n'empêche pas que je n'avoue que Kepler a été mon 1er maître 
en Optique, et que je crois qu'il a été celui de tous qui en a le plus su par ci-devant,” which 
translates, “This [Kepler’s errors] does not prevent me from admitting that Kepler is my 1st 
teacher in optics, and I think that he knew more [on the subject] than all those who came before.” 
There is good scholarly work on the influence of Kepler on Descartes in Stanley David 
Gedzelman, “Did Kepler’s Supplement to Witlo Inspire Descartes’ Theory of the Rainbow.” 
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 70:7 (July 1989), 750-51. 
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powerful instruments, and allowed more daring inquiries into the nature of optics. The 
ancient Chinese thinker Mozi mentions the camera obscura as early as the 5th century 
BCE, and he correctly explains that the image appeared upside-down because light travels 
in a straight-line from its source. Light entering the lens at a downward angle ends up 
proportionally lower than light which entered the lens at an upward angle. The image is 
not only upside-down, but reversed left-to-right due to the trajectory of light through the 
lens, or just a plain old pin hole in the wall of a dark enclosure. By explaining the 
appearance of images according to natural or physical principles, such as the movement 
of light, thinkers the world over were beginning to unlock not only the ways in which the 
world itself worked, but also the reasons why the world appeared to us in the manner that 
it did.42 Of course, Mozi’s “treasure house,” or the simple, improvised examples given by 
Aristotle to illustrate the problems connected with mathematical theory could be 
constructed without the use of lenses. Some small aperture leading to a darker space 
would suffice. Aristotle makes note of the behavior of light passing through leafy foliage 
into a shaded clearing, how the edges round off in a uniform way due to its passage 
through the leaves. With the camera obscura, the problems always have to do with 
mathematics, and with geometry in particular.43 Light was a way to “measure the earth,” 
so to speak. Around 300 BCE, Euclid develops a geometric theory of optics in which he 
too correctly deduced the reason for the inversion of the image as light passed through 
                                                
42 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China: Volume 4, Physics and Physical 
Technology, Part 1, Physics. (Taipei: Caves Books, 1986), 82. 
43 Aristotle, “Problems.” The Complete Works, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton 
University, 1995), 1415-20. 
 88 
the pin-hole.44 His theory built on a philosophical idea of Plato, who proposed that human 
vision worked because of rays emanating out from the eye and which constitute a visual 
cone. Anything that falls within this cone becomes visible, just in the way a flashlight 
illumines only a conical area emanating from one end.45 The 9th century Arab philosopher 
Al-Kindi promoted Euclid’s theory over that of Aristotle, who argued that both the eye 
and the observed object must appear in a transparent medium, such as air, that is filled 
with light.46 Ibn al-Haytham, known in the West as Alhazen, further advance the field of 
optics through a synthesis of Aristotle, Euclid, and Ptomely. Composed from 1011 to 
1021 CE, Alhazen’s book was among the most comprehensive in the world at the time. It 
contained the first clear, technical description of a camera obscura outside of China in 
addition to experimental arrays using lenses and mirrors to explore the geometries of 
reflection and refraction.47 Eventually, Alhazen’s Book of Optics was translated into 
Latin sometime in the late 12th or early 13th century. In 1572, Freidrich Risner, a German 
mathematician from Hersfeld, printed the book as The Thesaurus of Optics. The Book of 
Optics was widely read and copied, even before Risner published it, and there is evidence 
that Alhazen’s work was profoundly influential to Roger Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, 
Descartes, as well as Descartes’ Dutch correspondent Christaan Huygens. In addition to 
                                                
44 A good translation of Euclid’s Optics by Harry Edwin Burton appears in The Journal of the 
Optical Society of America, 35:5 (May 1943), 357-72. 
45 Plato presents discussions of optics in several dialogues, notably in Timaeus, Meno, and in the 
Republic, during the famous analysis of the Divided Line. All of these dialogues can be found in 
Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
46 Peter Adamson & Peter E. Pormann, eds. The Philosophical Works of al-Kindī (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012). 
47 Alhazen’s Book of Optics is translated in two volumes by Abdelhamid I. Sabra as The Optics of 
Ibn al-Haytham, 2 vols. (Kuwait: National Council for Culture, Arts, and Letters, 1983 and 
1989). 
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these early stars of science, Alhazen inspired Giambattista della Porta to place a lens in 
the camera’s aperture in order to sharpen the image generated within the dark enclosure.48 
I spend the time rehearsing this history because I want to emphasize just how technical 
Descartes’ understanding of reflection was, and how light itself was central to Descartes’ 
natural philosophy – light is the first element, the most fluid and least dense of the 
corpuscles that constitute matter in its various states.49 Reflection is a fundamental 
property of light, and it is clear that it is Descartes’ basic inspiration for the notion of 
mental reflection. His account of the perception of light, given in the “Treatise on Man,” 
a mechanistic physiology following “Treatise on Light” in The World, involves the same 
geometrical optics he deploys in both Dioptrics, Meteorology, and The World’s “Treatise 
on Light.” Think too, how rare it was for a Western European actually look at themselves 
in a mirror until about the 19th century. It was not until the 1500s that mirrors as we know 
them today develop in Venice. The German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk ties the 
development of the mirror at this time to a conceptual shift in our sense of self-
identification that was increasingly yoked to the idea of having one’s own face and being 
able to see that face of one’s own in a mirror.50 Prior to the capabilities of mass 
production, mirrors of a quality sufficient for indoor lighting in the 1800s were rarely 
available to people who were not wealthy, or else had access to mirrors as part of 
scientific or aesthetic research. This last element brings Sloterdijk’s analysis of mirroring 
                                                
48 For Alhazen’s influence on the Enlightenment: David C. Lindberg, Roger Bacon and the 
Origins of Perspective in the Middle Ages (New York: Clarendon Press, 1996), 11; Charles H. 
Carmanx and John Hendrix, eds. Renaissance Theories of Vision (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 
2012), 12; and, Frank Northen Magill and Alison Aves, eds. "The Middles Ages: Alhazen.” 
Dictionary of World Biography, Vol. 2 (New York: Routledge, 1998), 66. 
49 Descartes, The World, 17-18. 
50 Sloterdijk, Bubbles: Spheres, Vol.1, trans. Wieland Hoban (Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2011), 197. 
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in self-identification into relation with Modernists’ confrontation with Descartes. 
Descartes, as I have shown, was a man of science. Philosophers, in their reverence of the 
Meditations and Discourse on Method, tend to forget the natural philosophy that put 
Descartes on the map. Descartes was using optics, and the attendant technologies, to 
make scientific investigations more rigorous, and geometry served as a mathematical 
model, coupled for the first time with algebraic mathematics imported from the Middle 
East. The point of this historical overview is to paint a picture of Descartes as the Modern 
technologist, invested in the progression of knowledge, but caught in a crisis when the 
mechanistic philosophy of nature conflicted with the metaphysical presuppositions of 
Church doctrine. As a result of this crisis, not quite a crisis of faith, for there seems to be 
no evidence whatsoever that Descartes was an atheist, but nevertheless, a sort of political 
crisis, which Descartes expresses in writings as an earnest desire to seek the truth; truth to 
which he believes most people are allergic, and he thus comes into conflict with the 
competing desire to be left alone and live a life of relative calm and quietude.51 This is a 
systemic crisis, as we saw Descartes admit that if he could not postulate the motion of the 
                                                
51 The desire for a peaceful existence is expressed numerous times in Descartes’ correspondence, 
and the series of letters to Mersenne concerning the Copernican hypothesis are exemplary. See, 
Descartes, The Correspondence, 36-43. There is also the moment in his Discourse on Method in 
which Descartes writes, “…in order that I should not remain irresolute in my actions while reason 
obliged me to be so in my judgments, and that I might not omit to carry on my life as happily as I 
could…” he resolves to live by a few maxims in order to live happily, one of which being to, 
“obey the laws and customs of my country…it was most expedient to bring my conduct into 
harmony with the ideas of those with whom I should have to live…” in Descartes, “Discourse on 
the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason.” Philosophical Works, Vol. 1, trans. Elizabeth S. 
Haldane and G. R.T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1931), 95. Note this pragmatic argument is 
published in 1637, in the aftermath of his decision regarding The World, which Descartes 
discusses in the closing section of the Discourse, and which is also the public premiere of the 
famous “I think, therefore I am” argument developed further in the Meditations, see Parts IV, V, 
and VI in Descartes, “Discourse on Method,” 100-130. 
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Earth, then the whole of mechanistic science is scrapped. Descartes had already engaged 
in practices of obfuscation, hiding away his true hypotheses to shield his endeavors from 
scrutiny. Already in The World, when Descartes introduces the mechanistic principles of 
the world, he does so only hypothetically, in the mode of a thought experiment, but then 
moves to argue that the hypothetical world structured on such principles would not 
appear any different from our own world. This is compounded in the “Treatise on Man,” 
which gives mechanistic explanations for human behavior, shielded as hypothetical 
theories about the bodily functions of hypothetical beings, but to whom the hypothetical 
world would appear no differently and who would themselves behave no differently than 
the world appears to us and we ourselves behave.52 The use of hypotheticals to disavow 
serious postulation of propositions heretical to Church doctrine was a staple of natural 
philosophy, deployed by Galileo himself, and utilized throughout the Enlightenment, 
including by Newton.53 More to the point of our purposes here, at the end of the “Treatise 
on Man,” Descartes concludes, 
Further, I desire that you consider that all the functions that I have attributed 
to this machine, such as the digestion of food, the beating of the heart and 
the arteries, the nourishment and growth of the bodily parts, respiration, 
waking and sleeping; the reception of light, sounds, odours, smells, heat, 
and other such qualities by the external sense organs; the impression of the 
ideas of them in the organ of common sense and the imagination, the 
retention or imprint of these ideas in the memory; the internal movements 
of the appetites and the passions; and finally the external movements of all 
                                                
52 Cf., Descartes, The World, 21-22, 67, 69, 99-100. 
53 This point on the genre of Enlightenment scientific writing is indebted to Gaukroger, 
Descartes, 238; and, Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy (New York: 
Cambridge, 2002), 10-23, and 28-29. But first and foremost to the astute historical scholarship in 
Peter Harrison, “Laws of Nature in Seventeenth Century England: From Cambridge Platonism to 
Newtonism.” The Divine Order, The Human Order, and the Order of Nature: Historical 
Perspectives, ed. Eric Watkins (New York: Oxford, 2013), 133-36. 
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the bodily parts that so aptly follow both the actions of objects presented to 
the senses, and the passions and impressions that are encountered in 
memory: and in this they imitate as perfectly as is possible the movements 
of real men. I desire, I say, that you should consider that these functions 
follow in this machine simply fromthe disposition of the organs as wholly 
naturally as the movements of a clock or other automaton follow from the 
disposition of its counter- weights and wheels. To explain these functions, 
then, it is not necessaryto conceive of any vegetative or sensitive soul, or 
any other principle of movement or life, other than its blood and its spirits 
which are agitatedby the heat of the fire that burns continuously in its heart, 
and which isof the same nature as those fires that occur in inanimate 
bodies.54 
 
Such proclamations lend heft to the interpretation that Descartes cannot intend the 
“animal spirits” coursing in nerves and muscles in hydraulic processes to be anything like 
immaterial soul substance55 – and, crucially, that this substance does is not required in 
perception. This brings us back to the task at hand. It is central that Descartes’ theory of 
perception is rooted entirely in his mechanistic natural philosophy and its centerpiece, the 
crowning achievements in optics. 
 When understood in this context, with Descartes experimenting, trying out new 
and dangerous ideas under the threat of condemnation from the Church, it becomes clear 
how Descartes worked to protected the validity of mechanistic natural philosophy, in part 
by advocating a metaphysics that would essentially build a wall of substance to separate 
                                                
54 Descartes, The World, 169. 
55 Descartes was working almost entirely without an understanding of electricity. In fact, the word 
itself was not formally introduced into the English lexicon until 1646, and there was only a basic 
grasp of static electricity put forth in 1600 by William Gibbert. See both Brian Baigrie, Electricity 
and Magnetism: A Historical Perspective (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006), 7–8; and, Gordon 
Chalmers, “The Lodestone and the Understanding of Matter in Seventeenth Century England.” 
Philosophy of Science, 4:1 (January 1937), 75-95. 
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the two realms.56 But because Descartes’ provides a definition of immaterial substance 
that is entirely privative, he continues to explain all functions associated with the mind in 
purely mechanistic terms, including reflection, defined as the observation of the 
operations of the mind. All such procedures are already contained in the optics which 
Descartes just uses as a frame onto which he projects a metaphysically shaded picture. 
 Consider how Descartes explains visual perception, his primary example of 
sensory perception. He does not think the senses function much differently, in principle, 
other than in terms of their physiological mechanisms and attending secondary qualities. 
He describes the anatomy of the eye, and how refraction of light by the convex shape of 
the eye’s surface allows the image to be sharpened and focused as the light constituting it 
passes into the eyeball according to all the geometrical principles laid out in the optics 
and investigated with the camera obscura.57 The light, which is material and composed of 
the smallest and most energized corpuscles, stimulates the optic nerve in the back of the 
eye, and that sets animal spirits to motion. The geometry of the light as it enters the eye 
determines the effects it has on the nerves, which differentiates the movement of the 
animal spirits. But Descartes also goes on to describe internal senses, such as those 
involved in dreaming and imagination. This is where Descartes gives his most robust 
explanation of animal spirits in terms of fluid dynamics (hydrostatics) that have flows 
throughout the body.58 When explaining the brain, the seat of all internal functions, 
Descartes makes special note that these are dynamic flows, saying, “The spirits never 
                                                
56 This is Gaukroger’s recurring argument in Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, and 
Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy, as well as in the “Introduction,” to Descartes, The 
World. 
57 Descartes, The World, 124-29. 
58 Descartes, The World, 140-41. 
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stop for a single moment in one place.”59 Descartes wants to give a physiological account 
of the distinction between waking sensation – ideas and memories had while awake – as 
well as the sensations of dreams.60 Now, according to Descartes, the image received 
through the eye is transmitted by the animal spirits through the optic nerve and are 
transferred to the infamous pineal gland. But Descartes discusses this transference as a 
“tracing” of the image onto the gland, as if the animal spirits carry, by virtue of the 
geometry that stimulated them, that very geometry into the brain in order to literally 
project the image onto the “Cartesian Theater.”61 Descartes details how random 
movements of the body’s animal spirits, the general excitation of the nerves, produce 
daydreams and fancies when not properly directed by reason.62 This is the basis of his 
explanation of the occurrence of dreams. These are produced by the internal actions of 
the animal spirits, particularly those involved in memory, which are never at rest and 
which impress upon the gland and bring about somnambulant imagery. External 
stimulations of the body may also produce dreams, but these are mostly prevented from 
reaching the brain by the dormancy of the senses and their dullness in sleep.63 Again, all 
of these processes operate along the basic principles laid out in the “Treatise on Light,” 
expounded as the basis of Descartes’ hypothetical world, and none of these presume a 
soul or immaterial substance in any way. We could echo Pascal’s complaint regarding 
Cartesian natural philosophy and God, substituting in our own case the “soul” for 
Pascal’s God when he writes, “I cannot forgive Descartes. In all his philosophy he would 
                                                
59 Descartes, The World, 145. 
60 Descartes, The World, 146. 
61 Descartes, The World, 148-50. 
62 Descartes, The World, 155-56. 
63 Descartes, The World, 165-67. 
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have been quite willing to dispense with God. But he had to make him give a fillip to set 
the world in motion; beyond this he has no further need for God.”64 Indeed, he has no 
further use for the soul either, accept as a ghostly observer and pilot watching the trace of 
the image on the pineal gland, a fool in his cave commanding a mechanical puppet. The 
brain inside the head, with its pineal gland prepared like a screen on which to project the 
world, with the eyes as the aperture through which light enters and by which the 
geometry of the image is determined, is just a camera obscura. The brain is the black box 
within which the image can manifest through the aperture. Reflection becomes 
paramount when we want to observe these internal operations – the operations of our own 
minds as they are busy with the ideas they have got. And they are always busy. All 
things, according to the basic principles of Descartes’ natural philosophy, have an 
inherent tendency toward circular motion. He does not arrive at Newtonian inertia, but 
motion is necessary to Descartes system. One of the primal elements of matter is that is it 
in motion relative to the material that surrounds it, and this motion is fluid, hence the 
reason for Descartes’ reliance on hydrostatics. That movement is at the center of this 
picture will be foregrounded in time. This basic movement will be central to our 
understanding of emplacement, and with it, we have uncovered the first instance of 
Descartes’ unspoken and heretical commitment to place. 
 Edward Casey commits admirable work to tracing the specific function of the 
word “place” within early modern philosophy, particularly in Descartes, Locke, and 
Leibniz. His arguments, focused on the explicit treatment of place, show that place 
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gradually becomes subsumed under “space,” that space and time become a dichotomous 
pair, two basic concepts that structure the whole system, and place becomes a secondary 
feature, a combination of time and space instead of their ecstatic unity. Casey’s argument 
is astute, and I think his scholarly work tracking how place is subsumed into space is spot 
on.65 It is on this point that the arguments in Getting Back into Place dovetail with those 
currently being developed. I have already undertaken to show the role of space and time 
in Modern subjectivity, how this basic bifurcation facilitates the covering over of place 
and the rendering of the subject in placelessness as it is cast into the immaterial 
chronology of a continuous timeline. Casey focuses more expressly on “place” and the 
conceptual history of its relation to space and time. Here, I have come at the problem 
from the explicit orientation of the representational cogito in an effort to show, 
independently of Casey, the implicit emplacement that is already nascent in Descartes 
and thereby demonstrating in another way, from another beginning, the ontological a 
priority of place. It has also brought me, circumspectively, to the ontological significance 
of movement as such. These finer points will be brought into sharper relief as we 
proceed. We turn now to the end of the mind in Descartes, keeping in mind that reflection 
and refraction are considered fundamental properties of light, and light can be treated 
geometrically in two ways. First, as particulate, like the motion of tennis balls bouncing 
off surfaces to illustrate the trajectory of light as it was reflected or refracted. This was 
Descartes first step toward a mechanical understanding of light.66 He later clarifies and 
we are given to understand that light emanates in rays, following straight lines from their 
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source, the rays reflecting and refracting in the same patterns described previously under 
the particle model. 
 Consider again how Descartes explains the epistemological foundation that “I 
am” – that I exist – as grounded in the act of reflection. In The Principles of Philosophy, 
Descartes affirms that thought itself is “all that of which we are conscious of operating 
within us,” and later that “although the mind of a man informs the whole body, it yet has 
its principle seat in the brain, and it is there that it not only understands and imagines, but 
also perceives,” [emphasis added in both instances].67 Between 1642 and 1648, in replies 
to objections by Antione Arnauld and Pierre Bourdin, Descartes insists that reflection is 
not something distinct from thinking itself – reiterating on several occasions that 
reflection is thinking in such a way that we become aware of whatever is being thought.68 
Thinking becomes so synonymous with reflective consciousness that, by 1690, Locke’s 
definition of “reflection” is nearly identical to Descartes’: “the perception of the 
operations of our minds within us as it is employed about the ideas it has got.”69 But even 
for Descartes, perception happens someplace. It occurs somewhere. Thinking has a place. 
 The mirror metaphor only works if we can imagine being in front of a mirror. 
Thus, thinking can only occur if it can be directed toward itself as in some place. The 
manner of refutation we will see in Rilke and Pirandello has its origins already in Hume, 
in 1748. Hume takes ideas to be “less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, 
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when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements,” which have previously been 
impressed on us through sensation.70 If an idea arises from reflection, it does so through 
its perception of “the operations of our own mind,” and this is part of the reason why 
Hume will go on to deny the introduction of any novel simple ideas through the 
observation of these operations – because there is no clear impression of the idea given in 
sensation.71 On these grounds, Hume denies knowledge of the Self and casts personal 
identity as an illusion. When Hume says, “There are philosophers who imagine we 
intimately conscious of what we call our Self; that we feel its existence and its 
continuance of existence; and are certain beyond evidence of demonstration, both its 
perfect identity and simplicity,”72 he no doubt has philosophers like Descartes and 
Arnauld in mind, philosophers for whom reflection and consciousness are inseparable 
from thought itself; and also Locke, for whom consciousness as self-reflection is the 
necessary element of personal identity. Hume refutes this line of argument by insisting on 
experience as the origin of all ideas: if I have no experience of something, I have no idea 
of it – thus I can have no idea of a simple self because I have no impression of a self that 
is given through experience; when I reflect on the operations of my mind I perceive only 
the flux of whatever ideas occupy me over the duration of my reflection. Yet, even for 
Descartes, knowledge is presented has having its origin in perception when he writes, 
“consequently, this notion of thought precedes that of all corporeal things and is the most 
certain since we still doubt whether there are any other things in the world, while we 
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already perceive that we think,” [emphasis added].73 What Hume wants to show is that 
under Descartes’ own definition, it is not possible to substantiate myself as a “thinking 
thing,” because I do not perceive this thing, even in reflection. But really, the response is 
already there, in the natural philosophy, which has been displaced and covered over by 
the later discourse initiated in the Meditations and picked up in Arnauld, Gassendi, 
Locke, now the subject of Hume’s polemic. Everything is there to excite the perceptive 
apparatuses without a soul. The activity of the body and brain themselves are enough to 
stimulate consciousness – that consciousness just is the unfolding, the movement of these 
processes from which reflection gives rise to a basic awareness. Descartes does not 
disavowal the earlier works. In The Passions of the Soul, published reluctantly in 1649, 
Descartes returns to the Dioptics as sufficient treatment of visual perception, and the 
general treatment of perception, imagination, and the body are repeated from “Treatise on 
Man,” part of The World which was still unpublished at the time.74 Thus, again, just as 
Pascal complains that Descartes reduces God to a causal mechanism to set the motion of 
the cosmos into play, in Passions of the Soul, the soul with its will is reduced to a causal 
power that exerts its influence on the body via the pineal gland, the seat of the cogito’s 
agency, again, the forensic task to assign responsibility for actions, but an ontological 
responsibility as the chief cause and producer.75 If Descartes is reluctant to publish the 
Passions it is because of how embarrassingly inadequate is his treatment of the soul in 
light of his robust natural philosophy. Everything, in any event, falls back on the body, 
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the seat of the brain, the “ultimate and most proximate cause of the passions of the soul is 
none other than the agitation with which the [animal] spirits move the little gland which 
is in the middle of the brain.”76 The aperture opens to a place, a place for the projection of 
the image. But within this place lies another mirror, the mirror of reflection, and from this 
second surface the play of the projection on the first can come into view – but there is no 
real need for the soul. Descartes props it up, but it is really sequestered and harmless 
behind the wall of substance. Kant’s insight that the empirical subject will never itself 
come into view but is only discernable through the perturbations it can effect on the 
manifold given in intuition is anticipated when Descartes writes that “we cannot desire 
anything without perceiving by the same means that we desire it; and, although in regard 
to our soul it is an action to desire something, we may say that it is also one of its 
passions to perceive that it desires.”77 The very movement by which the soul, selfsame 
with mind, acts is also the very same movement by which it perceives, and this 
perception is itself the grounding, that I think, lies implicit in every thought, revealing 
that thinking just is this movement, the movement not the post hoc unity of space and 
time, but the ecstatic place from which space and time are derived. Casey's 
phenomenological analysis of place details emplacement as the ecstatic unity of space 
and time that is phenomenologically prior to both conceptualizations. Thus, we have an 
open avenue beyond the Kantian position outlined above, wherein space and time are the 
forms of intuition a priori. This is best expressed by Casey when he writes, “Rather than 
being separate but equal cosmic parameters...space and time are themselves coordinated 
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and co-specified in the common matrix provided by place.”78 Much of the work in 
Getting Back into Place is devoted to the deconstructive power of its central concept, 
where traditional dyadic structures (Mind/Body, Space/Time) are disrupted and subverted 
by a careful analysis of the role played by place in the facilitation and articulation of 
these dyads. And Casey is quite clear on the ontological primacy of place when he writes 
that, “place, by virtue of its unencompassability by anything other than itself, is at once 
the limit and the condition of all that exists.”79 Later, he stipulates that although place 
may not necessarily have metaphysical or logical primacy, because it is descriptive and 
phenomenological, it does, nevertheless, express a certain ontological primacy in that to 
be is to always be in place. That is, there is no placeless being.80 
 Reflection requires a staging, an emplacement, such that thought can double back 
on itself in order to catch itself in the act, so to speak. This is why the mirror metaphor 
becomes central at the same time Modern philosophy is bandying consciousness as the 
key defining feature of being human. The mirror puts us in a position to see ourselves – it 
is a metaphor of fundamental emplacement with a view of our own machinations. What 
remains an underground current within the Cartesian doctrine, which is entirely different 
from the words written by Descartes, will be brought to the fore in a parodic gesture by 
Rilke and Pirandello, presenting characters on the verge of madness, lingering in front of 
mirrors, discovering a topology of reflection opening as we work toward the place of 
thought. Descartes enters into the major discourse, acquiesces to the demands of the 
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Church authorities, and participates in the covering over of his own ground. Under his 
guidance, the place where the mind takes root is forgotten, and the mind itself becomes 
opaque, inaccessible, placeless; an unmoved mover in a world that is nothing but 
movement, a being in time forsaken by its other half, disemplaced by the subsumption of 
place to space that occurs in the shadow of Descartes’ desire to be left alone. He retreats, 
and with him, the subject into its own mind, an abyss where place once disclosed itself. 
2.4 Overcoming the Mirror 
 It is important to remember that the mirror is a fundamentally technological 
metaphor. Descartes is modeling his metaphysics off of insights gained primarily by 
technological manipulation. This will not be the last time in the history of philosophy that 
a scientifically minded thinker has used the technological apparatuses of scientific 
research as the models for his own being – those tools perhaps seen, in some oblique 
way, as themselves the extension of our being. One motivator of 20th century Anglo-
American philosophical discourse on the concept of “mind” was certainly a research 
program related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics. The publication of Alan 
Turing's “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” in the October 1950 issue of Mind 
marks a watershed event in the history of that research program. Yet it is not so much the 
question of whether or not a machine could think that fueled philosophy of mind, for the 
line between computing machinery and thinking would not remain clear. Mind 
increasingly began to be described as computing machinery, the brain supplying the 
hardware on which the “mind” program would run as software whose function was 
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representational in nature.81 While a small sampling here conveys a great variety of 
thought, it remains clear that analytic philosophy of mind in the second half of the 
twentieth century is marked by a concern with computationalism and a turn toward the 
discourse of “cognition.”82 However, by the end of the 1990s, the popularity of 
computationalism waned, former advocates of computationalist theories significantly 
altered their position, and an engagement with cognitive science began opening 
possibilities of non-representational theories of mind.83 Following the externalist path 
forged by Putnam, Clark, and Chalmers, as I noted in the previous Chapter, is a trend in 
research on cognition with a particularly existential flavor.84 Although we would do well 
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to take note of the reemergence of phenomenology in the mold of Husserl, Heidegger, 
and Merleau-Ponty within analytic philosophy (or, at the very least, among analytically 
trained philosophers) it would be a mistake to think that the trend of externalism in 
Anglo-American philosophy of mind is any kind of a return to the brand of existential 
phenomenology practiced in continental Europe in the early- and mid-20th century. 
Despite having overcome computationalism and its attending reductionism, even verging 
on the discovery of non-representational theories of cognition, philosophy of mind 
remains attached to the research programs of AI and robotics. No better example can be 
given than the paradigm case of Andy Clark, whose 1997 book Being There makes 
obvious titular reference to the Dasein analysis of Heidegger's Being and Time, but 
quickly drops any existential consideration after the first page to spend the next 228 
discussing a dizzying array of robots and their various abilities. Computational AI is 
thereby replaced by the technology driven robotics program, wherein the function of AI 
is to produce seemingly autonomous action in a mechanical body. The ontological 
foundations of philosophy of mind, since the 1950s, have been parasitic on programs in 
AI and robotics. Descartes is in good company when it comes to his technologically 
driven metaphysical paradigm – the mechanical universe, of course. 
 One way we might think about this drive to the technical is as a movement by 
which we extend our senses, and thereby reinterpret ourselves. The very first chapter of 
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The World is called “On the difference between our sensations [sentiment] and the things 
that produce them,” probably by Claude Clerselier, Descartes’ editor. In two extremely 
important passages, Descartes writes, “In putting forward an account of light…it is 
possible for there to be a difference between the sensation that we have of it, that is, the 
idea that we form of it in our imagination through the intermediary of our eyes, and what 
it is in the objects that produces the sensation in us, that is, what it is in the flame or in the 
Sun that we term ‘light’,” and then immediately proceeds to make a foundational point 
regarding language. This often discussed passage deserves consideration, and so I offer it 
in full: 
 As you know, the fact that words bear no resemblance to the things they 
signify does not prevent them from causing us to conceive of those things, 
often without our paying attention to the sounds of the words or to their 
syllables. Thus it can turn out that, having heard something and understood 
its meaning perfectly well, we might not be able to say in what language it 
was uttered. Now if words, which signify something only through human 
convention, are sufficient to make us think of things to which they bear no 
resemblance, why could not Nature also have established some sign which 
would make us have a sensation of light, even if that sign had in it nothing 
that resembled this sensation? And is it not thus that Nature has established 
laughter and tears, to make us read joy and sorrow on the face of men?85 
 
This argument really summarizes the question driving the crisis of representation that 
runs throughout modernity. Descartes, in his optics and natural philosophy, was able to 
show that the world as it was in itself may be very different from the way in which the 
world appears to us, but from observation and technological manipulation and not by way 
of allegory or thought experiment. This is one reason why the “observation of the 
operations of the mind” becomes a hallmark phrase of early Modern philosophy, where 
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the goal is to bring the mind into view, put it before itself for observation and 
experimentation. All of this makes representation an appealing answer, since the internal 
stage of the Cartesian Theater is primed for a performance of the outside, rendered in 
miniature on the inside, etched out and traced across the most spiritual of glands in the 
brain’s center. No wonder Rorty titles his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, nor 
that Las Meninas is the work of art by which Foucault makes his entry into the history of 
epistemes, when that painting features, at its very center, a mirror reflecting the artist, the 
producer of the image. This theme will return with Derrida in the next Chapter. 
 Now we are in position to see how the mirror positions us. It is the technological 
apparatus by which we can see ourselves out there and recognize ourselves in the same 
way as we recognize others. I will return to this point in Sloterdijk, but the point is made 
more salient by the analysis of the literature to follow. The whole process of coming to 
consciousness is illustrated in the act of looking into a mirror, an act internalized and 
made self-productive in the cogito. This very act has become a litmus test for the 
detection of consciousness – that some being can recognize itself in the looking glass. In 
Descartes, this is a foundational act on which we can rest the epistemic certainty of 
scientific knowledge (notice the circle; the apparatus of science used as the model for a 
foundation on which to rest the apparatus of science). Yet, in Modernist literature, the act 
consciousness becomes a way to manifest the symptomatic neurosis of dis-ease.86 The 
examples from the works of Rilke and Pirandello will solidify this for us. 
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 Consider the case of Vitangelo, the narrator of Luigi Pirandello’s 1926 novel One, 
No One and One Hundred Thousand. In this novel, the narrator’s wife points out that his 
nose is crooked. In literary criticism it has been common to approach this scene within 
Lacan’s theoretical framework of the mirror stage.87 Radcliffe-Umsted, for instance, 
flatly reads Vitangelo’s mirror-crisis as one wherein Pirandello’s humorous style reveals 
the falseness or seeming inauthenticity of subjectivity, which is alienated, thus somehow 
thrown into untruth, by their constitution as a subject in the mirror stage.88 Alcise Sforza 
Tarabochia is right to argue against this simplistic reading, showing that, at least for 
Lacan, alienation in the “imaginary” order is not equivalent to being “false,” and it is 
therefore misleading (at best) to assume there is some “true” or authentic order to be 
attained on the other side.89 Further, Radcliffe-Umstead argues that Pirandello somehow 
misunderstands or misreads Lacan, but I want to emphasize that, insofar as Lacan stands 
within the Cartesian-Kantian shadow of subjectivity, the primary target of Pirandello’s 
critique is not necessarily Lacan. Michael Quinn handles Pirandello’s humor much better 
in relation to subject formation, where self-discovery functions as a pun, as Quinn puts it, 
“not mirror as phase but mirror as stage, as a platform for the theatrical representation of 
the self.”90 Such performative insight makes sense in the context of Pirandello as a 
dramatist and playwright, but it also highlights the activity and movement we’ve been 
tracing out in the underlying structures of Cartesian metaphysics – its inherent dynamos. 
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Though, there is a problem when Quinn emphases the stage over the phase. Understand, 
for Lacan, the mirror-stage is the culmination of a process of subjection that results in the 
phase-effect of self-identification and differentiation; the seeing of myself as the other 
sees me, and of the fact that the other sees and has some idea of who I am.91 Note too that 
we have half an ally in Lacan, who writes that, “this experience sets us at odds with any 
philosophy directly stemming from the cogito.”92 And yet, Lacan nevertheless ends up 
the same, with the Ideal-I and the subject, still beginning in an Innenwelt that is shattered 
in an alienating Umwelt, in which the I must shore itself up as a defended encampment, 
always threatened by the encroaching world that will uproot and displace it, placeless 
thing it remains.93 Nevertheless, we are close to Lacan when we talk about dynamic 
persons, and particularly when we begin to explore the building up of representation as a 
higher order cognitive function. 
 With respect to Pirandello, he does present a theatrical rendering of a “mirror 
stage” in Quinn’s sense when he writes of his character Vitangelo lingering “unusually” 
in front of a mirror, and his wife mistakenly assumes that he lingers to examine the way 
his nose tilts to the right. In fact, Vitangelo had never before considered his nose to be 
tilted at all, one way or the other.94 The seemingly innocent exchange ignites a crisis of 
identity (self-representation) in Vitangelo, and the rest of the book recounts his spiral into 
what everyone around him takes to be madness. His wife’s comment undermines the 
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certainty of his identity, and he begins to see that the identity he took for granted as 
certain and self-assured is in actuality mediated through the relation he shares with all the 
others with whom he is in community. This is actually one of the key stumbling blocks to 
reading Pirandello in a strictly Lacanian light. For Lacan, the mirror stage is a 
developmental process that is specific to early childhood and can provide an explanatory 
causal mechanism for neuroses that manifest later in life, but are rooted in this primary 
identification. In One, No One and One Hundred Thousand, Vitangelo is middle aged, 
and thus cannot effect the mirror stage simply by looking at himself in the mirror, even if 
we read his wife as a substitution instance of the mother’s formative gaze.95 But it’s clear 
that Vitangelo is well on in the formation of his own self-representation, and in the 
parodic gesture read as Pirandello’s humorous style, we actually see the inversion of the 
mirror stage, not as the self-enclosure affected at the culmination of a developmental 
stage, but rather as the first pull in the unravelling of the subject’s private citadel. It is not 
merely Lacan’s theory put to literature, but a radical critique of the subject itself, from 
Descartes to Lacan, who, even if he claims not to start from the cogito, still ends up in the 
same self-enclosed unity. The wife’s comments are the anti-thesis to the mother’s, and 
undermine the certainty of self-representation, an identity taken for granted as self-
assured but which is, in actuality, mediated through the relations he shares with all the 
others with whom he is in the world. Vitangelo muses that “everything” is based on, “The 
assumption that reality, as it is for you, must be and is the same for everybody else.”96 
Just as Dostoevsky has undermined Enlightenment faith in rational consciousness by 
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positing consciousness as a disease, Pirandello undermines the paradigmatic metaphor of 
gazing at oneself in the mirror by showing this exact situation to be the onset of madness 
– thus, the act becomes symptomatic of the ontological dis-ease I’m treating here. 
Pirandello has his narrator confess to “…the little signs of madness I began to exhibit in 
the form of pantomimes, in the lively infancy of my folly, at every mirror in the 
house…”97 Vitangelo wants desperately to catch himself in the midst of “natural acts,” 
not those of self-contrived expressions of emotion that are put on by actors.98 He 
summarizes his problem elegantly, saying, “The idea that the others saw me as one who 
was not I as I know myself, one whom they could know only through watching me from 
outside with eyes that weren’t mine, giving me an appearance fated to remain always an 
outsider’s to me, though for them it was inside me, mine, (a “mine” therefore that didn’t 
exist for me!); a life which, though for them it was mine, I couldn’t penetrate: this idea 
allowed me no peace.”99 Here too, as Dostoevsky’s underground man stood against the 
presupposition that the interaction between the mind and body was questionable, 
Pirandello’s underground man, Vitangelo, stand against the problem of other minds. He 
does this through the inversion of the usual mirror function. It is not the simple fact that 
others see him differently than he sees himself. That is not the point, at least, not entirely. 
The deeper point is that the recognition of the perspective of the other alters Vitangelo’s 
ability to recognize himself. His own self-representation becomes modified by the 
perception of the other’s recognition of him. Thus, the solipsistic certainty of the 
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recognition of my own self-representation is undermined by the alteration of this 
representation through the imposition of the difference between the representation of me 
to myself and the representation of myself given to me by the other. Vitangelo literally 
loses himself in the multiplicity of representations, becoming unable to differentiate what 
might be his “authentic” self from the mere representation of himself.100 Pirandello 
presents us with a very Kantian form of madness, one that results from the closure of the 
subject from a direct access to the Transcendental Ego, an Ego which can only be 
detected by its operations on the manifold presented in experience. 
 Another useful Modernist illustration is found in The Notebooks of Malte Laurids 
Brigge, published in 1910 by the poet Rainer Maria Rilke. The novel is an example of the 
semi-autobiographical in fiction, and Rilke presents Malte as an alternative version of 
himself, with not altogether different life circumstances. At one point in the novel, Malte 
narrates a time when he was a child left to his own devices. He occupies himself by 
trying on various costumes from a bygone era which he has found locked in a wardrobe 
in the unoccupied guest-rooms of his well-to-do family’s manor house. This is a much 
discussed episode in Rilke’s prose writing, and its general theoretical significance will 
soon be apparent.101 Rilke has Malte describe the effects and affects worked by the 
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donning of different costumes. He explains, “Scarcely had I put on one of these outfits 
than I had to concede that it had me in its thrall; it dictated my movements, my facial 
expressions, even the thoughts that occurred to me,” [emphasis added].102 Like 
Vitangelo, the mirror opens up a vast array of opportunities for Malte to see himself 
transfigured by the costumes – but there is one further wrinkle. Malte notes in particular 
how he feels a loss of control or of autonomy. This occurs in Pirandello’s text as well, but 
more subtly, as the focus is there on the dynamics of intersubjective self-representation. 
Here, Malte is alone, like Descartes in his dressing rooms, seeking out a true self beneath 
the masks, within the tomb of the body. Malte and Vitangelo are alike in this respect, 
determined to, as Malte puts it, “find out what I actually was,” and discovering that the 
mirror, “really was superb. It exceeded all my expectations. The mirror instantly returned 
my image; it was too, too convincing. There really was no need to move at all; this 
apparition was perfect, even if it did nothing.”103 The illusion only works without motion, 
when even Descartes observes the constant motion of consciousness. Here, at first, the 
mirror weaves an opposite effect on Malte as on Vitangelo. At first, Malte becomes more 
certain of his identity. Thus, he is initially comforted, the change in appearance 
reinforcing his own static sameness beneath the masks. Rilke expresses it clearly, writing, 
“These disguises never went so far as to make me feel a stranger to myself, though, on 
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the contrary, the more my transformation varied, the more convinced I was of my own 
self. I grew more and more daring…”104 Malte is emboldened by his experiments with 
the mirror, offering a counterpoint to Vitangelo’s growing uncertainty. But Malte’s 
performance cannot go on indefinitely – he must move, after all. He is only emboldened 
up to the point when he determines to find out who he actually is. This ontological 
qualification, the demand for the actual, undoes Malte’s game. He knocks over a table. 
Expensive porcelain knick-knacks are broken, a phial of perfume is spilled, and Malte 
struggles to clean it up only to find his costume now constrains his movements. He rushes 
to the mirror in order to take off the disguise, but finds only horror in the reflection. Rilke 
has Malte describe the scene, “Hot and furious, I rushed to the mirror and, with some 
difficulty, watched through the mask the working of my hands. But that was exactly what 
He was waiting for.”105 Rilke here stresses “He,” the translators capitalizing the English 
pronoun to highlight a newly realized autonomy for the apparition in the mirror. All of 
Malte’s previous confidence had been misplaced. The apparition had been waiting for the 
opportune moment. Rilke writes, “His moment of retribution had come. While I 
struggled, with a measurelessly mounting sense of trepidation, somehow or another to 
tear free my disguise, He compelled me – I do not know by what means – to look up, and 
imposed on me an image, no, a reality, a strange, incomprehensible, monstrous reality, in 
which I was steeped against my will: for He was now the stronger and I the mirror.”106 
The loss of control in the face of some imposing reality is a hallmark of Modernism, and 
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of its philosophical iteration in existentialism as well. Malte has found his “actual” self: it 
is the self of his own creation, but once projected into the world, this creation takes on a 
life of its own and turns around to ensnare its creator. Rilke describes the realization of 
Malte’s literal selflessness, the vacuous Nothing that underlies the assumptive certainty 
regarding his personal identity in self-representation: “…the very worst had happened, 
and I lost all sense of myself, and then He was the only one who remained: there was 
nothing but Him,” that is, nothing but this projection of Malte’s own making that takes 
over and controls his thoughts and actions.107 
 Both Pirandello and Rilke present characters that deeply agree with Descartes’ 
famous conclusion, cogito ergo sum. However, the predicaments of both Vitangelo and 
Malte reveal a subtle rebuttal of the logical leap from “I am” to “I am a thinking thing,” 
where to think is to be Rational. The mirror might confirm one’s existence, but it cannot 
provide the insight into that which one essentially is. The more earnestly this essence is 
sought in the mirror, the more hopelessly lost it becomes. To be one, after the Cartesian 
way, is to be no one and/or one hundred thousand – it amounts to the same. Sartre’s 
famous “decompression of being” is a compelling alternative to Lacan, for it explicitly 
marks the nothing that arises from beginning with the cogito; that the subject must 
distance itself from itself, becoming a presence to itself.108 The decompression suggests 
multivocity, an appearance of different selves across time, quickly multiplying our 
potential as being-for-ourselves. Like we have seen with Hutcheon, Sartre too interprets 
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this first grounding fissure, which as temporal is historical from the perspective of the 
for-itself, as liberatory, as a being-freed-for. And as before, with Futurism’s historical 
association with the fascism of Apollinaire and Boccioni, we see here that freedom is, in 
itself, not a conceptual inoculant against political extremism. Look no further than 
Heidegger’s Nazism, however it’s interpreted, as well as some of Sartre’s own stances on 
Communism during the 1950s and -60s. Whatever political scandals continue to broil 
over the personal lives of these thinkers, it is clear that there is a common trend of 
philosophizing about being freed for ourselves, however, this comes at a price, namely 
our contingency and finitude, and thus we are thrown into this freedom. The strange 
phenomenological result of this nothingness – the negation that is our movement in time, 
our having to be other than who we are at the present moment – can be a sense of having 
been given over to something, or someplace, and having to find your way in this already 
existing and eminently meaningful construct. Judith Ryan sees this in Rilke’s scene, that 
Malte realizes the horror that his own possibilities bring with them,109 and I might add 
that, once he has chosen, he is bound to that choice, and free only from it, to do in the 
aftermath of what he is. Thus, there is a play, an opening up between contingency and 
necessity, that I can do, and that I must do, that Rilke’s episode in front of the mirror 
invokes. On the one hand, Descartes says we must posit the cogito, we cannot help it, but 
it is nothing, just the other side of our affirmation of whatever we think, the “I think” 
echoing after it, haunting it. Whatever it is, it is not to be oneself. The “actual” self, the 
thing-in-itself, is always hidden under the representation that facilitated the act of 
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recognition by bringing me into my own presence. But the representation of me, in whose 
presence I am, cannot be the “real” me. It can only be a phantasm, a fiction, something 
postulated post hoc in an effort to patch up a floundering representational schema and 
provide the basis for postulating that each representation given in experience is my 
representation. What Pirandello and Rilke provide are characters for whom this Cartesian 
outlook fails. 
2.5 In Front of, Before, and on the Other Side 
 Pirandello and Rilke both present characters whose expectation in front of the 
mirror are structured on a sense of permanence and stability. Vitangelo believed 
“everything” rested on the assumption of a reality that was the same for everyone. Malte 
is convinced of his identity’s strength while striking a pose, remaining still and presenting 
a fixed image. This desire for a fixed identity is expressed by both those two who are 
looking in the mirror to see who they “really” are – just as Descartes presents mind as the 
substance of our being. But like Hume, what Vitangelo and Malte actually experience is 
an ever changing flux that inevitably obscures their identity and washes it away, 
obliterating it to nothing. Malte even feels dissociation, as if a foreign agent has usurped 
his volition and had assumed his identity in his stead. It is not only that we lack the 
ground to posit an “I” that thinks. It is moreover that to posit “thinking” at all, even for 
thought without an I, there must be some place where thinking is thought. Reflection 
requires a staging such that thought can double back on itself, to emphasize the camera 
obscura structure underlying the cogito, decompression in its dark enclosure. The 
underground in Descartes becomes foreground in Malte and Vitangelo. Vitangelo, on the 
verge of madness, and Malte, a young boy, enthralled by the radical changes in his person 
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that can be brought on by the seemingly superficial changes in his semblance. 
Discovering a topology of the subject. Before we ever postulate a being like the cogito, 
we must first prepare a place for it such that the “there” of emplacement always precedes 
the presence of the being. “There is,” we say. If we have worked through Descartes’ 
legacy we have arrived at a new formulation, a parodic transformation of the old axiom: 
“Think, there is.” That is the only ontologically responsible thing we could say. Or, to put 
it more generously, and therefore, perhaps, more irresponsibly, “Thinking happens, 
therefore something is.” No wonder Vitangelo is stumbling into madness!  
 At this point it may be good to draw attention to how peculiar and particularized 
are these Modernist subjects. Vitangelo – he has a name, and a nose that may or may not 
be crooked. And Malte, a little boy, a bourgie pup playing in an attic wardrobe. 
Descartes’ cogito is everybody but before it can be anybody it has to have a place. Casey 
argues for the particularization of place, taking the phenomenological approach of asking 
readers to think of themselves, wherever they are, in a room;  
Wherever you are, you are distinctly (if not simply) located in space and 
time. Let us assume that you are now in your living room as you read these 
words. The room itself serves to distinguish you, at least as much as does 
the time of day or year. You are there, in your room now, comfortably 
ensconced in space and time. Your existence is reflected and supported by 
the room as a distinguishing mark, a “specific difference” in an otherwise 
undistinguished world of homogenous space and equably flowing time.110 
 
Again, the ecstatic unity of space and time is reaffirmed in this particularization. 
Certainly, Heidegger is drawn to Kant’s philosophy of finite thinking to glean similar 
insights, why the ecstases of time are always tied to instants, the instantaneous, the 
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sudden, and abrupt.111 Casey also points to Hegel’s linguistic argument from the 
Phenomenology of Spirit that locator adverbs and propositions are always used to specify 
particularly emplaced things, they are nevertheless intrinsically universal in scope.112 
This reminder is meant to guide us to the ontological insights of place as the other 
beginning, that, starting from place, we are always given some particular place, but 
through the particular we can see that insofar as things are, all things are in place. 
“Occasion-bound,” is a term Casey uses to denote that places occasion, they happen, as 
I’ll stress repeatedly. From his phenomenological perspective, and in the tradition of 
Merleau-Ponty, Casey focuses on my body as something that “continually takes me into 
place.”113 The body is part of this occasion-bound, space-time matrix that unfolds in 
places, that is the movement of place as the things appearing there are emplaced. The 
body is part of a foundational cognitive structure, and Casey performs the existential 
phenomenologist’s move of regulating formal, geometrical accounts of direction and 
dimensionality to a secondary position, focusing on how those basic concepts (now in my 
sense) arrive from our bodily emplacement. Casey’s describes bodily orientation as a 
“tensional arc” between here-there relations – that I am always emplaced here, in my 
particular local body, but there is some over there toward which I am oriented, that 
occupies me from where I am here – is a useful general concept that I will put into 
motion below.114 Bound up in the space-time of place, as the ways of place’s movement, 
                                                
111 Excellent studies on the ecstases of time in Heidegger’s philosophy can be found in David 
Farrell Krell, Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger’s Thinking of 
Being, 2nd ed. (University Park: Penn State, 1991); and, most recently in Krell, Ecstasy, 
Catastrophe (2015). 
112 Casey, Getting Back into Place, 23. 
113 Casey, Getting Back into Place, 48. 
114 Casey, Getting Back into Place, 53-56. 
 119 
dimension and direction also follow from the basic emplacement of things. From within 
the underground discourse, the body in this orientation, given dimension and direction, is 
uncovered beneath the cogito. Even Descartes gives, in the “Treatise on Man,” an entirely 
bodily account of perception, cognition, and memory, putting us always in a position 
from which we can always already perceive that we think. The toward which of 
consciousness, the trademark of phenomenological intentionality being that 
consciousness is always consciousness of…, is found in Descartes’ mirror; the turning 
around to catch sight of the operations of the mind, my own doubling back, this turn 
already implying a bodily emplacement, something capable of turning in or back on 
itself. This folded body creates the enclosure for Descartes, the dark scene of the 
Cartesian Theater, the cave and cabinet of consciousness, fit for the projection of 
shadows on the wall, cavern camera obscura. 
 The mirror act was designed to dispel doubt. But it bears out the existential 
question “to be or not to be,” what does it mean? Can I really doubt that I am? But if I 
am, then what am I? This is what the philosopher never gets a handle on. When she looks 
for it, it’s gone. Daniel Dennett is very good at this line of attack on the cogito, ridiculing 
the “Cartesian Theater,” where we turn to look for the seat of our identity and the power 
of our volition only to have it slip away undetected.115 Kant goes further to bar us from 
accessing the self, really in agreement with Hume that we cannot catch ourselves in 
experience, and are left to postulate the I out of a logical necessity – a necessity to the 
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cohesion of Kant’s own system, of course.116 I concede Kant’s requirement that a certain 
system must necessitate the axiomatic proposition of an ego in order to bring about the 
systemic unity of representation. But any such system, as founded on the metaphor of the 
mirror, is secondary, not foundational, as I have shown that such a system is founded on 
the tacit assumption of a basic emplacement – the place from which I can see myself, 
placed before myself, represented in my own presence. Notice that Casey uses the word 
“reflected” in the passage above, “reflected by the room.” Rather than reflecting to 
ourselves, from ourselves, beginning from place puts us in a position to reflect on 
ourselves in place, ourselves already out there in the world, and being reflected back to 
ourselves by that world. Remember the salience of bivalence in Gibson’s theory of 
affordances. But here, with Casey’s ontological insights about place, we take a step 
further away from the bifurcation, implicit dualism, that is some subject in its 
“environment.” We are still hinting at Malte and Vitangelo’s surroundings, the people 
and things around them that disrupt their egos, with whom they expect to share a world, 
but we are starting to see them in a more dynamic interplay, now with the mirror 
highlighted as a technological object, but moreover, one used experimentally, a device 
turned back on its creator and seizing hold of them, rendering them now according to the 
mechanizations of their own design. Thus, the move to “externalize” is supported and 
reinforced, to evade the damning requirements of the old system from which the 
underground discourse seeks its escape. Again, it remains possible to sometimes 
construct a representation, even one of ourselves, but place remains ontologically prior to 
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any such representation, is the basis of any representation as such – any representation 
being someone’s representation, and any someone being some particular someone 
somewhere. Presence, then, is freed from the representational scheme, and we are 
encouraged to continue thinking presence as the availability of the world, even its 
availability to become a representation. We must pay close attention to our literary 
examples. 
 Let’s think, first, of just standing in front of a mirror, looking at your own 
reflection. This is the basic scene for Vitangelo and Malte’s crisis of identity. In order to 
reflect, in the sense of being conscious, one’s image must be projected out to the surface 
of the glass. Already, Descartes’ interest in optics is apparent. That light serves as the 
ontological basis of his natural philosophy is tied to this notion of the self-image – the 
representation of myself in which I am rendered sensible and brought into self-awareness 
through the act of recognition; that is, I perceive myself to be. Light projects the image on 
the glass, which returns the light again to its source, providing the mechanism of my 
return, the trajectory of the reflected light illuminating the procedure of my own self-
awareness. This out and back again, the back and forth, to and fro, there and back, of 
consciousness is the first step toward understanding the basic occurrence of 
emplacement, the movement of its happening: oscillation. It means, first, a doubling of 
the center (the decompression of being), which is a destabilization of the very identity 
Descartes hopes to secure, silently, in his bid for harmony with the powers aboveground. 
Through neglect of the ontological foundations of his thought, and the assumptions 
regarding the necessity of securing the certainty of his method, the Cartesian doctrine 
becomes something entirely separate from the words of Descartes – its own technological 
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apparatus, a matrix of concepts.117 For, when we've attended to the metaphor at play, we 
can see that oscillation is already tacitly at work even within Descartes own writings, 
wherein nothing that is, that exists, is without movement, and regular movement to boot. 
It remains true, however, that Descartes was himself oblivious to the basic emplacement 
that ensured he had a place from which to doubt at all. Radical doubt, then, is exposed as 
an illusion – but not just because its end is achieved in certainty. More importantly, 
radical doubt is an illusion because Descartes never doubts the veracity of his own 
procedure, based on his optics. It is uncritically assumed that the reflective act 
analytically contains the basis upon which the deductive procedure can extrapolate 
systems of scientific knowledge. That is to say, just as he treated light in a mathematical 
way, according to geometric principles, Descartes assumes the reflective procedure 
inherent to thought itself must contain, a priori, the foundational axioms of mathematical 
logic such that mere knowledge that I am could systematically ground the whole 
scientific endeavor. This is why Descartes is treated as the inception of a new mode of 
philosophizing and among the first rays of a dawning modernity. 
 To express the law identity accordingly is already to double that which is 
identical, “X = X.” There are two “Xs” required to write the identity of the one X. Thus, I 
need the representation of myself in the ego to be the selfsame identity of which I am 
conscious – this consciousness exactly that which makes me what I am. The mirror 
facilitates this obscurity while nevertheless pretending to an austere rigor. Rooted in the 
science of optics and geometries of reflection, consciousness sees itself essentially as it 
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sees others. Historically, the advent of the mirror brings us at last into the position of 
seeing ourselves as we had previously seen only the others with whom we live. This 
reversal of the phenomenal order is a point developed by Sloterdijk. He writes, “The 
other acts as a personal mirror; but he is also the opposite of a mirror, for he permits 
neither the peace nor the discretion of a reflection in glass or metal – but above all 
because he produces not an eidetic representation, but rather an affective echo.”118 I 
think, rather, that we have seen the cogito’s reflective thought ground out in an affective 
echo as well. Though discrete, the self-representation cannot be discreet; discretion is 
broken by its very being, its being as the disclosure of myself to myself, already a 
confession. Vitangelo laments the discovery that the world appears differently to others, 
thus, he loses the stability of having any certain world at all. Malte’s discovery is no less 
dramatic. He discovers the power of semblance in his interplay with the mirror. In that 
fundamental oscillation he uncovers the real transformations wrought by changes in 
semblance, such that in these oscillations, both between costumes and between images in 
the mirror, his identity becomes unstable to the point of dissolution, going from one to 
one hundred thousand, and at last to no one, running in fear from the spectacle of his 
usurped identity. At this point we find ourselves beyond the mirror. It has been 
transformed from a stabilizing metaphor to a radical act of fundamental destabilization. 
Literary Modernism turns the modern foundations of identity into the dissimulation of the 
one amid the multitude of semblances. Beneath this tumult, we have discovered place. In 
Descartes, it is a tacit, underground place unacknowledged by doctrine. I want us to look 
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more closely at emplacing oscillation, a concept that will develop throughout the 
remainder of this study. By oscillation, I mean the movement by which emplacement 
occurs. Thinking without representation will come about by a basic movement and 
through this movement, things will become presently. 
2.6 Empty Centers 
 The basic movement I want us to think about happens from an established basis, a 
major language, aboveground, so to speak; one that is taken for granted most of the time. 
And so, the first step from this pre-established and largely uncritical basis is one in which 
that basis is disturbed and destabilized. In his 1989 book, translated as The Transparent 
Society, Gianni Vattimo discusses oscillation in relation to art, taking up themes shared 
by Heidegger and Benjamin. Vattimo focuses in particular on the destabilizing power of 
oscillation that is “directed toward keeping the disorientation alive.”119 But he does not 
go far enough, because in this movement, one described as oscillation, Vattimo fails to 
recognize the other side of the movement. Something emerges on the other side of 
oscillation, and, as something sensible, is something stable. The Modernists open an 
opportunity to see this movement in action, to experience for ourselves this 
destabilizing/stabilizing oscillation in which being springs forth from the work of art. We 
can appreciate phenomenology at work here.  
Heidegger develops a notion of Stoss or “the blow” in relation to the work of art’s 
destabilizing power – the same power by which the world “breaks down” and reveals the 
essential groundlessness of its signification. According to Heidegger, it is this moment in 
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an aesthetic experience, coming on suddenly and “from out of nowhere,” that opens us to 
the Seinsfrage, the Question of Being.120 As Vattimo interprets it, during an encounter 
with a work of art, which is to say, during an aesthetic experience, we are struck by a 
blow that destabilizes our normal way of understanding the world. Under this 
interpretation of Heidegger, the oscillation of the work of art faces us toward the abyss 
where the certainty and presumed validity of our normal ways of going about the world 
collapse and are called into question – what’s more, we realize the basic groundlessness 
of our everyday understanding. Vattimo relates this concept of Stoss to Walter 
Benjamin’s concept of the “shock.” For Benjamin, shock is best represented in film, 
where one image is constantly usurped and replaced by another, then another, and so 
on.121 What ties Stoss and shock together is their mutual emphasis on disorientation, and 
specifically, one that is being shaped by and coming into conflict with the technological 
apparatuses developing in conjunction with urbanization and metropolitan life. Further, 
both Heidegger and Benjamin, by focusing on disorientation, break from the previous 
aesthetic tradition, particularly the followers of Kant and Hegel, who teach that aesthetic 
experience is reducible to formal relations in which one finds repose; aesthetics in terms 
of Geborgenheit, security, organization, or reorganization.122 We can read Vattimo’s 
oscillation, with its emphasis on destabilization, in both Pirandello and Rilke. 
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 In his art, Pirandello argues precisely that with the destabilization of the ego at the 
center of the epistemological order comes a chain reaction throughout the system of 
differences built upon the signification of the I. He appropriates Cartesian consciousness 
and provides a literary rendition of the mirror metaphor that parodies the Cartesian 
arguments, thereby offering a refutation of them. Rilke performs a similar aesthetic 
gesture. Rilke presents an easier approach, due to Malte’s relative isolation in the 
wardrobe episode described above: a boy parading a series of costumes in front of the 
mirror. Simple enough. His identity is secured by the fixity of the image. As long as 
Malte strikes a pose he carries off a convincing semblance of identity. But the illusion is 
soon shattered by the fluidity of his transformations together with his inability to control 
the appearance of his identifications. He is taken out of his own hands, the semblance 
determining, in part, the things he was able to think about himself. To put it another way, 
the manner of his appearance determined the limits by which he could identify himself. 
Remember, Malte is wearing costumes found in a wardrobe that are notably outdated – 
they are historical and representative of a bygone era. It is in virtue of these historical 
facts that the costumes co-determine the character with which Malte identifies, the style 
and manner of dress coupled with the bodily gestures of his pose, which orients him 
toward the mirror, toward the manifestation of himself in the manifold given in 
appearance. A particularly cut and ornamented jacket imposes the characteristics of the 
era’s aristocracy, or the petit bourgeois, and throws Malte into relations with the system 
of references within which those lives and worlds make sense, all of those pre-
suppositions which necessarily go into understanding a place with landed gentry and 
such. Just as donning the livery of a servant necessarily places him in relation to those 
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systems of labor and he “becomes” a servant in his mirror image – always particular, 
always this body, in these clothes, here I am, there they are, the mirror over there, here in 
the room. As he undermines the Cartesian doctrine with one hand, with the other Rilke 
opens the avenue to another way of thinking, toward a radical emplacement. Casey paints 
our bodies and their surroundings as “coeval epicenters around which particular places 
pivot and radiate.”123 These epicenters offer open horizons, a differential interplay 
between them, that is also a transference, a passing through. Because of this openness, 
this interplay occurring in place, places display a cultural dimension, an eminent 
sensibility that allows us to take places in stride, to “get down to business” in different 
contexts (literally different places) that demand certain responses from us, that structure 
certain attitudes and behaviors. But this is also why oscillation, as an ontological 
principle, cannot be destabilizing only. I’ll return to this point below. Stay with Malte and 
the wardrobe just a bit longer. See that Rilke has built on the basic Humean position by 
not only noting that Malte can never have a perception of his “actual” self in experience, 
but that in fact the perception of himself which he does have is not entirely within his 
possession or control. If he is garbed in a particular costume, then his identity is guided 
by the logic of that costume – he identifies according to the historical significations 
manifest in the costume’s style. Even as the confidence in Malte’s identity is diminished 
and he flees in the face of his own annihilation, we are nevertheless circumspectively 
presented with something stable enough to impose an order upon Malte’s amorphous 
identity. Warren F. Motte has compared this moment in Rilke with Dostoevsky’s 
                                                
123 Casey, Getting Back into Place, 29. 
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underground man, who also has his own moment in the mirror, one in which the dis-ease 
is reflected back.124 He confesses, “I caught sight of myself accidentally in the mirror. 
My flustered face looked utterly revolting to me: pale, evil, mean, with disheveled hair. 
‘It’s all right, I’m glad of it,’ I thought. ‘I’m glad that I’ll seem repulsive to her. I like 
that…’”125 Motte wants us to see in both Rilke and Dostoevsky that the ancient 
imperative to “Know Thyself” has backfired, with catastrophic results.126 Yet even the 
underground man points beyond himself, has dimension and direction, an orientation, at 
least to her, to the other who he can imagine will be repulsed, thus, his own self-
representation mediated already through his relation to those with whom he communes, 
in places that condition his reflection. He sees “by accident,” stumbling upon himself 
unawares, and then, suddenly revealed “out there,” is thrown back on the wretchedness of 
his condition. This horror is also what Ryan perceives in the Rilke scene, Malte’s mixture 
of elation and despair, the way his possibilities overpower him and he becomes lost in 
multiplicity.127 The blow is delivered in each instance, and the shock follows, being 
subjected to and by the flow and movement in which we are emplaced. But we see that 
the wake of the destabilizing effect of oscillation does not reveal a meaningless nothing. 
This annihilation is not nihilism, understood as devoid of sense, or without any meaning. 
The destabilizing effect of oscillation, even under Vattimo’s interpretation, should never 
be confused with an absolute lack of order. It is not in any way equivalent to disorder. 
Further, there must be something which is itself unstable. There may be an order, but an 
                                                
124 Motte, “Reflections on Mirrors,” 777. 
125 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, 338. 
126 Motte, “Reflections on Mirrors,” 779. 
127 Ryan, “Validating the Possible,” 312. 
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unstable one, or one in fluctuation. Like Hume’s argument, Malte’s identity is not under 
attack because there is disorder, not at all. Instead, Malte and Vitangelo’s identity are 
dissimulated under the shear multitude of different orders which come to be instantiated 
in their place. 
 The greatness of Descartes’ thought is attested when we realize that, even in his 
gravest error, the philosopher still manages to point us toward an ontology of place. By 
using the language of “reflection” Descartes reveals the ontological underpinnings of his 
thinking, expressed as natural philosophy in his treatises on light and optics. So we see 
even more clearly the trajectory of identity, from bodily person, in which even Descartes 
located the activity of perception, to the surrounding environment, the wardrobe, the 
costumes, before the mirror, this projection onto the mirror and the return of this image 
from the mirror to myself again. All of this at once revealing the destabilization of the 
cogito and also the mechanisms by which whatever various identities might occur can be 
constituted at all. The historical trail accumulates across space-time, in place, building 
beings up as they traverse the developing surface, a lifeline, always in relation to a 
fundamental emplacement. Put into place how? Exactly in this oscillation between, 
between places, between one being and the next, defined in relative motion to them. A 
return to Pirandello will help me clarify. 
 Prirandello presents Vitangelo in an exclusively relational light. The character is 
always between, he exists intermezzo. First, he is caught between his wife and the mirror. 
That is, between the image he has of himself, his own representation, and the image of 
himself as he imagines his wife must see him. But now, witness how vertiginously 
Vitangelo’s in-between identity multiplies. If there is Vitangelo as he himself see him, 
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and Vitangelo as he imagines his wife sees him, then there must also be Vitangelo as his 
wife herself see him, to which Vitangelo has no access, thus a version of himself that 
remains completely unknown. But further, there may even be a Vitangelo that is one his 
wife imagines is how Vitangelo sees himself. And so on. But the philosophically salient 
point is not merely that there are different perspectives on who Vitangelo “really” is. It is 
not the banal point that there are many different ideas of Vitangelo that people imagine to 
be the case. It is that these perspectives bear on Vitangelo’s actual identification to the 
extent that they shape his actions in the world and the realization of their existence, 
imagined or not, brings about the Stoss and shock that dislodges and destabilizes the 
everyday understanding routinely taken for granted. The text walks us through the 
destabilization of Vitangelo’s identity in such a way that we are made to feel the vertigo 
of the existential question. The implication of the reader by the text is a recurring theme 
in all of the critical literature I’ve been citing in relation to Modernism. The net is cast for 
us by Vitangelo’s narration when he muses, again, in front of a mirror, “What could I 
know of him?” he asks, referring to the reflected image of himself. The answer: “What I 
saw of him for the moment in which I stared at him and nothing else.” There is the basic 
insight from Hume again, upon which Pirandello continues to build and add layers of 
nuance. Vitangelo goes on,  
If I didn’t wish myself or didn’t feel myself the way I looked then, he was 
also for me an outsider, who had those features, but could have had others. 
Once the moment I stared at him was past, he was already another; in fact, 
he was no longer what he had been as a boy, and was not yet what he would 
be as an old man; and as I tried to recognize him today in the him of 
yesterday and so on. And in that head there, immobile and hard, could put 
all the thoughts I wanted, kindle the most disparate visions…All of a sudden 
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I extinguished the vision, and that head remained there again immobile and 
hard in dazed apathy.128 
 
The real impermanence and instability of Vitangelo’s self is fully revealed the moment 
immediately before something else entirely is made clear. “Who was he?” Vitangelo asks 
of his self-image. “No one. A poor body, nameless, waiting for someone to take him.” 
His is no one. But then he is taken over, and this brings us closer to breaking free from 
Vattimo’s emphasis on destabilization. Vitangelo is overcome by a series of sneezes, 
which is, of course, entirely beyond his control and generates a dramatic effect in the 
image as it is seized by the need to sneeze. Vitangelo feels that, “He had been affected, 
on his own, alone, by a little draft, which had come God knows where from, to that poor 
body, without telling me anything and beyond my will.”129 Vitagnelo expresses, in a less 
traumatic mode, a feeling of dissociation similar to Malte – and so, if we are to make 
oscillation into an ontological principle, we must associate it with a loss of ego. The Stoss 
is a blow to the ego, and the shock, that of realizing, not that the ego has been lost, but 
rather that the ego was an empty concept all along, that it was never necessary. Indeed, if 
we follow Descartes’ own foundational metaphor of the mirror to its logical conclusion, 
the subiectum, which was not as rigorously developed in Descartes as in Kant, has always 
been a chimera, a mere play of light on a reflective surface. If the ego-self at the center of 
Modern philosophy has been an illusion, then the epistemological foundations which 
facilitate the movement of metaphysics after the Enlightenment (another wholly light-
centered way of talking about a certain historical period where it was thought that “to 
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have knowledge” is always to stand in the presence of what has been illumined as 
“truth”) are proven to be empty centers, but centers of a sort nonetheless. 
 With the cogito disrupted, decompressed and bleeding out into the body, situating 
itself in world, but losing its cranial bounds and slipping more and more fluidly into 
place, dissipating and thinning across some environmental matrix, we now find an empty 
center, the place once occupied by the ossified ego. Of all those who thought against 
Descartes’ major literature – Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, James, Dewey, and Whitehead – it 
is Heidegger who Casey thinks best thematizes place, although in an inconsistent and 
fragmentary manner.130 With Casey, we will return again to Heidegger, who is quick in 
reminding us of the deconstruction of the subject – that we are “always already” out 
there, in the world, being with others and the things through the use of which we make 
sense of our lives. This is an appropriate reminder as we embark on the next chapter, 
which will begin to take us, in the wake of these dissolutions, out into the world, one 
formerly composed of objects over and against subjects. But without a subject, we can no 
longer be quite so sure. What is it that can relate to an empty center? How can anything 
mean, have significance for, these bizarre empty centers? In an oblique way, this issue, 
this question concerning sense and significance, that whole apparatus of reference bound 
up with representation, the ground of which has been deconstructed and cast on a breeze 
by the destruction of the cogito, will recur in the Chapters that follow. Thomas Sheehan 
has recently published a groundbreaking study on Heidegger’s career which proposes that 
the central question, the Seinsfrage proper to Heidegger’s thought, is concerned first and 
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foremost with the intelligibility of things, the astonishing fact the anything makes sense at 
all; in ontological terms, what makes intelligibility possible. Heidegger’s answer, 
according to Sheehan, is eventually existence as the thrown-open clearing.131 One way 
Casey gets at this is his tensional arcs, the openness between my body and the landscape, 
the room, the place in which my body emplaces me. Perhaps there is overemphasis on the 
spatial environment in Casey’s effort to avoid Heidegger’s absolute surrender to 
temporality. In going through Descartes’ underground discourse, we have rediscovered a 
balance, just as Heidegger sought temporality in Aristotle’s account of motion, here too, 
we find place in movement. Casey’s tensional arcs are certainly rooted in Heidegger’s 
temporal account of dimensionality as a “stretching,” an opening gesture. I want to stay 
within this influence in thinking oscillation as an emplacing movement; as a movement 
that opens space and time, that brings us into place, and in whose play things can stand 
out in the open as the things that they are. There is still a dimension of appearance that 
has philosophical significance. This will become paramount in Chapter Four. As we close 
the door to the subject, and bar ourselves from recourse to that orthodox explanation, 
moving out into the world to better secure our placial ontology, I want still to think about 
these empty centers, these strange clouds, the debris of the self, a field, somehow still 
sensing, for they are a part of the whole that ontology seeks. Ontology and epistemology 
are never far apart. Let our first attempt to think these empty centers take us far afield in 
excess, to the most inhuman terrain, on a most inhuman scale. Let us think this first, 
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excessive attempt beyond the end of the mind on a cosmic scale, and image the empty 
centers that hold a solar system together. 
 These things, huge in their orbits, do not, strictly speaking, orbit other things, 
whether they be neutrons and protons in the center of an atom, or the sun at the center of 
a solar system. Rather, it is more accurate to say that all these things, even those at the 
supposed center, orbit around an imaginary point in space – a center of gravity that is 
“empty.” The sun itself is in a tight orbit around this center, the star itself oscillating 
around an axis that is the undetectable hub of the solar system. The systematic 
metaphysics built on the humanistic centrality of the ego-self, normally analyzed under 
the auspices of “subjectivity,” begins to lose its structuring force if this ego-self is 
missing. However, even with the center emptied, we might still put a system in orbit 
around a point of gravity, perhaps one heretofore undetected by the tradition, one that 
was obscured by the brilliant luminosity of the ego-sun. Perhaps our placial ontology is 
composed of binary stars, the center the empty space between, two horizons, coeval 
epicenters, constitutive parts of a larger whole. If we believe falsely about the ego, and it 
is in fact illusory, a play of light, then what we falsely believed to have conceptual weight 
has none, and the system it held in place begins to break down and dissolve, sending its 
former certainties spinning off into the ether as merely speculative fantasy. But here we 
are, and things make sense. There is, and it’s all around. So how can we describe these 
empty centers in order to account for the way in which the world and ourselves can 
express the meaning that it inevitably does express. For neither Malte nor Vitangelo ever 
experience the annihilation of meaning as such. There is no “meaningless-ness” attested 
by the loss of ego in either works, even if one set of assumptions is revealed to be 
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groundless or unnecessary, even if all knowledge is so. There is something there, the 
world remains sensible even to those who experience the destabilizing aspect of 
oscillation most powerfully. What follows, the wake of creative emplacement. 
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We recognize oscillation to be the natural order of the world. 
 – Luke Turner, “Metamodernist Manifesto,” (2011) 
 
3.1 Is this a Metaphysics? 
 Oscillation occurs on many levels. Until now, the focus has remained almost 
exclusively on human being – the mind that minds itself. This mind has been thoroughly 
particularized by a basic emplacement, and we have seen the tensional arc described by 
Casey being put into motion, moving beyond mere destabilization into a formative 
movement, an opening of place into which things can stand forth. We begin to move 
outward from here, leaving the human being behind as we approach mere being, guided 
forward by the strange song that, so long as we catch it, still comes from a place, though 
it may be no human place. We struggle against this enigma, wondering how this foreign 
song can even have meaning for us if it is not a human song. Perhaps it is, in one sense, a 
senseless song, but still a song that sounds. We will continue to struggle here, at the end 
of the mind, trying vainly perhaps to see that bird in the palm, hear and makes some 
sense of the song, even if it is just to say “I can hear…something…” At this limit, on the 
edge of meaning, the question stares us in the face: is this a metaphysics? So much has 
been said about the relationship between epistemology and ontology, their Modern 
division and distinction set out prominently after Kant. If this is a metaphysics, it is one 
that comes after the end of metaphysics, and so is obliged to start again, from the other 
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beginning. I have sought this other beginning in Casey’s work on place, and have tried to 
meet him half-way, uncovering place in modernity where Casey himself saw that it had 
been obfuscated and reduced to mere space. The cogito, reified as subjectivity, has been 
the starting point of metaphysics since the inauguration of Modern philosophy, at least 
since 1641. It has also been the end of metaphysics, heralded stridently by the 
deconstructionists and so-called “postmoderns” of the 20th century, and largely ignored 
by the Anglo-American analytic school, which carries on as if philosophy was first 
invented by the Vienna Circle in 1929, perhaps with Frege and Bertrand Russell as 
precursors to the abuses of “logic” perpetuated in their names. Because of this alternative 
starting point, and the radical break from the traditional point of view discussed 
aboveground, in the major literature, the metaphysics that follows, if it is indeed a 
metaphysics, may appear blessedly unphilosophical to those whose prejudices lie rooted 
in the received interpretation of the history of metaphysics as the history of a search for 
certitude resting upon the human subject for which knowledge of the “outside” world is 
secured through a logico-linguistic representative procedure. As I have already shown 
through an engagement with Heidegger and Alva Nöe, we will not require representation 
in the usual philosophical sense of that term, to the extent that we will need it at all. 
 To the extent that what appears here appears as a form of metaphysics, has 
metaphysical comportments, tendencies, and vices, we tread dangerously close to the 
twin giants of Realism and Idealism. Indeed, in this Chapter we will begin to see the 
relevance of realism in its literary manifestation, which has significant import for the 
treatment of emplacement in literature. Realism has again become a theme of importance 
in philosophy, and, to some extent, I will take a dedication to “the real” as axiomatic. But 
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this is really no more than to say that I hold places to be real, to exist, and, insofar as 
anything else exists or is real, it only does so in place. Strictly speaking, this is not an 
epistemological commitment, but an ontological one. However, what I do not mean by 
“real” or “to exist” is that there is a “real world” “out there” and my major philosophical 
difficulty is how to get “out there” from “in here” the inside of consciousness, locked in 
the epistemic cabinet of subjectivity, slipping out to get knowledge in shiny baubles and 
artifacts that I recreate for myself in my treasure box mind. Still, this ontological 
commitment shows how little we can separate epistemology and ontology completely; 
another layer to the arguments laid out in the previous Chapter. If we are to know 
something real, that things exist, we seem to be committed to “the real” before the 
question is posed, or rather, to assume it in the very posing of the question itself. And if 
existence, whatever is real, is to appear as an object of knowledge, then I must at least 
offer the start of an answer as to how I know it. Graham Harman has supplied a critical 
insight necessary to unpacking what I’m driving at here, although, I certainly will not be 
following Harman uncritically into the realm of the “object oriented ontologists.” It 
doesn’t take much to see, from the coupling of “realism” and the “object” orientation of 
this new movement, that the old metaphysical paradigms are uncritically reinforced, 
again the postmodern trend of throwing all the weights onto on side of the onto-epistemic 
scales, this time in favor of the object over the subject, the real over the ideal, but never 
escaping the draft of Kant’s tremendous gravity and the eminently Modern origin and 
determinations of their basic position. It is not my task here to directly and fully engage 
or “refute” the object orientation of New Realism, or Harman in particular, but it should 
be made clear that this project, although rife with certain family resemblances (we have 
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all read our Heidegger), takes off from a trajectory that is tangential (at best) to this line 
of Continental thought. In many ways, I am, with Casey, still waving the flag of 
phenomenology – even after the end of phenomenology.1 Despite these caveats, I do 
endorse Harman’s arguments to the effect that “all relations are on the same ontological 
footing as the human-world relation,” and he thereby poses an inversion of the Kantian 
doctrine that, as Harman sees it, “the human-world relation has privilege over all 
others.”2 Before I ask readers to also accept this commitment, I will work once again 
through literature, where we find an emphasis on the impact of the surrounding 
environment on human being. 
 We will find this emphasis in Honoré de Balzac. My arguments will begin with a 
reading of Balzac, whose Human Comedy repeatedly emphasizes the global importance 
of place as his narrative oscillates between the urban and provincial, between Paris and 
Angoulême. From Balzac, we traverse the Atlantic to find another great author of place 
who took his literary inspiration, in part, from Balzac. William Faulkner and his 
Yoknapatawpha County will become paramount for my most forceful formulation of a 
placial ontology. 
3.2 Becoming in Places 
 The critic E. K. Brown has commented that, for Balzac, “between man and 
animals there is this crucial difference, by which the representation of men becomes 
immensely more dramatic, more complex, and more interesting: in the individual man 
                                                
1 My friend Tom Sparrow has made a powerful argument regarding the relationship of 
phenomenology and Idealism in his The End of Phenomenology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University, 2014). I will be engaged with Sparrow’s arguments below. I am indebted to him for 
an extremely fruitful correspondence on the issues taken up in this and the following Chapters.  
2 Harman, “Realism without Materialism.” SubStance, 40:2 (2011), 55. 
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there is striking change as his habitat is changed. Throw the rabbit in the ocean, and he is 
still a rabbit; throw the young provincial into the welter of Paris, and he becomes a being 
new and strange.”3 If we ignore the clumsy, gendered language, and Brown’s 
anthropocentrism, we can hear the final clause ringing with a profound truth. In order to 
execute the task of bringing to life the transformations in character that result from the 
transition from locale to locale, it is necessary to paint a sufficiently vivid picture of the 
material and social environments within which the activities of the character take on 
meaning. Around 1832, Balzac conceives of a grand work that would capture the life of 
France at the time. Historic in breadth and scope, populated with dozens of elaborately 
wrought and thoroughly imagined characters, Balzac began his monumental work with 
Eugénie Grandet in 1833, followed quickly by Père Goriot, published in serial form from 
1834-35. Although he is not properly a Modernist, according to the usual dates, Balzac’s 
literary realism is philosophically relevant to the current project. He is also formally 
significant in terms of the influence of Balzac’s style and subject matter on writers that 
follow him, and on Modernism in particular. For us, it is important that Balzac prefigures 
Faulkner in the use of place and the development of an intricate social-historical order 
related to place, which enables the powerful depictions of human interactions and 
personal psychology. In these intensely realized places, Balzac’s characters become what 
they are, and he presents them through their oscillations between places, and between the 
people and things that occupy those places. When he wishes to evoke the mood or 
thoughts of a character, or to sum up their positions in life, and how the broader social-
                                                
3 Brown, “Introduction.” Père Goriot and Eugénie Grandet (New York: Modern Library, 1950), 
x. 
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historical context is reflected in their situation, Balzac invariably refers us to these places 
and their accoutrements. 
 The final Chapter of Eugénie Grandet, entitled “The Way of the World,” begins 
with rumination on the state of the title character’s happiness, or rather, her unhappiness. 
Throughout the novel, Eugénie cultivates a miserly nature inherited from her father, 
Felix, who plays his daughter’s suitors against one another for his own paternal profits. 
When his nephew, Charles Grandet, arrives from Paris, Felix’s provincial plans are 
thrown into turmoil, largely due to the fact that Charles and Eugénie fall in love with one 
another. Felix desires to be rid of Charles by sending the young nephew overseas, a wish 
he is eventually granted, but only because Eugénie herself funds Charles’ expedition with 
her own gold coins, outraging her father and sending her mother into a dire illness. 
Neither Felix nor Eugénie’s fortunes continue for long, as Felix’s wealth is ravaged by 
opportunistic businessmen, and Charles returns to France only to renounce his love for 
and engagement to Eugénie in favor of marrying a down-on-her-luck aristocrat. This 
alternative marriage is more beneficial to Charles, as it allows him to leverage the new 
wife’s titles in order to ascend the social ladder himself. Eugénie eventually does marry; 
she weds a wealthy suitor, who in turn dies at a young age and leaves Eugénie a thirty-
three-year-old widow, but also very wealthy. In summing up the life and effort spent by 
Eugénie on a quest for fleeting happiness, Balzac writes,  
Thus, until now, in her struggle for happiness she had wasted her strength 
and gained nothing. In the life of the soul, as well as in the life of the body, 
there is both a breathing in and a breathing out; the soul must first absorb 
the feelings of another soul, must assimilate them and give them back again 
more abundantly. Without this glorious human phenomenon, there can be 
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no life for the heart; it cannot breathe; it suffers and wastes away. Eugénie 
had begun to suffer.4 
 
Readers are given to understand that Eugénie retreats inward, a soul-searching gesture, 
because her wealth was not a power for her, nor did it console her. Love, religion, a faith 
in the future: these were Eugénie’s comforts, where she is “plunged in the depths of 
infinite thoughts, which for her perhaps merged into one.”5 And yet, Balzac does not 
express Eugénie’s treasures as some immaterial “within” that brings her solace through 
meditation (reflection) on her own immaterial attributes. Certainly, it is not the abstract 
principle of her value in terms of wealth or income. As Balzac describes, it is, “Charles’ 
dressing-case, the two portraits hanging above her bed, the jewels recovered from her 
father and proudly spread out on a layer of cotton wool in a drawer of the cabinet, her 
aunt’s thimble, which her mother has used and which she put on religiously every day to 
work at a piece of embroidery – Penelope’s web, begun solely for the purpose of wearing 
on her finger that gold so full of memories.”6 The reference to Penelope here is telling: 
that the embroidery, like so many human endeavors, is not undertaken merely for its own 
sake, but is engaged for the purpose of connecting Eugénie to those others from whom 
she derives her life’s meaning through its use.   
 It is not that we must adhere to a mode of materialism, where these “external” 
objects define Eugénie’s character, and we should be even more skeptical of the 
reduction of her relationship with those object to mere symbolism – an act of 
                                                
4 Balzac, Père Goriot and Eugénie Grandet, trans. Dorothea Walter and John Watkins (New 
York: Modern Library, 1950), 472. 
5 Balzac, Eugénie Grandet, 472-73. 
6 Balzac, Eugénie Grandet, 473. 
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representation wherein the object stands in for the person’s psychology. Charles’ 
dressing-case is not, strictly speaking, a symbol; it is just a dressing-case, presented by an 
author as belonging to a character, a reasonably believable articulation based on 
experiences had with others in the world. The dressing-case can take on symbolic value 
only to the extent that it appears to us as a dressing-case, an everyday object with which 
people in Balzac’s time (and we with analogues in our own) have familiar dealings as 
they go about the course of their lives. Charles’ dressing case is and is not a mere conceit 
of fiction. It is, because it is part of the artist’s technique. Prefacing The Lily of the 
Valley, Balzac explains that, “writers use whatever literary device seems capable of 
giving the greatest intensity of life to their characters.”7 And yet, it is not, because there is 
some philosophical significance to the fact that the technique shows Balzac to be driving 
toward an imagined emplacement of characters within a “realistic” setting – a setting 
recognizable as the usual types of places we occupy in daily life. To understand both, 
consider the literary and philosophical prejudice long held against description. 
 On the one hand, mentioning the dressing-case has symbolic potential. It can refer 
us to Eugénie’s failed relationship with Charles, her sacrifices to his success only to be 
spurned, and so on. In part, the “standing in” for Charles works because Charles is 
literally absent and his absence is expressed in the object with whom he was familiar. But 
there are other ways in which Balzac utilizes details such as the dressing-case. Again, 
part of its symbolic function allows that the object itself be somewhat arbitrary. The 
important thing is that whatever it is that Balzac mentions must be part of imagined 
                                                
7 Quoted in Samuel Rogers, Balzac and the Novel (New York: Octagon Books, 1953), 161. 
 144 
history of his characters. Thus, there must be repetition of the image or phrase, a 
repetition of the sign, by which Balzac will signal the relation between the characters, 
their history together with the object. And yet, there are plenty of details about the 
character’s surroundings that are never repeated, that are just rote descriptions of things 
going on, laying about, furniture, wallpaper, and sundry accoutrements of living. These 
descriptions of the surroundings, descriptive prose generally, has been subject to much 
abuse in the history of French letters.8 It is interesting to note that description is used 
often and early in the 1600s primarily to describe places; Paris, Versailles, military 
exercises. But this is to put it out of the purview of literature, because it served as a 
textual praxis, writing to “describe-for” some practical purpose. Such “work” and praxis 
was avoided, or detoured in proper literature as art.9 Hamon and Baudoin show that this 
attitude toward descriptive writing led to a policing of literature for descriptive language 
during the classical period in France. There were three particular dangers posed by 
description: 1) the introduction of “foreign” terminology, especially the technical 
vocabularies of professions associated with the thing being described and would, thereby, 
corrupt the text with the “trace of work,” but which could also hinder lay people in 
accessing the text; 2) descriptive details are valued only for utility in proofs offered in the 
text, and this becomes compromised if description becomes an end in itself, just writing 
for writing’s sake; and, 3) the freedom offered by excessive description plays into the 
uncontrollability of the readers’ reactions and thus, the author loses control of the 
                                                
8 A good critical review of this history is provided in Philippe Hamon and Patricia Baudoin, 
“Rheotrical Status of the Descriptive.” Yale French Studies, 61 (1981), 1-26. 
9 Hamon and Baudoin, “Rhetorical Status of the Descriptive,” 4-6. 
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audience, and the text becomes less effective at what it aims to communicate.10 The 
extensive use of description is seen as an innovation of the realists, and Zola includes 
Balzac among its champions when he is trying to sell the realist school of fiction 
writing.11 Nevertheless, description still serves several ends that Hamon and Baudoin 
successfully fit into Foucault’s configuration of the Classical episteme. Here, by the time 
of Flaubert (Bovary is 1857, Dictionary of Received Ideas, 1911), description has become 
a space in which the author as artist can show their own work. This technical prowess 
can be demonstrated in three ways: 1) exactly by deploying a technical vocabulary 
associated with what is being described; 2) the use of this vocabulary in metaphor making 
and linguistic showmanship; and, 3) that connects with the general work going on in the 
world, work that produces such vocabularies, and by which knowledge is categorized.12 
These tendencies, as I will discuss below, lead even contemporary critics to view 
description as nothing but so many curlicues; an embellishment just for show, but which 
carries no deeper significance. After all, even the example from Balzac above, in which 
he ties everyday objects to the deep psychological dramas of a woman’s lived experience, 
can come off as just a list of things given in the text. Other passages would fair far worse 
on that front, without the explicit connection to a character’s consciousness. Regardless, 
such attention to detail allows objects such as dressing-cases to take on the role of a 
minor character: the fate of such objects are in themselves consequential to the plot, and 
it has effects on the actions and states of the people with whom it is associated. Balzac 
                                                
10 Hamon and Baudoin, “Rhetorical Status of the Descriptive,” 9-10. 
11 Zola, letter to Henry Céard, 22 March 1885, cited in Hamon and Baudoin, “Rhetorical Status of 
the Descriptive,” 11. 
12 Hamon and Baudoin, “Rhetorical Status of the Descriptive,” 21. 
 146 
needs a fully realized place in which his characters can live. It is from these places, and 
primarily from them, that actions and relationships between characters take on 
significance and have the level of intensity necessary to render meaningfully dramatic 
stories – and thereby keep readers’ attentions. But more than that, such technique 
resonates with philosophical import. For it is not just the symbolically laden object that 
brings the characters to life in this way. It is also through seemingly inconsequential 
details that a robust historical place can be prepared in which plausible characters can do 
the sorts of things people do in the course of living their daily lives. 
 Take the descriptions of wallpaper provided in another of Balzac’s works, Père 
Goriot.13 Balzac sets up the wallpaper as a point of comparison, as a way of determining 
certain fundamental differences between the places in which his characters are to 
develop. Very early, he describes the condition of the boarding house, owned and 
operated by Madame Vauquer. Before we are introduced to the players in the drama – 
and it is a drama14 – Balzac gives a thorough description of the boarding house itself, 
which includes the following details: “The floor is far from even; the wainscoting rises to 
elbow-height; and the rest of the wall is hung with a varnished paper representing the 
principle scenes from Télémachue [the Telemachus episode from the Odyssey], with the 
classic personages in color. The panel between the two barred windows exhibits to the 
guests the feast offered by Calypso to Ulysses’ son.”15 Of course, the grandeur of the 
                                                
13 Graham Robb notes the source of Balzac’s inspiration for this detail is the poet Henri de 
Latouche, who knew the details of hanging wallpaper, in Balzac: A Biography (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 1994), 152. This reinforces Hamon and Baudoin’s general point regarding the 
deployment of professional and technical vocabularies by the French realists. 
14 Balzac, Père Goriot, 3. 
15 Bazlac, Père Goriot, 7. 
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Greek drama is contrast to the lowly state of the boarding house, and this Balzac 
leverages on a symbolic level, but some details (uneven floor, the wainscoting) are sort of 
throw-aways; that is, they are just the kinds of things found in boarding houses at the 
time. It makes sense that, for forty years, that wallpaper and its epic had, “stimulated the 
humor of the young boarders who try to forget their poor estates by making fun of the 
dinners to which it condemns them.”16 When we are at last introduced to the title 
character after about twenty pages of place-setting, Balzac again includes the wallpaper, 
writing about Goriot’s apartment that, “Madame Vauquer had done over the three rooms 
of which the apartment consisted, in consideration of a down payment sufficient, it was 
said, to cover the cost of yellow calico curtains, wooden armchairs covered with Utrecht 
velvet, a few cheap pictures, and wallpaper which was too ugly for suburban cafés.”17 
Note again the layering of the symbolic with the mundane, and yet the whole working 
toward the greater connectivity in historic circumstance – class, country, city life. When 
we revisit the same rooms much later in the novel, we are again directed to the wallpaper. 
“There were no curtains at the window; the wallpaper was hanging loose at many places 
because of the dampness, and where it had shriveled one could see the plaster yellowed 
by smoke.”18 The curtains are gone, light comes in, but reveals more. Always these 
circumstantial details of the room refer us, not only to the individuals that inhabit them, 
but also to the greater social conditions under which the person is lodged in the rooms so 
described. I do not here mean something reductive, as if the “social conditions” as such 
                                                
16 Balzac, Père Goriot, 7. 
17 Balzac, Père Goriot, 19. 
18 Balzac, Père Goriot, 133. 
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could be reduced to the rank of classes in society, to which each individual ultimately 
belongs according to a series of power relations, etc. Class distinctions are important, and 
Balzac displays a consciousness and provides a detailed account of class differences that 
impress both Marx and Engels.19 Nevertheless, I mean to include in the “social” other, 
less thoroughly politicized phenomena. For instance, the wallpaper reveals plaster that is 
“yellowed by smoke.” Yellowed by the social habit of smoking cigarettes, which one can 
do in isolation, but which remains throughout a habit conditioned by the social mores of 
the times, as well as the material paraphernalia that constitutes, together with practices, 
the habit of smoking. We could refer further, to the heating mechanisms of the time. Coal 
and wood burning stoves, ventilated to various efficiencies, together with the workaday 
dust stirred by cleaning and maintaining the heating instrument, yellows the wall of the 
years, and, left unclean, the plaster is later papered over, only to have the previous grime 
discovered again, highlighting the original attempt to cover over the soiled plaster. 
 The peeling wallpaper that signals this robust history to us as the history of a 
place which houses the character and gives shape to their appearance in the text 
reinforces our need to think place, along with Casey, as the ecstatic unity of space and 
time, and particularized in such ecstasis. Not only does oscillation occur between 
localities in space, but also in time, across it, as the past effects the present, generating 
conditions for the future, which becomes present and then past, exerting in its turn and 
                                                
19 In a letter to Margaret Harkness, dated April 1888, Engels extols the power of Balzac’s realism 
to recount the historical development of French society and its class relations. See: Engels, Letter 
to Margaret Harkeness, early April 1888, Letters: Marx-Engels Correspondence, The Marxist 
Internet Archive, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1888/letters/88_04_15.htm 
[accessed 03/20/2016]. Balzac also, famously, coined the phrase “fictitious capital” as part of a 
character’s description of French financialization, which has become a well-known phrase within 
Marxism. 
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effect on the present yet to come, itself to be the conditions of some as yet undisclosed 
future. The fundamental unfolding of time in history, as the history of…someplace or 
something, shows that ontological oscillation is not sufficiently thought out if we take it 
only as a “back-and-forth” between objects. How to resolve this difficulty? I suggest we 
adopt “play” as a technical term in our developing placial ontology. Initially, let’s think 
“play” as in a game, a “play” called in football, or a play on the chessboard. A play in this 
sense has its peculiar time dimension, both as a goal toward which the play drives and 
also in its series of distinct movements. But let us work toward a definition so that the 
concept might reveal itself most powerfully as a result of analysis. Oscillation can be 
sought in the play between things. This is not to say that oscillation occurs, and then, as 
an effect or function of oscillation, things arise in certain relations. It is an ontological 
statement. The relation between things is their oscillation. The play between manifests 
oscillation. Thus, the appearance of things is their play in oscillation. Their play frees 
them, and makes things available to us. 
 To clarify, we need to consider how differently the walls appear in the well-to-do 
homes of Balzac’s aristocratic salons. What a contrast to Madame Vauquer’s boarding 
house is the dreary wallpaper in Goriot’s sad apartment. The home of the Baroness de 
Nucingen exhibits walls too exquisite for drab paper. Reader find her drawing room, 
“hung with Italian paintings and with the general air of a café.”20 The wallpaper in Père 
Goriot’s room was too unseemly for suburban cafés, but the Baroness’ reading room 
provides the air of the café itself, a striking play between the public and private spheres, 
                                                
20 Balzac, Père Goriot, 144. 
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the Baroness’ home itself the scene of a public life to which the young boarder at 
Madame Vauquer’s aspires. The house was generally composed of “stucco and stairways 
with landings in mosaics of marble.”21 The book plays between luxury and destitution, 
and the characters display a consciousness of the fact that to become the kind of person 
they wish to be, they must adapt themselves to the environments most appropriate to the 
lives they wish to cultivate. Balzac’s realist novels are rife with sentiments expressing the 
importance of emplacement to the success of a character’s plans for self-advancement, 
such as this passage concerning Eugène de Rastignac, the young boarder “whom 
misfortune has condemned to hard work, who understand in their first youth the hopes 
that their relatives have set on them, and who prepare for a great career by calculating the 
bearing their studies will have upon it and adapting them in advance to the future 
tendencies of society in order to be among the first to profit by them.”22 Thus, the 
development of Eugène’s character does not unfold from some inner subjective essence, 
but is first conditioned by wherever he finds himself, his original position, and leads from 
there into a series of relations involving his education, his family, and society at large, 
within which he must anticipate and prepare a place for himself. Eugène’s personal 
development is then presented as the oscillation between these different places, the run-
down boarding house, the fine salons of the aristocracy, the theater, the pubs of common 
Parisians, and so on. Each of these locales, and the outward ways in which these places 
signal their relationship with other elements of society and their shared history, play into 
the manifestation of Eugène as a person, and heighten the intensity – the realism – with 
                                                
21 Balzac, Père Goriot, 144. 
22 Balzac, Père Goriot, 11. 
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which Balzac is able to portray them as living. Nowhere is this play more evident than in 
Lost Illusions, the centerpiece of his ongoing Human Comedy. Written between 1837 and 
1843, Lost Illusions centers on the young poet Lucien Chardon and his drive to become a 
successful literary figure. He begins fairly poor in provincial Angoulême and Paris, 
oscillating between these two poles, and also between failure and success in his quest for 
literary acclaim. It is worth noting, just to begin, that much of the character’s motivation 
is derived from the idea that in order to be a poet, one had to be in Paris. Location was 
everything to the young man from the provinces. 
 It is significant that the book opens with a consideration of the printing press. In 
Angoulême there is an outdated press; a wooden “groaning press” with leather ink 
daubers and a stone “marble” on which the type was arranged for printing.23 Here is good 
evidence for Hamon and Baudoin’s observations regarding the use of professional and 
technical vocabulary in realist description. Balzac relies on technical details to paint a 
picture of the press. He lists off the parts, their make-up and working relations, but also 
elaborates on the beliefs and superstitions of the printer, the history of the technologies 
developed by Elzivir, Pantin, Aldini, and Didot, as well as the machine’s relevance to the 
overall plot.24 The first page already deploys the object as an instance of historical 
grounding, connecting, through the object, the persons with whom the object is 
associated in their work, the global history of the development of the technological object 
itself, and the local history of the story contained in the novel, dealing not with 
                                                
23 Balzac, Lost Illusions, trans. Katherine Prescott Wormeley (New York: Barnes and Noble, 
2007), 5. 
24 Balzac, Lost Illusions, 5. 
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developments in French society and culture, but with particular individuals and people 
who draw their living from the larger context. And, as I’ve mentioned in regards to 
Charles’ dressing-case, the press itself has a role to play in the story. We are lead into the 
context of the drama through this object. Our trajectory through the text is “set,” as it 
were by the press. Here, although we do not typically consider Balzac as a Modernist per 
se, we can see how his realism prefigures the critical work of Modernists through the 
“meta” level awareness of the objects as both historically constructed (literally, in the 
case of a machine press), but also of the role this object will play in the unfolding of the 
story. 
 For us now, it is crucial that this press is an outdated one, and that immediately 
distinguishes life in the provinces from life in the urban glow of Paris. In fact, Balzac 
notes that the specialization of printing in Angoulême allowed a very close relationship 
between the province and Paris, so that the two maintain an intimate interplay, although 
Angoulême remains “behind the times.” No surprise then, that Lucien will often feel as 
though the provincial life holds up or otherwise retards his progress toward literary 
greatness – so much so that he must catch-up to his own talents in the salons of Paris. At 
least, Lucien imagines that he can only be the poet per excellence after he takes up the 
Parisian life, and thus catches and surpasses his own provincial potentials. The outdated 
press is thus the initial foil against which the basic oscillations of emplacement are 
established – from the object, Balzac sets up some basic binaries between which the 
actions of the story take on meaning and significance and through which the positions of 
the characters are revealed. These oppositions crop up naturally and linearly in Balzac’s 
narrative. I will complicate these relations later, and allow them to take a more realistic 
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(irony noted) nuance that is not fully developed in Balzac. It will also be made clear how 
the realism in Balzac’s literature is carried over into Modernism and why this literary 
realism has philosophical implications. The placial ontology is, in other words, perhaps a 
mode of literary realism, given its phenomenological dimension, rather than a strictly 
philosophical realism that is opposed to some idealist foe. If this is the case, we may 
sidestep the danger of falling back into the subject on which the outside of realism breaks 
against the inside of subjectivity. It could mean something like a methodological realism 
against the onto-epistemological orthodoxy. 
 Part One of Lost Illusions is called “Two Poets.” It begins with the printing press, 
and the proprietor of the machine, Jérôme-Nicholas Séchard, whose son, David, is one of 
the titular poets. David Séchard eventually takes over the press from his father. The 
younger Séchard is a scientifically minded fellow who has been educated in Paris. After a 
while, David hires Lucien Chardon as a foreman and falls in love with Lucien’s sister, 
Eve. David and Lucien become close friends, business partners, and share in Lucien’s 
literary aspirations. They prefer the creative poetic work of the mind to running the print 
shop, which carries on a marginal existence largely due to the fact that its most serious 
competitors, the monarchist Cointet brothers, view Séchard and company as weakened 
threats, ultimately preferable to other, potentially stronger competition.25 Like the earlier 
work Père Goriot, Balzac spends many pages place-setting. He gives historical 
background through his discussion of the printing machine and its passage from father to 
son. He used the publishing business, rooted in the technology of the press, to elucidate 
                                                
25 Balzac, Lost Illusions, 20-24. 
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the then-recent history of France and the post-Napoleonic politics of revolution, 
monarchism, and republicanism. He casts Lucien and David as liberals, against their 
rivals in printing, the monarchist Cointet brothers. The proximity between Paris and 
Angoulême is highlighted and elucidated, foreshadowing the interplay between these two 
localities that will give shape to the drama yet to unfold. David and Lucien are 
themselves played off one another as like-minded souls, but of basically different types: 
David the scientist and business owner, calculating and pragmatic, Lucien the literary 
artist and dreamer, and yet, both are poets in their own rights, with creative visions of the 
world, seeking truth in the written word. These were some of the crucial planes between 
which the oscillations central to defining the key characters, events, and dramas of the 
book play. Again, Balzac outlines these basic differences in a very linear manner, careful 
to root social-historical abstractions in realist descriptions of everyday life and the objects 
that facilitate the activities of such living. 
 With this outline of the novel and Balzac’s descriptive technique in mind, we can 
move on to the philosophically relevant insight gained by reading Balzac’s work, 
focusing on Lost Illusions. Such a reading will reveal the salience of literary realism, 
which will pass from its literary form to a methodological consideration in the vein of 
phenomenology. This will be made most clear by our encounters with William Faulkner. 
Once with Faulkner in his Yoknapatawpha County, I can show the philosophical power 
of Modernism’s latent placial ontology, and use it to further elaborate on the concept of 




3.3 A Detour Through Physics on the Way to Methodological Realism 
 Oscillation occurs on many levels. In the previous Chapter, the focus was mostly 
on particular individuals, characters that are singularly depicted in their immediate 
environment, in rooms, with the objects and garments that occupy them, in front of their 
own reflections. Earlier in this Chapter we saw Eugénie Grandet drawing sustenance 
from the few things that linked her to those with whom she’d lived out her life’s drama. 
With Lost Illusions, and even more so in Yoknapatawpha, we ascend to levels beyond the 
individual, and our time scales become proportionally longer in relation to the 
accompanying topologies that open on each level, in each layer. Our view of places will 
increasingly resemble an onion with hermeneutic layers that allow us access to different 
levels of analysis – the individual, the familial, the household, the village, the town, the 
city, the county, the country, the nation, the planet… Of course, the individual need not 
be the starting point. The terminal scale in the direction of small is on the order of 
1.6119926 x 10-35 meters, and for events occurring at that infinitesimal level of being we 
would need to consider durations of time on the order of 10-43 seconds.26 It is only fitting 
that we express these dimensions using measures based on the scale of the human body, 
given our average 1.64-meter height. The opposite magnitude is attained on the order of 
light-years, 9.5 trillion kilometers long, measuring galaxies forming and colliding over 
billions of years. Still, we refer these astronomical measurements to the things we can 
                                                
26 In physics, these are Planck lengths and times, which are, theoretically, the terminal limit of 
measurability. These so-called “natural” limits are derived from five physical constants (gravity, 
the speed of light in a vacuum, the reduced Planck’s constant, the Coulomb constant, and the 
Boltzmann constant), each of which are in turn associated with a fundamental physical theory 
(general relativity and Newtonian gravity; special relativity and electromagnetism; quantum 
mechanics; electrostatics; and, statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, respectively). 
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deal with – light, a trip around the sun, multiplication. The bigger story we tell, the bigger 
are the requisite timescales. The more modest our narrative breadth, the less time is spent. 
A human lives over sixty years, a hundred if we’re lucky. Sometimes we are barely born 
– a single breath can be the breadth of our finitude. A generation spans a century and 
heralds the next, 150 years, give or take. There is a ratio. Place is, after all, the ecstatic 
unity of space and time. They are, irrevocably, connected in spacetime. And yet, all of 
this is not to say that “man is the measure of all things.” The universe can be its own 
measure, granting Planck his achievements in physics. What ontology seeks is an 
understanding of the κόσµος, which means an understanding of ourselves in φύσις. I 
allow the Greek to stand so that readers might be thrown back on themselves, to make 
these terms (cosmos, physics), weird for us again, to make us puzzle over them a second. 
Although I grant the physical sciences their achievements, and readily accept that 
philosophers benefit from knowledge of the sciences, I do not want to necessarily mislead 
readers into a naive materialism or physical realism. I also want to be careful to avoid the 
idea that oscillation, cultures, places, history, or cognition – really anything – 
“supervenes” on the physical or material. This presupposes all the old metaphysical 
dogmas that the last two Chapters worked hard to circumvent. Supervenience, generally, 
is too firmly entrenched in the order of representation, where the goal remains the 
correlation of property sets between objects, such that propositional formulae express 
their identity in veridical procedures.27 This more local, particular concern puts it outside 
our purview here, since emplacement is the ground of any relation of supervenience and 
                                                
27 Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennet, “Supervenience.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/ [accessed 03/22/2016]. 
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the condition of their possibility. But supervenience in relation to physicalism poses a 
further problem, namely one of implicitly introducing an ontological hierarchy in which 
what is “physical” is somehow “more real” than what supervenes on it – mysteriously 
immaterial things like mind, culture, history, etc. I want to dwell just a bit longer on the 
relationship of this project, and ontology broadly, to the physical sciences so that we can 
move forward clear headed with regard to these thorny metaphysical issues. Indeed, I 
have been using, and the literature has pushed me to use, examples laden with 
materiality, with the physical things and stuff with whom people live, with which they 
interact, and from which they draw meaning. 
Philosophers must be careful when treading the theoretical boundary between 
Newtonian mechanics and our contemporary Standard Model, which is itself undergoing 
tentative and controversial revision. As early as Einstein, the old Newtonian ideal of 
absolute space and absolute time, and both as two distinct and separate fundamental 
properties (notice the latent Kantianism – space and time fundamental, intuitive absolutes 
of all physical phenomena) was reformed as a unified manifold of spacetime; a fabric in 
which things are suspended, and which itself can effect and be affected by the things 
appearing in it. So again, the vessel metaphor. Just as consciousness was fundamentally 
placeless, yet trapped within the body, bodies themselves were formerly held to be “in” 
absolute space and time as in a container, but never interacted with the container itself. In 
the Standard Model, physical objects appear enmeshed in a dynamic matrix of spacetime, 
and interact with it, engaging a multi-valenced web of active fields; relative forces which 
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co-depend on and define one another.28 The mathematician Hermann Minkowski, in a 
now famous lecture to the Naturforscher Verstammlung (Congress of Natural 
Philosophers) at Cologne in 1908, says: “The conceptions about time and space, which I 
hope to develop before you today, has grown on experimental physical grounds. Herein 
lies its strength. The tendency is radical. Henceforth, the old conception of space for itself 
and time for itself shall reduce to a mere shadow, and some sort of union of the two will 
be found consistent with the facts.”29 In this statement we can see a natural philosophical 
affinity between spacetime and place as developed by Casey. Again, Casey shows that 
spacetime brings us back to event, events in space and time, a placial happening, where 
anything that occurs has its place.30 Particularization, multiplicity, relative motion, 
relativity generally – whatever is physical is relationally defined between fields of force. 
So, philosophers must understand the radically revised notion of what it even means to be 
physical that exists in today’s Standard Model. Physicist Frank Wilczek has argued that 
“the ancient contrast between celestial light and earthy matter has been transcended. In 
modern physics, there’s only one thing, and that thing is more like the traditional idea of 
light than the traditional idea of matter.”31 In fact, although matter is no longer considered 
to be the extended, mechanical objects thought by Newtonian physics, the question of 
                                                
28 For a general overview of this development in the physical sciences, see: Herman Minkowski, 
“Space and Time.” The Principle of Relativity, trans. Meghnad Saha (Calcutta: University of 
Calcutta, 1920), 70-88; James Jean, “Space-time.” The Growth of the Physical Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1947), 205-301; Tamás Matolsci, Spacetime without 
Reference Frames (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1994); Georges Francis Rayner Ellis and Ruth 
M. Williams, Years Later (New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 2010). 
29 Minkowski, “Space and Time,” 70. 
30 Casey, Getting Back into Place, 339-40. 
31 Wilczek, The Lightness of Being: Mass, Ether, and the Unification of Forces (New York: Basic 
Books, 2008). 
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void and vacuum has again been raised in the context of quantum fluctuations – that on 
the Planck scale, the elementary physical particles are continuously and unstably popping 
in and out of existence in a tangible quantum ether of fields. Of course, no one 
understands why this is the case.32 Ironically, modern quantum field theory echoes with 
Descartes and Newton’s corpuscular theory of the atom, in which there were not point 
particles, but corpuscles, little cavities of different sized matter, energized and differing 
in active intensity.33 Rather than an ontological hierarchy, where the “physical,” whatever 
that now means (the oscillation of light-like stuff?) is a “domain of all domains” on 
which other “non-physical” stuff, whatever that means, globs on, or supervenes on, and 
thus maintains its parasitic existence, we have Dirac’s sea of relative motions; 
fundamental differentiations that are themselves the very constituents of the things that 
appear, and is itself the stratum of being, never a container or a confined area. From here, 
we arrive with Deleuze at the insight that this multiplicity presumes, “a swarm of 
differences, a pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences; a properly differential and 
original space and time [place!].”34 As far as I can tell, contemporary physics offers no 
stable substratum on which whatever might somehow be “non-physical” would 
supervene. Whatever substratum it does offer, however, itself depends on oscillation.35 
                                                
32 Cf., Wilczek, The Lightness of Being, 76-111; Leonard Susskind, The Black Hole War (New 
York: Back Bay Books, 2009), 96-98; Roger Penrose, The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to 
the Laws of the Universe (New York: Knopf, 2005), 622-28 and 897-907. 
33 Richard Feynman, QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter (Princeton: Princeton 
University, 2006), 13-14. 
34 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University, 
1994), 50. 
35 That is, can be described by the mathematics of harmonic oscillators. Cf., Leonard Susskind 
and Art Friedman, Quantum Mechanics (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 311-46; Susskind, 
Black Hole Wars, 169-75; Penrose, Road to Reality, 153-78. 
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Showing oscillation to be a fundamental element in the physical world is relatively easy. 
We need only two of the most well-known equations of the standard model to show how 
oscillation functions at the heart of the mathematics explaining physics, and further, that 
it is by this fundamental oscillation that physical objects are differentiated, that is, their 
identity is bound to their oscillation. 
Take the following two equations, those of Einstein and Planck. Planck’s equation 
is E = h! where (E) is energy, (h) is Planck’s constant, a quantum of action (that is, the 
quantification of the trajectory/path/history of a system with the dimensions of either 
[energy]![time] or [momentum]![length]), and (!) is the frequency. Einstein’s equation is 
E = mc2 where (E) is energy, (m) is mass, and (c) is the speed of light, which is a physical 
constant. 
Now, we can easily combine these two equations and get ! = m "#$  where the 
frequency equals the mass times the speed of light squared divided by Planck’s constant. 
Oscillation is already central to Planck’s constant, since that represents the coefficient of 
proportionality between a minimal increment of energy (E) and some frequency (!). Of 
course, the constant c is itself measuring a quantum (light) which exhibits wave-particle 
duality. We can thus see that any particle exhibiting mass (so, all particles except the 
photon [the quantum of light, carrier of electromagnetism] and the gluon, which is the 
carrier of strong force. However, the gluon is never observed alone and is always 
imbedded within a hadron composed of quarks held together by the strong force carried 
by the gluon. Of course, this is complicated by the fact that, insofar as “massless” 
particles accelerate, they do in fact have relative mass due to the equivalence principle 
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which equates the effects of gravity and acceleration. But I digress…) would have a 
frequency of oscillation inherent to its mass relative to the two constants, namely the 
speed of light squared and Planck’s constant. The fundamental feature of things is that 
they oscillate. The differences in their oscillation give rise to the different elementary 
particles wherein the string’s dynamics determine the properties of the particles 
themselves, such as mass, spin, and charge. To understand the ontological significance of 
place is to grasp how an oscillation emplaces things as the things they are. Placial 
ontology is a sort of philosophical topology performed on a surface generated by the 
historical motion of structures in place. Formerly things became available in 
representation. Now, things become available qua their oscillation into place. Things are 
emplaced by oscillation. The topologies produced by places serve as the basis of later 
categorizations of the things emplaced. Things emerge from the interactions between 
places, the conjunction of events in space and time, all events happening in place, place, 
the ecstatic unity of space and time. Ontology seeks an understanding of what makes 
physics possible, which means an understanding of ourselves as part of a cosmos, of the 
whole. Further, that it is we who understand to which the understanding must be cut. In 
order to “get it,” it must be made available to me, in a sense, be brought to my level so 
that I can “get a sense of it.” So I look through microscopes and telescopes, and I make 
graphs and charts and work on equations and tell stories that render the world around 
sensible to something like me. Thereby, I see that everything is in place, has its place, 
occupying different levels, different layers, big and small. 
Literature leads us through these levels, and herein lies our methodological 
realism – in the phenomenological element of description. We follow along a 
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philosophical path, and are introduced to Père Goriot, in his room, with its wallpaper. It is 
a human place, for us and by us. Previously, literary critics have treated details like the 
wallpaper as just a symptom of “realism,” a listing off of details to depict a scene or scale 
it to the drama. It is no more than elaboration on a set-piece, a flourish on the backdrop 
before which the character stands as if on a stage, supposing they could be lifted out of it 
as from a vessel, and plopped down again unaltered in some other scene.36 What I hope 
our detour through the complexifiers of theoretical physics has shown is that there is no 
such vessel from which they could be removed. That old way of understanding is now cut 
off from us, and Goriot in his room can only appear through the dynamic interplay of his 
emplacement, the relative motions of his rooms within the flow of French history, its 
happening in its time and space relative to the other happenings depicted by Balzac. 
Balzac’s contribution to our placial ontology is that emplacement is constitutive of his 
characters and the drama precisely qua their places. He is realist to the extent that his 
writing performs a vision of the world in which the place-setting determines the 
archetypes by which a character’s action and motivation within the ensuing dramatic 
events will be rendered sensible to the reader. Everything, for Balzac, has a place. More 
radically, place cannot be deconstructed. Without place, there is no work to deconstruct – 
the necessary representational order cannot emerge to be taken apart. 
 
 
                                                
36 Cf., Alexander Fischler, “Rastignac-Telemaque: The Epic Scale in Père Goriot.” The Modern 
Language Review, 63:4 (October 1968), 840-48; and, Paula Quigley, “Realism and Eroticism: 
Re-Reading Balzac.” Paragraph, 36:1 (2013), 31-49. 
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3.4 Balzac’s Printing Press 
It is a great coincidence that Lost Illusions begins, as it does, with a printing press. 
And, like all things, deconstruction has its place. Within Balzac’s novel, we can take the 
printing press itself as a symbol of the domain of deconstruction. That which is 
underwritten by the word is fair game. But we might also encounter something like a 
“natural object” which is itself recalcitrant to the words used to define it. The thing itself 
shapes our approach to it. The drama is driven, in part, by the recalcitrance of the world 
in the face of Lucien Chardon’s grand plans. 
In his discussion of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Derrida makes his most famous – and 
most thoroughly misunderstood – claim: il n’y a pas de hors-texte, literally, “there is no 
outside text,” or even, “there is no out-of-text,” if we compare the French hors-saison, 
“out of season.”37 Derrida is attempting to elucidate the concept of the “supplemental” in 
writing. The supplement is itself a substitutive signification (a representation) existing in 
a chain of signifiers upon which the “real” supervenes – again, the issue of hierarchy in 
supervenience is made relevant. “Reality” is then something “added on” by an appeal to 
the supplement itself, and so on ad infinitum. Writing is revealed to be the disappearance 
of natural presence, where “presence” is the presence of Nature in Rousseau’s 
understanding of “Nature” as the source of human morality and justice in society. We 
cannot forget that Derrida’s dictum that there is “nothing outside the text” occurs in this 
discussion of Rousseau and concerns this very exacting definition of “Nature.” For 
Rousseau, Nature bequeaths to human beings an essentially good disposition that 
                                                
37 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1997), 158. 
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becomes corrupted by social injustices, inequality, property, and the like. The opening 
line of Émile attests to Rousseau’s vision of God-given natural goodness: “God makes all 
things good; man meddles with them and they become evil.”38 Also of note regarding 
Rousseau is his belief that Nature does not lie, and therefore offers a more certain and 
reliable “text” than those written by human beings. He says stridently, “O man, of 
whatever country you are, and whatever you opinions may be, behold your history, such 
as I have thought to read it, not in books written by your fellow creatures, who are liars, 
but in nature, which never lies.”39 It is this view, particular to Modern philosophy in the 
18th century, that Derrida is criticizing with his infamous dictum. Kant, once again, 
carries Rousseau’s philosophy to its logical conclusion, writing that, “…the first 
characteristic of the human species is man’s ability, as a rational being, to establish 
character for himself, as well as for the society into which nature has placed him. This 
ability, however, presupposes an already favorable natural predisposition and an 
inclination toward the good in man, because evil is really without character (since it as 
odds with itself, and since it does not tolerate any lasting principle within itself).”40 Kant 
then goes on to argue that because human beings are the kind of creature that we are – 
namely, social, rational, and free – that we are able, unlike the “lower” animals, to thwart 
Nature’s teleological plan for us. As Kant puts it, “Regardless of the purposes of Nature, 
we can assume the principle that she wants every creature to arrive at its own destiny 
                                                
38 Rousseau, Émile, trans. Barbara Fowley (North Clarendon: Everyman Library, 1993), 5. 
39 Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality.” The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole 
(North Clarendon: Everyman Library, 2003), 51. 
40 The following views are put forth by Kant during a discussion of Rousseau in: Kant, 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Victor Dowdell (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University, 1996), 246. 
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through the proper development of all inherent tendencies, so that at least the species, if 
not every individual, accomplishes Nature’s purpose. Among irrational [non-human] 
animals this actually happens, reflecting Nature’s wisdom. But regarding man only, the 
species reflects this principle.”41 It is this very specific take on Nature and its role or 
manifestation in human moral-social development at which Derrida takes aim in 
Grammatology. Nature, in Rousseau and Kant’s sense, disappears under the trace left by 
the trail of signifiers, which has no end, and thus, under which “Nature” as the “real 
mother” of humanity is not even lost, for that would imply that we had hold of her to 
begin with! Nature in the sense used by the Modern philosophers, was never clearly 
discernable as such. It has always only been the chain of historical signifiers through 
which, as a function of language, meaning is construed – constructed by us. Thus, there is 
“nothing outside the text,” insofar as the supplement offers only an ever-multiplying 
chain of signifiers into which we are thrown as if into an abyss. This abyss is the absence 
of natural presence, or its erasure to use Derrida’s language. But here is the catch. 
Derrida’s argument only works if we think of presence in terms of representation. He 
says, “Representation, in the abyss of presence is not an accident of presence; the desire 
for presence is, on the contrary, born of the abyss (the indefinite multiplication) of 
representation, from the presentation of representation, etc.”42 To avoid the 
deconstructionist critique, then, would require two moves, one of which is already 
underway. First, we cannot mean anything like “Nature” or “natural objects” in the sense 
used by Modern philosophers such as Kant and Rousseau. Second, we must think beyond 
                                                
41 Kant, Anthropology, 246-47. 
42 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 163. 
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representation as the basis of thought, if not language. Deconstruction must be put into 
place. 
Balzac’s printing press cannot be deconstructed. The wallpaper cannot be 
deconstructed. The Italian philosopher Maurizio Ferraris has already made in-roads 
toward limiting the reach of deconstruction’s power. To “radicalize” Derrida, as has been 
done in the name of postmodernism to the extent that, as Ferraris puts it, “squirrels are 
socially constructed,” is wrongheaded. Rather, he says, we should “look for the area to 
which that statement [that there is no outside the text] is truly pertinent.” Ferraris argues 
that this area is the social world.43 Incorporating Derrida’s insight to a level of analysis at 
which it is most salient allows Ferraris to develop the concept of “documentality,” which 
is a key element of his philosophical New Realism. Ferraris uses documentality to 
describe the conditions by which social objects emerge, thereby explaining the “social 
construction” of such objects as underwritten by writing technology. Here, technology 
means the technique by which anything becomes recordable, and this is the de facto basis 
of iterability in general.44 We can deepen this understanding with an insight from Bernard 
Stiegler on “technics,” as, “the domain of skill.”45 We have a skillful recording, one 
practiced, learned by one that also unfolds across time. Stiegler wants to give an account 
of “technics as time…as a question of time.”46 Ferraris’ concern with iterability also 
suggests a temporal structure, at least as repetition, if not of the same, then of a likeness. 
                                                
43 Ferraris, Introduction to New Realism, trans. Sarah de Sanctis (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 
9. 
44 Ferraris, New Realism, 63. 
45 Stiegler, Technics and Time, Vol. 1, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: 
Stanford University, 1998), 93.  
46 Stiegler, Technics and Time 1, 83. 
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The historical process of writing these iterations gives rise to the social institutions that 
are inscribed in jurisprudence, business practices, educational programs, and so on. 
Documentality provides the basis of archival practices associated with the preservation 
and maintenance of the recorded social interactions and the documents regulating these 
interactions.47 Ferraris also thereby restricts the Derridean tendency to overgeneralize 
“writing” to include any speech act or any possibly construed inscription of any kind. The 
recordabilty and iterabilty elements suffice, and always also indicate some intentionality, 
a language all too human expressing what is always its relation to the world. Thus, a mere 
speech act, unrecorded through any technic, is not writing. A conversation amongst 
friends is not writing. If these are recorded, by written word, audio, video, hologram, 
memorization, whatever means so skillfully deployed, then there is writing. Reading can 
still be writing by both Ferraris and Stiegler’s accounts. This should give us pause when 
considering Balzac’s printing press, if we’ve followed the gist of the New Realism thus 
far. In what sense, then, can the printing press be like a “natural object”? 
It must be ceded to the deconstructionist that Balzac’s printing press appears in 
literature, and thus is written. It’s in the text. That much is obvious. But, to what does 
Balzac refer when he indicates this particular printing press, the inheritance of David 
Séchard? Let us take a sentence as an example, describing what a visitor to the printing 
office might see: “While they gazed at the vault of paper, stretched on ropes, hanging 
from the ceiling, they stumbled against rows of cases, or had their hats knocked off by the 
iron bars which held up the presses.”48 Of course, it cannot be that Balzac refers to some 
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actual printing press, in the sense that there is some particular printing press in mind, 
instantiated in physical materials, residing at some specific location, and so forth. The 
Séchard’s press is an invention of Balzac’s imagination, Lost Illusions, is his creative 
work. This is a useful ontological distinction – what is actual, in the sense of the 
instantiation of some individual thing in spacetime. Kant understood the actual in 
distinction to what is real, that is, had what Leibniz would call possibilitas, the what-
content of things in general.49 In this sense, Balzac’s printing press is real. But the 
sentence, taken as a whole, represents a possibility, a scene in a printing room, what 
might happen trying to traverse that room, its human hazards. The representational aspect 
of the work of art must be developed. It doesn’t immediately leap out. It emerges. There 
are layers of details, “vaults of paper,” that hang from the ceiling, “rows of cases,” “iron 
bars,” and taken individually these refer us to actual things. Balzac refers to an actual 
historical object: a particular kind of press, made in a particular way, with particular 
materials. It was a press from a particular place. It is not that he refers to some historical 
individual press, but that he invokes a particular kind of press that is rooted in actual 
French history. Balzac describes a possible printing press conjured from his imagination. 
But he nevertheless refers to actual objects in the textual construction of this possible 
press, that is, sheets of paper, ropes, the ceiling of rooms, iron bars, cases, rows, these all 
indicate actual things, and their imaginary construal in the scene articulated by Balzac is 
                                                
49 Cf., Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1989), 74 and 218; Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of 
Man, and the Origin of Evil, trans. E. M. Huggard (La Salle: Open Court, 1985), 246; Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, 274-75 and 566-67; and the treatment in Heidegger, The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1982), 
34-35 and 38. 
 169 
itself real in the sense of mere what-content. The what-content of the Séchard’s printing 
office is an imagined possibility, and real as such, whereas the references made to the bits 
of stuff making the imagined possibility refer to actual things by which the imagined 
scene it rendered sensible. It is also to say that these things as they are rendered in the 
text don’t appear any differently than they would if we were to encounter them in 
actuality. All the usual rules apply to our understanding. We see the danger Balzac 
intends when he depicts a hat knocked off by an iron bar. An iron bar is really actual. We 
are to imagine it brought into a possible relation with someone’s head. As an idea, that’s 
real enough, and no one gets hurt, though it takes knowing someone would actually get 
hurt for the possibility to be imagined. I will call this the world’s “recalcitrance,” or the 
recalcitrance of the real. I’m going to return to this issue of the “real” in the next Chapter. 
I must do so in order to avoid a lapse back into the old realist/idealist-subject/object 
metaphysical paradigm that will bury emplacement if it is uncritically reasserted. We will 
see that realness is bound up with appearances, and that becomes obvious here, where we 
are dealing with the appearance of the printing press in the text, its appearance as a real 
possible object that is recalcitrant. It cannot be deconstructed. It just is whatever it 
happens to be, a printing press. Such an object has come to be, through its relation to a 
thoroughly historical set of emplaced individuals, something like a natural object. If it did 
not appear this way, it would not be possible for the press to serve its metaphorical or 
symbolic function in the text. Metaphor only works if we are able to take something to be 
what it is not. This means, for the metaphor to work, the thing must appear to me as what 
it is. It is only through an overarching contextual organization that the press, which 
appears just as a press, can then take on the further signification at play in the symbolic, 
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could be put into narrative play qua characterization. On that level alone, where a meta-
narrative begins to take shape, is the place for deconstruction, because it is on that level 
that the text begins to represent something. The printing press does not refer to a 
representation of a printing press. The printing press is used to build a representation of a 
possible printing office in the French province of Angoulême. 
The printing press is an interesting example because it is a tool, a piece of 
equipment. The discussion of Heidegger and Nöe in Chapter One is relevant here. We 
think of the concept as that through which the world is made available. The world is not 
represented; it is opened to us, made ready for thoughtful action. This is made possible, in 
part, by the world’s recalcitrance. First, Saussure’s claim that the relation between the 
signifier and the signified is arbitrary must be given its proper measure.50 The claim 
should be taken at face value – whatever phoneme or grapheme is used to signify a 
concept, is arbitrarily assigned, and has no “natural” basis in the concept itself. The 
concept of a tree is as sufficiently indicated by “tree,” as by árbol, arbre, Baum, or , 
there is no necessary connection between signifier and signified. However, there is no 
justification for leaping to the conclusion that, “since there are no fixed universal 
concepts of fixed universal signifiers, the signified itself is arbitrary, and so is the 
signifier.”51 There is nothing arbitrary in the assignment of some sign, though the sign 
itself be arbitrary, to the concept of a tree, because this concept reveals actual trees in the 
world that serve a variety of functions that are not themselves dependent on a particular 
context. A particular culture might make use of a particular kinds of trees in particular 
                                                
50 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 1983), 67. 
51 Jonathan D. Culler, Saussure’s Theory of Language (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1986), 32-33 
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and culturally relative ways in order to shelter their family – but the fact that trees are 
used to build human shelter is a general one, and so it is no surprise that most, if not all, 
cultures that associate with tree-like objects have some word or indication that a thing 
being encountered is a tree-like thing. Trees are recalcitrant. Again, we need not think 
“natural” in the former Romantic sense of Mother Nature, for it is as natural to say 
“printing press,” as it is presse d’imprimerie, Druckerpresse, or , whatever the 
situation demands. What those various contingent situations will invariably have in 
common, however, is the object “printing press,” that performs some function that is, 
admittedly, contingent upon human whims and desires. Thus, even if a given phoneme or 
grapheme is arbitrary, the concept signified takes a determinative value from the 
recalcitrance of the world in the face of human interactions, the fundamental way in 
which the world lends itself to or impedes the intentional actions of human beings. The 
concept just is this skillful interaction, the fact that I know such and such an interaction 
can occur or has already, that it is possible. That I think “cup” is already an act, and as 
such indicates the real possibility that I can drink and have drunk, call the cup what you 
will.52 It is to be oriented toward cups in a meaningful way. My thinking “cup,” in 
whatever capacity I so choose, is the real possibility of a cup, that is, that I am in a 
relation to actual things, cups, which open up the domain of actions for which cup is a 
meaningful constituent. But what would it mean for me to say, then, that cups and 
printing presses are something like natural objects? 
                                                
52 The idea that “all doing is knowing and all knowing is doing,” has been posited and defended 
in regards to living autopoietic systems that display cognitive function in Humberto Maturana and 
Franscisco Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding, trans. 
Robert Paolucci (Boston: Shambala, 1998). 
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Philosophers who would radicalize either Derrida or Saussure’s dictums are guilty 
of a category mistake. They subsume concepts under the category of representation. In 
fact, these are two very different things. If we understand concepts as merely being 
representations of something perceived, then we make perception dependent on 
representational schemes. What we perceive is determined by the representation, and we 
“see” a cup or tree only to the extent that we are able to represent them through a 
concept. The words we use to signify a thing do not refer to a representational concept. 
The concept signified by our words are the ways by which we skillfully act in a world 
that sometimes resists our conceptual schemes. I can use the hand of a screwdriver to 
hammer in a nail, but that’s wrong tool for the job. My neighbor wants me to give their 
horse a bath so I run it through the car wash. In each case, I’ve got the wrong idea. My 
conceptual approach to the issue at hand is off. And the world resists my attempts to fit 
the square peg into the round hole. Once I get the right idea, my actions begin to meet 
with less resistance in the world. Ferraris treats what I am calling the recalcitrance of the 
world by referring to the way in which the world is sometimes not amendable to our 
concepts. He argues that the “unamendability of the real determines the non-conceptual 
content of experience. It is a contrastive principle, which manifests the real as non-I.”53 
Here, Ferraris leans on Gareth Evans’ articulation of the non-conceptual content of 
experience as being whatever is given through the sense without being rendered 
linguistically.54 Evans thinks through the non-conceptual content in terms of 
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“information,” and it is out of this basic, sensibly obtained information that human 
subjects are able to posit concepts that correspond to the information acquired by the 
senses. For Evans, non-conceptual content directs a perceptive entity toward their 
environment in a way that is meaningful in terms of skillful behavior or activity.55 Indeed, 
Evans goes so far as to say that (non-conceptual) information states about the 
surrounding environment are not necessarily perceptual experiences, that is, they are not 
something we are conscious of, strictly speaking.56 For our purposes, the key to 
understanding Evans’ (and also Ferraris’) treatment of the non-conceptual comes in the 
following passage: “…it is not thoughts about the experience that matter, but thoughts 
about the world…we arrive at conscious perceptual experience when sensory input is not 
only connected to behavioral dispositions…but also serves as the input to a thinking, 
concept-applying, and reasoning system; so that the subject’s thoughts, plans, and 
deliberations are also systematically dependent on the informational properties of the 
input.”57 In treating concepts as representation, Evans must recognize the barrier thrown 
up between ourselves and the world. “It’s not thoughts about the experiences that 
matter,” he writes, indicating the orientation of thought toward the world, and not merely 
inward, toward projections of its own positing. But, I have argued that concepts are not 
representational in nature, and have been building an account of concepts in which they 
function on a more elementary level than representation. In fact, to the extent that human 
beings represent the world to themselves, they do so only by the possible arrangement of 
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concepts according to some assumed logic. All representations are made up of concepts, 
but concepts themselves do not represent. This is the same as in painting. All paintings 
are made of dabs and smears of paint, but these are not themselves paintings. However, 
we say the painting “is red,” or “has red in it,” just as we say the dab of paint is red. Just 
so, we think the concept “tree,” and can represent a scene with a tree in it, or represent 
some single tree against an empty background in an act of abstraction. Evans is correct to 
say that the primary sensible information we receive from the world is always oriented to 
skillful behavior or activity, but we do not err if we admit that this primary information is 
conceptual. For us, a concept is not a representation. 
For this reason, I must also reject Evans’ claim that we are not conscious of this 
basic information. As deployed here, “concept,” though it has lost its representational 
function, still carries with it an implication of experience, because my argument has been 
precisely that we make real contact with the world. Thus, experiences are not experiences 
of some perceived concepts (nor of a representation). Perception is a mechanism that 
explains how experience comes about – an account of perception is an account of the 
relationship between some conscious entity and the world such that experience can occur 
to the entity. Experience is an experience of the world directly, not as told to myself by 
myself after the fact. To be conscious-full-stop is just to be aware of the world in general. 
Self-consciousness, then, is the second order thinking about the fact that one is aware as 
such – it is the experience of taking one’s experience as the object of experience. 
Nevertheless, both Evans and Ferraris are correct when they assess the world’s 
demonstrable effect on the shape and heft of our ideas about it. It is not correct to put 
concept fully “on the side” of the subject, to make concepts something that the subject 
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casts over things to give them shape, or a model of the world that might translate what’s 
real into terms the subject can understand. Such a translation would occur on the level of 
perception. That is why I had made references to telescopes and microscopes. Those tools 
help to translate different levels of being to us, adapting our perceptual apparatus to the 
very small or large. Conceptually, it is a matter of scaling, that we navigate our 
interaction through the instrument as taking a view on such and such a scale, magnified 
so many times relative to our usual capabilities, determined by our body, its perceptual 
apparatus, and my environmental situation, historical context, and so on. So it is that I 
“take a view on” society writ large, a dynastic legacy, or a colony of ants. I can thus think 
the life-cycle of a star, that a star even has a life; through the concept, though a concept 
that is just as much “on the side of” the object to which the so-called subject is oriented. 
The concept is precisely the two in conjunction, that some entity is capable of 
experiencing is in relation to some other entity capable of being experienced. This 
relation holds even in the eventual absence of that object. And so, I am prepared to 
answer the question: how is Balzac’s printing press like a natural object? 
3.5 The Accretion of Things Natural and Technical 
 We do not perceive concepts. Concepts are a way of explaining how our 
perceptions orient us to act on and interact with our surroundings. Within Lost Illusions, 
the Séchard’s printing office operates on the level of representation. It is a real possibility 
imagined by Balzac. In order to conjure this representation of a printing office, owned 
and operated in the province of Angoulême, the author must bring actual concepts into a 
possible relation by writing them out, such that reading through these relations as iterated 
in language will established the possible relation of actual objects sufficient to render a 
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reader aware of such printing offices in Angoulême. Readers are thereby led through a 
series of actual objects, referred in sequence to these through a writing technique that 
generates a representation in art. Balzac does not present a printing press. He refers to the 
printing press to construct a scene, lay out a world into which his characters walk and 
take on life. The world Balzac weaves is made up of stuff. Things populate this world and 
are the touchstone by which we come to know the world. Things and stuff have histories. 
I am going to refer to the general ontological condition that there is something extant in 
the world as things. I resist retention of the word “object” because I think this 
inadvertently privileges two metaphysical positions that are wrongheaded. First, we are 
immediately referred to the subject/object distinction, which has dominated Modern 
philosophy into the 20th century and continues to exert inordinate influence on our 
concept of certain philosophical problems. But it also is very easy to slip back into the 
old comfort of thinking of things in the world as primarily extended objects that take up 
space – the substance of matter or material. Further, to talk of “things” is both sufficiently 
general to be a useful term for ontology, but it is also, in a way that may seem strange to 
a certain school of thought, sufficiently ambiguous to be a grounding ontological term. 
The details of a thing must be sufficiently ambiguous so that our concept directs us to just 
whatever happens or is capable of happening given the kind of experiences we have as 
the kind of things that we ourselves are. As ontological, all the term “thing” needs to do 
is refer us to the general manifestation of individuals, particulars, and any given 
relationship between these. Relationships are things in that I can sensibly refer to them. 
My usage stems from the Heideggerian tradition, wherein Heidegger ties “the thing” to 
ontological differentiation, and also shows the thing to be an entry into world – the thing 
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is that worldly entity most near to us, appearing to us as thing.58 However, I do want to 
drive in my own direction, away from the superficial mysticism of Heidegger’s 
“fourfold,” a rhetorical device of Heidegger’s that will not serve us here. More to our 
concerns are Heidegger remarks, made in a 1935-36 winter seminar, that, “The question 
‘What is a thing?’ is the question ‘Who is man?’ That does not mean that things become 
a human product (Gemächte), but, on the contrary, it means that man is to be understood 
as he who always already leads beyond things, but in such a way that this leaping-beyond 
is possible while things encounter and so precisely remain themselves – while they send 
us back behind ourselves and our surface.”59 I might get to “justice,” a certain relation, 
perhaps an “abstract concept” in some ways, but I arrive there through the real bodies of 
people involved, their relationships to a judiciary and legislative body and practice, that is 
inscribed and reified by the history of these things, the historical dynamics of the 
relations, and the concrete objects that are extended in space and so on, which in their 
own way serve to constitute the just or unjust situation as a whole. Ontology, in its 
generality, must be able to talk about all sorts of things. And thus, things as a terms must, 
for now, be sufficiently defined in order to serve some technical purpose, while 
remaining sufficiently ambiguous so as to be generally applicable in the manner 
appropriate to ontology. Now we can give an account of how things come about. As I’ve 
indicated, it is an historical process, and things generally tend to be built up over a period 
of time. The technical term for this process will be accretion. Things accrete. Thinking in 
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Regnery, 1967), 244. 
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this way retains our emphasis on place as the unity of space and time. To come into a 
spatial relation requires temporalizing. To be a thing is to be busy being that thing – to be 
sustained as the thing that is. Thus, persistence as well as change invoke time, but also 
construed over a spatial dimension. This is still not to reduce everything to bare physics. 
With this sketch of a technical definition of “thing,” let’s address the issue of natural 
objects. 
 Balzac’s printing press appears as something like a natural object. It is, first of all, 
a thing, and as such, is real. But we can say more. It is an object, in the sense that it is 
indeed extended, with mass and all that. Objects can be thought of here as physical 
objects, rendering that specific phrase redundant. Any conceivable printing press bears 
the marks of being an extended thing, taking up space, so to speak, and it is also a reliable 
sort of thing that persists over time, spoken to in the solidity of its extended appearance. 
All of this, again, just to say that things like printing presses are real things that we 
understand by virtue of our accessibility to things, our basic ability to skillfully navigate 
the world in which a thing such as a printing press can be. To get at my basic position, we 
don’t really even need to think of the press as an object. We could simply bracket the 
press’ “objectivity,” and withhold for the sake of argument that it is extended and so on, 
that it has those physical properties and the like. Nevertheless, when Balzac describes the 
press, we get it. The idea is conveyed and we make sense of the scene he constructs and 
in which the press figures. We don’t stumble. It is easy, given the level of detail provided 
by Balzac, to render a representation of this printing office in Angoulême. This 
approaches my meaning if we are to have an adequate understanding of what in the world 
a “natural object” could be, given the placial ontology as our new beginning. 
 179 
 Instead of narrowly thinking of “objects,” let’s take a more open term, things, and 
see how things are in place. I have already begun to elaborate oscillation, so we must bear 
in mind this basic movement of emplacement. Oscillation is ontologically prior – it is the 
other first decision, the movement of the opening of place that is the ground of things in 
their very showing forth, the movement that makes what is available and is the scene 
whereby what appears can appear to what is given appearance. As historical, things 
accrete in the wake of the movement of emplacement. As oscillation unfolds and 
differentiates, the relative motion of places begins to build a trace, begins to accumulate a 
condensate, and the thing stands in the aftermath of the gathering of place; the 
spatiotemporal sediment aggregated by the play of oscillation through which things 
become emplaced. If we are thinking through oscillation, and with it as a grounding 
concept, then we are already in the midst of an historical ontology. Ian Hacking has 
described and argued for an historical ontology in which “concepts have their being in 
historical sites. The logical relations among them were formed in time, and they cannot 
be perceived correctly unless their temporal dimensions are kept in view.”60 Of course, 
we must augment Hacking’s statement with our own, reworked theory of the concept. 
Regardless of this substitution, as historical ontology, placial ontology follows Hacking’s 
observation, already incorporating emphasis on time by acknowledging the deep 
interconnection of spacetime. We now have a set of issues to work with, as I have been 
outlining them in the current Chapter. Thus, I can also endorse Hacking’s statement that 
historical ontology, “would show how to understand, act out, and resolve present 
                                                
60 Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2004), 25. 
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problems, even when in doing so it generated new ones” [emphasis added].61 Things, 
then, have their historical sites, their places, and we must keep this in view. As historical, 
things have, always, some procession, long or short, during which they unfurl themselves 
in the world, and at the end of which they withdrawal again, variously disintegrating or 
bursting apart as they cease to be the thing that they were. Things are finite. Things come 
into being over time, building up over the course of their duration. Things are accreted. 
Accretion describes the cumulative effect of oscillation whereby things come to stand-out 
as the particular things that they are, and become individuated as a result of their unique 
play taking shape in place as history. Accretion occurs in two basic ways, and this will be 
the key to understanding how it is that things could be anything like “natural.” 
 The two kinds of things that accrete in oscillation are natural and technical. 
Perhaps it is obvious at this point, but I do not mean by “nature” anything like “the source 
of all that is,” or the “totality of all things,” or “the domain of all domains,” or even, 
“what stands outside of human created things.” I will get more into the details of the 
traditional, metaphysical problems of “nature” in the next Chapter. By “nature,” I here 
mean something very simple that has nothing to do with any sort of absolute totality or 
“independence” from human endeavors. I’m skeptical of whatever it is that philosopher’s 
hope to achieve by this “independence,” that bugbear of the realists, which will be given 
full consideration in due course. In antiquity, the Latin natura meant “birth.” We know it 
later incorporated the meaning of the Greek phusis, which also has a sense relevant here, 
that is, the original one, relating to the intrinsic properties of plants, animals, and 
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whatever appears in the world as they develop of their own accord. So by “natural,” I 
mean whatever comes into being of its own accord. Try not to read “of its own accord” as 
a statement of intentionality or agency. By “of its own accord,” I mean to say that it 
emerges from the relations it has in place, the result of oscillations which have not come 
under the regulatory principle of a determinate thing – that are not subject to some logic, 
that is, the ordering principle of a thing. So rocks and streams and meadows are natural 
things, and bugs and birds and human beings are natural things, just as snowflakes, and 
raindrops, and clouds are natural things. Really, “nature” as used in everyday speech is 
not a bad indicator of what might be, in this philosophical sense, “natural,” but I have 
rendered a sufficiently specific definition for our purposes here. What is technical, on the 
other hand, emerges from the practices of natural things that fall under some logic, or 
organizing principle – such as the logic of life, biology. At this stage, autopoiesis 
becomes formative. I signaled the significance of this idea back in Chapter One, and it is 
now time to discuss, briefly, its relevance. The Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana 
and Francisco Varela give a working definition of “autopoiesis” as follows: 
An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a 
network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of 
components which (i) through their interactions and transformations 
continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that 
produce them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in 
space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological 
domain of its realization as such a network.62 
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In this language, we might say that technical things are the products of autopoietic 
machines. They are things that are the result of these networks of processes that take 
shape according to those processes, but that then become detached from those processes 
and are capable of standing and perduring on their own without the support of the 
machine that produced them and even if the autopoietic site of production is totally 
destroyed or ceases to be. In short, autopoiesis is a description of the self-sustaining 
activity of living things, living things being natural things in our placial ontology, and 
living things, as products of their living practices, accrete technical things. Technical 
things have a second order temporal position after natural things, but that in no way 
reduces their ontological significance. Natural things are only prior to technical things in 
the order of their temporal appearance. Ontologically speaking, they are on level ground. 
But this leads to an interesting phenomenon from the epistemological perspective. What 
we have is the peculiar result that technical things don’t appear as fundamentally 
different from natural things. 
 Think of the appearance of a cup in a room. We could even think of a cup and a 
rock sitting together on a table. Upon seeing these things, they appear just as they are, a 
rock and a cup, nothing immediately jumps out, unless we begin to consider the matter 
further. Change the setting. Think of coming upon an old cup in the forest, perhaps 
during a hike or however it is one finds oneself in a forest. The cup may be found in a 
pile of rocks, yet we see the cup as a cup, and the rocks as rocks and all this different 
from the dead leaves strewn around and the trees that dropped them. We experience all 
these things as something, just so, without having to make all the further logical 
distinctions between the kinds of things they are. I chose a cup, but any sufficiently 
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familiar thing will do. Familiarity is key to understanding the phenomena in question, 
because it takes a sufficiently robust history for things to appear to us as such. For 
instance, even if I have never personally seen a printing press, printing presses are things 
with a sufficiently robust history, integral to the production of an extremely widespread 
technology – the production of writing – that, even without a direct personal experience 
of one, a printing press can appear as just one thing among others, without any further 
thought given to the kind of thing it is. The printing press, insofar as we encounter it, just 
is as it is. It seems like a natural object just by virtue of its deep historical constitution. 
Now, consider the launch of the iPhone. The major question posed upon the launch of the 
new technology was: what is it? Is it a phone, a device for playing music, a gaming 
platform, all of these? Or none of them? The thing is ostensibly a phone, but it goes far 
beyond that function in terms of its use, and it is arguable that a phone conversation is 
actually pretty low on the list of the device’s popular uses. The iPhone was, 
unmistakably, a technical thing. But now, after years of use and incorporation into all 
facets of life, including our entertainment and art, the iPhone just appears as an iPhone. 
Its distinctive design, as well as its ubiquitous appearance in society and culture, allows 
us to see it just for what it is, an iPhone, and understand it as a multi-tool, its own thing, 
so to speak, and no longer ponder over just what in the world that thing is anyway. That 
process took time. It took time for us to see this new thing just as another thing that is 
what it is. The iPhone, over time, achieved its robust thinghood. Now that we take it for 
granted, the iPhone might appear just as natural things do. This is how it is possible for 
Balzac’s printing press to appear as something like a natural object. It is not, 
ontologically speaking, a “natural thing,” it is in fact a technical thing, but 
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phenomenologically, our placial ontology, as historical, can explain how it is possible for 
things to appear just as they are, on the same level as anything else, natural or otherwise. 
 Spider-webs, beaver dams, and bird’s nests are all technical things. Spiders, 
beavers, and birds are natural things capable of producing other things, technical things, 
that have the structure of being in-order-to do something in the natural life of things. 
Heidegger’s treatment of pragmata in section 15 of Being and Time is again relevant to 
the point. Technical things will always point us back toward their origin in a living 
autopoietic process. Thus, upon the discovery of some technical thing, we can begin to 
trace that thing back to its origin in some technique. Thus, the spiders’ webs are 
differentiated according to differing species and their habitats. Birds’ nests differ, again, 
according to species and the materials furnished by the environment – the affordances – 
for nest building. In part, this is due to the fact that living things produce the technical as 
a means of continuing their life, and the technical, on such an account, is an extension of 
the autopoietic process itself, an “externalization” of the living mechanism that is capable 
of standing on its own and used extraneous to any given autopoietic system. Many 
different people could use one hammer, and a bird might abandon a particular nest, or 
return to find it occupied by usurpers. The technical thing has an established 
independence from the circumstances of its production, though those circumstances will 
always be involved in the life of some autopoietic system – that is, some living thing. 
What is living, as such, maintains itself as what it is through directed activity. Through 
Maturana and Varela, I come back to the Nietzschean insight of life as a will to power, as 
he put it, “A multiplicity of forces, connected by a common mode of nutrition, we call 
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‘life’.”63 The nutritional aspect here is captured by those “interactions and 
transformations that continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes 
(relations) that produce them,” as Maturana and Varela say.64 With the placial ontology 
and its basic emplacement by oscillation, I am making a philosophical attempt at, 
“specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.”65 The 
Nietzschean roots of such an attempt can be traced back to my earlier work on personal 
identity and the metaphysics of freedom.66 We will find an affinity between my use of 
autopoiesis and Nietzsche’s use of the will to power (a concept we do not need to adopt 
as such) as the principle of life, which he explains as something that “defines limits, 
determines degrees, variations of power.”67 We see autopoiesis when Nietzsche writes 
that life would be defined, “as an enduring form of processes of the establishment of 
force, in which the different contenders grow equally,” [emphasis added], and also that 
life can “manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it sees that which resists it – 
this is the primeval tendency of the protoplasm when it extends pseudopodia and feels 
about.”68 We come full circle, back to the driving force behind Balzac’s realism and the 
need to constitute that realism through descriptions that are thoroughly grounded in place: 
the need to depict an intensity of life. What I am calling the recalcitrance of the world is, 
indeed, part of the resistance indicated by Nietzsche and necessary to the regeneration 
                                                
63 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967), 341. 
64 Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition, 81. 
65 Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition, 81. 
66 Cf., “Interlude,” and “The Free Spirit Parallax,” as well as the Third Study of the title essay in 
Irven, The Ontological I and Other Essays (Philadelphia: Streisguth/Martin, 2012). 
67 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 342. 
68 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 342 and 346. 
 186 
and realization of a self-sustaining system. The world is just as recalcitrant to a spider, 
beaver, or bird as it is to humans, and, of course, to the protoplasm’s pseudopodia. 
 Moving forward, we have the account of things as given above: things accrete, 
and accretion is the historical process of oscillation by which things get built up. 
Accretion generates two basic sorts of things – those natural and technical. Though the 
technical may depend upon the natural in order to be produced, the technical nevertheless 
attains, as a culmination of the productive process, an independence and ontological 
stature equal to that of any natural thing. 
3.6 The Power of Place in William Faulkner 
 We are now prepared to move away from Balzac toward the work of William 
Faulkner. In the next Chapter, Faulkner’s 1936 novel Absalom, Absalom! will serve as a 
case study for the placial ontology and the play of oscillation. For now, we must take a 
broader approach to Faulkner and his Yoknapatawpha county. First, a little comparative 
work to tease out what we have gained from Balzac. We will see that Faulkner is 
indebted to Balzac, that much is well established in the literary criticism. But the 
philosophically salient advances made by Faulkner over his French precursor have never 
been uncovered and certainly, the ontology implicit in the construction of 
Yoknapatawpha is completely beyond the purview of literary theory. 
 The influence of Balzac on Faulkner is well known and, it has been argued, 
formidable.69 Faulkner read Balzac’s works aloud with his friends Phil Stone and Bess 
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Storer. As a result of these readings, Faulkner conceived of the idea to re-work Balzac; to 
give him, in Stone’s words, “a new coat.”70 However, Faulkner might have 
“appropriated” Balzac, we must take note of a great difference that will be the focus of 
our philosophical investigation. For us, it is essential that Faulkner makes substantial 
strides away from Balzac’s form in his advanced treatment of time. When it comes to the 
concept of time, Faulkner finds his inspiration elsewhere. He was keen to set up an 
interview with the physicist Albert Einstein, as James Merriwether reports to Horton.71 
But an in-depth conversation never transpired, despite the fact that Faulkner did indeed 
meet Einstein at a party hosted by the Comminses at Princeton toward the end of 1953.72 
Nevertheless, Faulkner was certainly concerned with time, not only with Einstein and the 
physical notion of spacetime, but also with the philosophical positions of Henri Bergson. 
Faulkner was, at the very least, familiar with Bergon’s Creative Evolution. Faulkner is 
known to have told the Memphis-based writer Joan Williams that Bergon’s book had 
“helped” him, and he inscribed “Don’t work too hard at it, but read it,” in her copy of 
Creative Evolution.73 His interest in the philosophical concept of time, or rather, the 
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radical changes that the concept of time underwent in the early 20th century, no doubt 
drove Faulkner beyond the strictly linear time that unfolds in Balzac’s writings. 
 In fact, I began with Balzac in part because his conception of time is linear, as 
opposed to Faulkner’s multi-valenced depictions of time. Balzac’s realism opens an 
avenue toward understanding the accretion of things and their basic historical 
constitution. Through their linear progress, Balzac compellingly illustrates the 
accumulative procedure of place-building and the centrality of emplacement to 
characterization, plot development, and representation, which only arises at an advanced 
stage, brought into being by a complex of concepts in possible relations. Lost Illusions 
allowed us to approach things, because it has its peculiar origin in the appearance of a 
particular printing press in the imagined offices of the Séchards. There, the thing 
provided an historical anchor, a point that moored the story in a particular place, set in 
particular spatial relations to other places and at a particular juncture of time in French 
society. Faulkner performs similar constructive gestures, but we are not so easily led 
from the start. With Faulkner, we very often have no moorings, no set anchor that 
delineates a clear avenue into the text. This, strangely, only increases the realism of 
Faulkner’s texts precisely where we least expect it. For Balzac, the world had a straight 
forward (temporal) appearance – as if time itself was something that moved in a line 
through some spatial dimension. Faulkner throws us into the maelstrom, where we are 
left to put the pieces into place ourselves, often without direct clues as to their ultimate 
placement. The reason this is more realistic, I will show, has to do with the collapse of 
the subject-object dichotomy in the moment that space and time are unified in place. 
Without space for itself and time for itself, the subjective and objective have no domains 
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over which they reign, and the ecstatic unity of spacetime in place shows the subject to be 
already “outside” itself, in the world as one sort of thing among others. Thus, Faulkner is 
more realistic because he strives to depict the human being as she is in herself, in addition 
to depicting the recalcitrance of the world in the face of human design. Faulkner is more 
metaphysical in his basic position – a comprehensive position. There are, then, 
descriptions of real things in Faulkner, just as in Balzac, that are shown taking form 
through historical accretion, but the intensity with which Faulkner is able to present the 
life of his characters, due to his particular emphasis on their “inner” conscious lives and 
the dynamic interconnection between the “inner” and the “outer” as they mutually 
formulate one another, achieves a philosophical rigor previously unheard of, except, 
maybe, in James Joyce, or Virginia Woolf.74 Again, my focus here is on the play of time 
and the reformation of the concept of time that was a widespread philosophical concern 
in the early 20th century, and which can readily be seen in Faulkner’s art. 
 My application of the term “realism” to Faulkner will be an idiosyncratic one to 
literary theorists. There has been a dissertation on magical realism in Faulkner, Márquez, 
and Morrison.75 Otherwise, realism is, again, treated as a technique whereby pop cultural 
“facts” and details are listed off as a way to heighten the “realism” of a novel by making 
sure we all know when and where the action is taking place. And, again, this type of 
realistic place-setting is just a backdrop, the details no more than a flourish on a set 
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designed to make the characters come off as believable.76 More often, Faulkner’s 
experimental style and his application of the stream of consciousness technique are 
labeled as anti-realist.77 However, if we read the literature carefully, we can see that there 
is a sharp difference now between the way the critics treat realism – on the one hand, as 
part of a descriptive technique deployed to make readers accept the story and characters 
as true to life, and on the other, as an epistemological stance oriented around the subject-
object distinction whereby the readers are able to see the characters questioning the world 
“out there” by the way the author now depicts the details of their “inner” life. This 
confusion, wholly unacknowledged, harkens back to Chapter Two’s discussion of 
postmodernism and Modernism with Faulkner teetering on the edge of modernity itself, 
sometimes read as the site of the transformation from Modernism to postmodernism!78 As 
we shall see, part of the power of Faulkner is exactly this tendency to complicate things. 
Since it has been made clear that the Modernists generally complexify and undermine the 
very distinction upon which the subject/object (and hence, philosophical 
realism/idealism) operates, I’m going to jettison this consideration within the literature to 
focus on the descriptive-phenomenological technique of a methodological realism. This 
will help make sense of the stream of consciousness technique, as well as aid in our 
approach to the increasingly messy temporal relations that we find in Modernism, and 
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Faulkner in particular. Recall Nisly’s assessment of Dostoevsky’s underground man, 
discussed in Chapter One, and we can see Faulkner himself may be such a man, a 
“paradoxicalist, a complexifier, one who can never treat any issue simply.”79 In fact, in 
Modernism we can see the nascent deconstructive slogan that there really is nothing that 
is simple. This is a strength of Faulkner’s, not a flaw. Even now, the underground 
discourse remains at work, drawing upon the ontological undercurrent in literature to 
sustain the drive to another beginning – one staged in parodic homage with the refuse of 
those built before. 
 Let us consider the accretion of things in Faulkner’s work, and the strange 
complexification of things by the ecstatic unity of spacetime in place. 
3.7 Building Yoknapatawpha, One Thing at a Time 
 The flight of Caddy Compson in The Sound and the Fury is a good starting point 
for our analysis of place in Yoknapatawpha County. The Compsons are a Southern 
family thrown on hard times as their ancestral estate is whittled away, and their lineage 
falls into disrepute. One brother, Benjy, is mentally handicapped – a fact interpreted by 
most of the family to be punishment for their sins – and his parcel of land is ultimately 
sold off to a golf course. The sister, Caddy, is cast in an iconic image climbing a tree in 
order to spy on the scene of her grandmother’s funeral, while her brother Jason and the 
servant’s children watch from below and see the sister’s underwear muddied from 
playing in the creek. Her actions create a scene to be repeated again by her daughter 
Quentin, the repetition of the act of flight her legacy, but one that perpetuates the 
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abandonment of the old ways of Southern family life, which the conservative and even 
reactionary Compson brothers struggle to maintain in the face of a cultural crisis. Of 
course, it would be better if everyone could ignore the transgression of the sister, if she 
could come and go unnoticed, without drawing attention to herself. But she is given away 
by the world’s recalcitrance. 
 The famous opening section takes place from Benjy’s perspective and is dated 
April 7, 1928. Benjy is thirty-three years old. He walks along the fence that borders the 
golf course with Luster, one of the Compson’s servants who is tasked with supervising 
Benjy. In order to render Benjy’s point of view, much of this section is written in simple, 
declarative statements with a pointed lack of motive ascription. Benjy doesn’t take much 
note of people’s intentions. Things, from Benjy’s perspective, just happen. A comparison 
to Impressionism in painting is useful – Faulkner gives a sense of the action, a simplified, 
yet vibrant encounter with things passing in succession. Again, the place is foundational. 
The fence by the golf course refers us to the Compson’s land, and Benjy’s literal position 
across the fence from it gives us the image of him barred from the land, his birthright 
inaccessible to him, and Benjy himself unable to acknowledge the claim. Further, Benjy 
waits for the golfers to call for their caddies. The homophone “caddie” refers also to 
Benjy’s sister Candace, who is his favorite sibling, and certainly the one who is nicest to 
Benjy from the reader’s perspective; but Benjy himself never expresses his love for 
Caddy in terms of what she does or how she treats him. He just loves her, and associates 
her with nature sensations – dry leaves, the earth. 
 The temporal structure of Benjy’s sequence is complex to the extreme. Words and 
events on the day of April 7 trigger memories that Benjy vividly inhabits, and the 
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narration turns sharply on these significations, dropping the reader abruptly into different 
past timeframes associated with the events of April 7 by whatever triggered the memory. 
More to the point here, these significations all arise out of the emplacement of the 
Compsons on the land, in Yoknapatawpha, with the golf course and so on. The basic 
emplacement in Yoknapatawpha County also constitutes the appearance of things as such 
within the text. The first diversion into the past comes when Benjy gets snagged on a 
loose nail as he passes through a gap in the fence with Luster. Luster unsnags Benjy, and 
this triggers Benjy’s memory of Caddy unsnagging him in the same place when they 
were children, on the day of their grandmother’s funeral.80 This first diversion sets up 
Caddy’s defiance of her brother’s authority, her getting muddy in the creek, and her 
power over the family members who both adore and wish to protect Caddy, but 
inadvertently lord over her in the controlling manner of would-be patriarchs. Benjy’s 
reveries are punctuated by snippets of scenes from the Compson property; its barn falling 
into disrepair as a commentary on the state of the family, and Benjy’s muted desire to 
walk by the golf course to hear the call “Caddie!”81 As we dip in and out of these 
different past timeframes, which include not only the day of their grandmother’s funeral, 
but also the day Benjy’s name was changed from Maury, after his uncle, to Benjamin 
upon the discovery of his handicap, we are given fleeting insight into the family history, 
the social dynamics of the time, and the obsession with Caddy and her cleanliness; the 
focus on the sister’s purity that remains the center of the novel throughout. We discover 
that Caddy’s illegitimate daughter is named after one of her brothers, Quentin, who was 
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81 Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury, 12. 
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spared the sight of his sister’s muddied drawers, thus preserving her innocence in his 
eyes, and whose perspective on June 2, 1910 is featured in the second section of the 
novel, the day of brother Quentin’s suicide. Daughter Quentin, and the repetition of her 
mother’s defiance, feature prominently in Benjy’s perspective on April 7, 1928. I want to 
turn there and look closely at how particular things appear in this text, heavily laden with 
the significance of the arc of time from the very beginning. I have provided much more 
exegesis here than Faulkner does leading up to the scene I am about to analyze. It is 
important to keep this in mind, because Faulkner’s style is a huge departure from 
Balzac’s linearity. Balzac narrows his focus until he finds a clear path and then follows 
that path. He gives us the printing press, and uses the cultural history of that thing within 
the printing industry in France at the time to place the Séchards and Lucien, constituting 
their characters through the historical accretion of details about their emplacement. 
Faulkner throws us into Benjy’s perspective, sends us on a series of detours that briefly 
illuminate scenes spread across time, but gives us pinpoint access to moments of great 
significance, whose meaning plays out over time. Balzac explained all this up front, with 
plenty of place-setting exposition. In Faulkner, the payoff comes much later, after the 
intense, disorienting, and, to be plain, really difficult reading of the first two sections. 
Nevertheless, even when the reader is unaware of the full significance, we see things 
appearing in the text in the same natural way that my analysis of Balzac’s printing press 
made clear. Let us look at a small collection of things found in Yoknapatawpha. 
 From Benjy’s perspective on April 7, 1928, we see Luster looking along the fence 
for a quarter he lost. Luster wants to see a musical show, but needs the quarter to be able 
to pay his way. He is supposed to be watching Benjy, but gets distracted in his search for 
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the quarter. Caddy is in exile in this timeframe, but she has left her daughter Quentin at 
the Compson family home with the promise that she will send money to help care for the 
daughter. Benjy, between memories, happens upon Quentin and a nameless young man 
from the traveling show whom Benjy identifies by the red tie he wears. Benjy makes an 
awkward scene, wanting to hang around Quentin and the man as they sit together on a 
swing, until Luster intervenes. The man with the red tie tries to trick Benjy into burning 
himself with a match. Quentin stops him, gets aggravated with the whole scene, and runs 
off into the house, leaving Luster to explain his lost quarter to the man with the red tie.82 
Luster tries to sell the man with the red tie a golf ball for a quarter when the following 
exchange occurs: 
“You don’t want to buy no golf ball neither, does you.” Luster said. 
 “What kind of ball?” he said. 
 “Golf ball.” Luster said. “I don’t want but a quarter.” 
 “What for.” he said. “What do I want with it.” 
 “I didn’t think you did.” Luster said. “Come on here mulehead.” he 
said. “Come on here and watch them knocking that ball. Here. Here 
something you can play with along with that jimsom weed.” Luster picked 
it up and gave it to me. It was bright. 
 “Where’d you get that.” he said. His tie was red in the sun, walking. 
 “Found it under this here bush.” Luster said. “I thought for a minute 
it was a quarter I lost.” 
 He came and took it. 
 “Agnes Mabel Becky.” he said. He looked toward the house. 
 “Hush.” Luster said. “He’s fixin to give it back.” 
 He gave it to me and I hushed. 
 “Who came to see her last night.” he said. 
 “I don’t know.” Luster said. “They comes every night she can climb 
down that tree. I don’t keep no track of them.”83 
 
                                                
82 Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury, 48-49. 
83 Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury, 50. 
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As Faulkner writes it, there are three non-human things of significance in this scene. 
There is the quarter, golf balls, and a semi-mysterious, bright thing, about quarter sized, 
identified by the proper names “Agnes Mabel Becky.” Most contemporary readers have 
no immediate way of telling exactly what the third thing is. This break down of easy 
identification is exactly what we need to consider. Its philosophical significance is 
crucial. 
 The thing is not named as such. It is quarter-sized, bright. “Agnes Mabel Becky” 
signifies the thing only insofar as it indicates something written down, displayed on the 
thing and read by the man in the red tie. Readers at the time would have been more ready 
to identify the thing as a tin in which the 3 Merry Widows brand of condoms were 
packaged. Even without a direct identification of the thing as exactly what it is, the 
condom tin emerges out of its relations, and refers us ultimately to the sexual promiscuity 
of Quinten. The 3 Merry Widows brand came in small tins that were stamped with the 
brand name, along with the names “Anges – Mabel – Beckie.” Luster has given Benjy 
this discarded tin to placate him. We contemporary readers struggle more with the 
historical distance between the widespread use of this particular brand and ourselves, 
who would now easily recognize Trojan (an odd and symbolically loaded brand name 
itself…). We have here the opposite situation from the iPhone example discussed above. 
The significance of this particular thing deteriorated over time, losing its easy and natural 
identification for readers in the 21st century. Notice too how Faulkner, or his editors, 
varied the spelling of “Beckie.” This variation is a minor point, but one that reinforces the 
arbitrariness of the signifier while simultaneously revealing the recalcitrance of the thing 
itself. Further, though the thing is not really referred to as such, the fact of its use as a 
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prophylactic signals to readers, through the reaction of the characters to its appearance, 
the web of sexual politics that so dominate the Compson family and is the singular legacy 
of daughter Quentin, who unknowingly repeats the actions of her mother in the shadow 
of her namesake’s suicide. Not only does this thing, which is not referred to as such, still 
manage to refer us to a real historical object even in its absence and, through this 
reference, indicates the tangle of human sexuality, it also orients the characters (and 
readers) to the broader historical context of this particular place – the Compson family 
home. With Benjy as our first source, we are able to bounce around the timeline of this 
history, gleaning bits and pieces of the story as we go. Thus, with the 3 Merry Widows 
tin, Faulkner discovers the oscillation that occurs even in the absence of a stable signifier; 
that the thing still emerges through the play of its absence and presence, and attains 
stability as what it is through the series of significations rooted in historical place. The tin 
was found in a bush, after all. It was uncovered, just we seek to uncover the details of the 
Compson family drama, or recover them from the complexities of Benjy’s temporal 
juxtapositions. Whether or not Faulkner could have realized it, he has enacted a scene 
wherein readers, especially contemporary ones, must piece together the significance of a 
particular thing in the same way we must piece together the overarching history of the 
Compson drama. In the Chapters to follow, we will touch upon the philosophical 
relevance of synecdoche, where a part stands for the whole, but for now we can see this 
scene as a structural synecdoche for the organization of the whole novel. The pieces can 
fall into place exactly because of the web of references given throughout the text as a 
whole and which signal the thing’s involvement in the sexual politics of the South, and 
specifically tie the Compson family turmoil to this elaborate politics. Indeed, the 
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appearance of the condom in the scene already indicates the advanced stage of this 
drama. Perhaps Quentin repeats her mother’s rebellion, but she has the cultural tools 
available to thwart an unwanted pregnancy of which she is herself the result. Caddy had 
no such access to condoms, and the appearance of this thing here reveals yet a different 
flight – not a flight from the South, or from the surveillance of the brothers, but a flight 
from the repetition of the sins themselves. The thing, as what it is, offers a way out for 
Miss Quentin, a way out that is very different, both from Caddy’s exile and brother/uncle 
Quentin’s suicide. Thus, the thing, and its stubborn recalcitrance, conditions the very 
possibility of Miss Quentin’s future in Yoknapatawpha, whatever future that may be. 
Faulkner conceals these intricacies of place behind the simple expressions of Benjy’s 
experience, but strangely, this apparent simplicity is itself concealed behind the 
complexity of the temporal trajectory we wend through the text. 
 And then there’s the issue of the red tie. We are tempted, because of Faulkner’s 
emphasis on the Compson’s policing of female sexuality, to think that Quentin and the 
mystery man from the traveling show are engaged in some sort of necking or heavy 
petting. Faulkner sort of implies this when he writes, “I kept a telling you to stay away 
from there, Luster said. They sat up in the swing quick. Quentin had her hands on her 
hair. He had a red tie.”84 As Luster comes upon the trio, the man and Quentin sit up, 
implying a reclining position, and Quentin’s hands are on her hair, suggesting it may 
have been tousled. But Michelle Ann Abate makes a compelling argument that the man’s 
red tie is meant to signal him as a homosexual, thereby further disrupting the sexual 
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policies of Yoknapatawpha, and the American South in general.85 As we will see when 
we take on Absalom, Absalom!, things not only accrete, they also disintegrate – or 
sometimes, explode. It is not just that things come into being and stabilize. There are also 
processes of decay and erosion that result from the play of oscillation. Just as the condom 
opens Quentin to the possibility of breaking from the repetition of her mother’s path, the 
red tie could open the possibility of another kind of relationship, not just between 
Quentin and men, but between men and women generally. Faulkner deploys homosocial 
relations as the site of cultural transformation, transformation that means, for many, the 
destruction of a way of life seen by those who inhabit Yoknapatawpha as the only valid 
tradition. A ready connection is made to the brothers Buck and Buddy in both Go Down, 
Moses and The Unvanquished. In The Unvanquished, Faulkner writes of the brothers’ (at 
least) homosocial lifestyle, “Father said that they were ahead of their time; he said that 
they not only possess, but put into practice, ideas about social relationships that maybe 
fifty years after they were both dead people would have a name for.”86 We could easily 
apply that sentiment here, to Miss Quentin and her companion. With these examples, we 
should see that complex historical and social relations are brought about and signified by 
an elaborate interplay between things natural and technical, between the places things 
occupy, places inhabited by people and their creations upon which are built the array of 
socio-political institutions that shape their lives. 
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Mississippi Quarterly, 54:3 (Summer 2001), 293-312. 
86 Faulkner, The Unvanquished (New York: Vintage INterntional, 1991), 48. 
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 Faulkner plays out a subtle parody of those institutions, often behind the backs of 
his own characters. Jason Compson, Caddy’s reactionary brother, later wonders, “what 
the hell kind of man would wear a red tie?”87 What kind of man indeed. We may never 
know for certain, though Abates analysis leads us to consider that, “even though Miss 
Quentin’s escape signals the end of the ‘old’ Compson line, it may simultaneously mark 
the beginning of an entirely new order.”88 Perhaps in fifty years there will be a name for 
it – for this other beginning. Certainly, Jason’s comments come just as Miss Quentin 
prepares her escape, on Easter Sunday, no less, if not a resurrection, then at least the 
emergence of something new from out of the old. It is not simply that these things 
constitute life in Yoknapatawpha. Rather, it is that the historical play of things is exactly 
their generation and constitution as such. As things fall apart, something new emerges 
from the significations that spin off from the collapsing structures. If all that is solid 
eventually melts into air, then all that is solid also condenses from air in its time. 
 Keeping with Faulkner’s parodic gestures, his play with the changing and 
unstable socialities that unfold across time, I want to turn to another passage wherein the 
author manipulates the supposed simplicity of the mentally handicapped. It is remarkable 
that Faulkner plays on prejudices held, not only by his characters, but also by his 
audience, in order to enact the radical emplacement that we find in his Yoknapatawpha 
novels. In The Sound and the Fury, Benjy is given his own voice, simple in its direct 
expression, complex in its mode of temporalization. In The Hamlet, Faulkner performs an 
inverse complexification of the simple. Rather than explaining a complex scene with 
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simple declarative sentences, he depicts a simple scene with a hyperbolic effluvience 
whose excess cannot be missed. However, Faulkner does not place us so firmly “within” 
the mindset of the character in the scene to which I now turn. From the distance of a third 
person narrator, we see Isaac Snopes, the handicapped cousin of the conniving and 
ambitious Flem Snopes, in the following scene: 
 Then he would hear her, coming down the creekside in the mist. It 
would not be after one hour, two hours, three; the dawn would be empty, 
the moment and she would not be, then he would hear her and he would lie 
drenched in the wet grass, serene and one and indivisible in joy, listening to 
her approach. He would smell her; the whole mist reeked with her; the same 
maleate hands of mist which drew along his prone drenched flanks palped 
her pearled barrel too and shaped them both somewhere in immediate time, 
already married. He would not move. He would lie amid the waking instants 
of earth’s teeming minute life, the motionless fronds of water-heavy grasses 
stooping into the mist before his face in black, fixed curves, along each 
parabola of which the marching drops held in magnification the dawn’s rosy 
miniatures, smelling and even tasting the rich, slow, warm barn-reek milk-
reek, the flowing immemorial female, hearing the slow still in the mist lout 
with its hymeneal choristers. 
 Then he would see her; the bright horns of morning, of sun, would 
blow the must away and reveal her, planted, blond, dew-pearled, standing 
in the parted water of the ford, blowing into the water the thick, warm, 
heavy, milk-laden breath; and lying in the drenched grasses, his eyes now 
blind with the sun, he would wallow faintly from thigh to thigh, making a 
faint, thick, horse moaning sound.89 
 
This is Isaac, pleasuring himself as he watches a cow come to pasture. He takes great 
sexual satisfaction from watching this animal, and has designs to do more than just 
watch, though, again, the sexual mores of the place will condition his attempts and 
failures as he is policed by the community for his aberrant sexual proclivities as well as 
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his status as someone of limited mental capacity. Our concern here is not an exploration 
of these sexual politics, nor are we engaged in a disabilities oriented study of the 
treatment of these extraordinary characters. Such concerns are beyond our purview here. 
Nevertheless, these factors are most powerfully revealed, and indeed, are ultimately 
grounded upon, the emplacement of things presented in a particular place and, as 
Faulkner writes, “somewhere in immediate time.” 
 We are tempted to laugh at Ike, and the scene is a funny one. And yet, even 
though he lacks the linguistic prowess with which to express the scene as we in fact read 
it, Ike fully inhabits the scene, his poetic imagination given flight through the third person 
narration that breaks from the old pastoral form in its content. That is, to Isaac, the cow is 
Venus. The pastoral, though not given in Ike’s voice, gives full expression to what Isaac 
feels welling within him, which he is unable to articulate for himself, and which appears 
comical to us. Although we laugh, Isaac remains exultant despite our chiding. In order to 
paint this scene most fully for us, to grant Isaac the fullness of his passion, Faulkner 
relies, not just on the pastoral as a genre, but also on the deep emplacement of pastorals 
as such – that they take us immediately to the countryside wherein the scene is brought 
most vividly to life. 
 In fact, more than describing any characters in these scenes, Faulkner devotes 
most of his words to the place: the drenched grasses, the dew-laden morning, the mist, the 
smell, and the sun. The parting of the mist in the sunlight reveals the cow in the river, the 
man in the grass, a particularly Platonic revelation, despite the erotic intent of the man, 
because it is, of course, seeing the cow in the full light of the morning sun that most 
powerfully reveals her for what she is. We do not need to (and hopefully do not in fact) 
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share the amorous inclinations of Isaac to see the scene in this way, to see the “flowing 
immemorial female” celebrated in this pastoral. It is only because we can see the cow in 
the pasture as such that the passage can come off, after the torrent of its excesses 
subsides, as a rather funny one. It is the play between the simplicity of the scene (man 
sees cow come to pasture) and the complex rendering of the scene thoroughly emplaced 
in the pasture, as Ike lays there, in the ford, in Yoknapatawpha, that the humor can 
emerge – Faulkner’s underground discourse a parody of the orthodox pastoral, one of the 
countryside’s great vices given sacrosanct treatment. Only by seeing the cow as Ike does 
can we then break the usual script of the idealized human female and see that the cow, 
just as what it is, has come to stand in the usual place of a rising Venus. These 
substitutions work because of the oscillation that emplaces them as such, through which 
we can see the things as what they are, and then relate their play to the broader context 
that imparts the significance derived from Isaac and his longing for a cow. Here, Faulkner 
lets time be. With Benjy, time is overly complex. With Isaac Snopes, time stands still. 
Time becomes oversimplified so that the complexity of emplacement stands forth. 
Through this contrast, we are led in both instances to place – in the case of Beny through 
the temporal web of his family’s history, in the case of Isaac, through the simple morning 
revealed in its spatial web. In each case, we see the slow build of details, the layering of 
concepts that point us onward, on a trajectory by which we compose the representation of 
a particular scene that becomes burdened with significance and meaning only through the 
emplacement that makes such representations possible in the first place. 
 The scene of Isaac Snopes in The Hamlet gives a timeless time, the “immediate 
now” of the marriage of Ike and the cow together in the pasture, but what of Benjy? How 
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do we understand his time? I suggest that Benjy’s temporal structure can be understood 
as a rhizome.90 Deleuze and Guattari define the rhizome as follows: “A rhizome has no 
beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo.”91 
The rhizome functions under principles of connection and heterogeneity,92 while 
simultaneously displaying a substantive multiplicity.93 Benjy’s perspective contains all 
these traits. Since place is a unity of spacetime, the rhizome here functions spatially and 
temporally. Faulkner must lay the timeframes out in space, among the pages of the novel, 
but the reading takes time, and the procession through this spatial arrangement brings us 
into relation to the various times and the various spaces strewn across these times that 
constitute the history of the Compsons. We are constantly disrupted in our traversal of the 
timeframes, always landing in a heterogeneous place, the exact day on which we land 
intimately tied to Benjy’s struggle. Benjy himself is between many different timeframes, 
oscillating between past and present days, constantly breaking away from the present, 
seeking refuge from moments of recurring trauma or signals of past traumas, connecting 
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heterogeneous events through a multiplicity of referents that are nonetheless substantial 
in terms of their impact on the story. Deleuze and Guattari designate these as “lines of 
flight,” but we need not adopt this vocabulary to see how Benjy, his sister, and his niece 
seek ways out of their predicaments, and indeed, in their resistance to the prevailing 
orders, restructure that order and reveal new significations, form new structures, and their 
flights cause ruptures in the old order. Benjy, though not able to vocalize it, rebels in his 
own small ways, loving Caddy despite her transgressions, and escaping Luster to follow 
Quentin. 
 There is not, then, just one time in Yoknapatawpha. Time takes many forms as it 
erupts from places. We can determine this from The Sound and the Fury alone. Neither 
brother Quentin, nor Jason’s sections of the book follow the same pattern as Benjy, and 
they differ from one another in significant ways as well. We see Quentin twisting himself 
into knots trying to acquit Caddy of her crimes, convincing himself it would actually be 
better if everyone thought he and Caddy had committed incest together. Jason, the single-
minded businessman of the three, holds to a fairly linear time, at last giving readers a 
chance to piece things together in a more typical narrative order, though relatively late in 
the novel. There is a temporal plurality that grounds the procession of spatial relations, 
but that is, in turn, grounded by the juxtapositions of those relations in space. Perhaps 
Kant was right. Space and time, themselves a unity in place, are but rationalizations of 
the experience of place, whereby spacetime comes to be for us as subsistence, procession, 
repetition, and so on. Though time is no object, Levinas is right when he points out the 
lesson taught by Heidegger, that “one cannot pose the question ‘What is time?’ because 
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then one immediately posits time as [a] being.”94 But, as soon as one posits time at all, 
insofar as time must be given as, one cannot help but posit time as a thing – if not a 
being. We can begin to see the collapse of time-for-itself as a philosophical concept, 
something derived, as if analytically, from a basic emplacement. Taken together, these 
paradigmatic examples show the substantive multiplicity of time that plays on the 
appearance of things in space, both of which only emerge out of the places in which 
things can be. Spatiality and temporality are both derived from place, which is their 
ecstatic unity. In the next Chapter, I will explore this theme in more detail, focusing on 
Absalom, Absalom! This novel will allow me to more fully convey the fundamental 
nature of place and fend off potential criticisms of this other beginning. Much of this 
criticism, I suspect, will come from the New Realists, notably the German philosopher 
Markus Gabriel. 
 Before turning to the philosophical issues of realism and the confrontation with 
Absalom, Absalom!, let me, in closing this Chapter, briefly clarify that place itself is not a 
thing. Then, since we have covered a lot of ground, let’s take stock of our new 
ontological vocabulary, and see where oscillation has gotten us in terms of the 
quadripartite structure that was uncovered in Chapter One. 
3.8 Why Place is Not a Thing, but Everything Else Is 
 Place does not appear as place. The thingliness of things is determined by their 
as-structure. The mug appears as a mug. Things display this tautological structure. They 
are what they are, and are sometimes many things at once, but in each instance appear 
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just as the things they are. We gained this insight, initially, from considering Balzac’s 
printing press. Place, as such, never appears to us. Places are always apparently 
particular, an event, an occurrence, always specific – my living room, the diner down the 
street, a particular meadow, forest, city block, townhouse, beach. Places appear as these 
things, and not as place itself. Places are always someplace, somewhere, sometime. This 
is why all things are in place and not the other way around. To the extent that place 
appears as place, it appears as oscillation. Why? Because place always appears 
differentiated. There appears to be places and things, or better, things in places. We never 
get immediately at place, which is why place is so universally taken for granted. We 
work to uncover place, work I undertook in the first two Chapters, uncovering and 
recovering place from obscurity in the Cartesian legacy of post-Enlightenment thought. 
In the analysis of Absalom, Absalom! that follows, the singularity of Yoknapatawpha will 
become ever more apparent, much more so than it does here, with a sampling of 
examples from throughout Faulkner’s corpus. Place can never appear as place, can never 
be a thing, because place occurs as oscillation, that is, as the very differentiation of things 
in their being what they are. Place is not, and this is very important, anything at all like a 
universal category, or a master domain that encompasses everything that exists, or “in” 
which everything that is is contained as if the universe were a giant vessel – a 
metaphysical cookie-jar filled with all the stuff. Place cannot be anything like this 
because there is nothing that could possibly unify, in a sensible way, everything that 
appears in place. 
 The ontology of place is not a domain ontology. The next Chapter will make this 
clear. Rather, place is an explanation for the fact that things appear at all – that there is 
 208 
anything to begin with. “To exist,” does not mean, “to appear in a place,” and even less 
does it mean anything like “to be subsumed under the concept of being-in-a-place.” As 
we have seen, such an understanding would lapse back into the old and entirely useless 
way of thinking concepts themselves as representations. We are beyond that now. If we 
are to get at place as such, we must understand it in other terms, and come to see that 
being in place is exactly the differentiation of things in their particularity. I have 
proposed oscillation as the way in which we can come to understand the differentiation of 
things in places. The play of oscillation frees things to be what they are between the push 
and pull of other things from which they become differentiated in play. Absalom, 
Absalom! will help to see this play most clearly, aided in our reading by philosophical 
thought and the relevant literary criticism. 
 Taking stock, we can say that place is the manner of the existence of things as 
such. If we wish to describe or explain this emplacement, just the fact that things are such 
and such, we must turn to oscillation for that explanation. How are things emplaced, such 
that they can be just what they are? Oscillation. What does this achieve? It accounts for 
the basic differentiation between things that are given in places, and so thoroughly 
differentiates that no places are the same, except maybe in the sense that time and space 
may be derived from the appearance of any given place. Oscillation thus usurps 
representation as the mode of the appearance of things as such. Place takes the 
overarching role of the ego cogito as the ground of ontological and epistemological 
inquiry. Because places are historical and oscillation is an historical movement, things 
accrete. Accretion results in two sorts of things: natural and technical, where natural 
things accrete out of their own basic emplacement, and technical things accrete out of the 
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emplacement of natural things as a result of their self-sustaining activity, autopoietic 
activity, by which an autopoietic natural thing works to maintain itself as what it is. 
 Remember the old quadripartite structure: the act of recognition, presencing, 
representation, and difference. This was the procedure of the cogito in its self-grounding. 
Now, something quite new is emerging, de-centered from the ego in its founding act of 
recognition. Place is now central, and the occasion of oscillation is the first step. Not only 
has representation been replaced, its role has been displaced. The new quadripartitie 
structure, transformed through careful analysis, a deconstructive/reconstructive gesture, 
takes shape: oscillation, difference, play, accretion. Oscillation generates difference and, 
in this movement, is the grounding place. These differences are freed, coming to stand as 
what they are against the background of their basic emplacement, by historical movement 
(oscillation). These differences accrete things. The accretion of things results from the 
play of differences released by oscillation. Once things have accreted, in their mutual 
play, they become available to other things, to each other, to themselves as things, and 
this was first understood by us as affordance. Epistemologically, this is where the concept 
emerges – as the affordance of things both as what they are and also for the others. 
Graham Harman’s insistence on a sort of ontological egalitarianism, mentioned above, is 
reinforced. The ontological relationship between things is the basic component of any 
subsequent relation between the subject and the object, or the human being and the world, 
of the human cognitive apparatus and the representations appearing to the one who 
cognizes. One relation between a certain kind of thing is not privileged over the other 
kinds, even if it remains the case that we must deal with the repercussions of being the 
specific kinds of finite things that we are as human beings. 
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 Next, we go deeper into the placial ontology, distinguishing oscillation from the 
current trends in philosophy through a close reading of Absalom, Absalom! The new 
ontological structure of emplacement is put into motion and yields our most robust results 
thus far. We approach the culmination of the odyssey begun with Edward Casey, where 
our destination has always been to get back into place. 
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Writing is drawing the essence of what we know out of the shadows. That is what writing 
is about. Not what happens there, not what actions are played out there, but the 
there itself. There, that is writing’s location and aim. But how to get there? 
 – Karl Ove Knausgaard, My Struggle, Book One, (2009) 
 
4.1 Emplacement, Oscillation, and the Real 
 Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! presents an opportunity to explore the meaning of 
the real because its central concern is with what really happened between Henry Sutpen 
and Charles Bon. The moment is made ever more opportune by the irony that there is no 
mystery as to the facts of the story. Henry kills Bon. That much is established outright. It 
is not a question of what happened or whodunit. Those facts are given. Rather, Faulkner 
presents characters whose questions about what “really” happened are questions 
regarding the personal significance of events for Bon and Henry themselves – that is, the 
mystery of the real is an “intersubjective” one. The speculative work of the characters in 
Absalom, Absalom! centers around the nature of the real in regards to the question of why 
the facts are the way they are; why did Henry kill Bon?  It is a question of motive, of 
guiding principles and intention. The question of the real appears, then, as the relation of 
personal projects – the so-called “inner” life of the subject, according to traditional views 
– and the recalcitrant facts of the world. Unfortunately, literary criticism of Absalom, 
Absalom! has almost entirely neglected the ontological significance of the novel, instead 
treating it as a variety of murder mystery where the forensic procedure is not carried out 
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in a crime scene – since both victim and perpetrator are already known – but is instead 
carried out on operations of the minds of those who lived through the event and have 
some stake in it. Even Brian McHale, whose thesis in Postmodernist Fiction places 
Absalom, Absalom! at the starting line of postmodernism because of its ontological 
content fails on philosophical grounds to confront the ontological insights developed by 
Faulkner, whether knowingly or not. Indeed, McHale, as I have shown, falls into the 
Enlightenment rut of completely separating ontology and epistemology, a rut that is 
embraced and reinforced philosophically by the New Realists. Because of the profoundly 
Heideggerian lineage claimed by the New Realists, who variously assert on inappropriate 
grounds that Heidegger was or was not a realist himself, I am compelled here to take a 
stand on the issue. Thankfully, such a position works in our favor, clarifying some of the 
more demanding and obscure of the insights won from the preceding studies. Here, we 
are brought into relation to Gabriel’s Sinnfeld, or “fields of sense,” which he believes 
escapes the criticism leveled against domain ontologists (which, for Gabriel, includes 
almost everyone in the 20th century, from Heidegger to Badiou). 
 In many ways, oscillation provides an alternative to Gabriel’s Sinnfeld, and at the 
same time, rejects the neat compartmentalization of epistemology and ontology (or 
metaphysics, a word of which I am not quite so afraid as Gabriel). As we explore the 
potential of a methodological realism, if not a metaphysical one, it will become clear that 
when we ask the question of what is, we are also implicitly stepping into the problem of 
how we know what is, and further, when we ask how we know what is, there is implicit 
within that question the tacit assumption regarding what is. This Chapter will attempt to 
round-out the ontological theory developed so far. Before a confrontation with Faulkner’s 
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text, I want to consider, at length, what are the philosophical stakes of realism, and what 
exactly I achieve with a methodological realism over a metaphysical one. 
4.2 New Realisms 
 The concern is that a full embrace of realism in its metaphysical or ontological 
dimensions would throw us back into the subject-object distinction, thereby into the old 
interpretation of the subject experiencing on the inside what it meets on the outside, 
where the philosophical problem becomes one of mediating between the two. The 
standard answer for the media of such mediation has been representation. Two 
approaches to realism will highlight this concern, and allow me to bring into sharper 
relief what exactly I mean by a methodological “realism” as a descriptive, 
phenomenological technique over an ontological commitment to “the real” out there 
somewhere beyond the cabinet of my consciousness.  
 The first, historically, is a group of American philosophers writing in the first 
decades of the twentieth century whose legacy has been almost entirely forgotten and 
whose major book lays long neglected and out of print. Markus Gabriel and Maurizio 
Ferraris are not the first to proclaim themselves “New Realists.” In 1912 a group of six 
philosophers in the United States published a collection of thematically interrelated 
essays under the title The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy.1 This old 
New Realism shares many aspects with the new New Realism espoused more than a 
hundred years later. The lead author of this text was Edwin Holt, whose legacy is perhaps 
                                                
1 Ferraris acknowledges the previous movements, both American New Realism and the Brazilian 
Novo Realismo of the mid-1970s, and yet, neither Ferraris nor Gabriel have, to my knowledge, 
considered with any seriousness the claims made by these other “new realists.” Ferraris’ 
acknowledgement of his predecessors can be found at Maruizio Ferraris, Introduction to New 
Realism, trans. Sarah de Sanctis (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 11. 
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best served by his Princeton advisee James J. Gibson, on whom we’ve relied for his work 
on affordances. The New Realists of 1912 oppose all forms of “subjectivism,” which they 
identify primarily with Berkeley and Kant, although I’ve provided enough evidence to 
show that, in practice, this rejection is effectively a shake-down of the entire post-
Cartesian metaphysics and epistemology. Indeed, although it is not clear that Holt et al. 
reject the Cartesian ego outright, they do, nevertheless, argue strongly against the ego-
centric nature of philosophy on two grounds. The first responds to the supposed 
predicament that all known things require a knower; thus, if we eliminate the knower, 
nothing could be known of anything. Such consequences would reinforce the Kantian 
view that without the “I think” to accompany every cognition it is not possible to say 
anything positive about the noumenal world-in-itself at all. All knowledge then, is 
knowledge of the phenomenal – that is to say, is subjective knowledge – leading 
eventually to the placement of truth within propositions that maintain a correspondence 
between these separate inner and outer realms. But the problem now arises that when we 
do form a proposition concerning things, we are faced either with the redundant 
proposition that “all known things are known,” or with the false inference that all things 
are known, full stop.2 As the New Realists have it, this kind of subjectivism, so closely 
aligned with and associated with the dominant Idealism of the time, puts us into a corner 
and wrecks itself on the thorny tangle of propositions that was so thoroughly 
deconstructed by Derrida and others at a later time. Of course, logically speaking, a 
redundant proposition is not at all a proposition, and the old New Realists claim that the 
                                                
2 Holt et al., The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1912), 
11-12. 
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assertion of the former only conceals a commitment to the latter false inference that all 
things are known. That all things, full stop, are not in fact known should be obvious 
unless we admit to the end of discovery and the futility of all science. There is yet a 
further logical issue, which is that, as Holt and company elegantly put it, “it is impossible 
to argue from the fact that everything one finds is known, to the conclusion that knowing 
is a universal principle of being, because it is impossible to find non-things that are not 
known.”3 The other line of attack zeroes in on the notion of the simple self, which had 
gained philosophical currency following the attacks of Thomas Reid on David Hume, 
and, of course, Kant’s proposal of the transcendental ego as a necessary ground for the 
possibility of cognition as such. My own views on this are that Reid fails to refute 
Hume’s position on the self, and that Kant only fairs better because he concedes so much 
to Hume from the start; something I’ve discussed above. The old New Realist refutation 
of the simple self lies in the fact that philosophers who assert this simplicity violate their 
own methodology, which presumably only admits to analytic simplicity after the analysis 
has been carried out, and not as the starting point of all inquiry in general. According to 
Holt et al., concepts taken as simple (the self, the will, immediacy, life) are not, in fact, 
analytically simple, because when they are treated as such “it is necessary to give them a 
complex existence also in order to account for what is known about them.”4 They hold 
that all attempts to say that these more complex iterations are just “manifestations” or 
“transformations” of a simple and fundamental reality are just excuses which conceal the 
invalid reversal of the espoused analytic procedure. We are thus gravely in error when we 
                                                
3 Holt et al., New Realism, 13. 
4 Holt et al., New Realism, 13. 
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assert that the self could exist just as a simple datum of consciousness – precisely because 
that much is just assumed, together with the assumption that consciousness and the like 
can be known only introspectively. I find these two criticisms to be the most powerful of 
the handful presented by the old New Realists. The others are intriguing as well, and are 
more dialed in on the specific concerns of American philosophers in the early twentieth 
century when American philosophy as such was coming into its own; hence the emphasis 
on refuting Idealism. At the time, most US scholars took their PhDs in Germany or were 
students of German emigrants, as Holt himself was under Hugo Münsterberg at Harvard 
in 1901. In this regard, the accusation that subjectivism and Idealism fall prey to the 
“fallacy of exclusive particularity” is notable for its extreme sensitivity to linguistic 
context, no doubt shaped by pragmatists like Charles Saunders Pierce (who was also 
deeply indebted to Reid) and William James, with whom Holt also studied. In New 
Realism, the issue is stated clearly, “Unless…multiple classification of terms were 
possible, discourse would break down utterly. All the terms of discourse are general in 
the sense that they belong to several contexts.”5 This may seem obvious to those of us 
raised on Wittgenstein and deconstruction, but in American philosophy circa 1912 it is a 
significant statement. Likewise, the fallacy that follows from this, the “fallacy of 
definition by initial predication,” which claims that once a subject of discourse is taken to 
be a particular kind of thing, say, that the mind is immaterial substance, then, following 
on the heels of the fallacy of exclusive particularity, it is assumed that this one particular 
aspect is the only relevant aspect, and, further, it cannot belong to any more robust 
                                                
5 Holt et al., New Realism, 14. 
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relational manifold. Therefore, that initial characterization becomes the definitive 
explanation.6 More generally, subjectivism and Idealism are determined to suffer from a 
“speculative dogma,” which assumes that there must be some “all-sufficient, all-general 
principle, a single fundamental proposition that adequately determines or explains 
everything.”7 This proposition is strangely similar to Heidegger’s insistence that Being is 
not some general, all-encompassing property which can be attributed to everything that 
is. A final fallacy outlined by the old New Realists is that of “illicit importance,” and I 
think this particular notion should be revived and seriously considered by nearly every 
major analytic philosopher in practice today. This argument attacks as spurious the idea 
that because a proposition appears to be self-evident and unchallengeable, that that 
proposition is therefore an important or philosophically relevant one.8 The example given 
is somewhat silly, but speaks directly to the form of this fallacy: that I like cucumbers 
may be self-evident and unchallengeable, after all, who can challenge one’s tastes, but 
this proposition – that I like cucumbers – never gives us reason to conclude that 
“cucumbers are the true foundation of dietetics, nor that [my] liking them reveals 
anything about [my] own nature or the nature of cucumbers.”9 This brief outline of the 
old New Realist assault on subjectivism, which is by them largely identified with 
Idealism of the German variety, should be enough to establish their relevance to this 
project, and also to the current discussion of “New Realism” instigated by Ferraris, 
Gabriel, and others. Where the old and new New Realisms collide is surely in their 
                                                
6 Holt et al., New Realism, 15-16. 
7 Holt et al., New Realism, 16-17. 
8 Holt et al., New Realism, 19-20. 
9 Holt et al., New Realism, 20. 
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treatment of and general concern with the notion of “independence,” and this speaks 
directly to our current project. 
 This concern with independence is but one offshoot from the roots of 
representationalism and the subject/object divide. Here, the idea of independence is just 
the question of how we know things exist, and that their properties etc. exist, independent 
of human cognition. That is to say, how do we know what, if anything, exists whether or 
not there are human perceivers also there to perceive what is said to exist? An aside here, 
that, insofar as Gabriel and Ferraris treat this sort of problem as a serious one, they are 
doing metaphysics despite all protestation to the contrary. But to stick with the old New 
Realists for just a moment longer – their key insight into this issue is expressed succinctly 
by Ralph Barton Perry. Independence is essentially privative. That is, exactly the way 
Descartes’ “immaterial” substance tells us nothing at all about what mind is in itself, 
neither does “independence” tell us anything at all about what things might be in 
themselves, other than the negative principle of not being “dependent” in some way on 
being perceived.10 This is a brilliant move. It allows Perry to outline the positive things 
normally intended by “dependence” (relation, whole-part, exclusive causation, 
implication, and being exclusively implied), and then address each in turn so that a 
positive understanding of “independence” can be worked out.11 What emerges is that the 
old New Realists do not actually seek to define “reality” in terms of its independence 
precisely because independence is not a relation, but is the lack of a relation and does not, 
                                                
10 Holt et al., New Realism, 106-107. 
11 Holt et al., New Realism, 106-113. 
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therefore, define anything.12 Thus, we can say, for instance, that a is related to b, and yet 
is independent of b, and such statements are equivalent to saying just that a can be 
defined without reference to b. We are then in a position to see that realism need not 
assert that “everything true of a is independent of b,” exactly because a’s independence 
of b is true of a, and at the same time, this judgment rests upon a certain relation between 
a and b. Still further, realism does not require that we deny a could enter into a relation, 
such as it does in the case of knowledge (it enters a relation to a knower), nor that a exists 
“independently” of knowledge even though it has acquired that relation (to a knower of 
which it is independent), but it would deny that the added relation of being-known is 
necessary to the constitution of a. As Perry puts it, “Thus a is known, it is a itself, as 
constituted without knowledge, that is independent of that circumstance. The new 
complex known-a is of course dependent on knowledge as one of its parts.”13 While I find 
the argument compelling, I cannot endorse it without a few caveats. 
 It must be said that the intellectual atmosphere for the American New Realists 
(and Anglo-American philosophy generally) in 1912 was one in which it made sense for 
G. E. Moore to famously argue for “the existence of the external world” in a completely 
un-ironic fashion, though certainly his argument hints at the common language approach 
soon to come, and is rooted in Moore’s own ideas regarding the philosophical power of 
common sense.14 While I think Moore’s own ideas regarding so-called “common sense” 
                                                
12 Holt et al., New Realism, 117. 
13 Holt et al., New Realism, 117-18. 
14 Moore’s essay appeared in 1939: G. E. Moore, “Proof of an External World.” Proceedings of 
the British Academy, 25 (1939), 273-300. 
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are preposterous on their face,15 it is, nevertheless, notable that on the other side of the 
channel, in 1927, Heidegger found the very question of the existence of the external 
world to be a scandal and an embarrassment to philosophy, one that marked the decline 
of thinking in the West – that the question of Being had been covered over and 
forgotten.16 This gets us to the crux of the matter in a definitive way. Interestingly, 
Ferraris claims that “new” realisms, as separate from “realism as opposed to idealism,” is, 
historically, always a response to a philosophically dominant or hegemonic anti-
realism.17 In the case of Ferraris and Gabriel, it is a response to the Pyrrhic skepticism of 
                                                
15 The admiration and philosophical heft granted to “common sense” by some 20th century Anglo-
American philosophers is entirely suspect and in no way admits to philosophical rigor. If it were 
up to common sense, I would go outside, observe the movement of the sun across the sky, and 
conclude – reasonably, given the utterly inadequate criteria – that the sun moves while the Earth 
and myself with it remain still. The truth of the matter is discovered only later and through much 
work and technological manipulation. The truth thereby becomes observable, but from the 
common sense perspective is entirely counter-intuitive and contradictory to the observations 
commonly available to all people. The vast, vast majority of people, after all, have no access to 
the technological and cultural apparatuses that allow scholars, academics, and scientists to so 
readily and easily propose, more or less correctly, that the sun stays put while we and the Earth 
orbit around it at break-neck speeds. Of course, even more daunting to prove, but which science 
has nevertheless demonstrated, is that the sun itself is not exactly still either. That, in fact, the sun 
itself orbits a yet greater center of gravity and drags its planetary hangers-on along with it. 
Common sense, provided this information, might “reasonably” infer a pattern and propose that 
the galaxy must then orbit some greater center itself (after all, the Moon orbits the Earth, the 
Earth orbits the Sun, and the Sun orbits the center of the galaxy…) but of course, this is wrong as 
well, and as far as we know galaxies are observed, with great effort, to be gravitationally bound to 
a number of other galaxies in a fractal-like hierarchical distribution of clustered structures. 
16 Heidegger writes, “Der »Skandal der Philosophie« besteht nicht darin, daß dieser Bewies 
bisland noch aussteht, sondern darin, daß solche Beweise immer wieder erwartet und versucht 
werden,” which I translate, “The ‘Scandal of Philosophy’ is not that these proofs [of an external 
world] are hitherto still pending, but that such proofs are repeatedly expected and tried.” 
Heidegger is here explicitly referring to Kant, who claims in a footnote to the Preface of the B 
Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that the “scandal of philosophy” is, “that the existence of 
things outside us (from which we after all get the whole matter of our cognitions, even for our 
inner sense) should have to be assured merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, 
we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof.” Heidegger is here taking a harder 
line than Kant. We find the source of the former at Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 272; and the latter at Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 121. 
17 Ferraris, Intro to New Realism, 11. 
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philosophical postmodernism, which I detailed in Chapter Two. Ferraris contends that it 
is Schopenhauer’s argument that the “world is my representation” which becomes the 
ontological heart of postmodernity. Postmodernity, then, is best exemplified by social 
constructivism in which, because reality is constructed by humans (note the residual 
Kantianism) therefore, “reality does not exist independently from the representations of 
an unspecified mankind.”18 I want to stick with the focus on independence, since I have 
already and at length presented arguments against representationalism. Now, Heidegger 
was himself dismissive of the division between idealism and realism, both of which were 
taken by him to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the knower who knew the 
real. For Heidegger, reality [Realität], like all philosophical issues, must first be 
understood ontologically, and this means that “Reality” refers us to the Being of entities 
(beings) that are present for us within-the-world. This, in turn, means that Reality can 
only be understood after the careful clarification of the concept “world.”19 Enter Markus 
Gabriel’s audacious thesis that the world does not exist. 
4.3 Being and the Meaning of the World 
 First, let me be very clear – I think Gabriel’s conclusion that “the world does not 
exist” is rather absurd. However, his current impact and acclaim in the philosophical 
community merits some comment here, especially since what follows depends on the 
existence of something like the “world.” There is the further issue of Gabriel’s 
indebtedness to Heidegger, which Gabriel seems to exploit for the benefits of a family 
resemblance, but in which Heidegger’s philosophy is rather poorly represented. Both of 
                                                
18 Ferraris, Intro to New Realism, 18. 
19 Heidegger, Being and Time, 252. 
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these issues are entangled, since what I mean by “world” (and what Heidegger means by 
“world”) is not at all the same thing that Gabriel means by the term – and in fact, my use 
of “world” is actually very, very close to Gabriel’s idea of a Sinnfeld, or field of sense. 
 When Gabriel says “world” he means something like “the unified totality of all 
that is,” what we would indicate categorically as the domain of all domains, and such. 
I’m a little vague here only because Gabriel is himself vague. He says that how his 
arguments strike you depends on how you are given to understand what the “world” is. In 
his 2013 book, Why the World Does Not Exist, Gabriel clearly means: “The world is 
neither the entirety of objects or things nor the entirety of facts. It is the domain of all 
domains.”20 But two years later, in Fields of Sense, he is less clear. A quote might help: 
“For some, I will deny that there is unified entity, which goes by the name of ‘the world’, 
‘reality’, or maybe even ‘nature’. For others, I will deny that there is a unified domain of 
all facts, the single all-encompassing ‘sphere of objects’ unified by some conceptual 
operation of other.”21 In this sense, where the world is treated as some unified totality of 
all that is, or the domain of all domains, I totally agree with Gabriel. The world, if we 
mistake it to be the unified totality of everything that is, a metaphysical catch-all as the 
domain of all domains, does not exist. Gabriel seems to be correct. But there’s a problem 
here, and at least one that is potentially damning. Before we get into all that, first notice 
that Gabriel calls himself a New Realist, but part of his thesis involves denying “reality,” 
again understood as a unified totality of all that is. So, he is not, in principle, opposed to 
                                                
20 Gabriel, Why the World Does Not Exist, trans. Gregory S. Moss (Malden: Polity Press, 2015), 
49. 
21 Gabriel, Fields of Sense: A New Realist Ontology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2015), 8. 
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admitting redefinitions or reimagined concepts into the ontological vocabulary, and that 
is a good thing for us all! However, his whole project involves proving a negative, which 
is logically suspect. 
 Tom Sparrow has written me to the effect that Gabriel may not be trying to prove 
a negative when he sets out to deny the existence of the world, but rather that he could be 
simply trying to show that anyone postulating a domain of all domains are just not 
permitted to assert that such a mega-domain exists – that such a domain need not exist. 
This point is well taken, however, both Sparrow and I concur that Gabriel seems to be 
loading the dice by using highly idiosyncratic definitions.22 I do not think the definitions 
are a real problem – after all, theorists of every stripe use idiosyncratic definitions that are 
cut to the measure of the subject under consideration. I want to pursue the proving a 
negative line for just a moment, because I think that Gabriel’s rhetorical tact very 
strongly implies a proof of a negative, and not the less demanding conclusion offered by 
Sparrow. In mathematics, for instance, proving a negative is permissible. Negatives are, 
after all, just another point on the number line. It’s an odd way of speaking, perhaps, but 
in math negatives are positively extant. Not so in the “real world.” Mathematics have the 
advantage of being highly abstract and are thereby able to delve deep and soar high into 
realms far beyond what we experience – experiences that include observations made 
possible by technology, such as deep-space observation with a telescope and microscopic 
observations of sub-atomic particles. Now, it could be rejoined that Gabriel is involved in 
a deduction, and, like mathematics, strict deductions can prove a negative. Indeed, given 
                                                
22 Sparrow in email to the author, 31 January 2016. 
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a closed system, inference could prove a negative – such as proving that some 
identifiable object is not inside a box. But it is far from clear that the world is or must be 
such a system, and Gabriel’s argument hinges upon the denial of metaphysically closed 
systems. Insofar as the closed system is concerned, again, Gabriel is correct. If by 
“world” we understand some unified totality, the domain of all domains, and we then say 
something like, “for things to exists, they must belong to some domain,” then we are 
clearly committed to saying that for these domains to exist they must belong to yet 
another domain or else some meta-domain – the domain of all domains – which results in 
an infinite regress of domains within domains within domains.23 So Gabriel’s ontology 
cannot be expressed as a closed system. Further, Gabriel explicitly rejects thorough 
mathematization. “I reject the idea that the meaning of ‘existence’ can be fully or 
relevantly captured by the language of quantification,” writes Gabriel, elaborating that, “I 
also reject the idea that existence is relevantly bound up with the concepts used to 
understand set theory,” and, this is the kicker, “Existence is just not a particularly 
mathematical or logical concept, as there are vague and messy objects of all kinds…” 
[emphasis added].24 With that goes all hope of proving the negative deduction. On these 
terms, Gabriel simply cannot prove that the world does not exist. Of course, if we accept 
Sparrow’s less demanding interpretation, Gabriel could slip away from this criticism, 
however, he would do so at the cost of the force of his argument, and the titles of his 
work become misnomers. Gabriel isn’t claiming just that we are not justified or 
                                                
23 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 138-41. 
24 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 8. 
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warranted in postulating the world as the domain of all domains – he argues stridently 
that such a world “does not exist,” the much stronger claim. 
 I have already, and at length, discussed the difficulty (in my mind, the 
impossibility) of neatly or completely separating ontological and epistemological 
questions. The issue raised by Sparrow highlights the problem. Gabriel is very clear that 
he agrees “with Kant, who distinguished between epistemology and ontology: whatever 
holds good of our access to how things really are is not necessarily the most general 
frame for all things regardless of our access.”25 This position actually bars Gabriel from 
making the weaker claim suggested by Sparrow. The weaker claim is actually an 
epistemological one regarding our warrant or how justified we are in making claims 
regarding the domain of all domains. This throws us back into the Realism-Idealism 
debate, specifically, as it was hashed out by Hilary Putnam in The Threefold Chord: 
Mind, Body, and World. There Putnam writes,  
To suppose that philosophy divides into separate compartments labeled 
'philosophy of mind,' 'philosophy of language,' 'epistemology,' 'value 
theory,' and 'metaphysics,' is a sure way to lose all sense of how the 
problems are connected, and that means to lose all understanding of our 
sense of puzzlement. Indeed we have seen how the arguments in the 
realism/antirealism debate over the very possibility of representing a reality 
'external' to our minds (or to our brains) constantly appeal to assumptions 
about our perception and assumptions about understanding – in particular, 
the assumption that we face a forced choice between explaining the very 
possibility of understanding by an appeal one or another metaphysical 
mystery, on the one hand, and accepting a verificationist account of 
understanding on the other – and how that assumption in turn support 
deflationist and anitrealist accounts of truth.26 
                                                
25 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 162. 




I myself have shown the difficulties Putnam points out in several places: the discussion of 
Ferraris and Evans in Chapter Three, the uncovering of place in Descartes in Chapter 
Two, and the reaction to externalism by Adams and Aizawa in Chapter One. Thus, again, 
when Gabriel goes on to write that “if we give up the idea that our projected truth-
conditions generally matter for how things are, we might grant some terrain to anti-
realism, but never give up a realist conception of fields and accordingly of facts,” we can 
see that he does accept the verificationist account of understanding, while also appealing 
to the “mystery” of appearance and simply asserting that appearances are real “out there” 
beyond our minds, past the end of the mind, which, again, throws Gabriel back into the 
old metaphysical paradigm, where his idiosyncratic definitions are revealed to be merely 
new labels on a pre-existing logical structure. Here, we need to get a little more into the 
details of what Gabriel is saying, starting with that word which slipped so innocuously 
into the last quote – fields. What, ontologically, is a field of sense? 
 Readers sympathetic to Gabriel might admit that his one book’s title might be a 
bit of hyperbole, and that Gabriel, more than trying to prove a negative, is actually 
offering a positive alternative argument that to exist is to appear in a field of sense, 
Sinnfeld. To answer the question “what is a field of sense?” presents us with certain 
difficulties that arise from Gabriel’s avowedly Heideggerian position, which includes a 
total embrace of the history of metaphysics as “ontotheology.”27 Part of the difficulty, if 
                                                
27 A full interpretation of “ontotheology” is beyond the purview of this study. I bring this up 
because it is central to understanding Gabriel’s troubled relation to and appropriation of 
Heidegger’s way to ontology. He affirms Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics in Gabriel, Fields 
of Sense, 22-23. 
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not the whole of it, is that fields of sense are not substantively different than “world” as 
Heidegger understands it. Now, again, Sparrow has resisted this interpretation by 
emphasizing that Heidegger is rooted in phenomenology, thus cannot, due to 
methodological constraints, ever show the world to be independent (that tricky non-
relation again) of Dasein. I will return to this objection below, and consider Sparrow’s 
critique of the phenomenological method after we deal with Gabriel’s misinterpretations 
of Heidegger. It is important to understand that Gabriel really only makes fields of sense 
seem to be substantively different from Heideggerian worlds through an indefensible 
interpretation of Heidegger as a domain ontologist.28 To be fair, Gabriel hedges his bet, 
somewhat, when he says that Heidegger is a domain ontologist “in his earliest books.”29 
But even such hedging is problematic, since Gabriel nullifies this hedge when he says 
that Heidegger follows Aristotle’s domain ontology (because he talks about Bereiche) 
“throughout his [Heidegger’s] whole career.”30 Further, this statement shows a serious 
misinterpretation of Heidegger’s appropriations of Aristotle, who Heidegger did not treat 
as a domain ontologist, an interpretation of Aristotle that Heidegger explicitly rejects. In a 
1931 lecture course on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Heidegger is analyzing the Aristotelian 
notion that being is an analogy and not a genus. He asks, “is being the unity of a highest 
genus…which we can get back to by separating our what is common from the various 
                                                
28 I cannot fathom a coherent interpretation in which Heidegger can justly be read as a domain 
ontologist, and suggesting that his concept of “world” is meant to be something like the “domain 
of all domains” so badly mangles what Heidegger actually says, repeatedly, about the worldhood 
of the world that I begin to question either the interpreter’s competence as a reader of Heidegger 
or his honesty. 
29 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 146. 
30 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 136. 
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ways of being? Aristotle says no, this too is impossible.”31 Heidegger then clarifies his 
interpretation in a way that totally avoids Gabriel’s concern that domain ontologists assert 
some form of the claim that “to exist” means to “fall under a concept.”32 Heidegger says, 
“The universal, comprehended and defined as species-enabling genus, is usually called 
‘concept.’ If being is not a genus, then it cannot be comprehended as a subject, nor can it 
be conceptualized. This is so not just because there is a higher genus than the genus of 
being, but also because being is not a genus at all.”33 Such textual evidence is sufficient 
to refute Gabriel’s assertion that Heidegger follows Aristotle into a domain ontology, but 
one more point on this matter is of relevance here, namely that the “analogy” of being in 
Aristotle is historically interpreted in a way that all the different categories “lead back” in 
their ontological grounding to oÙs…a, ousia, or their substance. Heidegger says this is an 
error, “in part resulting from the inadequate interpretation of the pollacîj [manifold, in 
many ways]; more precisely: it was overlooked that only a question is here first of all 
being prepared.”34 He says this because Heidegger does not think Aristotle ever 
adequately formulates what exactly he means by “manifold” or the analogous nature of 
being, and only gives examples of analogy by which we are left to infer his intended 
meaning.35 So Gabriel has, at the very least, badly misrepresented Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Aristotle. 
                                                
31 Heidegger, Aristotle’s Metaphysics q 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force, trans. Walter 
Brogan and Peter Warnek (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1995), 28-29. 
32 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 162. 
33 Heidegger, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 30. 
34 Heidegger, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 37. 
35 This interpretation is supported by Thomas Sheehan, “Being in Aristotle.” Making Sense of 
Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (New York: Rownan and Littlefield International, 2015), 31-66. 
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 Before I move on, allow me a moment of scholarly pedantry. By “earliest books,” 
Gabriel can only mean Being and Time, which was Heidegger’s first book, and, perhaps, 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, published in 1929. Certainly, the materials for his 
next published books, developed in the 1930s, cannot be considered “early” since 
Heidegger had already taken his famous “turn” by then. Perhaps Gabriel means here all 
the early Gesamtausgabe, which include numerous lecture courses and seminars 
delivered throughout the 1920s. Gabriel does refer to Being and Time and to the 1929 
Kantbuch, but also to a 1927 lecture course, published in English as The Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology. However, Gabriel actually cites a much later work, written by 
Heidegger in the summer of 1943 and published in Early Greek Thinking, as the key 
textual evidence for his claim that Heidegger is a domain ontologist. This evidence is 
translated by David Farrell Krell as “the realm of realms” and concerns an interpretation 
of Heraclitus regarding aletheia, or truth as the unconcealedness of beings in the 
clearing.36 In Why the World Does Not Exist, this quote from Heidegger, who is talking 
about Heraclitus, is conveniently translated as “the domain of all domains.”37 One 
wonders which it is: early Heidegger, Heidegger after the turn, both? It is none of those, 
of course. In fact, the word “world” never appears on any of the pages cited by Gabriel, 
                                                
36 Gabriel makes these references to Early Greek Thinking in Why the World Does Not Exist, 45; 
and, Gabriel, “The Meaning of ‘Existence’ and the Contingency of Sense.” Speculations: A 
Journal of Speculative Realism (4), 75. 
37 The German word in question is Bereich, which, it is true, could be translated either as “realm” 
or “domain.” However, in either sense, Heidegger is emphasizing the “holding sway of Being” as 
the clearing is opened for the showing forth and withdrawal of beings. “Realm” is in some ways 
preferable in this context, because Heidegger is talking a lot about gods and mortals in this 
particular work, and traditional phrases like Reich der Götter [Realm of the gods] imply the 
lording over and dominion that Heidegger often, problematically, implies, while Gebiet, which is 
a mathematical term, is used more often for “fields” or “areas,” such as when we say a “field of 
research.” 
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and he never offers any interpretation that would either: 1) show that Heidegger is indeed 
talking about his own early concept of “world” in these sections; or, 2) that Heidegger is 
providing his own views and mot merely attempting an interpretation of Heraclitus. 
When we turn to the early works, where the concept of world is much more in the 
foreground, Heidegger makes very explicit statements that would seem to rule out 
Gabriel’s interpretation. 
 Part of the problem is expressed in the following statement by Gabriel in which he 
explains that the overemphasis on the condition of the knowers of the real, which Gabriel 
calls “zoontology,” can lead to an anti-realism “according to which the existence of ‘the 
world’ is interpreted as depending on our existence – a position wrongly attributed to 
Heidegger [emphasis added] on the grounds that he understands ‘the world’ to be the way 
things appear to human beings.” Gabriel elaborates that Heidegger “does not, however 
claim that there is a totality (‘the world’) whose existence depends on our existence, as he 
explicitly draws a distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘the world’, where only the latter is 
Dasein-dependent.”38 It’s hard to tell where we should start with this strange set of 
assertions about Heidegger’s thinking. Let’s just work out what Heidegger seems to mean 
by “world,” keeping in mind Gabriel’s claims about the world and its dependence on 
Dasein. This is a crucial point, as I am slowly returning to the theme of independence, 
which was the promised aim of this discussion! 
 Focusing on Being and Time, Heidegger asks us to take “world” to signify “that 
‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’.”39 Worldhood is taken to signify 
                                                
38 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 34-35. 
39 Heidegger, Being and Time, 93. 
 231 
the structural wholes that any given world (there is a plurality, pollacîj, something 
said in many ways) may have, thus the wherein in which humans finds themselves might 
encompass a multiplicity or manifold of entities (beings). Heidegger’s first example is the 
world of mathematicians, where “world” here signifies the realm [Region] of possible 
mathematical objects.40 The world of everyday human existence, which is the focus of 
Being and Time throughout, is the environment [Umwelt], the surroundings that human 
beings find themselves among and with which we have our usual and familiar dealings. It 
is true that Heidegger does make a distinction between the world and nature, and that 
nature is considered to be a categorical-aggregate, but “Only in some definite mode of its 
own Being-in-the-world can Dasein discover entities as Nature.”41 Therefore, even 
Nature, as a categorical-aggregate, is ontologically subservient to the world in which 
human beings might encounter any other entity as a being of nature. Thus, if world is 
Dasein-dependent, so too is nature, since nature can only be encountered in the world, 
which is part of the fundamental constitution of human existence as Being-in-the-world. 
Later in the work, Heidegger makes a fairly strong statement of identity between Dasein 
and world. Remember, as Being-in-the-world, Dasein needs the world as that wherein it 
becomes possible to encounter entities as such. Heidegger writes: 
…it [Dasein] has been delivered over to entities which it needs in order to 
[um zu] be able to be as it is – namely, for the sake of itself. In so far as 
Dasein exists factically, it understands itself in the way its ‘for-the-sake-of-
itself’ is thus connected with some current ‘in-order-to’. That inside which 
existing Dasein understands itself is ‘there’ along with its factical existence. 
                                                
40 Heidegger, Being and Time, 93. 
41 Heidegger, Being and Time, 94. 
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That inside which one primarily understands oneself has Dasein’s kind of 
Being. Dasein is its world existingly.42 
 
Basically, human beings need things they find in the world in order to sustain themselves 
as what they are in the world, to live a human life. Insofar as humans just are, that we 
“factically exist” – a technical way of saying that we just find ourselves here as a matter 
of fact – we understand ourselves primarily in the way we are concerned with worldly 
dealings that enable us to sustain ourselves, and these are always connected to some 
project, some practice, that we undertake “in-order-to” do the things that sustain us. 
Think back to Eugénie in her room, at the end of Balzac’s novel, the accoutrements of her 
life surrounding her and from which she draws meaning – from which meaning is 
reflected back to her, as Casey would put it. The world, for Heidegger, is that in which 
humans understand ourselves to be and it is just there as a matter of fact. The world is 
that obscure horizon within which all the entities with which we concern ourselves can 
appear to us as the things we need to live. The world has the same kind of Being as 
human beings, we are our world as it exists. Note how in German um as in um zu, “in 
order to,” is connected to Umwelt, the “around world” or “surrounding world” if we’re 
being literal, but which is commonly translated as “environment.” Then, Heidegger 
clarifies, Wenn kein Dasein existiert, is auch keine Welt »da«; “If no Dasein exists, no 
world is ‘there’ either.”43 Very clear. No Dasein, no world. How then can the world, in 
Heidegger’s sense, ever be anything like the domain of all domains? Things do not get 
                                                
42 Heidegger, Being and Time, 416. 
43 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 483; Heidegger, Being and Time, 417. 
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any better when we consider the 1927 lecture course, The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology. 
 In that key lecture course, Heidegger again addresses the ontological relationship 
between human beings and the world. Again, the distinction from nature is reinforced: 
“Nature – even if we take it in the sense of the whole cosmos as that which we also call, 
in ordinary discourse, the universe, the whole world  – all these entities taken together, 
animals, plants, and humans, too, are not the world, viewed philosophically.”44 And even 
more stridently than in Being and Time, “The world is not the sum total of all extant 
entities. It is, quite generally, not extant45 at all…The world is something Dasein-ish, it is 
not extant like things but it is da, there-here, like the Dasein, the being-da [das Da-sein] 
which we ourselves are: that is to say, it exists.”46 With this lecture series, it is possible to 
just catalogue instances where Heidegger identifies Dasein and world. A few key 
moments: “World is a determination of Dasein’s being,” “Only so long as Dasein is, is 
existent, is world given,” “World exists – that is, it is – only if Dasein exists, only if there 
is Dasein,” “Self and world are not two beings, like the subject and object, or like I and 
thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the 
structure of being-in-the-world,” and “Being-in-the-world belongs to the basic 
constitution of the being that is in each case mine, that at each time I myself am. Self and 
                                                
44 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana 
University, 1982), 165. 
45 Heidegger is here making a distinction that goes back to Medieval philosophy: things-in-
themselves, unliving material stuff, is extant, while things-for-themselves, living things that strive 
toward some end (self-preservation, autopoiesis in our terms), exist. Living things exist because 
they are ecstatic – they go our beyond themselves in a futural, transcendent movement that 
Heidegger cashes out in terms of Being as temporality. 
46 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 166. 
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world belong together; they belong to the unity of the constitution of the Dasein and, with 
equal originality, they determine the ‘subject’.”47 
 Returning to the unfortunate quote by Gabriel above, he is correct to say that 
Heidegger “does not…claim that there is a totality (‘the world’).” That much is clear; 
however, while it might not strictly speaking depend on our existence, the existence of 
the world is, for Heidegger, so deeply, ontologically entangled with the existence of 
human Dasein that, as he repeatedly says, if there is no Dasein, then there is no world. 
The distinction between Nature and world is irrelevant here, and reference to this 
distinction in no way proves what Gabriel hopes it does, again, because for “nature” to 
appear to us as a possible domain, or for anything to be an object of nature, or a natural 
object, it must be a being or collection of beings in the world alongside which Dasein 
already is. World is ontologically prior to nature. Finally, and I don’t know who 
attributes this view to Heidegger because Gabriel offers no citation, but whoever says that 
Heidegger understands “world” to be “the way things appear to human beings” is simply 
wrong. It is true that insofar as things appears to us, they appear in the world, but things 
do not have the appearance of being-in-the-world as such. The world is so close to us, 
the environment so deeply connected to us on the ontological level, that we do not 
usually notice it at all. In fact, it would make more sense in the context of Heidegger’s 
philosophy to say that the way things appear to us is exactly by the dis-appearance of the 
world in the showing forth of things. In order to make the world apparent as such, as the 
ontological ground of our dealings with things, we have to do a lot of painstaking work, 
                                                
47 Quotes founds at Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 296, 296, 297, 297, and 298 
respectively. 
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which is very difficult, technical, and the project of not only Being and Time, but a 
decade’s worth of university courses in philosophy and the history of metaphysics. The 
world, as such, is among the least apparent aspects of the way things appear to us. If we 
are really being technical, and true to Heidegger’s thought, it is most proper to say that 
the “way” things appear to us is by their “essence,” Wesen.48 Moreover, and this is my 
final point on the matter, Heidegger, from his earliest years, is not an anti-realist, as 
Gabriel suggests.49 Gabriel maintains that anti-realism is entailed by Heidegger’s position 
on the relationship between world and Dasein (which Gabriel has, in any event, badly 
misrepresented). 
 In the end, it is just not appropriate to interpret Heidegger as a realist. On the one 
hand, Heidegger does admit that, “Entities are, quite independently of the experience by 
which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping 
in which their nature is ascertained.” So, in one sense, perhaps Heidegger falls into a 
                                                
48 This particular point outstrips the current discussion, so I refer readers to William Lovitt’s 
masterful explanation of the role played by the German noun Wesen in Heidegger’s philosophy, 
found in the first footnote to “the Question Concerning Technology,” in Heidegger, The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Perennial, 
1977), 3. Heidegger himself elaborates on page 30 of the same essay. 
49 In fact, there is a large body of research which suggests Heidegger was some variety of realist. 
Although I think such lines of argument almost entirely miss the central point of Heidegger’s 
ontological project, their arguments, taken with sufficient caveats regarding what we mean by 
“realism,” are persuasive to a point. Cf., Trish Glazebrook, “Heidegger and Scientific Realism.” 
Continental Philosophy Review 34:4 (December 2001), 361-401; Glazebrook, Heidegger’s 
Philosophy of Science (New York: Fordham University, 2000); Hubert Dreyfus and Charles 
Spinosa, “Coping with Things-in-themselves: A Practice-based Phenomenological Argument for 
Realism.” Inquiry 42 (1999), 49-78; Jeff Kochan, “Why Heidegger was Not a Robust Realist: A 
Response to Dreyfus and Spinosa,” presentation at the Hermeneutics and Science Conference 
(August 2010); Graham Harman, Tool-being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru: 
Open Court, 2002). Gabriel forwards his own argument against reading Heidegger as a realist, 
translated by Nikola Mirkovic and Mark J. Thomas in Gabriel, “Is Heidegger’s ‘Turn’ a Realist 
Project?” Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy, Special 
Issue (2014), 44-73. 
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realist camp in regards to the independence of things. And yet, he immediately qualifies, 
“But Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like 
an understanding of Being belongs…there is a necessary connection between Being and 
understanding…”50 It is this necessary connection between Being and understanding that 
Sparrow uses to insist that, due to the methodological constraints of phenomenology, any 
philosophy beginning from here ends in idealism.51 But such an argument only works if 
phenomenology starts from within the presumed cabinet of consciousness, from the 
Cartesian cogito in the style of Husserl’s phenomenology. Thus, Sparrow’s argument is 
perhaps effective against Husserl or Sartre, who maintain the Cartesian roots of the ego in 
subjectivity, but fails to address the very deconstruction and rejection of this ground in 
Heidegger. Of particular interest here is Heidegger’s argument that, in order to “prove” or 
“presuppose” or have any epistemic relation to some “Reality” that is “out there” is to 
“presuppose a subject which is proximally worldless or unsure of its world. Thus from 
the very beginning, Being-in-a-world is disposed to ‘take things’ in some way 
[Auffassen], to suppose, to be certain, to have faith – a way of behaving which itself is 
always a founded mode of Being-in-the-world.”52 Here Heidegger displays his full 
underground character, denying the ground of the question of realism altogether, “for 
realism holds that the Reality of the ‘world’ not only needs to be proved but also is 
capable of proof.”53 The reason this is so is just because of the types of beings that we 
are, things in the world are already fundamentally disclosed to us – that is, wherever I 
                                                
50 All of these at Heidegger, Being and Time, 228. 
51 Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology.  
52 Heidegger, Being and Time, 250. 
53 Heidegger, Being and Time, 251. 
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look, there things are, and they’re already widely differentiated and appear already as a 
manifold and multiplicity to which I’ve secured access. This is why Heidegger admits 
that Idealism has an advantage in principle (not in fact), because it demands the 
“ontological analysis of consciousness as an inevitably prior task.”54 This sentence really 
explains the whole reason Heidegger writes Being and Time, which he repeatedly 
reminds us is a preparatory analysis aimed to clarify the meaning of Being 
phenomenologically, starting from the fact that wherever we are and whatever we’re 
doing, things just make sense to us intuitively.55 So when Descartes asks us to doubt the 
existence of our bodies and so on, to doubt the “external world” generally, Heidegger 
stands fast and says, “No! It’s just not possible – to doubt is to already have things 
revealed to you, to doubt, one already finds oneself in the world, a world which is to be 
doubted.” The method of doubt is an illusion, because it presupposes the very 
mathematical procedure embedded within the cogito from which one aims to deduce the 
mathematical procedure of certain knowledge as a doctrine of ideas (read: as the 
representational procedure).56 Heidegger’s phenomenological method does not end in 
idealism, but is rather the end of idealism and realism as salient philosophical 
distinctions. Realism which does not account for the being of the beings that know the 
real cannot account for the real, because knowledge is real, and understanding is real, and 
                                                
54 Heidegger, Being and Time, 251. 
55 Thomas Sheehan is very good at drawing out this insight into Heidegger’s phenomenological 
method. See both Sheehan, “Astonishing! Things Make Sense!” Gatherings: The Heidegger 
Circle Annual, 1 (2011), 1-25; and, the book-length Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger. 
56 Compare the arguments I’ve forwarded to this effect in Chapter Two with the argument 
Heidegger makes in the 1933 lecture series translated as Heidegger, Being and Truth, trans. 
Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2010), 30-36. Although we 
approach from different directions, we end in the same place. 
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the knowers of being are real, and so realism unjustifiably favors the object in a 
completely unreflective and uncritical way by dogmatically assuming the orthodoxy of 
subjectivity and representationalism on which the divide is founded. I’ll return to this 
point below, because, once we understand Gabriel’s fields of sense, we will see he falls 
right into this trap, and is, thus, on his own account of ontotheology, which he adopts 
wholesale from Heidegger, just unwittingly reestablishing the old metaphysics. 
 So what of Gabriel’s Sinnfeld? How does this compare to Heidegger’s Welt? I 
have been very hard on Gabriel. But like Nietzsche, I only attack the strong and worthy 
adversary. My quarrel regarding Heidegger is not, in any way, an attempt to dismiss 
Gabriel by the weak declaration that “Heidegger already said that.” Rather, it is an 
attempts to grapple with both Heidegger and Gabriel in order to gain ontological insight 
from a thoughtful encounter with them. Even if it were the case that Heidegger’s “world” 
and Gabriel’s Sinnfeld are exactly the same concept, it would nevertheless remain true 
that Gabriel goes beyond Heidegger, especially where his arguments engage the legacy of 
Heideggerian philosophy as it develops in the later 20th and early 21st centuries. If I were 
truly being uncharitable to Gabriel, I would take this quote, “existence is the 
circumstance that something appears in a field of sense…Existence is thereby found not 
in the world, but in one of its domains,” and then assert (as Gabriel does on the basis of a 
single quotation from Heidegger) that Gabriel is himself just another domain ontologist.57 
I really do not think Gabriel is a domain ontologist in the pejorative sense he intends that 
phrase, so let us see what exact he could mean. 
                                                
57 Gabriel, Why the World Does Not Exist, 50. 
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 According to Gabriel, “to exist,” to be, means “to appear in a field of sense,” in 
which “appearing in a field of sense” is a technical expression of “being in a context.”58 
Insofar as fields themselves exist, they too appear in fields of sense. It’s just that there is 
an indefinite plurality of different fields, and no one overarching universal domain that 
contains them all. Very good. Now, the great advantage that Gabriel has over Heidegger 
is that, for Gabriel, “to appear” is not strictly “appearing to some human being.”59 I think 
this is the correct view, and I have argued for a version of this in the previous Chapter 
concerning the difference between natural and technical things, and the concept of 
autopoiesis. Heidegger too began to recognize this mistake later, though he failed to 
clearly address the problem, and it will serve us well to heed Gabriel’s remarks on the 
issue.60 There is an almost insurmountable problem in Heidegger interpretation, wherein 
“Dasein” is take to be equivalent to “human being” – that Dasein just is human being. In 
fact, this is the weakest aspect of Sheehan’s “paradigm shift” in Making Sense of 
Heidegger. But then, what to do with passages such as this, from The History of Beyng: 
7. Da-sein 
Who could say it! 
 The clearing of being. To be the grounding ground of this clearing. 
 This itself does not = being human, rather the latter as guardianship 
and founding. 
* 
                                                
58 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 158. In the same text the notion that “existence = appearing in a field 
of sense” is explicitly affirmed on pages 166, 188, 190-91, and 213. This is consistent with the 
earlier work, Gabriel, Why the World Does Not Exist, 50-72. 
59 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 166. 
60 Heidegger later remarks that Being and Time is too “anthropomorphic” or “subjectivistic” in its 
understanding of Being, and yet, Being, even as the event of the clearing, is still an appearing. 
Later we can see that perhaps Heidegger leaves open the possibility of an appearance to 
something other than human. Again, however, this is not clear, and the issue remains contentious 
in Heidegger scholarship. For examples of Heidegger’s reflections on Being and Time that 
express this concern, see Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, 70-72, 233, and 237-38. 
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The There [Da] 
 A trace of the There in the [aletheia] of [phusis]. 
 But the trace has long since been extinguished – it can never simply 
be followed gain, but must be found from one’s own trail.61 
 
Here, Heidegger is casting humans, to which Being appears as beings, in the role of 
stewards, in whose language Being dwells. Thus, he reverses the advantage of Gabriel, 
who fails to recognize that appearing implies that to which the appearance appears! As 
appearing, existence always appears to something. We have the reemergence of our 
refrain – ontology and epistemology remain intertwined. Already in positing existence as 
appearing we have the implicit question “appearance to what/whom?” that haunts our 
investigations. Further, this makes Gabriel’s ontology fundamentally phenomenological 
in Heidegger’s sense, where the phenomenological conception is “that which shows itself 
is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications, and derivatives.”62 And, insofar as 
fields of sense exist, they must themselves appear in a field of sense. It is then perfectly 
coherent to say that there is a “field of a field,” which is a limited case. However, if 
ontology – “the investigation concerned with being”63 – is indeed ultimately “the 
systematic investigation into the meaning of ‘existence’, or rather the investigation of 
existence itself aided by insight into the meaning of ‘existence’,”64 then ontology, as the 
field of investigation into existence as fields of sense, is itself the field of fields. Ontology 
is the field (context) in which fields as such make their appearance. Again, investigation 
into existence itself as an appearing echoes the phenomenological call “to the things 
                                                
61 Heidegger, The History of Beyng, trans. William McNeill and Jeffrey Powell (Bloomington: 
Indiana University, 2015), 8-9. 
62 Heidegger, Being and Time, 60. 
63 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 1. 
64 Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 5. 
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themselves!”65 We have not seen the end of phenomenology, which Heidegger never 
abandons.66 With these insights into the underground presence of the field of all fields 
within Gabriel’s own work, let’s revisit what Heidegger could mean by the “realm of 
realms” in his confrontation with Heraclitus. 
 In the 1943 essay referenced by Gabriel, Heidegger is analyzing the fragment by 
Heraclitus which reads: tÕ mh dànÒn pote pîj ¥n tij l£qoi, translated by Diels-Kranz 
as, “How can one hide from that which never sets?” Heidegger understands mh dànÒn 
pote to mean “not setting ever.”67 This is how we are urged to understand nature, fÚsij, 
and the way in which it is experienced as “the ever rising.”68 Notice, ever-rising does not 
mean or connote some unified totality, or domain of all domains in Gabriel’s sense – 
Heidegger does not even interpret Aristotle in that way and he warns against this reading 
of Heraclitus when he writes, “Because mh dànÒn pote names the realm of all realms for 
early thinking. It is not, however, the highest genus which subordinates different species 
of realms to it. It is the abode wherein every possible ‘whither’ of a belonging-to rests.”69 
He stresses this fact precisely because he recognizes that the movement of concealing and 
unconcealing that is demonstrated in the thought of Heraclitus “has no images and no 
fixed place.”70 This echoes the remark in Being and Time that, “Being can be something 
                                                
65 Heidegger, Being and Time, 50. 
66 This is another of Sheehan’s astute insights in Making Sense of Heidegger. Yet, in 1963 
Heidegger himself plainly says he never abandons phenomenology in Heidegger, “My Way to 
Phenomenology.” Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
2002), 82. 
67 Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy, trans. David Farrell Krell 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1984), 111-12. 
68 Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, 111. 
69 Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, 115. 
70 Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, 115. 
 242 
unconceptualized, but it never completely fails to be understood.”71 In our current 
context, we can understand the “ever-rising” to mean “appearing” or “coming into 
presence.” It may seem strange, but these obscure (Heraclitus, Ñ SkoteinÒj) passages 
speak to the fact that so long as something appears, so long as it is apparent as the thing 
that it is, it does not ever “set,” that is, so long as something appears as what it is, it has 
not ceased to be what it is. The earlier distinction between world and Nature begins to fall 
away, because Heidegger is here attempting to understand “nature,” fÚsij, in the more 
original sense intended by the Greeks. We can quibble and argue whether or not it is 
possible for Heidegger to transpose himself into the mindset of the ancient thinker 
Heraclitus (he can’t, and he says as much himself)72 however, it is certainly the case that 
by working through the Greek in his own original way we have been brought around to a 
very different understanding of fÚsij than what is intended by modern interpretations of 
“nature,” including the categorical aggregate version differentiated from “world” in 
Being and Time. By 1943, Heidegger is attempting to think world through Heraclitus in 
the sense of what is ever-rising, what is standing-forth (vorstellen) and enduring in 
appearance as what it is. He writes, “We say ‘world,’ and think it improperly so long as 
we represent it exclusively, or even primarily, after the fashion of cosmology or 
philosophy of nature,” then, to elaborate the point and drive it home from the Heraclitian 
perspective, “World is enduring fire, enduring rising in the full sense of fÚsij.”73 The 
“fire” of Heraclitus means not only the sacrificial fire, the fire in the oven or hearth, a 
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campfire, but also a glowing or scintillating, such as by the light of a torch or the stars. 
Heidegger therefore claims, “In ‘fire,’ lighting, glowing, blazing, soft shining hold sway, 
and that which opens an expanse in brightness.”74 As the enduring fire, the world opens 
up the clearing (as a field is a clearing, or a clearing in the woods) into which whatever 
appears may stand out (vorstellen) and be revealed as the thing that it is. World and 
Sinnfeld struggle toward the same end. They attempt to think the same thought – though 
Gabriel still within the old metaphysics. 
 Gabriel says of the Sinnfeld, 
Fields are generally unconstructed, and their force is felt by the objects 
entering them…The field provides objective structures and interacts with 
the objects appearing within it. It is already there, and objects can pass 
through it and change its properties. Fields are not horizons or perspectives; 
they are not epistemological entities or objects used to explain how we can 
know how things are. They are an essential part of how things are in that 
without fields nothing could exist.75 
 
We see Gabriel uncritically falling into the old paradigm wherein objects must appear 
over and against some subject, glossing over and hiding the fact that for him “to exist” 
means “to have sense” in the field of sense – sense to and for something that is never 
spoken. Gabriel calls us back from the end of the mind. He cautions us from the orthodox 
position – but still we hear the foreign song. Heidegger reminds us of another of 
Heraclitus’ fragments, that the world (fire) is “that which neither any of the gods nor any 
mortal brought forth.”76 The world is unconstructed, and its force is felt by that which 
stands out from it, which is illumined in its light – the world is (always) already there, 
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and it interacts with what passes through it and its “properties” change (concealing and 
unconcealing in turn). Even the gods need the world to be. Though the world exists only 
with Dasein, Dasein does not “construct” the world. We already find ourselves in the 
world, and, insofar as anything exists, its existence occurs as appearance in the world. To 
exist is to appear in the world (Sinnfeld). The world just is the field of sense within which 
what appears appears as what it is. Sheehan sums this up nicely, if we forgive his 
questionable anthropocentrism, when he interprets, “We are a hermeneutical field of 
force, like a magnet that draws things together into unities of sense insofar as these things 
are connected with a possibility of ourselves as the final point of reference.”77 Remember 
Chapter Three: we have to bring things into our layer to know them, but this transferal in 
no way suggests that we have not been brought into a real relation with a real thing – it’s 
just that the thing must appear to us in the way that things can appear to us. As Heidegger 
puts it, “The whole of these relations, everything that belongs to the structure of the 
totality with which the Dasein can in any way give itself something to be understood, to 
signify to itself its ability to be, we call significance [Bedeutsamkeit]. This is the structure 
of what we call world in the strictly ontological sense.”78 In the light of this quote, it 
becomes obvious that Sheehan is punning on the inherent sensibility of the world as 
world in his title Making Sense of Heidegger. So, it is only the world that gives us a sense 
of things. The world is a field of sense. The only thing that should give us pause about 
this quote is Heidegger’s use of “totality,” Gesamheit. The most common meanings of 
Gesamheit are “entirety,” and also “aggregate.” Heidegger uses the word a lot in his early 
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works, and it seems as though he took it to be unproblematic. But I can see how, given 
Gabriel’s strongly persuasive arguments about totalizing domains, we might be 
suspicious of this use. Heidegger is simply not that clear about it. Totalities in Heidegger 
are always local, so we should understand “totality” here just as all the things that make it 
possible for anything to have meaning for – well, anything. This should give us no more 
pause that when Gabriel writes both that he “will deny that there is a unified domain of 
all facts, the single all-encompassing ‘sphere of objects’ unified by some conceptual 
operation or other,” and also that everything that exists only exists insofar as it appears 
in a field of sense, including fields themselves. The idea of a field of sense explains the 
existence of everything that is in Gabriel’s work. Heidegger’s “totalities” are local 
totalities of structure, of reference, and so on. It’s just a way for him to talk about all the 
stuff related to this area, anything we might talk about in relation to the issue at hand – be 
it the issue of equipmental contexture or the care-structure. It is never used to express the 
overarching and unified domain, or the sum total of all entities or objects in the world. 
That is just not part of Heidegger’s project, as I’ve shown above. 
 If the previous Chapter contained an ontological deduction, the first half of this 
Chapter has been a reduction. Working with Heidegger and Gabriel, I have given a 
general account of what I mean when I say “world.” Is the world independent of us? The 
question is meaningless, if we remember the words of Perry, the old New Realist. It 
might be more appropriate to say that we depend on the world, but that too misses the 
point. If we are to achieve our new beginning, somewhere after the end of the mind, we 
must accept the philosophical vacuity of those paradigms – realism-idealism. We account 
for the world and the things we encounter in it, and are able to account for the fact that 
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not only do things happen to exist in the world, but also that things appear in the world. 
That is, there are things to which things appear, and also things that appear to themselves. 
Insofar as things appear, they appear in the world, understood as the field of sense. How 
do they make this appearance? Though oscillation. Oscillation is the differentiation of 
things in the world, and in this differentiation, oscillation is the movement by which 
things stand out, the movement of opening, the disclosure of things, their unconcealment 
and release to that which they appear. Thus, the world doesn’t appear as such, but makes 
itself apparent through the very things that constitute a world. And there are indefinite 
numbers of worlds, of contextures (Sinnfeld), that generate the appropriate domains 
within which things become apparent. These are not only human contextures. Contra 
Heidegger, not even a spider is world-poor. 
 I’m sitting at a table. For me, the table is disclosed as that thing in the world at 
which I sit, that provides a surface for my work, a place to eat, something around which 
to gather with friends for a game or drinks. Along comes a spider. For the spider, the 
expanse of the table must appear as the ground or floor appears to me; the spider walks 
across the table. I would put the spider outside. I take a piece of paper and place it before 
the spider, hoping to scoop the little critter up with it. The spider is suspicious of the 
paper. It encounters it as different from the table and stops. It feels around, exploring this 
new and unknown obstacle. It backs away. It attempts to go around. I move the paper in 
front of the spider again. Its movements quicken, it senses something strange in this 
obstruction. I move the spider, and it exists for itself in a planter. It builds a web. The 
spider waits. It is futural. It has laid a trap. It engages its prey and performs all those 
things that are required to sustain the spider as what it is in the world. The spider, in the 
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only sense that matters, is concerned with its own being. Does it ask the question of 
Being? That is utter non-sense. Most people never ask the question – why should a 
spider? I would ask some sage spider one day what being means to it and it would reply, 
“the web, the wait, the fly…” It depends on its little world, the whole world to it, its field 
of sense. We need the world – but the world exists for us, in order to… The difficulty 
arises from the idea that ontology and epistemology are completely separate concerns. 
They are not. If ontology is ever to be adequate, it must account for the being of 
knowledge as well as of rocks. And it would be philosophically irresponsible not to make 
at least some effort to explain how I know what’s real. If indeed there is no domain of all 
domains, and I agree with Gabriel that there is not, then only from out of one world can 
we glimpse another. Thus, ontology cannot be revealed as what it is from within ontology 
itself. That is why, in Chapter Two, I showed that even when approached through 
Descartes’ “I think,” we still arrive at place. We still need a place to be, and the world is 
how our place is given in appearances – not that the world appears as such, as a place per 
se, but that, insofar are things are apparent, they are in places and, as for us, places 
manifest world. Rocks and mountains and bridges are in places, but the world does not 
exist for them. We are in places, my cat is in a place, the amoeba has a place, but insofar 
as things are apparent to and for those other things that live a life for themselves, their 
place is in the world. The struggle between Modernism and postmodernism has been cast 
as a struggle between the dominance of epistemology and ontology, but the dichotomy is 
a false one, recalling the call to wonder and awe that echoes from Aristotle through 
Putnam. It cannot be either/or, but only both/and. I now turn to the crucial place – 
Yoknapatawpha County. There, with literature as a case study wherein the placial 
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ontology can be illumined, the full import of our discussion so far can shine. We will see 
the deep connection between ontology and epistemology in the very movement of 
oscillation that opens the world for us, that places us there for ourselves and the other, 
and through which existence becomes apparent as such. We move now from philosophy, 
strictly observed, to literature, which yields the philosophy yet to come in heralding 
another beginning. 
4.4 Phenomenological Methodology as Descriptive Realism 
 Allow me first, before delving too far into Absalom, Absalom!, to lay out a little 
more clearly my own position relative to the New Realists. I do not wish to take up the 
mantle of New Realism, and so the phenomenological aspect of the current study should 
be foregrounded a bit more so that the distinction between my position and theirs is better 
articulated. As I have implied above, the New Realism of Gabriel and Ferraris is the most 
naïve of realisms, which cannot see the frayed bare threads hanging loose from the 
ontology they’ve wrenched from its philosophical entanglements – loose threads which 
they apparently refuse to sew up. Indeed, Sparrow seconds my understanding of the New 
Realists as simply asserting the mind-independence of “reality” as axiomatic, but he takes 
this view to be about as warranted as it would be unwarranted.79 I cannot agree regarding 
warrant, because, as I have shown, the New Realist are not merely asserting that the 
world is real – they are asserting that the world “out there” is real, and thereby 
reinforcing and uncritically assuming all the old metaphysical baggage that they proclaim 
to be avoiding. I am demanding far less – just that there is meaningful stuff all around. 
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Further, I, along with Casey, Heidegger, the Modernists, and analytic philosophers of 
mind and personal identity, have shown that the assertion of the world “out there” is 
wholly unwarranted because of the groundlessness of the subjective self that is alleged to 
be the “inside” against which the “outside” appears. My demand that we accept just that 
there are meaningful things all around is rooted in phenomenology, and my path to the 
deconstruction of the cogito as subiectum stems from my engagement with that tradition. 
There is a descriptive element to this procedure that has always appeared odd within 
philosophical discourse obsessed with propositions and verificationist explanations of 
truth. In philosophy, the old French prejudice against description still holds. All I mean 
by a descriptive realism is that when performing a phenomenological analysis, say, 
analyzing the experience of a young boy parading a series of costumes before a mirror, or 
asking that we think of our experience of sitting in a room, I am asking, first, for a 
descriptive account, on the one hand, of what it is like to be in that situation or have such 
and such an experience – to really have it. On the other hand, such descriptive techniques 
begin to yield philosophically salient insights as they confirm or deny theoretical 
expectations we have about what certain experiences should be like based on the 
theoretical model through which they are approached. The “realism” comes into play 
because I can find no reason at all to assume that something’s being existential or 
involved with a personal experience would somehow make it “less real” than anything 
“out there in the world.” Indeed, as I have shown, to have an experience at all already 
presupposes that there is something of which I have an experience; i.e., the world. In a 
way, Hume can be read “phenomenologically” when he expects to find the “simple self” 
in experience and, turning to observe, finds none. The phenomenological argument is 
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basically, “that’s just not what experience is like, that’s not the kind of things we are.” 
We cannot be rid of our reliance on experience, because that’s the only way we can go on 
confirming or denying things. This is why I have returned to comments regarding our 
abilities to expand our powers of observation. This is not to throw us back into an old 
modern Empiricism, but it is to stick within a general empiricist framework that 
maintains a “show me” attitude toward conclusions reached through “pure reason.” 
Rationalism, for instance in pure mathematics or theoretical physics, is demanding and 
trustworthy to a point, but we remain somewhat skeptical until theoretical conclusions 
can be hashed out and confirmed experimentally. Even analytics like Bernard Williams 
and Derek Parfit rely on this sort of existential confirmation, and the analytic love of 
pumping intuitions has always struck an underground chord that rings phenomenological. 
Again, epistemology and ontology are caught in cahoots, we who know what is are 
always backed into a corner by the question of how we know what is, the question itself 
an implicit proof that we at least know something. 
We have been carried as far as possible on the backs of our interlocutors. The 
engagement with old and new New Realists, as well as with the literary distinctions 
between Modernism and postmodernism discussed in Chapter Two, have brought us to 
an impasse regarding the separation of epistemology and ontology. At this point, it 
should be clear that I think ontology needs to be foregrounded; perhaps made the 
dominant theme, but not the only one, nor so dominant that we lose sight of the epistemic 
insights of conceptual availability and non-representational cognition opened in the 
previous sections. Insofar as these two philosophical threads are intertwined with one 
another, it is really epistemology that needs ontology. It makes some sense to say “talking 
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about knowledge is epistemological, talking about being or existence is ontological,” but 
that’s about as robust as the distinction gets. An adequate ontology will always be able to 
account for the being of knowledge and the being who knows – thus it will occasionally 
stray into epistemological territory. Epistemology is actually far worse off than that! 
Epistemology without ontology is a total non-starter. It literally makes no sense on the 
grounds of its circularity. It presupposes a theory of knowledge in order to execute 
arguments regarding the nature of knowledge – which have been presupposed. 
Epistemology, on its own, is self-defeating. Ontology is the only place from which 
epistemological investigations could be launched, because it is situated to account for the 
being of knowledge whose existence is presupposed in epistemology “proper.” Does this 
mean that epistemology “depends” on ontology? No – for we can describe 
epistemological issues separately from ontological ones, however, it seems that 
epistemology, at least, will always imply some ontology. Again, the relation of 
implication is distinct from that of identity or dependence. As Perry shows, only the 
implier is dependent on the implied in the logical sense that, in a syllogism for instance, 
the premises cannot both be true unless the conclusion is true, and thus, only what 
implies is dependent on the implied in a positive and unqualified sense. However, what is 
implied can be implied otherwise such that the conclusion of the syllogism can be 
obtained by more than one set of premises, and so cannot be said to depend in any 
exclusive manner on any one set of premises. We can likewise understand this distinction 
mathematically, as when we consider an “independent postulate.” In this case, the 
postulate in any given system is co-determined with the other postulates of the system, 
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however, it cannot be deduced as a theorem from the other postulates.80 Again, we can 
see the systemic risk that has spread from the fissure of the I-Am’s dissolution into the 
body and out into the world. This has been an underground crisis, one unacknowledged 
and incapable of acknowledgement from the position of entirely local and hyper-
specialized philosophical concerns. Indeed, most of these overspecialized theories 
presuppose and uncritically accept so much metaphysical baggage, are locked so blindly 
into centuries’ old metaphysical paradigms with ideas about the physical world that pre-
date Newton, and are so adamantly reluctant to ask fundamental questions regarding 
truth, knowledge, or thinking, that, from the Heideggerian perspective cultivated here, 
they are not really philosophical at all. The crisis of philosophy remains its radical 
groundlessness. 
Crisis is a key element of Faulkner’s overall artistic project, and is especially 
relevant to any interpretation of Absalom, Absalom!, a work whose characters are acutely 
aware of crises both recently past and those yet to come. Recall Sheppard’s assessment, 
discussed in Chapter Two, that Modernism was rooted in the sense that contemporary 
culture “was experiencing the subversion of the most fundamental assumptions and 
conceptual models on which the liberal humanist epoch has been based.”81 It is easy to 
spot this in Faulkner’s writing, as I have already shown in the previous Chapter’s 
interpretation of The Sound and the Fury. From the very outset of Absalom, Absalom! we 
can see the same concern with the subversion of fundamental assumptions and the 
explicitly acknowledged cultural crisis that marks the end of the antebellum South and its 
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integration (or failure to integrate) into a broader federal tapestry. This crisis of identity 
and its division is attested from the very start as Quentin Compson (the brother of Caddy 
from The Sound and the Fury) sits listening to Rosa Coldfield tell the story of how 
Thomas Sutpen came tearing into Yoknapatawpha from the Virginias with a band of 
“wild” black slaves in tow. Faulkner established the crisis of modernity very early when 
he writes, 
Then hearing would reconcile and he would seem to listen to two separate 
Quentins now – the Quentin Compson preparing for Harvard in the deep 
South, the deep South dead since 1865 and people with garrulous outrage 
baffled ghosts, listening, having to listen, to one of the ghosts which had 
refused to lie still even longer than most had, telling about old ghost-times; 
and the Quentin Compson who was still too young to deserve yet to be a 
ghost but nevertheless having to be one for all that, since he was born and 
bred in the deep South the same as she was – the two separate Quentins now 
talking to one another in the long silence of notpeople in notlanguage…82 
 
In this passage, one much analyzed over the years,83 we see not only the thoroughness 
with which the crisis grips life in Yoknapatawpha, but also the formal experimentation 
that often marks Modernist literature. Pericles Lewis has remarked, “In general, work that 
is considered modern is experimental rather than traditional, though many of these 
experiments draw on and develop techniques inherent in more traditional art…In each 
case modernism called attention to the medium of the literary or artistic work, defined 
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itself in contrast to convention, and radically altered the means of representation.”84 
Indeed, Faulkner’s notoriously long sentences, the unusual breaks and punctuation, the 
stream of consciousness that veers between characters all draw attention to the medium 
itself, and break radically from the traditional linear scheme of the novel; something I’ve 
already noted regarding the difference between Balzac and Faulkner’s styles. But the 
passage also marks the paradoxes that haunt the whole novel and signify its Modernism, 
paradoxes in line with Berman’s Marxist assessment that in modernity “all that is solid 
melts into air.”85 Again, we see this in the struggle of daughter/niece Quentin to break 
free of the vicious cycle implemented by the sexual politics of Yoknapatawpha and seek 
a new life beyond its confines, a new life prefigured in the enigma of the man with the 
red tie in The Sound and the Fury, which I discussed in the previous Chapter. 
 With Faulkner and the other Modernists, we have overrun the established 
discourse, which has melted into air, and stumbled out on our own into new territory. 
With Absalom, Absalom! we will make headway into this new, yet hauntingly familiar 
domain. In the section that follows, concerned almost exclusively with Faulkner’s novel, 
I will engage Yoknapatawpha from the placial ontology developed in the previous 
Chapters. The novel lends itself to this analysis because of the way in which the story is 
told and retold among the characters who are all oriented toward the story’s significance 
in different ways – that is, who all have different stakes in the consequences of Sutpen’s 
design. They have basic concepts that guide their actions in relation to others, orienting 
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them to the history of the Sutpen’s in Yoknapatawpha, and which they use in order to do 
and be the kinds of things they are in place. We will see the hermeneutic layers unfolding 
across generations of people making up an ensemble cast. Their actions cast meaningful 
roles to be followed and repeated in actions iterated over several generations. Of course, 
if we recall Ferraris’ notion of documentality, there are points in the text that show how 
meaning can be anchored in documents. We will touch on the significance of letters in 
the text, letters which relate characters and orient their actions, inspire love and 
vengeance. There are also ledgers, “what the old Aunt Rosa told you about some things 
that just have to be whether they are or not, just to balance the books, write Paid on the 
old sheet so that whoever keeps them can take it out of the ledger and burn it, get rid of 
it.”86 All well and good. But I want to focus more on the bodily emplacement, and the 
opening of rooms and houses in which characters dwell and from which their lives take 
on meaning – but more importantly – places whose meanings give rise to the ontological 
question, place that reflect characters back on themselves in such a way that there very 
being is at stake, becomes an issue for them. Since, as technical, documentality is 
derivative of the immediately lived experiences and actions (including, but not limited to 
speech acts), in order to get more directly at the placial ontology recoverable from 
Absalom, Absalom! I will focus more on the phenomenological enactment of the question 
within the text. 
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4.5 Absalom, Absalom! and the Movement of Being 
 Thomas Sutpen enters the world of Yoknapatawpha from that of the Virginias, 
and immediately sets about an unwitting transformation of the place. The world of 
Yoknapatawpha exists prior to Sutpen, it is “independent” of him, and yet, on arriving, 
Thomas Sutpen enters into a relation with Yoknapatawpha that becomes constitutional 
for them both. Insofar as the Sutpen’s become a fixture of the county and implicate 
themselves in the drama of its worlds, the Sutpen’s begin to change Yoknapatawpha. 
Even if it were the case that they did not change the county, we can see in Rosa 
Coldfield’s proclamation to Quentin Compson the fear of any potential change brought 
by newcomers. But what kind of world is Yoknapatawpha that admits Thomas Sutpen to 
its ranks? 
 We can loosely understand Yoknapatawpha itself as a localized matrix of 
overlapping and interconnected worlds – notably, those of race, gender, class, sexuality, 
ownership, and propriety. These are notable in that Faulkner takes them up as explicit 
themes throughout his writing. But in fact, there are many more factors at play at 
different times, such as the roles of families or individuals during the American Civil 
War, or the handling of mental illness by a town or family, always at the intersections 
between individuals and social units, be they family, townsfolk, farmhands, regiments, 
and so on. No one in Yoknapatawpha live alone, strictly speaking; though many of them 
live lives of relative isolation, it is an isolation predicated on a relation of absence from a 
larger social group. The hermit’s hermitage can only exist when there is a larger 
community from which the hermitage is distanced. Thus, Yoknapatawpha is a richly 
differentiated world; a “totality” whose component parts outstrip the boundaries of the 
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county proper, and in their very overflow, connect Yoknapatawpha to other worlds in 
other places, such as the American South, the Yankee North, the rural and the urban, the 
native and the foreign, white and black, and so on. Think of the most complex Venn 
diagram you can imagine, then multiply its density a thousandfold in dimensions greater 
than two. The totality is local, and it came to be in an historical process by which human 
beings engage one another and their mutual surroundings. From out of a senseless 
landscape emerges, in the state of Mississippi, the county of Yoknapatawpha. We can 
imagine this unfolding in the world of fiction just in the same manner as any given 
county in the “actual” world, where “actual” merely denotes the difference between 
imagined Yoknapatawpha and Lafayette (the historical Mississippi county on which 
Yoknapatawpha is modeled) or Tippecanoe (the county in which I sit writing these 
words). Yoknapatawpha exists in books written by William Faulkner, which he has 
situated and placed in the state of Mississippi through a rigorous dialogue with that place 
from which he raised up a fictional world with all the trappings of the actual one. This is 
Faulkner’s radical realism, couched in a descriptive practice that instantiates in art a place 
that readers find to be very much like the “real” American South in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries. Yoknapatawpha exists between actuality and fiction. It is really fiction, 
and as fiction, it is real, in real books, but the imagined place is a representation of the 
world we actually encounter in the American South, and in Mississippi in particular. It is 
built out of the actual. The fears in Yoknapatawpha are real fears, loves are real loves, 
and its crises are our crises. 
 If we follow the arguments of the previous Chapter, we know that much of 
Yoknapatawpha is “constructed,” in some sense. That is, there are interstices of worlds 
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whose meaning is historically construed for and by human beings. Race, gender, class, 
and so on need to be recorded, documented. Recall Ferraris’ notion of documentality on 
this point. Rosa Coldfield wants to document the Sutpen tragedy, and she does so by 
enlisting the help of young Quentin Compson who is to be a witness to the whole affair. 
This request raises the first major difficulty in interpreting the text. For one, we can see 
rather early that Rosa may not be the most reliable narrator, because the stakes for her 
and the consequences of the Sutpen affair for her personally are so daunting. Indeed, 
early criticism of Absalom, Absalom! focuses almost exclusively on trying to figure out 
what “really” happened, that is, why did Henry Sutpen really kill Charles Bon.87 Of 
course, this is not the question with which we are concerned. More important for our 
present purposes is to show both how the different narrations interact in order to 
“construct” Yoknapatawpha, and also how these mutual constructions inflect the different 
relative worlds through the perspective of each character, and thereby reveal that 
character is likewise constituted by a fundamental orientation toward these intra-worldly 
significations. 
 Consider just the first iteration of the story, that told by Rosa to Quentin. This 
version will be made more complex and questionable by a subsequent telling by 
Quentin’s father, and further, by Quentin’s own ruminations on the tale, both to himself 
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while listening to Rosa, but also in subsequent dialogue with his Harvard roommate, the 
Canadian Shrevlin “Shreve” McCannon. These other versions will become important in a 
moment, but for now, let’s stay with Rosa’s version of events. 
 Rosa is among the casualties of Thomas Sutpen’s calculations, mostly because 
Sutpen successfully maneuvers to marry Rosa’s sister, Ellen Coldfield. This union would 
cause Rosa much grief, and is, perhaps, the main reason for her disdain of the Sutpen 
family – not so much that he married her sister per se, but that he was a destroyer of the 
order of things. To make things worse, when Ellen dies, and then their father dies, both in 
the turmoil of the Civil War, Rosa retreats to Sutpen’s Hundred and becomes engaged to 
her sister’s widower. When Sutpen suggests they attempt to produce a son before 
marriage, Rosa breaks their engagement, and leaves Sutpen’s Hundred to return to 
Jefferson, the Yoknapatawpha County seat. The Coldfield’s family history ends in a 
tragic assimilation to the Sutpen clan. The mother dies giving birth to Rosa, Ellen is 
married to Thomas Sutpen, and the father goes mad during the Civil War, locking himself 
in the attic when soldiers ransack the store he had run with his Sutpen son-in-law, only to 
starve to death in 1864. These facts help to explain Rosa’s account of Thomas Sutpen as 
the Devil when she says, “It seems this demon – his name was Sutpen – (Colonel Sutpen) 
– Colonel Sutpen. Who came out of nowhere and without warning upon the land with a 
band of strange niggers and built a plantation – (Tore violently a plantation, Miss Rosa 
Coldfield says) – tore violently. And married her sister Ellen and begot a son and a 
daughter which – (Without gentleness begot, Miss Rosa Coldfield says) – without 
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gentleness.”88 The devil imagery is reinforced by the implicit usurpation of the role of 
God in creation, where Sutpen’s Hundred, the hundred-square-mile plot gained by 
Thomas Sutpen from Native Americans, is described, “Then in the long unamaze Quentin 
seemed to watch them overrun suddenly the hundred square miles of tranquil and 
astonished earth and drag house and formal gardens violently out of the soundless 
Nothing and clap them down like cards upon a table beneath the up-palm immobile and 
pontific, creating the Sutpen’s Hundred, the Be Sutpen’s Hundred like the oldentime Be 
Light.”89 A few formal remarks on these passages. Rosa is already revealed in her 
unreliability when she insists that Sutpen comes out of nowhere bringing terror. Of 
course, the terror he brings and the destruction wrought is predicated on Sutpen’s past, 
and his illicit relation to Charles Bon. I’ll make this relation explicit in a moment, but for 
now, it is important to realize that the entry of Sutpen into Yoknapatawpha is a literal 
collision of worlds as he brings his past with him. Too, notice the repetition90 involved in 
establishing Sutpen, the repetition of his name, of the Biblical imagery, the violent 
separation (its tearing) of house and garden from the land, and the lack of gentleness and 
the implication of sexual violence. These repetitions function to overlay the conceptual 
scheme by which Rosa interprets her own world and are exemplary of the process of 
accretion. We can see repetition functioning in this structural role throughout the text, 
such as in the repetition of renunciations by both Henry and Quentin. This repeated 
renunciation will become important below. In any event, we can see that Rosa’s 
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perspective does not spring up out of whole cloth. She rehearses it in the telling, but it 
also accretes from the entanglements of her own history and develop from out of Rosa 
herself and her relation to and situation within the social order of the county. This 
layering process of accretion is remarkable in every Faulkner character, and is signaled 
early in relation to Quentin, whose “childhood was full of them; his very body was an 
empty hall echoing with sonorous defeated names; he was not a being, an entity, he was a 
commonwealth.”91 Indeed, Rosa and Quentin are already implicated with one another – 
Quentin’s grandfather, according to his father, “was the nearest thing to a friend which 
Sutpen ever had in this county, and she [Rosa] probably believes that Sutpen may have 
told your grandfather something about himself and her, about that engagement that did 
not engage, that troth which failed to plight.” These speculations are immediately prior to 
one of the key moments in the book, wherein Quentin’s father pronounces the importance 
of keeping family secrets, that the whole affair should and could “still be in the family; 
the skeleton (if it be a skeleton) still in the closet.”92 
 Stepping back to take stock, we can see that Quentin, Rosa, and Jason Compson 
(Quentin’s father) are helping to establish what I designate “basic concepts,” or “ground 
concepts,” what might be called in German “Grundbegriff.” Again, these are not anything 
like representations nor maps nor models that relate to the world or to places in the mode 
of “correspondence,” where we must see if the “internal” concept “matches up” to the 
“external” state of affairs. The discussion of Heidegger and Alva Nöe in Chapter One 
should be consulted on this point, though it is a recurring one throughout the current 
                                                
91 Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! 7. 
92 Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! 8. 
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work. One reason why Faulkner’s novel helps us to understand this important notion of a 
basic concept is because, for once, he writes in a way that simplifies a phenomena and 
allows us easier access to it. In actual life, we are not oriented toward the world by just 
one basic concept. However, in Absalom, Absalom! one or two basic concepts become 
foregrounded and serve as a holistic explanation for any given character’s interpretation 
of established historical events. I will enumerate some basic concepts to be associated 
with each character below. Rosa is an interesting case because she seems to be searching 
for such a concept. Her basic alignment is “outraged bafflement,” and this lack of 
understanding with regards to why Henry kills Bon drives much of Rosa’s actions, 
including her fateful request to return to Sutpen’s Hundred with Quentin, and there 
finally confront the ghosts of her past. 
 Our understanding of  basic concepts generally follows Heidegger, who explains 
that basic concepts, “are anchored in our being gripped, in which we do not represent 
before us that which we conceptually comprehend,” but instead, “is in the grip of an 
attack – driven out of everydayness and driven back into the ground of things.”93 It is the 
fact that we are the kinds of things that we are, and that we are thrown into the midst of a 
comprehensive order that makes sense, which drives the assault coming from our own 
being there, in place, as we ourselves confront our own place in the world. Basic 
concepts get us oriented toward our own grounds, toward the ground of grounds to echo 
Heidegger’s way of talking about them.94 Again, Faulkner presents characters in the grip 
                                                
93 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 8, 21. 
94 Heidegger, Basic Concepts, trans. Gary E. Aylesworth (Bloomington: Indiana University), 2-3, 
9-11. 
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of this crisis – the ontological crisis of their very grounding, the undermining of the basic 
assumptions by which they live their lives and construe their actions meaningfully in the 
world. It is a fundamental crisis; a crisis of grounds. A few things should be made clear. 
If we think “concepts” under the old rubric of representation, then it should be 
immediately clear that there is something basically false about these concepts insofar as 
they are, admittedly, always oversimplifications of a complexity that outstrips the powers 
of human cognition to contain it. The basic concepts are comprehensive, not because they 
fully and totally represent all the salient facts about a state of affairs, but rather, basic 
concepts are comprehensive because they take a view of the world as it implicates the 
knower who knows it. Further, and more importantly, because the basic concept is not 
representational in character, but for us indicates the orientation of a being for whom the 
world holds significance toward its own situation in the place from whence the being’s 
history unfolds, these concepts remain avenues by which we can obtain ontological 
insight. Nietzsche is correct that there is something illusory about the truth of these 
concepts, especially when they are taken to be veridical representations of some world 
“out there” beyond us where things-in-themselves reside.95 But the illusion can be 
unmasked as such, and we are thrown back onto the “ground of things” by the shudder of 
the basic concepts when they are assaulted. Rosa will give us our first and best example 
of this. 
 One of the reasons Rosa calls upon Quentin is because she wants the young man 
to accompany her to Sutpen’s Hundred so that she can finally confront the secrets of that 
                                                
95 See Nietzsche, “Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.” The Birth of Tragedy and Other 
Writings, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999), 139-53. 
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old manor-house from which she had fled after the war. In one of the most bracing and 
revelatory passages in Absalom, Absalom! Faulkner recounts a confrontation between 
Rosa and Clytemnestra Sutpen. Clytie is one of Colonel Sutpen’s illegitimate children, 
fathered with one of the women who he had brought to Yoknapatawpha as a slave. We 
learn that Clytie is not the only one; that in fact, prior to arriving in the county, Sutpen 
had a wife, Eulalia, who had been awarded to him by the master of a Haitian plantation 
on which Sutpen had worked as an overseer and where he had helped to squash a slave 
rebellion. Sutpen fathered a son with his first wife, Eulalia, and that son was none other 
than Charles Bon. These racial “betrayals,” as Rosa sees them, are a secret locked in the 
house at Sutpen’s Hundred, and that Rosa enlists Quentin to help her secure. But 
something remarkable happens in the house in the two instants in which Rosa is forced to 
engage Clytie on the stairs. The first crucial moment is consistently illuminated in 
Faulkner scholarship, one returned to again and again as a key passage in the novel.96 
Faulkner writes from Rosa’s perspective, 
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I do not know. I know only that my entire being seemed to run at blind full 
tilt into something monstrous and immobile, with a shocking impact too 
soon and too quick to be mere amazement and outrage at that black 
arresting and untimorous hand on my white woman’s flesh. Because there 
is something in the touch of flesh with flesh which abrogates, cuts sharp and 
straight across the devious intricate channels of decorous ordering, which 
enemies as well as lovers know because it makes them both: – touch and 
touch of that which is the citadel of the central I-Am’s private own: not 
spirit, soul; the liquorish and ungirdled mind is anyone’s to take in any 
darkened hallway of this earthly tenement. But let flesh touch with flesh, 
and watch the fall of all the eggshell shibboleth of caste and color too. Yes, 
I stopped dead – no woman’s hand, no negro’s hand, but bitted bridle-curb 
to check and guide the furious and unbending will – I crying not to her, to 
it; speaking to it through the negro, the woman, only because of the shock 
which was not yet outrage because we both knew it was not to her I spoke: 
‘Take your hand off me, nigger!’97 
 
In an instant, Rosa has a flash of insight, the eggshell shibboleth of caste and color is 
broken and falls away, but only for a moment. She is thrown back into the ground of 
things. The passage describes Rosa’s dread and anxiety over her very being, an angst 
brought on by her confrontation with Clytie as Rosa attempts to climb the stairs and at 
last confront whatever ghost of the past may be lurking in the old Sutpen mansion. Rosa 
becomes ontological. She is a being such that her very being is an issue for her. The 
revelation is brought on precisely by Rosa’s growing awareness that there exists a very 
real conflict of interpretation.98 In this instance, Rosa sees the fissure of Southern culture 
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embodied in herself; the racial narrative that pits “white woman” against “niggers” and 
the fact of Clytie’s blood relation to the Sutpen’s and, through marriage between their 
families, to Rosa herself. In this moment, Rosa sees through her comfortable Southern-
white-female orientation and all the privilege it affords. Upon touching her, Clytie ceases 
to be some absolute Other that is deeply and essentially different from Rosa – so different 
that her difference amounts to a moral devaluation in Rosa’s eyes. However, touching on 
the stairs of the Sutpen manor, this essential difference melts away and Rosa is left to 
“watch fall all the eggshell shibboleth of caste and color too.” Her very being is 
disturbed, “the citadel of the central I-Am’s private own” is disrupted and de-centered, 
leaving Rosa reeling in a moment of groundlessness. Her groundlessness so profound that 
when she eventually retorts “Take your hand off me, nigger!” she knows it is not even to 
Clytie that the command is addressed. Indeed, Clytie herself knows that Rosa has not 
spoken to her. Rosa confesses, “…I crying not to her, to it.” To what? To what does Rosa 
cry if not to Clytie? She says she cries “to it” but to what does this “it” refer? “It” refers 
here to the sensibly rendered worlds themselves, worlds either comfortable for Rosa, the 
world of her white privilege, or the alternatives that would annihilate that comfortable 
world and force her to stand in a new light, without a tether, without the crutch of race 
and privilege to use, not only to stand, but as a cudgel with which to beat Clytie and all 
“niggers” into subservience.99 Rosa speaks to these colliding worlds “through the negro, 
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the woman,” and thereby implicates herself in the formation of Southern culture, which 
she has witnessed collapsing all around. But this cry is a cry in vain. The old world is 
dead. Rosa can expect nothing else. She laments, “What did I expect? I, self-mesmerized 
fool, come twelve miles expecting – what?”100 She knows she has fooled herself, that her 
own narration has all along been unreliable, that her world is unreliable, and that she 
must therefore take up the challenge of establishing herself or surrender to nihilism. Rosa 
here acts as a reactionary messiah saving the old world with her violent reassertion of the 
degrading and brutalizing racial epithet. But as this reactionary messiah she can act only 
as a ghost of the old world, a corpse hanging around the tomb of the old mansion who 
cannot yet move on.  
And yet, when we compare this instance to the second encounter between Clytie 
and Rosa, this time when Quentin accompanies Rosa to Sutpen’s Hundred, we see a 
different outcome; the possibility of a transcendence, not out of the world altogether, but 
into a new and different one. In the second meeting, the two women much older, perhaps 
Rosa “running up” to this leap for 43 years, Rosa now casts Clytie to the ground, Quentin 
allowing his friend Shreve to recount “how it just came out of the terror and the fear after 
she [Clytie] turned you [Quentin] loose and caught the Aunt Rosa’s arm and the Aunt 
Rosa turned and struck her hand away and went on to the stairs and Clytie ran at her 
again and this time the Aunt Rosa stopped and turned on the second step and knocked 
Clytie down with her first like a man would and turned and went up the stairs.”101 
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Rosemary Coleman and J. Christopher Cunningham have hashed out the difficulties of 
Rosa as a “mother” of a narrative, either her own, or Quentin’s who in some ways 
synthesizes Rosa and his father’s stories, and they point to the “problem” of Rosa’s 
gender and sexuality.102 I suggest we gain some insight by “queering”103 the text here, 
and see finally that Rosa is transgendered – literally transversing the genders in her 
passage from mother of a narrative, to a passive body in Clytie’s grip, to the masculine 
assertion on the stairs wherein she strikes Clytie down, and is resolute to enter the 
“cryptic closet” and therein discover a secret truth; an aletheaic truth.104 Again, this is not 
the “leaping out” to some transcendent being, but rather, a transcendence that is just the 
very overstepping of the threshold, the act of over-stepping itself that carries Rosa 
forward into a new being, a new world, in the wake of the destruction of the old. She had, 
after all, asked Quentin if he had brought a gun; for what else if not to become the 
destroyer of worlds?105 She overcomes in her resolve, moving out of her outraged 
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bafflement toward a consummation with Henry Sutpen in the secret heart of Sutpen’s 
Hundred. We can see the momentary hesitation of this resolution in the last repetition of 
the question, “Are you…?” 
 We are in the grips of the truly ontological movement of the novel. Rosa is 
revealed as a character that is ontological, that is, a being who’s very being is an issue for 
her; she has herself become questionable, mysterious, queer, her very existence in 
question. We can see the conflict of interpretation at work in other places as well, such as 
in Jason Compson’s retelling of the Sutpen tale to his son, Quentin. Let’s make sure the 
general outline of the story is clear and add a few more crucial details before muddying 
the worldly waters again – for we will see that Mr. Compson’s versions of the story 
eventually come into conflict with themselves, after he becomes aware of what Quentin 
knows after the latter’s initiation into the secrets of the manor’s haunted rooms.  
 Although the driving hermeneutic question of the novel is why Henry killed Bon, 
much of the narrative structure depends on the history of Thomas Sutpen, the 
circumstances of his entry into Yoknapatawpha, and his designs to become a proper 
Southern patriarch, though we are witness to that design’s disintegration. For that story, 
we must go back to 1807 and the tidewaters of Virginia. There, Thomas Sutpen was born 
and exposed to the plantation way of life and its concomitant slavery. He is fully inducted 
into the values of plantation culture on a chance errand, where he deigns to deliver a 
message directly to the front door of a manor where a liveried black servant instructs him 
that he must go around to the back door, where the servants enter. We see the accretion of 
Sutpen’s old Southern values. Sutpens naiveté is destroyed on the steps of the plantation 
house. A new world opens for him, and he begins to design a door by which he may enter 
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it. He runs away to the Caribbean in order to start amassing wealth, slaves, and there 
begins working for a sugar plantation in Haiti. In 1827, Sutpen is married to Eulalia, the 
sugar planter’s daughter, as a reward for defending the plantation from a slave revolt. 
They have a son, Charles Bon, but Sutpen discovers that Eulalia is part black – an 
unforgivable sin in the world of the South within which Sutpen would make himself into 
someone – and divorces her in 1831. Eulalia and Charles are abandoned to their fates and 
Thomas Sutpen arrives in Yoknapatawpha in 1833, a universal scandal due to both his 
lack of history (or his apparent lack of history in the world of Yoknapatawpha) and 
property. He negotiates a partnership with Goodhue Coldfield within five years of his 
arrival, and marries Goodhue’s daughter Ellen. Thomas and Ellen have two children, 
Henry (b. 1839) and Judith (b. 1841), but there is an illegitimate child, Clytemnestra, 
born to Thomas and a slave in 1834. Henry enters the University of Mississippi in 1859, 
where he meets and becomes good friends with Charles Bon. At the outbreak of the Civil 
War, Thomas Sutpen becomes the second in command in Colonal John Sartoris’ 23rd 
Mississippi Infantry. Henry and Bon remain friends throughout the war, but their 
relationship, for reasons unknown, sours as Bon courts and becomes engaged to Henry’s 
sister Judith. Ellen dies in 1863, making her sister Rosa swear to look after Judith, and 
their father Goodhue dies the following year. Thomas Sutpen has been gone this whole 
time, and he returns from the war to find his design in shambles, his wife dead, his son 
Henry a fugitive for the murder of Bon in May, 1865. Not to be denied, Sutpen 
unsuccessfully attempts to jumpstart his dynasty, first by trying to marry Rosa, then, 
when Rosa leaves him, by sleeping with Milly Jones, the granddaughter of Wash Jones, a 
poor squatter at Sutpen’s Hundred who ran his mouth about looking after the place while 
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Colonel Sutpen fought the war. When Milly has a daughter instead of a son, Sutpen 
spurns her, and Wash, whose pretense to be Sutpen’s equal parallels Sutpen’s own 
embarrassment on the plantation steps in Virginia, murders Thomas, Milly, and their 
child in 1869. Clytie, Henry, and Judith continue to inhabit Sutpen’s Hundred, and in 
1871, Judith sends Clytie to New Orleans in order to bring back Charles Bon’s son, 
Charles Etienne de St. Velery Bon, born of an octoroon mistress, who, although he could 
pass for white by virtue of his appearance, is raise to understand himself as black, and 
eventually marries a black woman, with whom he has a mentally handicapped son, Jim 
Bond. In 1884, Etienne falls ill with yellow fever, Judith catches it while nursing him, 
and both die, leaving the rest to haunt Sutpen’s Hundred, the ghosts of Thomas Sutpen’s 
failed design. Typically, Faulkner drops us in the middle of things, after these facts, in 
September, 1909. 
 Faulkner has each character invoke different reasons for why Henry kills Bon at 
different times depending on their relation to the story of Thomas Sutpen’s Grand Design 
as detailed above. In the beginning, we move with Quentin from Rosa’s outraged 
bafflement to Quentin’s Father, Jason, who seems mostly assured that “Because Henry 
loved Bon. He repudiated blood birthright and material security for his sake, for the sake 
of the man who was at least a bigamist if not and out and out blackguard, and on whose 
dead body four years later Judith was to find the photograph of the other woman and the 
child.”106 This passage already displays the slippage in Mr. Compson’s conceptual 
orientation as he meditates on the events, first understanding the tale through the lens of 
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Bon as a bigamist, then complexifying that interpretation through the additive element of 
Henry and Bon’s friendship, hence Henry’s love for Bon, blackguard or not. These 
meditations, ruminations occurring over the course of the retelling, lead Mr. Compson to 
understand the murder in terms of a “mutual seduction” wherein Bon seduces not only 
Judith, but Henry as well.107 I’ll return to the novel’s homoerotic subtext in a moment, 
but my goal here is simply to make readers aware of the transformation of interpretations 
as the different narrators come into different epistemic relations with the history of the 
Sutpen dynasty. As they learn, their explanations change to fit the recalcitrant facts of the 
story, facts coded in the actions, words, letters, and ledgers of Yoknapatawpha’s 
inhabitants. Jason Compson’s story changes again, after Quentin discloses to him the 
experience of meeting Henry when he takes Rosa to Sutpen’s Hundred. Once Mr. 
Compson knows of Bon’s illicit blood relation to the Sutpen’s he thinks it all becomes 
clearer: incest must be the motivating factor – kill Bon to prevent the incest between half-
siblings.108 Even still, Quentin and his friend Shreve speculate on the nature of that illicit 
relation, that Bon is the product of miscegenation, and therefore, according to the “one 
drop” rule of Southern racial identity, Bon is black. He therefore presents a great threat to 
the purity demanded by Southern patriarchs and must be killed to prevent this 
transgression.109 
 So far, we have only been talking only about Rosa Coldfield’s iteration of this 
story. However, there is obviously more to the story than Rosa tells. And yet, there is 
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more to the story than Rosa can tell, precisely because there are parts of this story that 
she just doesn’t know, to which she has no relation. Thus, certainly, the story is 
independent of Rosa, for I have just demonstrated in several ways how it is possible to 
describe the events without any reference to knowers of the story. But, crucially, it is also 
possible to demonstrate that when the world according to Rosa Coldfield is brought into 
conjunction with a series of events which become informed by Rosa’s having been 
conditioned by the facts, in the grip of those very events, there does arise something that 
is, in the sense relevant to the knower-known relation, dependent on Rosa’s existence. 
These entanglements, which under the old metaphysical paradigm would be termed 
“intersubjective,” destroy the anti-realist claims stemming from constructivist theories, or 
those unable to see truth outside of propositions. The general mistake of those types of 
theories, which rely on knowers knowing in order to substantiate the world’s “reality,” is 
that they are constantly slipping, in an undisciplined manner (that is, when it is 
convenient for their arguments), between addressing a singular Knower, the existence of 
which would vouchsafe all veridical knowledge, and communities of knowers, the 
totalities of which would constitute the ground either of all knowledge or at least of 
domains of knowledge. Thus, the old tension between idealism/realism rooted in the 
rationalism/empiricism debates of modern philosophy is reasserted. My theory denies a 
singular Knower, some remnant of the Hegelian World Spirit which comes to see itself as 
such, or the holder of the sum of all propositions, the Cosmic Compendium of all 
logically true statements, but it also assails the implicit uniformity, the assumed 
hegemony among any given community of knowers as well. Not all human knowers 
know the same, neither the same things, nor in the same way, though of course there may 
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be extensive overlap. What’s more, it makes rather a lot of sense to say that my cat 
knows something, that it is time to be fed, for instance, or that I will play with her and her 
little mouse-toy if she brings it to me, but that she knows these things in a cat-like way, 
and therefore has knowledge, but “cat” knowledge. Likewise, my sage spider knows to 
build the web and wait, and knows what to do when along comes the fly, but it has 
spider-knowledge of these things, which is different from cat- and human-knowledge. So, 
which knower is it that knows the truth of knowing? The idea, again, thinking back to the 
old New Realists, is that human knowledge being self-evident to me (or, generously, to 
kinds of things like me) does not tell us that human knowledge constitutes the essence of 
knowledge, nor does it necessarily tell us something fundamental about knowing itself. 
We should be skeptical of such claims, and, if our other examples of knowers can be 
accepted, we might then infer that one basic element of knowledge is exactly its 
finitude.110 On this point I digress. 
 Rosa Coldfield tells the things she knows, and her orientation by the old South 
and its gendered racial codes define her iteration of the story of Henry and Bon, which 
she struggles to make sense of in the intimacy of her outraged bafflement. Further, what 
she doesn’t know orients her toward the story as well, because they go on “behind her 
back,” so to speak, and they give her story the shades of unreliability that are so clear 
from the outset, and on which Quentin makes frequent comment. Indeed, Quentin is soon 
turning to other knowers who know differently than Rosa – not just that they have 
command of a different array of facts, but that, for them, the facts take on a varying 
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significance according to the basic concepts by which they orient themselves. We might 
complexify Rosa a bit, and say that her basic outrage and bafflement set her in an 
unstable oscillation between race, gender, and sexual propriety. The play of race, sex, and 
gender opens the field of sense for Rosa, her whole world, and render the things that 
manifest in that sphere sensible for her as the things they are in that world already colored 
according to black and white, male and female, heterosexuality, and family dynastics. We 
can try to keep it simple, but the matter multiplies beyond our control as the play of 
oscillation opens ever deepening hermeneutic layers. 
 Return to Jason Compson, Quentin’s father. Two main concerns drive the 
narratives he shares with his son, and which Quentin takes up with his Harvard roommate 
Shreve in the final chapters of the novel. The world of the Compson’s story is largely 
predicated on two ideas, namely bigamy and incest, but both are inflected at different 
times through the subtext of homosociality – if not explicitly homosexuality. Mr. 
Compson, moreover, is in possession of an artifact, a document, that clues him into facts 
about the story to which Rosa has not been privy. With this letter in hand, Mr. Compson 
proclaims what we have already heard, “Because Henry loved Bon,” and recalls after 
Bon was killed, on “whose dead body four years later Judith was to find the photograph 
of the other woman and the child.”111 So the Compson’s do hold some knowledge that 
Rosa does not, and we are introduced to the mystery of both letter and photograph – the 
mystery of the word. I want to linger on the photograph for just a moment, because it 
again brings us to the ontological insights for which Absalom, Absalom! is being 
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addressed. The implication of this photographic evidence, Mr. Compson believes, is that 
Bon had a mistress and child in New Orleans, which it turns out is true to a point. But the 
supposed fact of Bon’s bigamy is always told in questionable terms, such as when Mr. 
Compson speculates:  
…who knows, perhaps if Henry had gone with him that summer instead of 
waiting until the next Bon would not have had to die as he did; if Henry had 
only gone then to New Orleans and found out then about the mistress and 
child; Henry who, before it was too late, might have reacted to the discovery 
exactly as Sutpen did, as a jealous brother might have been expected to 
react, since who know but what it was not the fact of the mistress and child, 
the possible bigamy, to which henry gave the lie, but to the fact that it was 
his father who told him…112 
 
This long passage is riddled with hedged bets, loose associations, and unconfirmed half-
truths. Likewise, it continues explicitly informed by Mr. Compson’s metaphysical 
assumptions about human nature, that “…the father who is that natural enemy of any son 
and son-in-law of whom the mother is the ally, just after the wedding the father will be 
the ally of the actual son-in-law who has for mortal foe the mother of his wife.”113 Here, 
Mr. Compson plays armchair psycho-analyst with the unconscious machinations of the 
Sutpen mind. 
 But where in the text is the identity of the people in the photograph found on 
Bon’s body confirmed? Confirmation of their identities is not to be found. What we do 
find is the problematic nature of the Sutpen face. The face of Clytie when Rosa saw her 
in the shadows of the barn, and again later, when she confronts Rosa in the ruinous old 
house, when Rosa recognizes, “It was a Sutpen face enough, but not his; Sutpen coffee 
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colored face enough there in the dim light, barring the stairs…”114 We must consider: 
what if the face in the photograph, the face, not her face, the child, not her child, and 
perhaps, the other face, not her Bon. It is possible that Bon carries with him a lonely 
photograph of Thomas Sutpen with his mixed-race first wife Eulalia, who he abandoned 
for the white Ellen Coldfield, and therefore the child is actually Bon himself. Is this the 
“True” interpretation? No, but it is just as likely, given the text, as the possibility that the 
photo is of Bon and his mistress – that a young Thomas Sutpen looks enough like Bon 
would look. More importantly for us, both interpretations cannot be true. They are 
irreconcilable.  
 The Sutpen’s are irreconcilable with one another throughout the novel. It is 
insinuated more than once that Bon seduced not only Judith, but Henry as well.115 Mr. 
Compson is the primary user of this rhetoric, as I’ve mentioned above. Yet it leads him to 
talk as if it were Henry who had seduced his sister Judith all along, and we are thereby 
led, circumspectively, to the idea that incest is at the troubled heart of Bon’s murder.116 
This is only later made explicit, after Quentin tells his father of Bon’s parentage, where 
the roles of Henry and Bon are then switched and it is Bon who then risks incest with 
Judith. Now, not only are Rosa and Mr. Compson’s versions of the story in conflict, but 
Mr. Compson’s own telling has slipped, come into serendipitous conflict with itself. How 
then can we take Mr. Compson at his word? What unifying theme or style can bring these 
mutually exclusive views into alignment? We have not yet begun to approach Quentin 
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and Shreve’s speculative recounting of the confrontation between Henry and Bon. At this 
point, clarity is required. What these counter-narratives suggest is not at all that there is 
no truth, that relativism results and there is no “real” and authentically true story beneath 
all the different accounts by the characters. Henry killed Bon, it might as well be writ in 
stone. Rather, what emerges is that the myriad tellings of the tale require and necessitate 
that there is some common touch-point for them all. Remember the Venn diagram 
metaphor, because it serves us well here. All the stories revolve around a mutually shared 
set of facts, though different individuals have different access to different parts of the set. 
We commit to perspectivism after a fashion; that is, all worlds are worlds for and to some 
knower, are known from some perspective, but it does not devolve into a destructive 
relativism, because we are forced to ask, “relative to what?” To place and the play of 
oscillation which frees things to the worlds emergent from the thoughts and actions of 
emplaced people. There are bodies and houses and letters and photographs; deeds and 
wills and marriage licenses, birth and death certificates that anchor these worlds, around 
which the significance of Quentin’s world or Judith’s or Rosa’s revolve. Constructions, 
even meager human ones, stand on their own once they are built. Social constructs simply 
do not imply non-reality but a rather a modality of the real which facilitates human 
existence. I can build a shack in the woods and never return to it, but it can be discovered 
independently of me, by some raccoons, a bird, and termites; perhaps a pack of cub 
scouts wanders into it on a hike. Certainly, it is the case that the creation of the cabin, as 
a technological thing, depends in some way on me – but once construction is over the 
thing stands on its own even as I come to have no relation to it whatsoever. It is 
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discoverable without ever revealing me, although people will no doubt speculate, 
correctly, that someone must have built it. 
 The different interpretations of Absalom, Absalom! are not wrong, but they are 
finite. Finite here means basically that they develop from some perspective, which is 
informed by concerns and conceptual orientations that may be idiosyncratic, and as such, 
will not have access to every possible aspect of what is to be interpreted. Not even a 
theoretical sum total of all perspectives gives us something like the whole truth and 
nothing but, because all perspectives are finite, partial, and subject to error. Nevertheless, 
attentiveness to the shared aspects of each perspective lends itself to reasonable 
speculation about why things happened as they did, particularly when the object of 
speculation is the motivation for human action. The different theories put forth in 
Absalom, Absalom! are not crazy. They are all, more or less, generally reasonable, 
especially given which characters attach to which interpretations. 
 For instance, it is not particularly surprising that Mr. Compson and Quentin 
discuss the possibilities of incest and homosociality. Last chapter, I explained how 
Quentin, in The Sound and the Fury, had tried to save his sister’s honor, bizarrely, by 
claiming the two had committed incest together, and he is repeatedly going on about how 
he would tell their father this lie. But I have long suspected, and am not at all alone in this 
suspicion, that Quentin himself may be homosexual, or at least struggling with 
homosexual desires.117 Perhaps Jason Compson has his own suspicions. Nevertheless, it 
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is not important, nor is it relevant, to prove here that Quentin is a homosexual, or to show 
how a queered reading of Absalom, Absalom! better illumines the objective truth of 
Quentin’s situation. That has been done elsewhere and is not my concern here. Rather, I 
think we can safely speculate on Quentin’s sexuality precisely to show how the different 
worlds run up against one another, and how one person’s basic concepts can overlap with 
another and bring both into a similar orientation that has a dual effect, which is just the 
dual effect of worlds in general – that they are always, due their finitude, both revealing 
and concealing at the same time, in the same movement. The critic Betina Entzminger 
builds on the theory first applied by Deborah McDowell to Nella Larson’s novel Passing. 
What Entzminger shows, I think convincingly, is that Shreve and Quentin’s (at least) 
homosocial relationship mirrors that of Henry and Bon, but they code their homosexual 
tendencies (a minor language, see Chapter One above) in language that is more 
acceptable, namely, that of racial transgression (the major language).118 Extrapolating 
Entzminger’s insight to the current project, we can see Shreve and Quentin performing an 
underground discourse that erodes the norms of masculinity and Southern racial and 
sexual mores. Moreover, the ontological movement of Absalom, Absalom! is one that 
makes characters into problems for themselves; remember, their very being is at stake. 
Thus, it is important for us that each person’s version of the Sutpen story is one in which 
the telling is motivated, in part, by their attempts to understand themselves and their place 
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in the world, the role they have been left to play in the unfolding drama. And so, Shreve 
and Quentin, under such a reading, are finding ways to “pass” as they navigate the social 
constraints placed on them by the words in which they find themselves and must make 
meaning. Thus, as Erin Pearson has noted, both the house at Sutpen’s Hundred and the 
Harvard dormitory shared by Quentin and Shreve serve as “closeted” locations doubling 
as crypts for the ghosts of the past; places that hold secrets to the history and identity of 
one or more characters.119 Remember, Faulkner’s characters are commonwealths. 
 When Shreve and Quentin begin to speculate on the love of Bon, of the imagined 
affair between Bon and Henry, or at least their fraternal love for one another, they reveal 
exactly how, caught in the grip of their worlds and struggling to understanding 
themselves in that grip, they twist and turn their concepts around in order to try and make 
meaning out of the situation. Faulkner has them start out, 
 “And now,” Shreve said, “we’re going to talk about love.” But he 
didn’t need to say that either, any more than he had needed to specify which 
he he meant by he, since neither of them had been thinking about anything 
else; all that had once before just so much that had to be overpassed and 
none else present to overpass it but them, as someone always had to rake 
the leaves up before you can have the bonfire. That was why it did not matter 
to either of them which one did the talking, since it was not the talking alone 
which did it, performed and accomplished the overpassing, but some happy 
marriage of speaking and hearing wherein each before the demand, the 
requirement, forgave condoned and forgot the faulting of the other – 
faultings both in the creating of this shade whom they discussed (rather, 
existed in) and in the hearing and sifting and discarding the false and 
conserving what seemed true, or fit preconceived – in order to overpass to 
love, where there might be paradox and inconsistency but nothing fault or 
false.120 
 
                                                
119 Pearon, “Faulkner’s Crytpic Closets,” 343. 
120 Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! 253. 
 282 
Since hermeneutics has haunted our discussion thus far, I want to bring this passage into 
conjunction with one written by Hans-Georg Gadamer with which he begins his analysis 
of “Language and Hermeneutics.” Gadamer writes: 
We say that we “conduct” a conversation, but the more genuine a 
conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. 
Thus a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct. 
Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or 
that we become involved in it. The one word follows another, with the 
conversation taking its own twists and reaching its own conclusions may 
well be conducted in some way, but the partners conversing are far less the 
leaders than the led. No one knows in advance what will “come out” of a 
conversation. Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to 
us. Thus we can say that something was a good conversation or that it was 
ill fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own, and that 
the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it – i.e., that 
it allows something to “emerge” which henceforth exists.121 
 
Quentin and Shreve are having such a genuine conversation, one they have fallen into, 
one that leads them on, one in which they do not know what will “come out,” and the 
Sutpen tragedy, the reason why Henry killed Bon, emerges from the tellings and 
henceforth exists. They have become involved in a story that precedes them. But further, 
there is an explicit loss of ego involved, noted by Faulkner when he writes, “it might have 
been either of them [speaking] and was in a sense both: both thinking as one, the voice 
which happened to be speaking the thought only the thinking become audible, vocal; the 
two of them creating between them, out of the rag-tag and bob-ends of old tales and 
talking, people who perhaps had never existed at all anywhere, who, shadows, were 
shadows not of flesh and blood which had lived and died but shadows in turn of what 
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were…shades too.”122 Between the oscillation of the two opens the place for a new order 
to arise out of the old, but in that place is evoked the shades of the past that is not even 
past, as Shreve and Quentin evoke and invoke Henry and Bon, their “shuddering” and 
ecstatic being-with-one-another echoing and re-establishing the mysterious relation.123 
There is always a movement of oscillation between the two, then the four, then the two, 
the room again like a tomb that re-instantiates the ontological moment at Sutpen’s 
Hundred.124 The multivocity is highlighted and sent running – the story once told by 
Quentin’s grandfather, by Rosa, by Mr. Compson, by Quentin and Shreve, where 
something new emerges each time as a paradox, an irreconcilable difference by which 
each character in turn exists and becomes differentiated and individualized, giving way at 
last to the possibility of Henry and Bon’s own voices. John Duvall has suggested to me 
that the moment at the very end of the novel, where we witness one final formal lapse 
into italics, holds the potential to read as transcendence; the possibility of leaping out of 
the myriad baffled ghosts and into a “really was” of the two brother/lovers’ 
confrontation.125 Of course, here we must be very careful, for in the context of this 
current project, we are not permitted any leaping out toward some external narrative of 
Henry and Bon that is the transcendent object toward which Shreve and Quentin would 
overstep. Rather, here Quentin and Shreve achieve what Mr. Compson had previously 
written about Rosa, that they have, “escaped not at all the privilege of being outraged 
and amazed and of not forgiving but on the contrary has herself gained that place or 
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bourne where the objects of the outrage and of the commiseration also are no longer 
ghosts but are actual people to be actual recipients of the hatred and the pity.”126 This in 
the wake of a summoning, a séance set out in the crypt and tomb echoing with the raven’s 
nevermore.127 After all, it is in the “creating of this shade whom they discussed (rather, 
existed in) and in the hearing and sifting and discarding the false and conserving what 
seemed true, or fit preconceived” that the two pass over to love – read: pass over to the 
openness of the clearing in which the tale stands forth on its own terms, independent of a 
given teller, and wherein history itself seems to guide the telling between the two, the 
four, the two, the multitude in oscillation between in the commonwealth. This is not a 
comfortable love. This love is unsettling. The neat identity composed in the citadel of 
one’s private I-Am is de-centered and destabilized. The very conceit is proven inadequate 
and the characters find themselves (are thrown into their own grounds) existing in shades 
of their own creation where they must conserve what seems most true – or fits their 
preconceived notions. 
 Quentin ultimately experiences an anxiety analogous to that of Rosa on the stairs. 
Following their speculation, which concludes with Henry insisting that the marriage 
between Bon and Judith amounts to incest while Bon insists it is miscegenation, Quentin 
and Shreve retire to bed determined to put the matter to rest, as it were.128 But it still 
haunts them, leads them to uneasy rest. Quentin is troubled. Shreve begins to push again 
saying, “So it took Charles Bon and his mother to get rid of old Tom, and Charles Bon 
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and the octoroon to get rid of Judith, and Charles Bon and Clytie to get rid of Henry; and 
Charles Bon’s mother and Charles Bon’s grandmother got rid of Charles Bon. So it takes 
two niggers to get rid of one Sutpen don’t it?”129 Like Rosa and Clytie on the stairs, here 
the threat of the annihilation of Quentin’s identity as the white Southerner re-emerges 
after he had been assimilated into the Quentin-Shreve-Henry-Bon configuration. Shreve 
goes on, 
I think that in time the Jim Bonds [the last remaining Sutpen, a mentally 
handicapped black man] are going to conquer the western hemisphere. Of 
course it won’t quite in our time and of course as they spread toward the 
poles they will bleach out again like the rabbits and the birds do, so they 
wont show up so sharp against the snow. But it will still be Jim Bond and 
so in a few thousand years, I who regard you will also have sprung from the 
loins of African kings.130 
 
Finally, Shreve asks the question, “Why do you hate the South?” The question brings on 
Quentin’s panicked fear, and his response is denial. “‘I dont hate it,’ Quentin said, 
quickly, at once, immediately; ‘I dont hate it,’ he said. I dont hate it he thought, panting 
in the cold air, the iron New England dark: I dont. I dont! I dont hate it! I dont hate it!”131 
Again, as with Rosa, we must ask, to whom is Quentin talking?  To what is his emphatic 
denial addressed? We cannot be deluded and seduced into reading my interpretation of 
Rosa’s resolve or of Quentin and Shreve’s genuine and productive conversation (again 
the production in the wake of their bodily shuddering, a vibration, oscillation that hints at 
the sexual but cannot be that alone) as the only significant aspect – a positive one – and 
thereby fall into the divide opened by Hutcheon and Jamison, rooted in the modern 
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distinction of metaphysics and epistemology, playing out in their understanding of the 
historical in art. Even more suspicious is this positive feature if it is read as an ethical 
paradigm, though we may in time find a wellspring of ethics. There is the negative too – 
Rosa’s reactionary stance, her violence toward Clytie in overcoming – Quentin’s 
repetition of her renunciation, perhaps initiated into it by Rosa, himself reactionary – I 
dont hate it, I dont. Quentin earlier signaled this repetition, the reproduction of a 
difference, when Falkner writes “Am I going to have to hear it all again he thought I am 
going to have to hear it all over again I shall have to never listen to anything else but this 
again forever so apparently not only a man never outlives his father but not even his 
friends and acquaintances do.”132 The commonwealth, all differentiated relative to each 
other, differentiated by a past that is carried forward, repeated, but repeated also in the 
variations of the difference, freed in the play of these between which what is appears. So 
these denials are addressed in part to that ground I must be, to myself and the other and 
myself as the other, and to the world, to that conversation with a spirit of its own, with its 
own history, into which Quentin has fallen, and yet, which he is responsible for creating 
as he has helped create the shades in which he dwells. All of this is exposed to him. He is, 
in the end, ontological. Quentin’s own being is an issue for him. 
 Absalom, Absalom! is perhaps Faulkner’s most questionable novel, his most 
thought provoking achievement. Why did Henry kill Bon? I confess, I do not know. 
Bigamy, incest, miscegenation, homosexual or homosocial desire…destiny? One seems 
as likely as the next in retrospect. However, I wonder if the truth of why Henry killed 
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Bon is really important at all. The novel is, ostensibly, about the rise and fall of the 
Sutpen dynasty, a story that is founded upon the life and times of Thomas Sutpen. We 
cannot take the words of Faulkner’s characters to be objective truth, to expound fully the 
true and verifiable story of Thomas Sutpen’s design. Goethe provides sound advice for us 
on this point. He writes, 
If someone regards words and expression as sacred testimonials, rather than 
merely bringing them into quick and fleeting circulation like token or paper 
money, seeking instead to employ them as true equivalents in intellectual 
exchange, then one cannot chide him for drawing attention to the way in 
which conventional expressions that no one takes exception to any longer 
have a damaging influence, obfuscating opinions, distorting concepts, and 
leading entire disciplines in a wrong direction.133 
 
The narrators of Absalom, Absalom! treat their words, at times, like tokens or paper 
money, bringing them into quick and fleeting circulation. It is only when this smooth 
circulation breaks down that those conventional expressions, which none of them take 
exception to, become exceptional. And then, suddenly, they see the sacred attempting to 
shine through. And yet, they hold this dark truth at bay: “Take your hand off me, nigger!” 
“I dont! I dont hate it!” 
 We the readers should, however, regard their words and expressions as sacred 
testimonials in the common sense of the word, that is, as a formal statement given to 
clarify a person’s character, conduct, or qualifications. Although, these testimonials do 
not speak to the character of Thomas Sutpen, or Henry, or Bon – instead, they speak 
emphatically to the character of the one giving testimony. And when these characters are 
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themselves opened to the ontological question, they testify to the question of the meaning 
of being, to their own questionable nature. The consequences of such questioning is that 
there are no answers in Absalom, Absalom! that cannot in turn be questioned. The text 
contains no answers, only questions. It is, to use the words of Rosa Coldfield, an 
“incredulous recounting.”134 Peter Brooks has made a strong point in this regard when he 
too shows Rosa herself acknowledging the “incredulous recounting” of the Sutpen 
tragedy, and thereby suggest that the seemingly metaphysical claims of postmodernism 
were always already present in the Modernist novel. The ontological question haunts 
Brooks. He almost touches upon it when he remarks, “The seemingly universal 
compulsion to narrate the past in Absalom, Absalom! imaged in Judith’s insistence on 
transmitting Bon’s letter, may speak both of an unmastered past and a necessary narrative 
present, a kind of tortured utopia of never-ending narrative dialogue.”135 Brooks treats 
Absalom, Absalom! as a deconstructive text that “sums up the entire nineteenth century 
tradition of the novel” and at the same time subverts that tradition, maintaining all the 
former problematics of the novel without accepting any of the traditional solutions.136 
The whole effort comes off as a nod to the postmodern “incredulity toward meta-
narratives” without striking the ontological heart of the novel that always lurks beneath 
the surface waiting to open and swallow the reader whole, bringing them at last to 
question the meaning of “being,” the simple word to which no one takes exception any 
longer, and yet appears for us as the most questionable. 
                                                
134 Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! 130. 
135 Peter Brooks, “Incredulous Narration: Absalom, Absalom!” Comparative Literature 34, no. 3 
(Summer 1982): 268. 
136 Brooks, “Incredulous Narration,” 247. 
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 In Absalom, Absalom! the characters are not merely constructing some fictional 
world. It is the real world for them, and it implicates the real world of the readers. To say, 
as some postmodernism does, that the world is a fiction is not to say that the world is 
unreal, or simply a word game that can be done or undone on a whim. The terror that 
strikes Rosa Coldfield or Quentin Compson is not the terror of doing or undoing a world 
themselves. It is that the world is being done or undone around them, and they 
themselves have been thrown into this unravelling unawares, unconsciously participating 
in the formation of the new world and the preservation of the old. The very constitution 
of their being is at stake. This ontological movement is the hidden heart of Modernism, 
one always beating beneath the ontic surface, formed in the pre-theoretical womb of the 
author’s unknown design. It is not planned: it emerges from the text to confront us in a 
moment when we confront ourselves. In this sense, Faulkner cannot help but be a 
philosopher because he never ceases to ask these questions, to be questionable. These 
questions trouble us, and although they do so explicitly, they lead us roundabout to the 
question of being. To do that is to be truly ontological. 
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I hope that by now you realize what I am saying – that we cannot help making history 
because we are made of it, and history is made of people like us, carriers of the 
behavior and assumptions of a given time and place. 
 – Adrienne Rich, “Resisting Amnesia: History and Personal Life,” (1983) 
 
5.1 The Ontology of Place 
 
Oscillation is the movement of emplacement where place is the ontological 
ground of being as the ecstatic unity of space and time. The final chapter puts this insight 
into effect. What does a metaphysics of place, with oscillation at its conceptual center, 
look like? We have emerged from an underground discourse, engaging with the unspoken 
thought of thinkers such as Descartes, the forgotten words of the American New Realists, 
the silent interplay between places as far-flung as Angoulême, Paris, and 
Yoknapatawpha. We have come to see that, although reality can be described 
independently of those who know it, it is, nevertheless, a reality in which knowers exist. 
As these knowers, we know only what we know and from the perspective of knowing it. 
For the final analysis, I want to return to these knowers and the places from which they 
know. It is to them that being is revealed as it is, and it is us for whom appearing appears. 
And yet, we are not always ourselves. Although we are individual, we are so only to a 
greater or lesser extent. In the end, in place, we see that we are never The Individual; that, 
in fact, we are only individuals and we slide in places between ourselves and the other 
without whom we could not be ourselves. In some ways, this final stage is an attempt to 
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think the cogito anew after the painstaking critique that has come before and that 
has placed us on different terrain that may at first seem foreign and hostile. After all, I 
have called people things! Mere things, the horror of it; that I, this singularity, a 
shimmering snowflake, should be so reduced to a thing, an appearance to and for the 
other that appears also to me. The possibility no doubt accosts us and writes our finitude 
in towering letters before our unwilling eyes. But be not afraid of these strange new 
vistas. 
The outline of ontology is as follows: There is, though not yet a thing. I am 
willing to accept even that thinking itself proves this. To be and to be detected by, to 
appear, is a movement, a basic move. This I have called oscillation. But oscillation may 
go by other names – I call it thus only because oscillation illustrates a regular movement 
that opens a place between, that is the opening of place itself as a ground, as a possible 
domain or sphere into which things proper can really stand out. The movement of 
oscillation, as the opening of place, is the ground of significance. This happens in 
spacetime, the ecstasis of which is emplacement. Once oscillation takes hold, things 
begin to accrete. The opening of place in oscillation is ontologically a priori. The 
accretion of things is, in some sense, dependent on this oscillation, which provides the 
matrix of spacetime as the ecstatic unity of place. Places happen suddenly, from out of 
their own basic movement, and at each moment spread out from themselves in the event 
of their happening. Places happen. Insofar as place is, place goes out beyond in its 
opening for and to that which it might appear. Those to which place might appear as 
some things take up their basic position in places that, for them, become the world they 
know. Worlds take root in place. And, though places exist even without knowers, 
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knowing a place brings forth that place as world. To be from out of place itself is to occur 
naturally, with our modified understanding of that term. Ontology embraces nature and 
gives it its proper place. Oscillation frees things to enter into a play between one another. 
The play of oscillation in the between opened by emplacement is a way for us to talk 
about the various processes of accretion by which things become what they are and 
through which they are either maintained in that being or destroyed, fall into decay, and 
disintegrate. Things that accrete of their own accord, from out of place, may develop in 
such a way that they maintain themselves in their being what they are. This is autopoiesis 
– not a pure self-production from nothing, but a taking over of production in a place and a 
maintaining of the being that is, and thus, with it, a maintaining of the place from which it 
can be the thing that it is. This is the protective function of world, a world built from the 
struggle of beings to maintain themselves in their being and thereby render sensible the 
basic place that grounds them. In this endeavor, from this struggle in place, technical 
objects emerge and are always geared in order to maintain the productive being in its 
being. The technical is always close to the natural, and the technical can be spun off and 
stand apart from its producer in a manner that gives the appearance of what is natural. 
The technical, being so close to the natural, is often taken for granted as “the most natural 
thing,” but its origin in the in order to of the natural thing betrays its rootedness in the 
project of maintaining the movements necessary to holding open a place to be for the 
autopoietic being. 
Human beings are autopoietic things, though to be there is not, necessarily, to be 
human. Many things are there and there for themselves in the maintenance of what they 
are. However, these closing considerations will return us to human worlds and human 
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things in places by and for human being. Human beings do not enter the world fully 
formed, of course. We are nurtured in our places by those around us, and we grow, 
accreting, over time in oscillation between those forces that shape us and that we, in time, 
learn to shape ourselves – both shaping ourselves and shaping the places in which we can 
be and become ourselves. This is the dynamic that I want to explore, tentatively, in 
closing. Part of the motivation for these studies, outlined in Chapter One, was to place 
humanity on a new footing, one not utterly dependent on our own sense of self-
recognition, one that de-centered the role of the ego in the foundation of metaphysics and 
epistemology. Thus, it is important to show how we should proceed from this new 
beginning, where we ourselves are not the absolute center. What does such a view, 
perhaps a new humanism, look like when place occupies the theoretical center? A sketch 
of such a view is the project of this closing chapter. To assist in this endeavor, where the 
philosophical insights are new and depend upon the work that has unfolded in the 
previous chapters, I want to turn, once again, to literature. The major work to be 
considered is Robert Musil’s, The Man Without Qualities. This massive work, unfinished 
during Musil’s lifetime, provides the final scene of our ontology. Along the way, we may 
catch a few departing glimpses of Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha, the proving grounds of our 
theory thus far. With these two, we will at last make clear the placial ontology, the 
unfolding of the individual in the place belonging to them and to which they belong, and 
our conceptual scheme is fleshed out, made somewhat whole by the complimentary 




5.2 Returning to the Underground Discourse 
 Stijn De Cauwer has read Musil’s Man Without Qualities as a response to 
Nietzsche’s cultural immunology, which already expressed both the seeds for eugenicist 
and Nazi interpretation, as well as a strident critique of society’s demand for rigid and 
ultimately self-destructive immunological procedures, prophesizing that cultural 
stagnation would follow from obsessive purification.1 This insight brings us back, in the 
end, to the underground discourse. 
Musil speaks in this underground current against the Modern philosophies, much 
in the manner of other Modernists we’ve examined, namely Rilke and Pirandello. 
Dagmar Barnouw has made the connection between Musil and David Hume, noting that 
Musil has copied the introductory remarks from Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature in the 
draft to a volume of essays he was composing with the working title, “Versuche einen 
anderen Menschen zu finden.”2 In Musil’s 1913 essay “Mathematical Man,” he praises 
mathematics for having an exploratory method that dealt in the dimension of potentiality 
with courage and seriousness. But Barnouw is keen to remind us not to misread these 
praises of mathematics, and strongly argues that, for Musil, “mathematics and mysticism 
are not linked by the tautological structure of an a priori order abstracted from the world, 
but by an articulated openness to all the surprises that the world, as a disorderly complex 
of mostly conflicting structures will yield.”3 Barnouw is echoing a general Modernist 
trend to address the peculiar linguistic dimension of the extreme difficulties associate 
                                                
1 Cauwer, “Robert Musil’s Cultural Diagnositcs in the Light of Nietzschean Immunology.” 
Neophilologus 96:1 (January 2012), 411-25. 
2 Barnouw, “Skepticism as a Literary Mode.” MLN, 93:5 (December 1978), 852. 
3 Barnouw, “Skepticism as a Literary Mode,” 865. 
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with ontology. That is, how can you possibly give adequate voice to what being itself is? 
The paradigmatic example of this trope in European Modernism is Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal’s Lord Chandos Letter, which I discussed in Chapter Two. We have 
explored this theme in Rilke and Pirandello, expressed philosophically as the tension 
between metaphysics and epistemology. Recall Bayón’s sensitivity to the crisis evoked 
by the fin de siècle, an attitude toward the end of the century marked by suspicion, 
condemnation of society’s degradation by modernity, combined with terror and paranoia 
over the disintegration of traditions, often rural, cultures. The same tendency, a mid-
century repetition of the  fin de siècle sense of crisis, has been identified and lamented in 
Heidegger’s private ponderings of the 1930s, during the crisis of World War II, by David 
F. Krell as a period of unforgiving catastrophe and collapse.4 When Modernists confront 
this lapse into silence, the inability to speak, announce, or articulate the experience they 
have in the ontological confrontation with the world (Vitangelo and Malte before the 
mirror, Rosa and Clytie on the stairs, Shreve with Quentin, Chandos’ to Bacon) there is 
then a tendency to read this as a devolution into mysticism. Let us not be confounded by 
those baffled ghosts of Yoknapatawpha – those are shades that need places, that exist in 
places, that must haunt, and thus are not entirely disembodied, hanging as they do on the 
bodies (and minds?) of occupants still living. The same issue has been diagnosed in 
Heidegger, especially after the turn to poetry, mortals, earth, and gods, even if it is to be 
the last god.5 Such a trend toward mysticism explains Barnouw’s desire to clarify Musil’s 
                                                
4 Krell, Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to The Black Notebooks (New 
York: SUNY, 2015). 
5 Perhaps most notably in John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977), and Reiner Schürmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and 
Philosopher (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978). Caputo comments on mysticism in 
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position on mathematics, where it seems that Musil is attempting use mathematical 
metaphors (at least) to “speak” to this silence. In part, this response cannot take the 
typical approach, which is why we find Musil playing with the distinction between novel 
and essay. 
 Part of Musil’s interest in the essay form, and why he turns to the novel is driven 
by his desire to gain philosophical insight. Barnouw is, therefore, correct that when Musil 
praises the systematicity of mathematical approaches, and offers an ontological view of 
the “whole,” he is not thereby going back to a systematic philosophy that gives the static 
totality of all that is, the domain of all domains, recalling our discussion in the previous 
Chapter. Musil does not address the mystical element by trying to capture its essence in 
words that would render it completely. He uses the essay to blur the line between 
disciplines in a discursive movement, which echoes for us the role of parody in the 
underground discourse which we’ve adapted from Hutcheon. Mark Freed gives a helpful 
analysis of this technique, describing how Musil uses the essay as “a discursive space 
between science on the one hand and art and life on the other.”6 While we must 
acknowledge the power of science as a systematizing force, we must still, nevertheless, 
account for the human tendency to slip away from and overflow these systems, exhibiting 
what Musil himself calls “singularities,” and we are therefore entreated to essay between 
                                                
the Catholic context in, Heidegger and Aquinas (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982). 
See also, Caputo, “Heidegger and Theology.” The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. 
Charles B. Guigon (New York: Cambridge, 1993), 270-89; and, Michael Zimmerman, 
“Heidegger, Buddhism and Deep Ecology,” also in the Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 
240-69. More recently, Ryan Coyne has explored Heidegger’s mysticism in relation to St. 
Augustine in Heidegger’s Confessions: The Remains of St. Augustine in Being and Time and 
Beyond, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2015). 
6 Freed, “Robert Musil and the Techne of Rewriting Modernity.” The Germanic Review, 88:1 
(March 2013), 90. 
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the ratoid and the nicht-ratoid, the former characterized by a “monotony of facts,” 
serialization, and repetition, while the latter displayed “the dominance of the exception 
over the rule,” and in which, “facts do not submit, laws are sieves, event do not repeat 
themselves but are infinitely variable and individual.”7 Musil is thus engaged in a formal 
parody of appropriation between discourses of the arts and sciences that demands we pay 
attention to certain structural aspects of the text which demark it as underground 
discourse. For us, it is important that Musil engages in a silent but salient dialogue with 
the philosophical tradition of systemization, and does so in a way that destabilized that 
tradition while simultaneously opening on a new way. The underground discourse 
continues to open on the new beginning, functioning to bring us back again to 
emplacement, as Musil himself opens The Man Without Qualities with a movement down 
into place, bringing readers into the world of Vienna through a series of images which 
repeat a pattern, but whose repetition is not a repetition of the same (numerical identity), 
but is a repetition that displays a difference as well. I will elaborate on this 
philosophically charged locution, “repetition of a difference,” later, but for now it is 
enough to note that it is an important connection from Foucault and Deleuze to 
Heidegger, where Deleuze sees in Foucault the legacy of the deconstruction of the 
“outside” of consciousness that is initiated in Being and Time.8 For now, I want to stay 
                                                
7 Freed, “Musil and the Techne of Rewriting Modernity,” 91. Freed gives an excellent summary 
of Musil’s technique here, and the quotes I’ve provided are cited by Freed from Musil, “Sketch of 
What the Writer Knows.” Precision and Soul: Essays and Addresses. Precision and Soul: Essays 
and Addresses, trans. and ed. Burton Pike and David S. Luft (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 
1990), 62. 
8 The key moment is in Delezue, Foucault, trans. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 2009), 94-99. Although Deleuze does not explicitly mention Heidegger here, we must 
not fail to see the similarities with Heidegger’s notion of immanent transcendence as the act of 
overcoming itself, which is articulated in Being and Time, but also in the way Deleuze treats the 
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with Musil in order to draw out the ontological advantage gained by his formal choices in 
structuring the beginning of his novel, The Man Without Qualities. 
Keeping the above observations regarding mysticism, mathematical 
systemization, and the essayistic technique, I want us to attend to the way in which Musil 
sets out in a familiar world that is, for all its familiarity, foreign. It is a world that has 
been, but is no longer, the world of the Austrian Empire in its final year, August, 1913, 
just before the outbreak of World War I. Musil began composing the novel in 1921, and 
the first volume was published in 1930, with the second volume following in 1933. It 
commences with the ironic perspective of knowing beforehand the fate of the Empire, 
which all of the main characters are committed to celebrating in a grand jubilee year in 
celebration of Franz Joseph’s 70-year reign, which would occur in 1918. Of course, the 
readers know that the war breaks out, and Franz Joseph dies in November 1916, just shy 
of completing his 68th year in power. The text thus displays a play between past and 
future, a play that shapes the appearance of the past in the present conditioned by our 
orientation to the future of the past we address. It creates a distance between us and the 
characters, not so that we do not care, but rather so that our care is carried into the tragic 
mode that recognizes a flaw in all to which the characters are committed without 
themselves seeing this crippling flaw. Musil alleviates this tragedy with a comedic style 
and a primary protagonist, the mathematician named only as Ulrich, a man without 
qualities who does not take anything too seriously. Throughout, there remains a sense of 
                                                
“crossing of the line,” between inside and outside, which requires a transgression and resistance 
to the power of the outside, and how this treatment by Deleuze resonates with the “crossing of the 
line,” that consummates a nihilistic movement against the subiectum and prepares for the leap 
into being questionably in Heidegger, “The Question of Being (1955).” Pathmarks, trans. 
William McNeill (New York: Cambridge, 1998), 291-98. 
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catastrophe that tinges most comedic elements with absurdity. Cauwer describes Musil’s 
immunological response this impending catastrophe, “the pathology of the times is an 
inadequate response to the challenges and changes of modern life. Incapable of facing the 
complexities, novelty and problems of the present, people flee into a moral Hinterwelt.”9 
Recall Rosa Coldfield’s outraged and baffled ghosts. Just as we saw in Absalom, 
Absalom!, Cauwer finds that in Musil, people become “Confused by the present,” and 
subsequently “cling to a construction of moral order, often associated with ‘mystical 
fetishes’ of state, nation, and race.”10 In the current context, we can understand these 
mystical fetishes as reifications of certain basic concepts that people allow to dominate 
their orientation toward the world. When we’re talking about appropriately systematic 
views, I will describe Musil’s technique as being sensitive to hermeneutic layers, to 
which I’ve appealed in earlier Chapters. These layers, I will explain, are not hierarchical, 
but allow a better understanding of both the multivocity of being, and the interconnection 
of worlds (fields of sense), thereby gathering some loose threads from the previous 
chapter. The play of irony in the temporal distance that I have outlined above will be a 
good entry into the idea of hermeneutic layers in The Man Without Qualities, and will 
allow us to continue to pursue Musil’s underground discourse, guided by his essayistic 
technique that sets us in oscillation between various approaches to beings. 
5.3 Hermeneutic Layers in The Man Without Qualities 
 Ironic detachment, coupled with the temporal play between past and futures 
known, opens a series of layers in the text that each carry different hermeneutic demands. 
                                                
9 Cauwer, “Musil’s Cultural Diagnostics,” 422. 
10 Cauwer, “Musil’s Cultural Diagnostics,” 422. 
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Musil himself brings us into the novel in such a way that these layers are highlighted, and 
the way he begins offers us synecdoches by which we can understand the whole of the 
work. In a synecdoche, a part of something is used as a metaphorical stand-in for the 
whole of the thing, or vice versa. Kenneth Burke held synecdoche to be one of four 
“master tropes” because of their role in the discovery and description of truth.11 In Musil, 
the trope is applied in order to expose ontological truth. With a clear August day, Musil 
clears a way for us to approach being. Thus, Musil provides not only a series of 
metaphors by which to interpret the whole of the work, he also provides an opening that 
already contains a sense of precariousness, of immanent dissolution and transience. It 
begins with a descriptive account of the weather. Musil writes: 
A barometric low hung over the Atlantic. It moved eastward toward a high-
pressure zone over Russia without as yet showing any inclination to bypass 
this high in a northerly direction. The isotherms and isotheres were 
functioning as they should. The air temperature was appropriate relative to 
the annual mean temperature and to the aperiodic monthly fluctuations of 
the temperature. The rising and setting of the sun, the moon, the phases of 
the moon, of Venus, of the rings of Saturn, and many other significant 
phenomena were all in accordance with the forecasts in the astronomical 
yearbooks. The water vapor in the air was at its maximal state of tension, 
while the humidity was minimal. In a word that characterizes the facts fairly 
accurately, even if it is a bit old-fashioned: It was a fine day in August 
1913.12 
 
First, notice the technical nature of this description, but do not be seduced by it, as if it 
were the technical alone that should guide our interpretation! Walter Moser has given a 
thoughtful commentary on the play of language between the technical and the poetic in 
                                                
11 Kenneth Burke, “Four Master tropes.” The Kenyon Review 3:4 (Autumn 1941), 421. 
12 Musil, The Man Without Qualities, Vol. 1, trans. Sophie Wilkins (New York: Vintage 
International, 1996), 3. 
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this opening passage, and he notes the way it complexifies the reader’s usual contract 
with the author regarding any pre-suppositional “as-if” that would underwrite the work as 
purely fiction, taken as a byword for “make-believe.”13 We can add Moser’s observation 
to Freed’s contributions to our considerations of the essayistic technique displayed in The 
Man Without Qualities. Moser points out that although Musil makes generous use of 
allusion, parody, re-use, explicit quotation, paraphrase, metaphor, and so on, he does so 
without necessarily referencing a particular text, but rather, plays off of features 
autochthonous to one or more discursive types on which Musil plays and performs in his 
novel. What’s more, this technique addresses and highlights the onto-epistemological 
issues I’ve previously addressed at the heart of the modern/postmodern debate, where 
these issues manifest for Musil as the epistemological question concerning the 
appropriateness of a given discourse relative to its domain, and ontologically as the 
question concerning the subject itself as the grounding force of the subjectivistic 
system.14 But Musil starts off, crucially, from an emplacing movement, oscillating 
between the weather, the traffic, the technical, and the poetic. We can see place between 
the ratoid and the nicht-ratoid, highlighting the excess, the dominant of the exception to 
the rule. For although the paragraph rings out with a technical, meteorological sound, it is 
at the same time tinged with a sense of excess, as if at some point the “facts,” as they are 
so characterized cannot come to fully articulate the scene no matter how voluminously 
we pile on descriptive language. Not only are the basic atmospheric conditions outlined, 
but also the “rising and setting of the sun, the moon, the phases of the moon, of Venus, of 
                                                
13 Moser, “The Factual in Fiction: The Case of Robert Musil.” Poetics Today, 5:2 (1984), 411. 
14 Moser, “The Factual in Fiction,” 419. 
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the rings of Saturn, and many other significant phenomena...” So it is not just the 
immediate conditions of one particular place, but also conditions that telescope out 
beyond the world into vast expanses and magnitudes beyond the scope of this one fine 
day in August. There are “many more significant phenomena,” too many more to be 
elaborated, perhaps, and yet, this inability to account for all of the possible facts does not 
negate or erase their significance. In fact, Musil seems to be suggesting that the simple 
phrase “It was a fine day in August 1913,” captures the richness and significance of all 
the technically elaborate details provided in the entire preceding paragraph. 
This is Musil's methodological insight: that there is always so much to say, and 
yet there is only so much that can be said. Thus, although the technical account may 
appear superior is its minutia, the same phenomena and state of affairs is equally 
expressed in the far simpler statement that it is indeed a fine August day. And yet, this is 
not to deny the complexity of the event, nor is it to degrade the value of technicalities. It 
is, rather, to open us up to the full richness of poetic language and poetic thinking, in its 
very relation to and play with the technical. 
But we are just getting started. We are only at the very beginning of Musil's 
novel, only at the very beginning of this invitation to think ontologically – only just now 
starting our attempt at thinking. Just as we should not get sidetracked and overly invested 
in the language of meteorological technicalities, neither should we now become too 
enamored by poetic language itself. The task of thinking, rather, requires that we train our 
ears to listen for the truth in whatever form it happens to appear. Not every mode of 
expression is suited for every truth, and some modes better reveal certain truths than 
others. Moser’s observation regarding the appropriateness of discourse to its context is in 
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harmony with Aristotle’s profound advice at the end of Book Two of his Metaphysics. 
Therein, Aristotle teaches us, “one must be already trained to know how to take each sort 
of argument, since it is absurd to seek at the same time knowledge and the way of 
attaining knowledge; and neither is easy to get” (995a12-14).15 Thus, we must be wary 
and careful to differentiate the way in which Musil's text can expose us to an ontological 
insight from the insight itself – that to which we are exposed in thought. 
From the outset, where the weather is our entry into the whole of the text, we can 
see that Musil is presenting an essayistic mereology. In formal logic, mereology is the 
study of parthood relations, that is, the relation of parts to the whole and also of parts to 
other parts within the whole. In the opening paragraph, Musil presents us with a set of 
part relations which are intended to represent the whole, where the “whole” is expressed 
as “it was a fine day in August 1913.” Soon, however, Musil's view takes us down, layer 
by layer, to the scene of a traffic accident which has occurred in the city of Vienna. The 
opening paragraph sets us off on a course that begins from on high, in the atmosphere, 
where forces cosmic and global have come into conjunction to produce a fine August 
day. It should be noted, on the technical side, that precise knowledge of the cosmic 
conditions, the alignment of the planets and so on, would even allow us to determine that 
this fine day was indeed in August in 1913. We would only need to consult an 
astronomical calendar. Nevertheless, it is clear that this weather pattern is not the whole – 
Musil does not mean us to understand that this particular relation of parts is all that is. 
Somehow, this part of parts is illustrative of a deeper ontological insight. The weather is 
                                                
15 Aristotle, “Metaphysics.” The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University, 1995), 1572. 
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exemplary for Musil. This part of parts reflects for us the structure of being itself. Here, 
we must note that being has become, for us, a word for the primacy of place and the play 
of oscillation that opens all grounds. Not an all-encompassing ground of grounds, or a 
domain of all domains, though certainly that ground in which domains themselves 
become possible, and which open before us the possibility of signification, for our own 
being to be in a place that sustains it. We are then attempting to think “being” as the very 
openness of parts and wholes themselves. We can go pretty far with a preliminary 
Kantian view of “being,” not as predicating the existence of a thing, but rather, as itself 
the very condition of the possibility of anything whatsoever. A hasty articulation, 
perhaps, but one necessary to facilitate our attempt at thinking through Musil's text no 
matter how insufficient it may be in capturing the fullness of being itself. Thus, if we 
understand being in this way, we begin to see the power of Musil’s approach through 
synecdoche, an approach that can think, in one sense, the base commonness of being 
while at the same time prefiguring its radical differentiation. Synecdoche does not, in this 
instance, speak directly to being as such, but provides a way of approach, a way around 
being, in order to better see it, performing, as Moser says, a play between fact and fiction, 
poetics and technics, that transverses a line between discourses and frees language to 
address a mystery, not in hollow mysticism, but with an earnestness that still struggles in 
its orientation toward truth – always a truth appearing to and for, yet still one 
unconstructed, perhaps a singular truth emergent from the confluence of myself and the 
world, there waiting for me, yet still in need of being apparent. 
It is not a coincidence that Musil moves from the weather to traffic. Both weather 
and traffic could stand in for one another – they are systems of part relations wherein 
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tangential forces collide and produce a singular event whether it be one fine day in 
August 1913 or a traffic accident involving a truck and a pedestrian on a specific street in 
the city of Vienna. The day's weather and the day's traffic are, each in their own way, 
singular events that emerge from the collusion of an innumerable set of variables all 
coming into concert. They will each dissipate, their various parts and patterns moving 
away from the former whole and entering into new relations with new parts to generate 
new events, new wholes, and different days with their own weather and traffic that will 
be both like and unlike those of previous days and days yet to come. One of the 
innovations of Musil's vision of being lies in its systematicity. It is systematic in a way 
that is totally different from Kant's architectonics or Hegel's ascent through Reason to 
Absolute Spirit and the end of history. Musil, rather, presents a vision of systematic 
multiplicity. In this understanding, the world does indeed express a kind of systematic 
structure. This is contrary to the majority of analytic philosophy in the Anglo-American 
world, where systematic philosophy is eschewed for the minute analysis of isolated 
problems according to the representational schema of propositional logic. Musil's text 
suggests, with Aristotle and Moser seconding his suggestion, that this type of analysis is 
not fit for the task of ontology. Rather, we need a more inclusive vision – one that 
encompasses both the technical language of the meteorological sciences as well as the 
poetic potential of fine days in August; a vision suited to explain the emergence of 
systems from the confluence of forces, and yet also acknowledges and maintains the 
transitory nature of these systems, abstaining from the reification of any given system 
into an Absolute totality that pretends to encompass everything that is. 
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Thus, the movement from the weather to the traffic should not disturb us, for both 
are parts of a whole in relation to one another while simultaneously expressing wholes 
that are themselves capable of reflecting structures of being. Musil uses synecdoche in 
both its macro- and microscopic potential, offering us a glimpse of the whole through the 
part, and giving us a whole by which each part is rendered sensible. This interplay is 
facilitated by the openness of Musil's systems. They are never closed. They are open, 
transitory, and feed into and out of one another. These are dynamic systems. Like 
mereology, dynamic systems have a rigorous theoretical basis in mathematical logic. The 
theoretical application of dynamical systems analysis is to trace the continuous 
development of a complex system from one physical state to another. So, how does the 
system move from state A to state B in a smooth, continual movement. Students of 
calculus will no doubt suspect the importance of differential equations to these theoretical 
concerns, but our primary focus must be the emphasis that dynamic systems place on 
time. Time is of the essence for us. Musil has, serendipitously, brought forth the 
metaphysical bugbear of time through a revolutionary formulation of the age-old 
philosophical problem – the problem of change, of becoming, of motion between states. 
Time was subtly indicated in the beginning, where Musil makes sure we know the 
year. It was August, 1913, and so time is invoked through the acknowledgment of the 
historical record. Remember, volume one of The Man Without Qualities was published in 
1930, and so audiences of the time, and we as contemporary readers, are fully aware that 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire was doomed – that the Great War meant the final defeat 
and dissolution of the Empire into many smaller nation-states. This is crucial to the 
understanding of being introduced through the weather of the fine August day. The main 
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narrative of the novel involves the planning of a great celebration of the 70th year of the 
reign of Emperor Franz Joseph I. Anyone who has planned an event involving a 
significant number of people understand immediately the seemingly innumerable 
quantity of variables that arise in conjunction and contribute to the final form, shape, 
atmosphere, and quality of the event itself – in just the same manner as a fine day in 
August, or a traffic jam in Vienna. If you can, project the difficulties and challenges 
involved in planning these smaller events into the great magnitude of a year-long 
Imperial jubilee and you'll get a sense of the scope of Musil's novel, and also of his irony. 
The great event will never happen. Or, rather, its happening far outstrips the effort of any 
one character's attempt to control and guide the event and the finally realized historical 
moment is something no one involved could have foreseen. Each contributes in their own 
way, according to their talents, attempting to shape the event into the object they desire. 
Some objectives are achieved, some are thwarted. The theme of “A Year of Austria” is 
realized through the stroke of an unnamed journalist's pen, but the characters involved in 
the planning seize on this idea, appropriate it, attempt to make it their own and use it as 
the instrument for the achievement of their own ends. They are themselves wholes of 
parts within the whole, the wholes they are but parts within a greater whole, itself a part 
of the European whole, itself a part of parts in the whole of the world...and so on. In this 
mereology, Musil expresses a dynamic vision of open, interconnected systems involved 
in an ongoing process of mutual formation, confluence, and eventual dissipation. 
This get us to the point of hermeneutic layering. Just as I have previously 
discussed the necessity of “translating” into human terms any phenomenon which 
outstrips our capacity to bring it forth for comprehension, so too do hermeneutic layers 
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speak to the multivocity of being. I have, by and large, eschewed the language of “being” 
in order to speak more concretely of emplacement and the play of oscillation. Indeed, 
being is spoken in many ways and, as the title of this work suggests, being has always 
been in view insofar as to be is to be in place. Being is place, its oscillation and the play 
of things released by oscillation to their being in place. And place-being lends itself to a 
kind of systematicity that cannot be some absolute static system, or in some way a 
complete or total system, because such totalizing systemization exactly misses the 
dynamic nature of emplacement from the start. In a way, to even have a system requires 
from the start a place for the system, and so no system can ever capture place, though for 
us in our worlds it is necessary sometimes to think through place in a systematic way. 
This is basically Casey’s point when he argues that place, “by virtue of its 
unencompassability by anything other than itself, is at once the limit and the condition of 
all that exists.”16 Hermeneutic layers trace out the multivocity of place, its basic 
analogous structures that allow place itself to stand out for us in a way that can take on 
significance. Ontology itself demands, on one level, a systematic answer to the question 
of being. Here, that answer is the oscillation of emplacement where all beings, insofar as 
they are, are in places. Yet, on another level, folded in a different way in a different 
hermeneutic layer, that system cannot close in on itself, for such closure would deny the 
very play required by emplacement for the very showing forth of the things for which 
ontology provides an account! This is the difficulty that was overcome in the 
confrontation with Gabriel and Heidegger on the meaning of world and the Sinnfeld. In 
                                                
16 Casey, Getting Back Into Place, 15. 
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The Man Without Qualities, we require such hermeneutic layers in order to address the 
fullness of the story. We must descend, as Musil illustrates, from perspectives (layers) on 
high, that capture and render a social and cultural event that encompasses the activities of 
many people. But we must also “descend,” a word used in a metaphorical way, to the 
individual level (layer) where intimate relations between people help to understand their 
roles in other layers. The transversal of these layers further illustrates their 
interconnectivity and thorough entanglement. Consider the Moosbrugger subplot within 
Musil’s novel. 
5.4 The Problem of Subjection in Several Examples 
The city of Vienna, the locale of the committee and the home of the man without 
qualities, is enraptured by the newspaper coverage of a sensational serial rapist and 
murderer of women named Moosbrugger. Moosbrugger is himself rendered in intimate 
detail, and we are given access to the psycho-sexual proclivities of a vagabond, an anti-
social who does not fit in to society, who hates women, but moreover, hates his own 
neediness and physical attraction to women over which he has little to no control and for 
which he ultimately blames his victims in the crassest and most unreflective ways. 
Ultimately, Moosbrugger is shown to be mentally deficient, unable to take any critical 
distance from his actions, and fancies himself a victim of the system that has imprisoned 
him. All of this is just one layer. Operating in tangent with this is the press coverage of 
his trial and crimes. Now, different presses and periodical are actors in a sense. The 
aggregate of their individual members lead to different editorial decisions about the 
handling of the trial, and they compete with each other to render the most sensational and 
attractive (in the sense of winning over readership) rendering of the monster 
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Moosbrugger. So we are given quite a grand portrait of the Austrian media apparatus of 
the time, both in its own functioning, and in its relationship to culture, the way in which 
media can shape mass opinion. Running parallel to the Moosbrugger story is, of course, 
coverage of the planning of the year of Jubilee, so we are further treated to the way in 
which the Austrian Empire, as a governmental authority, is reified in the media coverage 
as it imposes social mores through coverage of cases such as Moosbrugger’s. To be clear, 
this is not to render an ethical judgment that the treatment of Moosbrugger by the media 
is right or wrong. That is not the point. It is clear that Moosbrugger is guilty of heinous 
crimes, though he himself does not see it that way. However, it is also clear that the 
media plays its part in shaping the general social views of people like Moosbrugger and 
his crimes. So, we have at least three hermeneutic layers here: that of the personal layer 
of Moosbrugger himself, his psycho-sexual formation; that of the media, where 
Moosbruggers case is handled on a mass scale; and the wider social network that gains 
access to Moosbrugger through the media portrayal of it and which integrates the media 
view, disseminating through several intermingled layers, eventually taking 
Moosbrugger’s case into the disparate private layers of Ulrich and his friends. The 
multivocity of oscillation between these layers, and the layering effects of overlapping 
worlds of sense and meaning are hardly more pronounced than in this example. Just to be 
clear – layers are places, just recall the discussion to this effect from Chapter Two. I use 
the term “layers” here because it must be made obvious that when we begin to consider 
the significance of places in their interconnection and entanglement, we are then 
considering the ontological plurality of place that extends in every direction. This is not 
an ontological hierarchy where the personal or the social are thought through a rank that 
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places one “over” the other or bestows ontological priority. Hermeneutic layering spreads 
out every which way, and ontological priority belongs solely to the oscillation that frees 
things to place and sets them forth for the mutual procedures and interactions. The term 
“hermeneutic” applies, because each layer, insofar as it is a world, generates its own 
guiding question – the world of Moosbrugger asks what drives him to commit these 
crimes, the world of the media concerns how to capture a readership and shape public 
discourse, the world of mass culture asks about the formation of adaptation of social 
mores, and worlds of given individual consumers of such mass media returns to the 
struggle of the individual to find their place in confluence of forces exerted upon them. 
Each layer demands a different approach, though not one that is entirely divorced from 
the others, since they are, ontologically, shot through with connections to each other.  
Moosbrugger has been previously identified by Wilhelm Braun as a microcosm of 
the European crisis that lead to the First World War, and comments at length on his 
schizophrenic nature, his name invoking the peaceful and serene atmosphere of an Alpine 
“mossy brook,” while his actions are one of a destructive, murderous force – I might add, 
without any of a brook’s “reflectivity.”17 Braun is also right to emphasize the way 
Moosbrugger oscillates between lucidity and madness, and this oscillation itself serves as 
a foil for Musil to poke fun at the medical establishment, particularly psychiatric 
medicine, who cannot fit Moosbrugger into their diagnostic schemes.18 Braun’s analysis 
anticipates Freed’s observations on the way the essay form plays on different discourses, 
                                                
17 Braun, “Moosbrugger Dances.” Germanic Review, 35:3 (October 1960), 215. 
18 Braun, “Moosbrugger Dances,” 215, 219-20. Braun even uses the term “oscillate,” though only 
in passing. 
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and we see, obliquely, the symptomatology of Modernism’s Nietzschean influence, 
though one seen earlier in Dostoevsky’s underground man. Given Musil’s systematic 
tendencies, and the aforementioned analysis of Moosbrugger as microcosm, together with 
entry into the text by way of synecdoche, we can then see the underground discourse 
manifest. There is a high co-efficient of deterritorialization in the play between modes of 
discourse by which, as I’ve outlined above, Musil speaks to the silence that might mystify 
our attempts to think being. He has destabilized us by our entry into the text, both by the 
synecdoches which repeat a difference and thereby epitomize the dynamic structure of 
the whole, but also by the entry through the non-human, the circumvention of the cogito 
through weather, and clouds; the analogies of being already prefiguring the 
deconstruction of the subject and its re-assemblage on the other side of the line, a line 
crossed into a new beginning, another way to begin. Like Nietzsche, Musil too diagnoses 
the ailments of European society, but in another movement he begins a sketch of an 
alternative vision. Thus, everything takes on the collective significance of the 
underground discourse that is working to lay foundations even as it undermines the 
previous one, sometimes taking up what is found to be of use in parodic gestures that re-
appropriate the major, canonical terms. Systems change, if we care to think metaphysics 
again, or a new and different metaphysics. Taking on collective significance gives the air 
of systematicity and Musil has provided a different, more open approach to such 
systematicity. But, because of the synecdoche, the analogous nature of being, the 
repetition of a difference, he has cast us back to the relationship, already spoken 
mereologically, of parts to whole, of the individual to the system that would condition it. 
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Ulrich becomes fascinated by the Moosbrugger case, both in Moosbrugger 
himself and in the media’s handling of the affair. In part, Ulrich’s interest concerns the 
way in which Moosbrugger is conditioned by his presence in the system, by his 
appearance in court and in the press coverage; the details of his crimes elaborated in 
bloody depictions to increase circulation (both of newspapers and the readers’ blood). 
The tangle of these forces can be illustrated succinctly by comparing Moosbrugger’s case 
to an episode in which Ulrich is “taken in” and processed by a social system. The episode 
is one in which Ulrich is arrested following his unwitting involvement in a barroom 
dispute concerning politics. The arrest proves fortuitous for Ulrich in the end, due 
primarily to his friends in high places, but during the arrest Ulrich gets a flash of insight 
into the state apparatus. As it happens, Ulrich was not the original object of the policing 
force, rather, it was a drunken working-class man whose political tirades, fomented by his 
reading of a particularly slanted newspaper, had devolved into physical violence and 
resisting arrest. But Ulrich intervenes, claiming that the poor man, given his inebriation, 
cannot be held responsible for any “offense against the Crown,” and this intervention was 
interpreted by the police as the cause of the drunk resuming his resistance. The police 
order Ulrich out, but the man without qualities “was unaccustomed to regarding the state 
as anything other than a hotel in which one was entitled to polite service, and objected to 
being addressed in such a tone; whereupon the police unexpectedly decided that one 
drunk did not justify the presence of three policemen and arrested Ulrich as well.”19 What 
sets off this series of events is a moment of existential dread. The agitated drunk had been 
                                                
19 Musil, The Man Without Qualities, 167. 
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further agitated, to the point of eruption, by a policeman’s buttons. Musil describes the 
arousal of the old ontological malaise elegantly when he writes, 
There is always something ghostly about living in a constantly well-
ordered state. You cannot step into the street or drink a glass of water 
without touching the balanced levers of a gigantic apparatus of laws and 
interrelations, setting them in motion or letting them maintain you in your 
peaceful existence; one knows hardly any of these levers, which reach deep 
into the inner workings and, coming out the other side, lose themselves in a 
network whose structure has never yet been unraveled by anyone. So one 
denies their existence, just as the average citizen denies the air, maintaining 
that it is empty space. But all these things that one denied, these colorless, 
odorless, tasteless, weightless, and morally indefinable things such as water, 
air, space, money, and the passing of time, turn out in truth to be the most 
important things of all, and this gives life a certain spooky quality. 
Sometimes a man may be seized by panic, helpless as in a dream, thrashing 
about wildly like an animal that has blundered into the incomprehensible 
mechanism of a net. Such was the effect of the policeman’s buttons on the 
working-man, and it was at this moment that the arm of the state, feeling 
that it was not being respected in the proper manner, proceeded to make an 
arrest.20 
 
So much of this analysis can be applied, not only to Moosbrugger’s individual case, but 
also the public response to it, which is proceeded by the revelation of one man’s 
encounter with this normally hidden and submerged apparatus of laws. Of course, 
Moosbrugger is guilty, admittedly so, of horrible crimes, but his guilt is not the issue 
here. What is at issue is the way, as Ulrich muses, “that the police could not only 
dismantle a man so that nothing was left of him, they could also put him together again, 
recognizably and unmistakably, out of the same worthless components. All this 
achievement takes is that something imponderable be added, which they call 
                                                
20 Musil, The Man Without Qualities, 165-66. 
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‘suspicion.’”21 Ulrich is repeatedly shown to be a champion of such lost causes. He seeks 
a way to have Moosbrugger excused and treated as mentally unfit for trial after seeing the 
accused in the docket one day, and witnessing for himself the blind struggle of one 
incompetent individual against the amassed powers of the state. And everyone he meets 
and interacts with in regard to Moosbrugger has, in some way, had their thinking on the 
matter mediated by the ever-present interpretations of the affair in the media. 
 We are not concerned here with media studies, or sociological issues, although the 
placial ontology worked out above should be the foundations of both. Neither are we here 
concerned with the ethical dimension of these encounters, although, contra Levinas, we 
should see that ethics cannot be the first philosophy if it has no basic concept of the thing 
that embodies ethos, has character, and could be held responsible. Rather, the ontology 
emerging from oscillation is itself the foundation of any possible ethics or else it is no 
ontology. Without some notion of what it is that is to be ethical, or sociological, or 
involved with media, there can be no adequate study of such phenomena, although it is 
not necessarily incumbent upon those studies to treat ontology as such. They all must, by 
virtue of their local character, assume some basic concept that will guide their discourse 
without that basis itself being brought into question. But the object of ontology is itself to 
question the foundation itself, to be, being the ground of grounds. 
 What the episode of Ulrich’s arrest, and his fascination with the facets of the 
Moosbrugger case reveal in the ontological context is that those moments exemplify the 
collision of worlds in their generation, coming together, and coming apart. The world of 
                                                
21 Musil, The Man Without Qualities, 169. 
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the working man, and that of the state, embodied in the police. The world of Ulrich’s 
class with the two, its radical differentiation from the working-class world that shapes 
and forms different outcomes and different consequences. Moosbrugger, his social 
placelessness resulting in his unceasing conflict with all the worlds woven into the 
tapestry of the Austrian Empire; its authority, its gender dynamics, its methods of 
employment, urbanization, and village life. Moosbrugger has no place to be, cannot be in 
any place, and thus becomes the destroyer of worlds, the worlds of so many women and 
eventually the vanquishment of his own self in unknowing guiltless vanity. To 
understand this, for us, we require the hermeneutic layers that show the folding and 
unfolding of these worlds as they meet and as the individual is conditioned by their 
entanglements on the surface of these worlds. As I had said in Chapter Two, we are 
arriving at a topological ontology, and at last, uncovering what is to be a topology of 
subjectivity, but a yet undiscovered subjectivity, one completely other, a subjectivity yet 
to come – we are here too attached to place. To venture into some other subjectivity 
would be too far, too much. 
 And yet, we find attempts already in progress, aids on our way to the new 
beginning. For instance, Stefan Jonsson has clearly laid out the case that Musil is 
attempting to think a different kind of subjectivity, and he does so in part through a 
subversion of the old paradigm, which hinges on cohesion, and a unified inwardness that 
must stand against some outside that subjects it.22 Jonsson shows Musil structuring 
                                                
22 Stefan Jonsson, “Neither Inside nor Outside: Subjectivity and the Spaces of Modernity in 
Robert Musil’s The Man Without Qualities.” New German Critique, 68 (Spring/Summer 1996), 
34-36. 
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subjectivity on enclosure by rooms, rooms in the architecture and urban landscape of the 
city. The man without qualities rejects the reification of his interiority – when he turns 
inward to escape the impersonal rush of the outside world, he finds within himself only 
another impersonal flow, this time composed of thoughts, feelings, and sensations.23 We 
have seen Musil’s interest in Hume, and I have previously discussed the Modernist play 
on the general Humean attack on the simple self in Rilke and Pirandello, expressed 
phenomenologically in novels as readers are treated to the conscious operations of the 
character’s minds. Jonsson refers to a conversation between Ulrich and General Stumm 
von Bordwehr, “if you escape from this drab repetitiveness into the darkest recesses of 
your being, where the uncontrolled impulses live, those sticky animal depths that save us 
from evaporating under the glare of reason, what do you find? Stimuli and strings of 
reflexes, entrenched habits and skills, reiteration, fixation, imprints, series, monotony!”24 
Here I must disagree with one element of Jonsson’s analysis. Jonsson blames a 
phenomenologically rooted sense of the ego-I as the ground and sole source of 
meaning.25 Jonsson overlooks the way in which it is really phenomenologically based 
method that underlies the arguments from Hume, even, in a different vein, those of 
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology of Being and Time. Descartes’ method of doubt 
attempts to set up a logical stop-gap that would give reason to question all 
phenomenological considerations, where to question does not mean to investigate the 
phenomenological appearance as such, but rather is intended precisely to throw the very 
                                                
23 Jonsson, “Neither Inside nor Outside,” 46-47. 
24 Musil, The Man Without Qualities, 410. Cited by Jonsson, “Neither Inside nor Outside.” 47. 
25 Most clearly at Jonsson, “Neither Inside nor Outside,” 52-53. 
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veracity of the appearance into doubt, to make us suspicious of the very notion that our 
phenomenological experience could even tell us anything meaningful about the world. 
The Empiricists variously fail to acknowledge this exact maneuver, refuse to grant 
Descartes such logical wrangling, or else actually follow the basic conclusions to their 
logical end, as was the case with Berkeley. Hume’s basic argument could be crudely 
summarized as “Very fine reasoning Descartes, but that’s just not what I experience if I 
reflect on my experience as such.” To the things themselves indeed! And, although Kant 
and Husserl are invested in the logical necessity of the transcendental ego, even their 
description of what experience is like entails serialization, repetition, and the trend in 
phenomenology after Heidegger seems geared toward destabilization and deconstruction 
of the stable subject, with de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty effecting a powerful shift 
toward emphasizing the body. Musil’s critique seems of a family resemblance here, 
offering us alternative models for subjects that accrete, while expressing through these 
new subjects an impersonal phenomenology of repeated and serialized experiences based 
on routine, habituation, and structured by social architectures and power relations. 
 Jonsson is correct to caution against the thought that “social roles develop as 
natural externalizations of desires and talents that are slumbering inside the self and are 
realized under surveillance of a benevolent environment. In this view, the formation of a 
stable identity is the result of a dialectic where interiority and exteriority check, confirm 
and legitimate each other.”26 But he is wrong to place the blame for this predicament on 
phenomenology, especially when we attend to the methodological procedure of 
                                                
26 Jonsson, “Neither Inside nor Outside,” 54. 
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phenomenology in philosophy, and as a technique of the novel to render the character’s 
insights and motivations as part of their emotional and intellectual landscape. But 
Jonsson’s exploration into the anticipation of a new subjectivity, one conditioned by a 
longing for an altogether different life – the different condition [der anderen Zustand] – 
that glimmers with potential in light of the Millennium [Das tausend-jährige Reich], seen 
as a break and sudden departure from past tradition.27 That is, for all the repetition and 
habitual, everything is at once, ecstatically, shot through and through with anticipation of 
a sudden rupture, a rapturous happening that comes “from out of nowhere,” and is at once 
the destruction of what came before and the ground on which the new stands forth. 
Again, the Nietzsche double movement of diagnosis and caution, excess, overcoming, but 
warnings of the danger of too much of one thing – not the excess itself, but an excess of 
the same, ending in nihilism. The complete fixation of Moosbrugger that destroys him, 
the singular drive that puts him against everything, even his own self. 
 Barbara Sattler has recently tried to hash these issues out in terms of necessity and 
contingency, how characters and groups deal with or “handle” contingency, and what this 
means for their efficacy as agents in the novel.28 Sattler’s concerns are prototypically 
metaphysical, rooted deeply and uncritically in the cogito. She worries over Musil’s 
radical treatment of contingency, seeing the danger that if this contingency is not 
mitigated in some way, we are led onto a trident wherein there is either no possibility for 
meaningful action, or is just acting in accord with dominant conventions, or just wholly 
                                                
27 Jonsson, “Neither Inside nor Outside,” 56-57. 
28 Sattler, “Contingency and Necessity: Human Agency in Musil’s The Man Without Qualities.” 
The Monist, 97:1 (January 2014), 86-101. 
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arbitrary actions. The only thing that can mitigate these disasters is a form of necessity 
that would connect individual acts to a basic principle, or finding some necessity in the 
network of actions taken by individuals collectively, or else identity a necessary 
superstructure, even if the individuals that flesh out this overarching form are 
interchangeable.29 Although Sattler captures the tone of crisis and impending disaster, she 
mistrusts the movement of Musil’s text and seeks to ground it again in comfortable 
paradigms. She, like Jonsson, analyses the relationship between Ulrich and Agathe, 
Ulrich’s sister and spiritual twin in the second Volume of the novel, his complimentary, 
quasi-incestuous woman without qualities. Sattler sees in Ulrich and Agathe the kindling 
of necessity, whereas Ulrich’s relationship with women in the first part of the book is 
always contingent, passing, unserious, and flirtatious, Agathe appears to Ulrich as a soul-
mate, and, as his sister, they are somehow connected in a non-arbitrary way.30 However, 
in Jonsson’s reading, we return back to the call of a latent mysticism, the other condition, 
“a liminal condition; the subject embraces a reality by which it is simultaneously 
embraced.”31 
 Like Sattler, Karen-Margrethe Simonsen falls back into old metaphysical 
paradigms when she attempts to read Moosbrugger as either a Dionysian hero or as a 
possibilist, denying the former on the grounds of Moosbrugger’s condemnable offenses, 
while nevertheless holding open the way to a different understanding of truth (another 
beginning) as a homo sacer who is implicated in society only through his exclusion.32 
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30 Sattler, “Contingency and Necessity,” 98. 
31 Jansson, “Neither Inside nor Outside,” 57. 
32 Simonson, “The Subject Before the Law: On Robert Musil’s Broken Fiction and Narrative 
Humanism Within the Law.” Pólemos, 7:1 (2013), 55-56. 
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Although working in very different paradigms, Sattler in the metaphysical paradigm of 
contingency-necessity with Simonsen concerned with literary types of Dionysian hero 
and possibilist, both read Musil solely in the mode of critique, and see him grappling with 
the collapse of an old paradigm – there is nothing of the heroic in Moosbrugger, a 
thoroughly Modern exile who is only rendered whole by his exclusion from the social 
order. Both have a harder time articulating the other side of the line which is crossed by 
Musil’s characters, and to which Jonsson gestures in his analysis. Simonson in particular 
is focused on “broken fiction,” harkening back to our dialogue with Vattimo, Heidegger, 
and Benjamin in Chapter Two. Simonson and Sattler both stop short, arrested by the 
brokenness of the system and casting around in the shattered paradigm for flotsam to 
shore up the fissure. But Musil is already preparing a way beyond the wreckage in the 
breach itself, crossing the rupture of the old system in a movement that brings forth the 
new with the occasional parodic appropriation of the old – though never wholesale 
appropriation, never a borrowing whole-cloth. The parody transforms, in some sense 
destroys, and the repetition of the same is a repetition of difference, the old paradigms no 
longer the proper ones in the new context. The issue is not now contingency/necessity – 
or to be or not to be the hero. Think again to Chapter One and the struggle with heroism 
evinced by Hegel in his confrontation with Goethe’s modernity. As we have seen, the 
inside of thought, of consciousness, has been thrust outside, and in this transversal of the 
line to the outside, the crossing of the threshold into place, is transformed into a being in 
the world, a being already “out there,” whose inside becomes a chambered outside, a 
fold, a bending of the outside to construct the within. 
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 The insight gained from attentiveness to this crossing of the line resonates with 
Deleuze, and his assessment of Foucault precisely where Deleuze claims Foucault has 
outstripped Heidegger. Deleuze writes, “If the inside is constituted by the folding of the 
outside, between them there is a topological relation: the relation to oneself is 
homologous to the relation with the outside and the two are in contact, through the 
intermediary of the strata which are relatively external environments (and therefore 
relatively internal).”33 However, Deleuze and Foucault are both still narrowly focused on 
the local ontic description of the subject, and thus, even within their radically 
transformative visions we are teetering on the precipice of the old metaphysics. From the 
placial ontology we can see the global implications of Deleuze and Foucault, who began 
to uncover the salience of cartography and topology in their explorations of what Calvin 
O. Schrag has called the “self after postmodernity.” There, Schrag picks up on Richard 
Rorty’s criticism that there is no “we” in Foucault, and elaborates that: 
The we-experience and the I-experience are more intricately intertwined 
than has been acknowledged by proponents of either the social doctrine of 
the self or the individualist doctrine. Whereas the social doctrine defines the 
self as simply and ensemble and product of social relations, the individualist 
perspective argues for a self-constituting individuality that proceeds 
independently of relations with other selves. The first doctrine buys into a 
species of collectivism and a semblance of group substantiality, relegating 
the individual qua individual to the status of a societal epiphenomenon. The 
other doctrine makes purchases on an egology, or either an empirical or a 
transcendental sort, and locates the primary datum of selfhood in a sphere 
of ownness that antedates the acknowledgement of other egos. The point is 
that both these doctrines trade on a common mistake of sundering an 
undivided portion of world-experience and then reifying the abstracted 
components.34 
                                                
33 Deleuze, Foucault, 119. 
34 Schrag, The Self After Postmodernity (New Haven: Yale University, 1999), 79-80. 
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It should be clear that the current project rejects the individualist egology identified by 
Schrag, but that does not mean we revert back to the social doctrine where selves are 
“merely” social constructs. I have been chasing out those remnants alongside the New 
Realists with whom I agree on the issue of constructivism in postmodernity, despite our 
other theoretical differences. As I will outline below, I am moving away from Schrag’s 
late-Derridean suggestion that we keep “subjectivity” alive,35 however, the crucial insight 
I am drawing out here is relevant to our appropriation of Deleuzian “folding” à la 
Foucault. For when we begin to reach the ontological power of emplacement in 
oscillation, we see that it is not just people who are folded thusly – the chord of space 
literally strung through us, from mouth to anus, the element of spacetime around which 
our bodies fold – but also that rooms, buildings, and other encultured places are likewise 
folded, and thus have their own “insides,” their own characters and apparatuses of 
subjection. Thus, individuals are “brought into the fold,” and their individuation oscillates 
along this axis as they are “subjected” to the logic of places into which they are 
emplaced. I will explore this subjectivating aspect of places in relation to The Man 
Without Qualities below, but first, I want to think with Schrag just a bit longer. Musil’s 
text has opened this mereological dimension through the repetitious deployment of 
synecdoches which reveal the analogous nature of being emplaced where places recur 
“all the way down,” but still maintain a general structure in the form of the oscillation by 
which each layer is opened. We can see the opening of each local site in oscillation. And 
yet, to understand ontologically is to understand in a comprehensive way. We must 
                                                
35 Schrag, The Self After postmodernity, 13-15. 
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therefore consider individuals, however briefly, as they are individualized among the 
layers of worlds they inhabit. To do this, I turn to Schrag’s ontology of self-with-society, 
as it will help us with the final piece of out ontological puzzle. In the end, we will see the 
axis of individuation along which we each slide in conformity with the projects we 
engage. Schrag’s concept will help orient us, and so I will outline the basics below. 
5.5 Schrag’s Ontology of Self-with-society 
 The ontology of self-with-society presents individuals and the societies in which 
they live as mutually formative entities existing along an axis of degrees of 
individuation.36 For Schrag, ontology constitutes the thematization of pre-philosophical 
and prescientific experience, thereby making everyday life explicit as opposed to 
something taken for granted. As such, ontological analysis of the self-with-society 
maintains roots in concrete experience in order to avoid abstractionism; that is, the 
reduction of experience to abstract theoretical models that break experience into discrete 
and atomistic conceptual units.37 The openness of societies generally is entailed in this 
view – that societies are not closed totalities such that we can ignore phenomena such as 
migrants, immigration, gentrification, and so on. Societies are fluid. 
 Schrag’s anti-abstractionist position emerges from a specific philosophical 
tradition that stems from Husserl and runs through Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty, 
incorporating tenants of radical empiricism from William James. Cartesianism (labeled 
by Schrag as a variety of intellectualism) is a prime example of an abstractionist 
                                                
36 Calvin O. Schrag, “The Concrete Dialectic of Self-with-Society.” Philosophical Papers: 
Betwixt and Between, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 147. 
37 Schrag, “…Self-with-Society,” 142. 
 325 
philosophical position. Descartes treats the self, the cogito, as something fundamentally 
separate from the physical world, and it is the physical world that constitutes the 
structures of society. Therefore, under a Cartesian model, the self can, in theory, be 
abstracted away from all relations to society. The self, as a Cartesian cogito, is considered 
an atomistic entity separate from and independent of any social relationship. Schrag, 
following the phenomenological emphasis on lived experience, rejects the Cartesian 
model as overly intellectualized. Views like Descartes do not take lived experience 
seriously; their foundational philosophical presumptions preclude the basic, concrete 
relations experienced in the course of a person’s everyday life.38 Classical empiricism 
suffers from its own abstractionist problems. While Cartesian theories focus on the 
transcendence of immaterial mind over and above a mechanical physical universe, 
traditional empiricism turns away from the idea of transcendence to focus very narrowly 
on physical processes that can be measured and quantified. Thus, Schrag contends that 
empiricism’s overemphasis on measurement and quantification gives a version of reason 
that is a controlling reason, obsessed with feedback-control procedures and techniques.39 
The self, then, is reduced to quantifiable bundles of physical and mental properties. 
Again, these bundled properties are severed from all intrinsic and meaning-laden 
connections to nature and society. Under the traditional empiricist model, the self is a 
discrete phenomenon, solipsistically dislocated from the world of lived experience within 
which the concrete relations of the self-with-society have no import in the formation of 
identity. 
                                                
38 Schrag, “…Self-with-Society,” 137. 
39 Schrag, “…Self-with-Society,” 138. 
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Against these two versions of abstractionism, Schrag calls for the suspension of 
philosophical commitments to foundationalist principles such as the transcendence of 
immaterial mind, or the quantification of the self into a discrete bundle of properties. The 
suspension of such philosophical commitments is part of the phenomenological method 
influential in Schrag’s work. When Schrag talks about “pre-philosophical” or 
“prescientific” experiences, he means just to attend to experience without assuming some 
foundational philosophical model uncritically, a priori.40 Schrag finds that, when he turns 
to consider experiences without presupposing a philosophic model uncritically, the 
experience of everyday life is always already intertwined with social relations. Instead of 
discrete, atomized subjectivities, Schrag argues that lived experience is intersubjective, 
that intersubjectivity is part and parcel of the social structures basic to experiences of 
everyday life. By intersubjective, we are to understand that subjects are mutually 
formative of one another, collectives of individual subjects come together to form society 
through their various activities and relations, relations that are always concrete and 
immanent – not theoretical, transcendent abstractions, or discrete, atomistic 
quantifications. To make the intersubjective nature of his ontology clear, Schrag focuses 
on language as a principle ontological feature of the world that carries a privileged role in 
the disclosure of “being-with” as a dialectical (that is, as a communicative) experience. 
“Language is both structure and event,” writes Schrag, “an institutionalized system and a 
creative act.”41 The structure and systematic elements of language allow linguistics to 
take language as an object of scientific scrutiny, but the creative aspect of event allows 
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the pre-objective and pre-categorical establishment of meaning to remain transparent; 
thus, neither of these two elements of language can be reduced to the other. Rather than 
being the object of reduction, language serves as a cross-section of the ongoing operation 
of language as performance. 
It is clear that Schrag does not attempt to get rid of, or downplay the role of 
scientific or philosophical theory. He does not proclaim that a full return to the 
prescientific or pre-philosophical mode of thought is entirely possible.42 However, all 
philosophical commitments should be treated critically, and the experiences of everyday 
life should not be taken for granted, ignored, nor treated lightly. The performance of 
language in dialogic communication helps to show that being-with-others is basic to 
everyday experience, to the world as lived experience. In a concrete interchange, 
participants reciprocally appropriate each other’s thoughts and interweave them so that 
individual contributions to the intersubjective exchange are, strictly speaking, 
indistinguishable. It is only after the fact, in a post-reflective stance, that dialogic 
language can be dissected and parsed out in a more systematic understanding. But there is 
something artificial to this postmortem operation, which cannot escape the ambiguity 
inherent in the original intersubjective exchange.43 The original exchange, according to 
Schrag, always already occurs among others; this is the primary role of being-with and a 
result of the suspension of abstractions that would render individuals as discrete, 
unrelated units. Instead of abstraction, Schrag’s ontology of self-with-society places 
                                                
42 Personal conversation with Schrag in Leonard Harris’ Philosophy of the Social Sciences 
Seminar at Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 30 October 2012. 
43 Schrag, “…Self-with-Society,” 144. 
 328 
individuals in an irreducible relationship to one another wherein individuation occurs on 
a scale between individuation and assimilation into society at large. Recall Gadamer and 
the genuine conversation, illustrated by the Quenting-Shreve-Henry-Bon configuration in 
the previous Chapter. Selves within society are more or less individuated, depending 
upon the degree of their participation within the broader social milieu.44 Members of a 
sports team, for instance, may lose a large part of their individuality by assimilating into 
the cultural milieu of their team, wearing uniforms etc. Later, after a game is played, the 
team may disperse and each individual may become increasingly individuated as they 
dissociated from the team and begin interacting in various ways with various different 
cultural milieus. Language comes to the fore because language mediates these 
relationships and presents an indicator of the various levels of individuation on display. 
The teammates articulate their relationship in a highly uniform language that revolves 
around the goals and rules of the game that binds them as a team. As those relationships 
become less uniform, language may reveal a wide variety of differences that mark 
individuation: from a taste for different foods, to divergent political opinions. Under 
Schrag’s ontology, we must always return to the concrete relations of lived experiences to 
observe the performative aspect of language, and then afterwards, in a reflective position, 
it becomes possible to dissect the language performance into theoretical constructions of 
concepts, theories, facts, and the like. 
A few things in the current context. I do not fall under the problem of assuming 
“foundationalist principles” in my arguments for oscillation as the basic movement of 
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emplacement. In fact, part of the argument has been exactly to account for the things that 
appear as they appear and give a philosophical ground for why they might be this way. 
This is, to be sure, the laying of some foundation. But the foundation is not an exhaustive 
or complete and total foundation, because we might always discover more. Further, 
oscillation is just one approach to laying this foundation. As I have said before, 
oscillation might go by other names, and at other times I myself might talk about other 
movements and other openings into place that go by other names. But these names name 
an attempt to think being as the being of beings. They are efforts, arguments put forth 
tentatively because humility demands it, and because it is not possible to exhaustively 
pronounce the one system of ontology. This is the limit Heidegger runs up against again 
and again. This is why scholars continually frustrate themselves on the language of 
ontology, throw up their hands at the “mystification” of being, and are unable, repeatedly, 
to put forth the one comprehensive system of reality. That is not my project. This is a 
project of beginnings, not endings. This is a place to begin again, not to finish. The 
foundation is always being laid, and revisited, and the structures built will not last into 
eternity. 
However, Schrag still suffers from the ghost of subjectivity, which cannot be 
entirely salvaged for the current project. Even this intersubjectivity, which is seen as the 
saving grace in his notion of self-with-society, puts up two insides with the outside 
between, two insides that trade between them, that share their contents as two vessels 
pour water back and forth. That scheme will not do for our placial ontology. So I want to 
amend this portion of Schrag’s thinking, while moving forward with the remainder of his 
astute insights. I must, in this case, fully endorse the Heideggerian position that there is 
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no innersphere, an inside of the subject from which we travel out into the world to return 
again with the knowledge of things like so much treasure won from our expedition.45 
That old model has fallen under the preceding critiques of representationalism, and now 
shows no signs of being salvaged in the weakening of the subject to the point of 
dissolution. But there is something there, if not a subject. Something emerges, there is no 
better word, from the confluence of these worlds in play with one another, some being 
who knows itself in its being and is doubled back on itself in the currents of the places it 
occupies, which wash over it and shape it even as it shapes the tides themselves. The 
accretion that leads to this emergence occurs as a play in the thrall of oscillation. This 
movement is basic emplacement, and here we find what makes Schrag’s self-with-society 
analysis so compelling in the context of a placial ontology. It highlights the fact that 
individuals are intensified by their exertion of conscious force, but diminished too by 
their subjugation to the forces at play in the places they inhabit. Thus, the axis of 
individuation becomes a useful conceptual tool. 
5.6 The Axis of Individuation 
 Think again of the team, perhaps a baseball team, from the example above. Or 
think of the many instances in The Man Without Qualities in which a character gets 
“brought in” to an organizational context and take up a role within that context that 
operates along certain social and legislative axioms geared toward a “greater purpose” 
than individual ends. Even the instance of Ulrich’s arrest with the working-man, or 
Moosbrugger’s eventual arrest and the way police lingo “brings them in.” Bring ‘em in, 
                                                
45 To echo Heidegger’s arguments in Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper Collins, 1962), 86-90. 
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brought in for questioning. Appearing in the docket, the interrogation room, the waiting 
room, all ways of being brought into the fold of social context, a field of sense, the world. 
Ulrich has the sense of being taken apart and reconstructed under a new rubric, in a new 
paradigm, reoriented in a new world, by new basic concepts, disoriented in oscillation, its 
play freeing new things to you, different, shaded in a new valence, in the new sphere. 
Thus the individual is thereby reduced to a kind of role; the police, the perpetrator, the 
secretary, detective, bailiff, juror, judge, guilty, innocent, beyond a reasonable doubt. But, 
at the same time, the individual brings along a particular history, but more, particular 
entanglements with other worlds, in other contexts, with other people. In the wake of 
their passing, a person carries with them the consequences of the myriad collision of 
worlds oscillating in the places thrown open before them. These entanglements weigh on 
the individual in their individuation. That is, being an individual, to a greater or lesser 
extent, but always, depends on their differentiation in places onto which the world can 
open from their particular historical direction. Such an historical vector, opened by the 
passing of the human being, opens as a passing cloud that becomes dense and dissipates 
over time, in an irregular oscillation, sometimes close to itself, condensate among the 
folds, atomic, but at other times it is thin, widely dispersed, shot through with the other 
passing vectors, lifted apart by the intensity of the forces thriving in certain contexts, that 
prefigure the individual and make demands upon it that are guided by the direction and 
ends of the social order itself, context for context, layer by layer, one being the 
individual, family, village, town, city, nation, state. As oscillation the pattern of 
emplacement repeats all the way down. The basic movement ripples through the folds in 
the hermeneutical layers by which world manifests with the significance it has to and for 
 332 
whatever inhabitant are open to sense. Ontologically, they are not of a fundamentally 
different kind. 
 Indeed, Austin Harrington has made the observation that Musil’s novel argues 
that “the subject of modernity is not at home in the world: that the subject of modernity 
has neither a fixed core of inner goals of life, nor a stable social world in which 
outwardly to express those goals…he opens these ideals to a kind of critical 
questioning…unique to the peculiarly aesthetic reflections that literary discourse can 
communicate.”46 What I have been arguing for, really, in each of the works of 
Modernism I have approached as ontological, is a vision that escapes the trajectory of the 
history of metaphysics as outlined in the ontotheological critiques of Heidegger and 
Gabriel – in the inversion of Descartes’ mirror in Rilke, Pirandello, and Faulkner. 
Harrington too, sees this inversion at work in Musil, wherein “the merely apparent, 
transitory and local can at the same time encapsulate the collective and universal: a kind 
of inverted Platonism that puts appearance and difference back into the heart of essence 
and identity.”47 However, as I have repeatedly alluded, such an inversion comes at a 
price. We see this inversion as far back as Nietzsche, who seeks to instill immanence 
with a metaphysical power and priority that usurps the old transcendence toward some 
transcendent Being. But Heidegger shows that such can inversion is not merely a reversal 
of roles, but comes at the cost of a systemic transformation in which the old world “up 
(out) there” in transcendence is destroyed. As Heidegger explains, “The new hierarchy 
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47 Harrington, “Knowing the Social World,” 58. 
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does not simply wish to reverse matters within the old structural order, now reverencing 
the sensuous and scorning the nonsensuous. It does not wish to put what was at the very 
bottom on the very top. A new hierarchy and new valuation mean that the ordering 
structure must be changed. To that extent overturning Platonism [or Cartesianism] must 
become a twisting free of it.”48 Certainly, the new structural order I am proposing here, 
alongside Deleuze and Foucault, is not even a hierarchical one, as I have shown, for 
instance, in the discussion of supervenience in Chapter Three. In individuation, we are 
not moving vertically amongst hierarchically ordered layers, but horizontally in every 
direction across the matrix of worlds (hermeneutic layers) into which we are initiated and 
engage ourselves with activities in which we take on differentiated roles and supplement 
or suppress our individuation through submission to and subjection by the logic of those 
places. We are more or less ourselves, oneself as another, to borrow a line from 
Ricoeur.49 Oscillation spreads in every direction, in every dimension, its movement the 
opening of directionality and dimensionality as such, unfolding everywhere, at every-
time, to and for everyone. And so the axis of individuation appears here as a sort of gauge 
by which this “more or less” is measured, to the extent that it can be measured. “I was not 
myself last night,” “I’ve never felt more myself,” my oscillation between the not at home 
feeling so regularly identified with Modernism and the feeling that I might, at any 
moment, slip into home, that this is where I belong, at least now and for a time. So, we 
see Moosbrugger qua Mossbrugger, and his slippage into Moosbrugger the misogynist, 
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the criminal, the vagabond, the carpenter; Ulrich, the man without qualities, 
mathematician, politician, bourgeoisie, friend, lover, son, member of the Planning 
Committee. The Henrys, Quentins, and Bons, of the world – oscillating between race, 
incest, miscegenation, homosocial-sexual, becoming together and between worlds. 
 But note that individuation is not just a human affair, and that all things come to 
be differentiated in their historic interplay. Even replicated things are stamped by their 
ecstatic differentiation – by the event in which they were stamped out, assembled, one in 
the order of numbering after the previous, a repetition of a difference that will make its 
own way into the hands of someone other than who will receive the next one down the 
line. Remember we are sorts of things, autopoietic things, and the prejudice against things 
come from the mistaken assumption of their absolute disposability. That “things” are 
disposable is true only in a context, and then only certain things. Some things are 
indispensable, and not only to a task, but to life and beyond. The other is indispensable, 
singular, even in its appearance to me in its thingliness, as a body, among other things, 
sometimes even using this to blend into the background as it were, a face in the crowd. 
The axis of individuation is one that describes how sharply that face stands out from the 
crowd, how richly delineated one thing is from the next. It is a kind of measure of the 
density of a things, how compact it is relative to the other things against which it is 
differentiated and particularized, as the members of a baseball team all appear relatively 
similar on the field, or the members of a choir blend together in their ensemble. The self 
is a shade, a shading, condensate, a passing cloud becoming dense or sparse in relation to 
the forces in oscillation around it, in place, as it traverses from place to place. 
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 The Man Without Qualities has lent itself to our study exactly because of the way 
Musil himself traverses these many layers in his essayistic technique. I have tried to show 
this traversing across a few examples from the text, as well as in my own traversing of 
domains that bear the formal marks of similar structuring. Place provides a kind of arche, 
a new formalism in which we can speak to an ontological ground, even one shifting 
beneath our feet, even now, in the grips of ever deepening crises that threaten the 
sensibilities of the old orders. I have come to this novel in the end because of this 
structure, because the structure of the current study is to be found there, because the 
structure of being is found there in place, in the places we’ve been and to which we are 
going. This last leg of our journey has given an account of how things, once they can 
appear, are given to individuation and particularization. I have wended my way through 
to this axis by a particular kind of being, the kind of being I am, but by being in place, by 
beginning from there, I arrive in place to the being of beings, the ontological dimension, 
opened by Modernist fiction. Modernism, in particular the novel, has become the scene of 
ontology. 
 Is this the place at the end of the mind? Have we heard the foreign song? I want to 
go back, in closing, to the beginning, to the other beginning. In the the opening lines of 
The Ontological I, readers were asked to imagine stepping up to a precipice – as if on the 
top of a mountain or the edge of a cliff.50 In staging the opening of my explorations in 
this way, I already conceived of the person contained in their environment, over and 
against it, confronting from within and the world without. I had already begun from the 
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subject/object divide, unwittingly perhaps, but within the old metaphysics nonetheless. 
How easily these structures insinuate themselves to us, even when we seek to escape 
them, seeking lines of flight away from the old order, as it were. If my last work has 
walked us up to a threshold, then the current one has, at the very least, encouraged us to 
take the leap – if indeed we have not yet taken flight. I want now, at last and in the end, to 
return there, where it all began, on the mountainside, and think through the places we’ve 
been to get to where we are here. We have reached a threshold, the last one for now, and 
I want to linger here just a moment longer, and await that sudden rupture wherein we 
might discover something new. This will be the last place, the place to herald the other 
beginning from the end of the mind. 
5.7 The Place at the End of the Mind 
 The tree had stood on the edge of space until at last it fell. The sun dried its bark 
and bleached its hull until its skin dropped flaking to the ground, into a soft, ruddy bed 
beneath its whitish surface; a great yellowing bone jutting from the mountainside. The 
tree lay perpendicular to the mountain face, pointing north. A creek ran east to west at the 
base of the mountain, out of the deep cleft called the Narrows through which runs the 
first national road, now Route 40, with either side festooned with steel ribboned railroad 
tracks and the clatter of the cars in the soot-strewn echoes of the valley. The place where 
the tree had fallen; the not insubstantial birch had grown for years beside an abandoned 
rail-line running west along the mountainside parallel to the national road. The iron rails 
are gone but the crossties remain in dirt and mud and moss; lichen covered, sticking out 
of the leveled shelf that drops abruptly away to the creek running at the base of the 
mountain where the valley levels off and spreads out into the suburbs. The tree had fallen 
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and conditions had stripped the bark and left a wide and whitened bench on a diagonal 
across the path. Another tree, oak, lay beside it on the ground in advanced stages of 
decomposition, shelf mushrooms blooming in a ridge along the side, dense green growth 
softening the top, moist chipped wood spilling out of the end in the path, its 
circumference buckling under weight. From my mother’s front porch, you can see the 
faint trace of this path along the side of the mountain, and in the right light, you can just 
make out a little gap in the trees where this fallen one made a clearing. This line, this 
trace along the mountain, extends from the fate of a nation, which just a mile east, had 
found a gap to the frontier, the way from the tidewater of the coast through the 
Appalachians and into the Ohio Valley where the great unclaimed future lay. Between 
east and west, civilization and wilderness, between the Old World and the New. 
Everything became conditioned by those railways, themselves conditioned by the 
mountains and the valleys beyond. Even time was bent to their measure in the setting of 
the clocks. Nobody living there in city or valley was untouched by those tracks. In my 
case it was two great-grandfathers, two grandfathers, a great uncle and great aunt who all 
toiled on the railroad, my mother’s father a true to life boilermaker whose color blindness 
kept him in the yard but whose skillful welding made him indispensable. His father had 
escaped the factory to work on the railroad, escaped the same factory in which his own 
father, my great-great-grandfather had lost both arms and died in an industrial accident 
for which no one was faulted. It was along the trace left from this old way of life that the 
tree had fallen where the tracks used to run, where no freight would run again. It was a 
place for me, the eventual ironic Boilermaker pounding keys like rivets into the edifice of 
my own design.  I would walk along this path, to this fallen tree, and think in solitude to 
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be most myself. Sometimes, my friends would walk and there, away from parents’ 
watchful eyes, would be most ourselves together, between us. This is a place in-between: 
between the height of the mountain and the depth of the valley, between the city and 
suburbs, between the technical and the natural, between solicitude and solitude, between 
myself and the world. It was a place for thinking – a place to be. 
 When I returned to the spot many years later, the tree was gone. It had been cut 
clear of the path, its guts gathered in mounds of sawdust atop the anthracite spackled 
banks of the sunken abandoned line. New neighbors used the path to ride their four-
wheelers. What had been for me a bench for so long was, for them, a recalcitrant danger, 
that spot transformed from one to be in one’s head to a place where one might lose their 
head, and so the obstacle had been dispatched. I will never forgive these neighbors, who I 
do not know, who I will probably never know, and who themselves will never know what 
they destroyed, just some fallen tree but for another, the world. The path from there to 
here is so clear once sitting mole-skin I sketched the words “Ginny’s Diner…” after a 
faux-steel box car pretending to another century down the street that become a place and 
anchor in the text and pages written and rewritten again; going over that place and back 
to that place and peopling it with friends and lovers and queers who never felt like they 
had a place here except where once was rotted next to the fallen bones of an unknown 
and unknowing sister whose great bleached thigh still supported a boy and his notebook 
that themselves emerged from this place just as they once sank into it again standing on 
that rotted and rotting oak; fungus lichen moss decomposing the once-living flesh too 
timorous and trembling to hold the weight of living and at the threshold gave way to the 
sensation of sinking, of being swallowed whole, of crumbling and sliding so graciously 
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into the disintegrating arms of rainsoaked wood chips that sitting on the ground in them 
after all that could be done was laugh and laugh and laugh and think I am, here I am, I, 
here between bank, ravine, and shadow of the old private citadel that lay crumbled at my 
feet and now in that sudden rupture cries Here I Am, Yes, Here 
 To be is to be in place. To be a self requires a place in which to be oneself. At the 
end of the mind, a gold-feathered bird sings the unhuman song, but it is a song that calls 
us to ourselves, to the places in which we can be, in which being is. I had heard so many 
birds in that clearing, singing so many songs, and each took off on their own flight in 
time. The bird in Stevens’ poem here signals our escape, or at least the attempted 
jailbreak from the old Platonic Cave of the I-Am’s private cloister. That the palm stands 
on the edge of space hints at the last dissolution of space-for-itself and time-for-itself, 
their ecstatic unity in places; always particular, always moving. The movement of being 
is oscillation. This movement, a movement between that opens place, that constitutes a 
place to be. In places, things can be and stand forth, always to and for something that has 
sense, that can sense. My feeling hand and seeing eyes, the spider with its leg on the 
trigger, the amoeba’s ancient pseudopodia. Out of this placial movement, freed in 
oscillation, things accrete and disintegrate, things natural and technical, the technical at 
the service of the natural’s having to be and being in such a way that its being becomes 
an issue for it – how to live? 
 At the end of the mind, reached as a limit of the old metaphysics and the threshold 
to another beginning, where we can think the old thinkers anew, and think again with 
them in wonder, there are so many questions. As a beginning, the whole of philosophy 
opens. This placial orientation illumines the perennial questions in a different light, 
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evokes a different tune from them – one addressed to the not merely human, but one that 
hears the human as well. The view from this terminus is expansive, comprehensive, but 
not in the sense that everything is captured and brought under a category called 
“oscillation.” It is comprehensive in the analogous sense that takes in the seeing and the 
seen, the feeling and the felt, the living and the lived. This is a foreign song. We have 
ventured beyond the last thought, the last representation of a place built up on the edge of 
the mountain; clinging there as the vestiges of the technical rails sink again into the earth, 
their path blackened by the passing of a thousand steam engines in the years before their 
decommission. But we have all seen these trees, these crossties, these clearings of light if 
not forested then between buildings who still encircle a dome of the sky. Synecdoche, the 
structure of being, all the way down into place. In this bronze décor, we might hear a 
song that is without human meaning, but so long as we are there to hear, we hear and ask 
“what’s that? What is there?” That is where this writing has tried to take us – there, to be, 
that has been the question, one of mere being. 
— 
One last attempt. One final pass, a coda. Robert Musil writes that thinking: 
...comes about not very differently from a dog with a stick in its mouth 
trying to get through a narrow door; he will turn his head left and right until 
the stick slips through. We do much the same thing, but with the difference 
that we don't make indiscriminate attempts but already know from 
experience approximately how it's done...the slipping through takes the 
clever fellow just as much by surprise [as it does a dim fellow]; it is 
suddenly there, and one perceptibly feels slightly disconcerted because 
one's ideas seem to have come of their own accord instead of waiting for 
their creator. This disconcerting feeling is nowadays called intuition by 
many people who would formerly...have called it inspiration; but it is only 
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something impersonal, namely, the affinity and coherence of the things 
themselves, meeting inside a head.51 
 
This “something impersonal” is the event of thought. It has the structure of the weather, a 
traffic jam, a grand jubilee. It is the dynamical confluence and mutual dependence of very 
many heretofore unforeseen variables coming together in the human being who has 
prepared a place for thought. There, in being human, is the place for the occurrence of 
thought. But it is not the human who thinks, rather, it would almost be better to say that it 
is the human being who is thought. We are the occasion of the thinking of thought – but 
only for a time, in-between states A and B, and then it is gone again. To think is to dwell 
in this in-between, to be in transit, to move, to come to be and then pass away, each 
thinking a bringing into being what is thought before it sinks again into non-being or is 
made concrete in deed. When we heed Aristotle's advice and we have trained ourselves to 
hear the truth appropriate to each way of approaching being, then our presence in this 
process of thinking becomes less and less evident. As Musil puts it: 
As long as the process of thinking is in motion it is a quite wretched state, 
as if all the brain's convolutions were suffering from colic; and when it is 
finished it not longer has the form of the thinking process as one experiences 
it but already that of what has been thought, which is regrettably impersonal, 
for the thought then faces outward and is dressed for communication to the 
world. When a man is in the process of thinking, there is no way to catch 
the moment between the personal and the impersonal, and this is manifestly 
why thinking is such an embarrassment for writers that they gladly avoid 
it.52 
 
I must confess I avoided talking about thinking for so long exactly to circumvent this 
embarrassment. Mereology, dynamical systems, the weather, traffic, a jubilee: these are 
                                                
51 Musil, Man Without Qualities, 115-16. 
52 Musil, Man Without Qualities, 116. 
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but the turning of the stick as we try to pass through the door of thought. And, although 
we may pass the threshold alone, we are led to the door by the others with whom we 
commune and are met again by them on the other side of thought – after all, Musil has it 
that at the end of the process of thinking we arrive at a thought facing outward, “dressed 
for communication to the world.” Thus, the solitude of thought rests upon the solidarity 
of meaning in a language that is shared. What we learn from our exposure to being in this 
way is the instability of ourselves in the act of thought, which is to say: the fundamental 
instability of our being as we oscillate between ourselves and the world, between 
ourselves and the others with whom we share the world, and with the other who is ourself 
on either side of thinking. To expose ourselves to the thinking of being is to expose 
ourselves to the possibility of an ethical relation – not only to other people, but also to the 
world, and, as Ricoeur has said, to oneself as another. 
Musil himself sees this oscillation, putting it simply and elegantly that if thinking 
is not a personal affair, then it is “World in, and world out; aspects of world falling into 
place inside a head.”53 This oscillation occasionally has the appearance of conflict or 
contradiction. Musil goes on to observe, “The well-known ability of thought...to dissolve 
and dispel those deep-raging, morbidly tangled and matted conflicts generated in the 
dank regions of the self apparently rests on nothing other than its social and worldly 
nature, which links the individual creature to other people and objects. Unfortunately, this 
healing power of thought seems to be the same faculty that diminishes the personal sense 
of experience.”54 However, this relation is only “unfortunate” for egoists and 
                                                
53 Musil, Man Without Qualities, 116. 
54 Musil, Man Without Qualities, 117. 
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opportunists, and is completely unknown to the Narcissist. In reality, this relation is all of 
life and the very basis of it. It brings us back again to our home and ourselves, where we 
might be able to hear at last and listen to the old Nguni Bantu proverb “I am because we 
are,” which was expressed by the philosopher Albert Camus when he wrote, “At this 
limit the ‘we are’ [le nous somme] paradoxically defines a new form of individualism.”55 
As the African thinker and scholar Michael Onyebuchi Seze has written, “Humanity is a 
quality we owe to each other. We create each other and need to sustain this otherness 
creation. And if we belong to each other, we participate in our creations: we are because 
you are, and since you are, definitely I am. The ‘I am’ is not a rigid subject, but a 
dynamic self-constitution dependent on this otherness creation of relation and distance.”56 
This is the ontological insight to which Musil's text has cleared the way: the deep and 
ineluctable interconnectivity between that threefold chord: places, ourselves, and the 
other. We must weather this thinking of being, let it wash over us and be carried away by 
it. 
                                                
55 Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage International, 1991), 297. 
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